
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ISSN 0376 - 415 X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

OL., XXIX NO. 1

JANUARY 2002

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Vol. 29

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF POONA

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

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HABERMAS ON PRESUPPOSITIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY

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S. PANNEERSELVAM

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In the post-metaphysical thinking the role of reason is unique. Some like Rorty consider it as a social phenomenon. "We have to resist the urge to see social practices of justification as more than just such practices"1 but explain "rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us to say", 2 argues Rorty. Foucault attempts to disempower the ideas of reason by totally objectivating them. "What is this reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers?"3, asks Foucault. Derrida attempts for a totalized critique of reason. He believes that the ideas of reason are built into thought, and give rise to illusions and therefore he wants to renounce the ideas of reason by interrogating, disrupting and displacing them. Similarly, Habermas reconstructs the Kantian notion of reason so as to explain the importance of comprehensive reason. This comprehensive reason, otherwise known as the "communicative rationality" is one of the important contributions of Habermas. The rationality, which he speaks of, is different from that of the other thinkers and hence it attracts the attention of scholars. This paper is an attempt to explain the importance of communicative rationality by showing some of the salient aspects of it in the background of communicative understanding. Also the paper evaluates some of the criticisms leveled against Habermas' theory of communicative rationality.

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Communicative understanding is important for Habermas in the context of critical theory. But to explain the importance of it, he talks about

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the presuppositions of communication. These presuppositions reveal a rational dimension within the conversation, otherwise known as "communicative rationality" which is achieved through rational consensus. What constitutes this rational consensus? For Habermas, it is one that is arrived in free and equal discussion within the framework of the "ideal speech situation". Since only a rational consensus can ultimately serve as the ground for truth-claims, Habermas wants to develop a concept of rationality sufficiently comprehensive to cover not only cognitive but also communicative processes and their embodiment in social interactions. He is keen on developing a comprehensive theory of rationality, which is essential for any communicative understanding.

Habermas is a critic of scientific-technological rationality. His concept of rationality is something different from that of the general notion of rationality. He is interested in constructing social rationality. He, for example, has rejected both Adorno and Horkheimer who considered that the development of western rationality as the totalisation of reification, domination and repression. Against this background, Habermas defended the positive aspects of enlightenment and also of modernity and western rationality. He wanted to emphasize the role of rationality in the economy, culture and morality. This means that for him social rationality has implications in social life, which cannot be neglected. In his comprehensive concept of rationality, different dimensions of social life, *i.e.* values, norms, interests, are studied and preserved.

Marcuse defines reason as "the fundamental concept of philosophical thought, the only one by means of which it has bound itself to human destiny... it is not only a category of bourgeois philosophy, but a concern of mankind". Hirkheimer and Adorno in thier Dialectic of Enlightenment attempted a critique of instrumental reason. Instrumental reason is now not identified with a particular period of history, society or class. Rationalization has thus moved from a historically specific to global context, thus expanded its scope to the whole of human society. Both Horkheimer and Adorno argue that unfortunately, the Enlightenment project, which had the agenda of liberating humanity, has turned into a new and powerful force of domination. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, both Horkheimer and Adorno explain how reason turned into its opposite and resulted in

new rationalized forms of social domination. Social rationality turned into irrationality and enlightenment into deception. Not only this, Enlightenment reason has resulted in domination and regression. Thus for them, instrumental reason and science have become myths which resulted in worship and praise for superior power and social domination. Habermas wanted to revise the project of Enlightenment rationality. His idea was to offer an alternate to the subject-centered tradition of rationalism. Along with Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse also criticized the scientifictechnological rationality and instrumental reason. He argued that the very form of technical reason is ideological and believed that not only the application of technology, but technology itself is domination. He says:

Specific purposes and interests of domination.... enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social project, in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a purpose of domination ...belongs to the very structure of technical reason.⁵

What is the problem with the subject-centered reason? Habermas answers: "Subject-centered reason is the product of division and usurpation, indeed of a social process in the course of which a subordinated moment assumes the place of the whole, without having the power to assimilate the structure of the whole"6. Habermas' concept of communicative reason is an attempt to show that the possibility of the social is opened by the basic categories of language. The Universal pragmatics is inscribed in the structures of the lifeworld and hence the presuppositions concerning the moral, instrumental, strategic activity are the transcendental forms through which communication is operated. Kant in his article, "What is enlightenment?" argued that by thinking rationally, individual subjects sustain a critical relation to the ethical and political forms, which govern them. Habermas criticizes the subject centeredness of Kant's idea of rational agency. Habermas' communicative reason attempts to show the dominance of instrumental reason. The pragmatic universals which are linguistically competent individuals must be able to form the basis of an ideal of communicative transparency that is implicit in every form of social action. This means that individuals within the lifeworld are always potentially able to reconstruct the rational communicative power of ordinary language.

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Commenting on this, Habermas says:

A peculiarity exhibited by these pragmatic presuppositions of consensus formation is that they contain certain strong idealizations. For example, the supposition that all praticipants in dialogue use the same linguistic expressions with identical meanings is unaviodable but often counterfactual. The validity claims that a speaker raises for the content of his assertoric, normative or expressive sentences are also found to be similar idealizations: what the speaker, here and now in a given context, asserts as valid transcends, according to the sense of his claim, all context dependent, merely local standards of validity.⁷

Habermas' interest in communicative reason is seen in the thorough study of the concept of reason and the rationalization of society dealing with the problem of rationality. For example, he analyses Weberian theory of rationalization and the critique of instrumental reason. Such an extensive study of reason is undertaken by him because reason can be defended only by way of critique of reason. One of the major concerns of Communicative action, he says, is to develop a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to and limited by the subjectivisitic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory.

Habermas firmly believes that his concept of reaching an understanding is the possibility of using reasons or grounds to atain intersubjective recognition for criticizable validity claims. He puts it in the following words:

The rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreement can no longer be headed off by everyday routins and yet is not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force.⁸

Habermas wanted to support a comprehensive concept of rationality, which does not exclude practical questions of values, norms, interests and commitments. For Marx, rationality must be located as socially and historically embodied reason. The distinction between Marx and Habermas is that whereas Marx developed a social rationality, Habermas developed

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a communicative rationality. Kant was attempting to defend reason in his own way against Hume, which included the idea of freedom in reason. Independence from authority and tradition was the crux of Kantian notion of reason, which was further, developed by Hegel. In the writings of Hegel one can see that his concept of rationality included the principle of autonomous rationality, subjectivity and substantive freedom.

Rationality, according to Habermas, is a specific form of unacknowledged domination. Reason has lost its functions as critical standard and hence Habermas wanted to develop a positive and a comprehensive account of reason. The role of impurity of reason has done a lot of damage and hence must be replaced. Commenting on this, McCarthy says: "The overwhelming 'impurity' of reason, its unavoidable entanglement in history and tradition, society and power, practice and interest, body and desire, has prompted, among others, Nietzsche's heroic proclamation of the end of philosophy, Wittgenstein's therapeutic farewell, and Heidegger's dramatic overcoming".9 Habermas was keen on negating the subjectcentered reason and replacing it by reason understood as communicatiove action. In communicative action, the subject is a participant. Thus it is a radical critique of reason. Habermas's concern for social rationality could be achieved through what is known as the "undistorted communication" where there will be rational discourse in which there is equal participation and rational consensus. His objective was to reconstruct reason and not to reject it. This can be seen in the two volumes of Theory of Communicative Action, (referred to hereafter as TCA) where he attempts to reconstruct rationalism through communicative action. Here he makes a distinction between instrumental and communicative action. The basic problem with the instrumental action is that it is subjectivist by nature and also lacks reflection. By nature it is domination and does not have any intersubjectivistic approach. On the other hand, communicative action is intersubjective communication and based on social solidarity. Consensus and participation are its concern. Instrumental action is all the time concerned with the preservation of the self whereas in communicative action, it is lost or is taken care of by social solidarity. Mutual understanding and consensus are important in communicative action. The theroy of communicative action converts rationality into communicative rationality.

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Only in such rationality, undistorted communication is possible. Habermas attacks the instrumental reason or positive reason to reconstruct reason and thus his attempt is not destructive. Habermas' theory of communication provides a conceptual scheme by which one can see and understand the pathologies of the lifeworld, like the colonization by the system of money and power and social participation etc. Habermas is critical of the negative aspects of Enlightenment rationality for the main reason that it is an instrument of domination and hierarchy. Democratic participation and consensus are the two important aspects of his communicative rationality. One salient aspect of this theory is that communicative rationality is grounded in language.

Habermas distinguishes different types of reason: instrumental, strategic and communicative reason. This, of course, is not new because Horkheimer also makes a distinction between instrumental of subjective reason and critical reason. Marcuse also develops what is known as "libidinal rationality" or emancipatory reason against the repressive reason or subjectivist reason. But what is important in Habermas' theory of communicative reason is that he makes communicative reason, a more socially oriented one at the same time pointing out the limitations of the instrumental and the strategic reasons. The importance of communicative rationality is explained by him as follows:

That communicative rationality, precisely as suppressed, is already embodied in the existing forms of interaction and does not first have to be prostued as something that ought to be is showed by the causality of the fate which Hegel and Marx... Communicative reason operates in history as an avenging force.¹⁰

In the TCA, vol. I, Habermas deals with four important themes, namely, (i) the theory of rationality, (ii) the theory of communicative action, (iii) the dialectic of social rationalization, and (iv) the critique of functional reason. He explains the importance of reason and how it played a major role in different philosophical thinking. According to him, philosophy is a theory of rationality The significant aspect of TCA is that here Habermas relates rationality to social theory through communication. A communicative action rests on rationally motivated agreement based reasons and grounds, rather than on coercion and force. The social actors, as members of

communicative community have the competence to distinguish between external nature, society and internal nature. He says: "Communication is social interactions. It is the application of social use of language, which will result in understanding, which further focuses on the action co-ordinating effects of the validity claims offered in the speech-acts." This means that participants by offering validity claims establish intersubjective relations. This is based on rational motivation which accepts the validity claims. It implies that communicative action is basically connected to communicative rationality.

Communicative rationality is the central theme in Habermas' social theory. Communicative rationality attempts to characterize universal features of communication in their structure and development which remains open to empirical-reconstructive test and refutation. It is empirical, theoretical and critical. The cognitive-instrumental rationality, *i.e.* the reason involved in speech and action is incomplete and one sided. According to Habermas, the concept of communicative rationality has three dimensions.

...first, the relation of the knowing subject to a world of events or facts; second, the relation to a social world of acting, practical subject entwined in interaction with others, and finally, the relation of a suffering and passionate subject to its own internal nature, to its own subjectivity and the subjectivity of others.¹²

These dimensions may by defined as external nature, society and internal nature. In the communicative action where the external nature is taken, rationality consists in expressing views and acting effectively. Here the speaker is ready to learn from the external world effectively. In other words, the speaker is ready to learn from the mistakes. This is known as "theoretical discourse". Society is considered as important in communication, and rationality consists in doing actions on the basis of established norms of the society. This is known as "practical discourse". In internal nature, *i.e.*, connected to communication, rationality consists in interpreting the nature of individual. This Habermas calls, "explicative discourse". The concept of rationality includes all the dimensions and none can be ignored. All the three dimensions are important in communicative understanding.

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According to McCarthy, reason can be defended only as critique of reason. The western rationalism has run into difficulties and hence reason has to be studied as a critique of reason. Further he says that Habermas is the last great rationalist and he is a rationalist with a difference. In the first volume of *TCA*, Habermas wants to develop a concept of rationality that is no longer tied to, and limited by the subjectivistic and individualistic presuppositions of modern philosophy and social theory. Habermas says:

If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication-and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the species *also* requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality inherent in communicative action.¹³

The subject who stands over against a world of objects has two basic relations: representation and action. This means the type of rationality associated with it is the "cognitive-instrumental" rationality of a subject. Mutual understanding in communication, which is free from coercion, is that what Habermas looks for in developing his idea of rationality. He says that the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreement can no longer be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force.14 Habermas tries to prove that the concept of communicative rationality has a universal significance and can be decided only by the empirical-theoretical fruitfulness of the research programme based on it. The guiding principle in Habermas's theory of communicative rationality is "the linguistification of the sacred", according to McCarthy. 15 It means a rationalization of the lifeworld. In order to understand the communicative action, Habermas introduces the ideal of the lifeworld. It links the concept firmly to the concept of society. To the different structural components of the lifeworld, namely culture, society, and personality, there correspond reproduction processes, namely cultural reproduction, social integration, socialisation based on the different aspects of communicative action i.e., understanding, coordination and socialisation, which in turn makes communicative action possible. When it

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is disturbed, it will lead to loss of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, alienation, breakdown in tradition etc. Thus for him, both the concept of communicative action and the lifeworld can serve as basic categories of social theory.

In this context, Habermas talks about the differentiation between the lifeworld and system aspects of society, i.e., a "decoupling of system and lifeworld". The rationalized lifeworld makes it possible the rise and growth of subsystems whose independent imperatives strike back at it in a destructive fashion."16 The "mediatization of the lifeworld" turns into a "colonization of the lifeworld". Different aspects of reason demand a decolonization of the lifeworld not in the sense of insulating it "altogether from processes of modernization", says McCarthy. There is a type of rationalization proper to the lifeworld. A communicatively rationalized lifeworld would have to develop institutions out of itself through which to set limits to the inner dynamic of media-streed subsystems and to subordinate them to decisions arrived at in unconstrained communication."17 In the first volume of TCA, Habermas talks about the different approaches to the problem of rationality and analyses the nature of communicative rationality. He is concerned with the relation between rationality and knowledge. This relation suggests that the rationality of an expression depends on the reliability of the knowledge embodied in it.

The concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of thier lifeworld.¹⁸

According the Habermas, an assertion can be called rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication. Further he argues to show that a goal-directed action can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the world. Habermas exhibits how in the analysis of rationality one can see two positions: the realistic and phenomenological. The realistic position starts from the ontological presupposition of the world as the sum total of what is the case and clarifies the conditions or rational behaviour on this basis. On the other hand, the phenomenological gives a transcendental twist to the question and reflects on the fact that those who *behave* rationally must themselves presupose an objective world. He quotes Max Black who suggests a series of conditions that an action must satisfy if it is to be counted as rational. Here rational actions basically have the character of goal-directed action.¹⁹

- 1. Only actions under actual or potential control by the agent are suitable for dianoetic appraisal.
- 2. Only actions directed toward some end-in-view can be reasonable or unreasonable.
 - 3. Dianoetic appraisal is relative to the agent and to his choice of end-in-view.
 - 4. Judgments of reasonableness are appropriate only where there is partial knowledge about the availability and efficacy of the means.
 - 5. Dianoetic appraisal can always be supported by reasons.

In the other model, namely, phenomenological, there is no dependence on the goal directed action. He inquires into the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a community. "The world gains objectivity only through *counting* as one and the same world *for* a community of speaking and acting subjects." The conception of the world is essential for communicatively acting subjects to reach understanding among themselves about what takes place in the world. Through this communicative practice, they assure common liferelations, of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the members as background knowledge. Thus for the phenomenologist, the concept of rationality must examine the conditions for communicatively achieved consensus.

Habermas explains how the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, which emerges from the realistic approach, can fit with the

concept of communicative rationality developed by the phenomenologist approach. This means that there can be internal relations between the capacity for decentred perception and the capacity for reaching intersubjective understanding about things and events on the other. "Well-grounded assertions and efficient actions are certainly a sign of rationality", 21 claims Habermas. Further he says: "The concept of communicative rationality which refers to an unclarified systematic interconnection of universal validity claims, can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation". 22 The argumentation is the type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through arguments.

Habermas' notion of communicative competence, which he calls a "universal pragmatics", has the aim of systematically investigating the general structures which appear in every possible speech situation, which are themselves produced through the performance of specific types of linguistic expressions, and which serve to situate pragmatically the expressions generated by the linguistically competent speaker. Wittgenstein's understanding of language games, and Austin's and Searles' analysis of speech acts-as well as Chomsky's analysis of linguistic competence-all these help Habermas to develop the theory that all linguistic communication presupposes a background consensus. Habermas argues that linguistic intersubjectivity is the medium within which claims to truth, in the cognitive sense as well as claims to rightness and authenticity, can be raised and arbitrated. We cannot jump out of the language with which our subjectivity is interwoven. For Habermas, the intersubjective dimension of speech cannot be disconnected from the cognitive in this way. This is because it is distinctive feature of articulated speech that even when an utterance takes the form of, say, a command or a question rather than of an assertion, it neverthless possesses a content which can be put into propositional form. Even a request contains a reference to a state of affairs. Thus Habermas argues against Wittgenstein that the meaning constitutive aspect of language cannot be examined in separation from its knowledge-constitutive aspect. Habermas views that Wittgenstein overlooks the fact that the cognitive use of language reveals the dimension, which all speech acts, must be related. He says that in every elementary utterance there appears a

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dependent proposition which depends upon the dominant proposition and which expresses the propositional content concerning which agreement is to be reached. This double structure of the speech-act mirrors the structure of speech in general: an understanding cannot be reached when both partners do not simultaneously occupy both levels-(a) the level of intersubjectivity, which a speaker and hearer speak with each other and (b) the level of objects or states of affairs concerning which they reach agreement. This means that without the propositional content, which is thematized in the cognitive use of speech, the interactive use of speech would also be impossible. Habermas suggests that it is precisely the one sided emphasis upon the interactive use of speech in Wittgenstein which led his later philosophy predominantly therapeutic cast.

Every act of speech, says Habermas, communicates simultaneously on two levels: it conveys a content which, can in principle, be cashed out in propositional form, but also establishes a metacommunication which specifies what he calls the "sense of application" of the content. Metacommunication consists in a system of reciprocal expectations on the part of the participants in dialogue. Habermas is fully aware that metacommunication cannot be determined at the level of explicit knowledge. Metacommunication can be objectified in a further act of speech, but this act of speech will in turn possess its own metacommunicative level, so that dialogue is characterized by an intersubjective dimension which cannot be simultaneously established and objectified. For Habermas, the relation of language, action and experience differ in principle in three forms of knowledge. Thus in the *TCA*, he explains how the notion of linguistic intersubjectivity operates and emphasizes how validity claims are referred to in intersubjective agreement.

Habermas believes that with the pragmatic logic of argumentation we can develop a concept of rationality. This is different and better than that of purposive rationality, which is tailored to the cognitive-instrumental.²³ This communicative rationality, Habermas says, recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a non-coercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally motivated agreement.²⁴ Habermas is of the view that communicative reason is expressed in a decentred understanding of the world.

III

Is this theory of communicative rationality free from defects? It is not so, says Roderick.25 He argues that one can question the role of communicative rationality as a normative foundation for a critical social theory. Habermas, according to Roderick, has avoided an approach that treats norms as simply external or internal. Habermas tries to avoid both absolutism and relativism, but in the process produces a tension in his work, which his conception of rationality does not resolve. In his attempt to find a normative foundation for critical social theory, Habermas is trapped. The foundation is either external or internal, i.e., "it is either in society and history, or it is not". "This ambivalence cannot be removed, nor the externalinternal problem solved, as long as Habermas continues to attempt to find a 'normative foundation' that is neither simply internal nor external, yet 'partially' both."26 Another important criticism also comes from Roderick. He questions Habermas' usage of communicative rationality for critical social theory. This is the problem of theory and practice. How does Habermas use the notion of communicative rationality for social theory? For example, how is it going to be helpful for the working class? It is said that Habermas is led to present an harmonistic account of the capitalist social system, which ignores the internal problems of both the state and the economy. Moreover, according to the critics, Habermas's communicative rationality is itself the expression of a particular culture, society and period of history.

Though both the criticisms are important in the context of communicative rationality and social theory, it seems to me that Habermas himself has answered these criticisms. It is true that Habermas tries to establish a normative foundation for critical social theory. Norms according to him, are neither external *i.e.*, transcendental nor internal, *i.e.* immanent. This would avoid the problem of treating norms as conceptual or contextual. This does not mean that he has altogether rejected both. Norms are partially transcendent and partially immanent, says Habermas. This means that the communicative rationality takes care of the society and history. Similarlyly the criticism about his usage of communicative rationality for social theory can be answered. Habermas is concerned about the rationalization of the

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lifeworld. In order to understand the communicative action, Habermas introduces the ideal of the lifeworld. It relates the concept to the concept of society. For him, both the concept of communicative action and the lifeworld can serve as basic categories of social theory. The criticism namely that his concept of communicative rationality is an expression of a particular culture and society can also be answered. It must be understood that though it appears that notion of communicative rationality represent only the European culture, in reality it is not. It is equally applicable to other cultures also.27 In a multicultural society, the impact of it is clearly visible and hence one cannot conclude that it is the expression of a particular culture. Thus Habermas' concept of communicative reason, is an attempt to show that the possibility of the social is opened by the basic categories of language. The universal pragmatics of communicative action, according to him, is originally inscribed in the structures of the lifeworld and hence all presupposition of all forms of moral, instrumental, strategic and productive activity are the transcendental forms through which communication is opened and sustained.

NOTES

- 1. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 390.
- 2. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
- 3. Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in Paul Rainbow (ed.)

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- Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory" in Negations, (Boston, 1968),
 pp. 135 and 147.
- 5. Ibid., pp. 223-5
- 6. Habermas, TCA, vol. I tr. Thomas McCarthy, (Polity Press, 1984), p. 315.
- 7. Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, tr. W.M. Hohengarten, (Polity Press, 1995), pp.46-7
- 8. TCA, vol. I pp. 17-18
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Thomas McCarthy, (Polity Press,) p. vii.

- 10. TCA, vol. I, p. 372
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- 12. Habermas, "Dialectics of Rationalisation", Telos, vol. 49, p.16
- 13. TCA, vol. I, p.397.
- 14. Ibid. vol. I, pp. 17-18
- 15. Ibid. Translator's Introduction, pp.xxv
- 16. TCA, vol. II, p. 277
- 17. TCA, vol. I, Translator's Introduction, pp.xxxix.
- 18. Ibid. p. 10
- 19. Ibid, p. 12
- 20. Ibid, pp. 12-13
- 21. Ibid, p. 18
- 22. Ibid,
- 23. Ibid, p. 314
- 24. Ibid, p. 315
- 25. Rick Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (Macmillan).
- 26. Ibid, p. 165.
- 27. In my dialogue with Habermas at Frankfurt on this, I asked him why his discussion on "ideal speech situation" or "communicative rationality" always centres round the European society and not with the third world countries. Habermas replied that what he has said about the European society on the above can be equally applicable to other societies also.

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REASON OR REVELATION? LOCKE ON THE GROUND OF RELIGION

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SUDIPTA DUTTA ROY

The religious thoughts of Locke, which have a prominent bearing on his philosophical as well as political writings, have been greatly misunderstood by many of his contemporaries and have been subjected to severe criticism. One of the main charges lodged against him relates to the inconsistency of his thoughts regarding the role of reason and revelation in religion. Against him, it is held that while in his earlier work vix., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke emphasizes the role of reason in religion, he shifts his emphasis to revelation in his later works, namely, The Reasonableness of Christianity, A Discourse of Miracles, etc. Those who bring this charge of inconsistency seem, however, to miss the real implication of Locke's religious views. The present paper purports to focus on the fact that whether it is the earlier or the later works of Locke, his concern all throughout is that of a committed Christian, struggling to establish a sure foundation for revealed religion in the modern world. However, even though the religious objective of Locke is the same in all his works of earlier and later periods, the emphasis regarding reason and revelation is found to be different owing to defferent circumstances. As far as the Eassay Concerning Human Understanding (henceforth referred to as Essay) is concerned, Locke is anxious to save religion from the twin danger of Enthusiasm and Authoritarianism, while in the The Reasonableness of Christianity (henceforth referred to as Reasonableness) he is keen on saving it from the threat of Deism. Hence, in order to discern the inner consistency of Locke's religious thoughts, we shall have to look at his views against the proper backdrops in which they

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are held.

Locke In The Essay

In the opening of the *Essay*, Locke discloses the very purpose of his exposition of it. In the Epistle to the Reader, Locke states that his discussion with some friends about the principles of morality and revealed religion has prompted him to undertake the work of the *Essay*. In order to resolve our disputes regarding religion, once for all, Locke thinks it proper to take up an enquiry into the extent and limit of human understanding. Locke supposes that once the boundaries between reason and revelation are clearly drawn, it will be possible to know how far we are to be guided by reason and how far by revelation or faith. He distinguishes between the two in the following way:

"Reason ... I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz., by sensation or reflection. Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men are called revelation."

Thus clearly delineating the realms of reason and revelation, he seeks to drive this point home that we should not expect certainty in the domain of religion. Since religion deals with such things of whose existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all. Religion, in Locke's view, is not a matter of reason but of faith. Human mind, not being able to judge the truth or falsity of religious propositions from naturally acquired ideas, accepts them only on probable grounds. Locke contends that where reason falls short, revelation comes as another way of discovering the truth and provides the mind with determination on the ground of faith. Although human knowledge does not reach the level of absolute certainty in the realms of religion and morality, Locke assures,

"it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker and the sight of their own Duties."² It is

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Reason or Revelation? Locke on the Ground of Religion

Such knowledge, in Locke's opinion, is the chief purpose of our life. It is this commitment for revealed religion which makes Locke alert about the threat in the Enthusiast's notion of an 'inner light'.

Locke calls those persons Enthusiasts who used to claim that they are possessed of some internal light within themselves, by virtue of which truth is revealed to them. In Locke's contention if something is revealed to be true it must be justified to be so either by the principles of reason or by the miracles of God. The Enthusiasts, however, fail to provide any evidence for their claim. Their claim for a revealed truth, in Locke's view, turns out to be nothing but an unfounded presumption of their minds. As Locke says,

"For all the Light that they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded persuasion of their own Minds that it is a Truth."

Locke argues that a simple mental assurance without any other ground of support cannot serve as an evidence for the truth of a revealed proposition. He stresses that when God reveals some truth, He either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else convinces us that it is from Him by some marks recognizable by reason. To prove his point Locke holds that our holy men of old days, whenever they had some revelation from God, were provided not only with some outward marks but also with the power of performing some miracle to justify the divine authority of the revelation. Locke thus endeavours to disdain claims of those individuals who only pretend to have direct revelation in order to secure their opinion and beliefs.

Out of the same concern for revealed religion Locke also repudiates the claim of innate religious principles. The proponents of this theory, having declared the religious principles as God Given, ask for the blind credulity of men regarding the views dictated by them. According to Locke, these people try.

"to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them."

Locke feels that the doctrine of innate religious principles is prone to exploitation by conservative and reactionary forces. The 'innateness' of morality and religion can be easily used as a shield against any challenge to

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prevailing authority and interest. Locke detects danger lurking in the doctrine of innate principles to freedom of thought and enquiry. Under these circumstances with the intention of rescuing revealed religion Locke, appeals to man's rational capacity. Locke upholds that God has not imprinted in the minds of men all that they ought to know of Him or ought to do in obedience to His Will. In Locke's contention God has endowed men with faculties (Locke here refers to the faculties of experiencing and reasoning) which are sufficient for the discovery of all things they need to know. In his words:

"...a Man by the right use of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him."

In order to demonstrate his point Locke asserts that we are capable of knowing the existence of God with certainty through deduction from the indubitable knowledge of our own existence. Locke argues as follows: Man has a clear intuitive perception of his own being. Next, man knows with intuitive certainty that nothing or non being cannot produce a real Being. Hence it follows that there is an Eternal Being as the source of all beings. If it were not eternal then it would be produced by something and that again by something else and so on *ad infinitum*. Again, a man finds in himself some degree of knowledge and power. It is evident that a being who has being from another Being (God) must have everything (that belongs to it) owing to that Being. Therefore the Eternal Being must also be the Source or Origin of all power and knowledge. To quote Locke.

"Thus from the considerations of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being..."

Locke also argues that when a rational creature reflects on the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power present plentifully all around the works of creation, he cannot but miss the discovery of a Deity. Locke thus strives to show how our natural power of reasoning enables us to acquire knowledge in religion. However, Locke advocates the role of reason not only in the acquisition of religious knowledge, but also in certifying and interpreting revelation. He warns us not to accept any

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proposition as a revealed truth without judging it to be so by reason. He implies that whatever is claimed to be a revealed truth demanding assent can by no means be contrary to reason *i.e.*, we should never receive anything for a truth that is directly opposed to our clear and distinct knowledge. He also cautions us that for the proper grasp of the meaning of the scriptural truths, we must discover through reason the ideas and thoughts of those who set them down. We should not accept a report of revelation on the basis of traditional truths, which being far off from the original truths, do not provide any sure or forceful ground. Therefore, as far as religion is concerned, in Locke's view,

"Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in everything."7

Unless reason verifies the truth of revelation, there are chances of mistaking delusions and false interpretations as revealed truths. Hence, all his emphasis on reason in the *Essay* springs from his concern to rescue revealed religion (specifically, Christianity) from the hands of the Enthusiasts and the Authoritarians. Out of his urge to make revealed religion acceptable to the modern mind, all his attempt in the *Essay* is to present it as well grounded in reason Richard Ashcraft's comment is quite relevant here.

"Locke's primary commitment was to certain principles of the Christian Faith, and that it is within that context the Essay should by read in order to gain an appreciation of Locke's viewpoint."

Now, however noble be the intention of Locke, his views regarding reason and revelation in the *Essay* give rise to some grave implications. It is in this context that Peter Byrne comments,

"Followers of Locke's Way of Ideas (as his epistemology was described) could find plenty of ammunition in his narrow conception of reason and his frank discussion of the problems surrounding the attestation of revelation if they wanted to dismiss the certainty of revealed truth."

The above paragraph actually refers to the Deistic movement of thought of that period. Locke's ideas in the *Essay* have been appropriated by the Deists in favour of an entirely rational and natural religion. Consequently, Bishop Edward Stillingfleet accuses Locke of laying the philosophical foundation for Deism and of destroying 'faith' in the name

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of saving it. Under this newly developed situation, Locke finds it incumbent on him to check the Deistic turn of religion and thereby, to defend it from the attack of the churchmen.

Locke In His Later Work

In the later work The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke's attempt is to arrest the rationalistic tendencies of the Deists by a clearer defence of the concept of revelation. In it, he undertakes the task of explicating the content and justification of revelation. Before entering into Locke's defence of revelation, it seems necessary to have a brief acquaintance with the basic position of Deism. The beginning of the Deistic movement of thought, roughly speaking, is contemporaneous with the Revolution of 1688. The Deists oppose revealed religion and present themselves as champion of natural religion. By natural religion, they signify that religion which is possible for any man to discover for himself through the exercise of his own individual reason. Some of the prominent names in this movement are John Toland, Anthony Collins and Matthew Tindal. Toland, in his famous work Christianity not Mysterious (1696) claims to be drawing the natural consequences from the premises of Locke's philosophy. He strives to show that there is nothing in the Gospel either contrary to reason or above it and that no Christian Doctrine can properly be called a mystery. In his view, large portions of early Christian literature are the outcome of superstition and occulity. Anthony Collins advocates an enquiry into the credibility of prophecy and miracles. He reiterates and emphasizes the claim of reason to pronounce upon the contents of revelation. The process of thought initiated by Toland and Collins has been brought to its logical conclusion by Matthew Tindal. He insists on the duty of every man to fashion his own religious belief for himself.

Even though neither does Locke intend nor does he approve of Deism, it cannot be denied that there are some common elements of thought between Locke and the Deists. Both hold reason at a high esteem and oppose religious dogmatism of any sort. The Deists share with Locke the importance of freedom of thought in religious matters. In spite of these points of similarity, however, we should not miss the main spirit of Locke's religious thought which distinguishes him from the Deists. What Locke attempts to affirm is not a rational but a reasonable religion. Locke's

Reason or Revelation? Locke on the Ground of Religion 23

Reasonableness is directed against two main propositions of the Deists. The first one is that there is no need of revelation at all in Christianity, and the second one is that the Scriptures should not be accepted as revealed truths as thery are above reason.

Since Locke does not want to limit religion to the rational sphere, he recognizes a realm of faith in addition to the realm of reason. He holds that the ground of faith is completely different from that of knowledge and has nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge. In a letter to Stillingfleet, he expresses his views in the following words:

"Faith stands by itself, and upon Grounds of its own, nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of knowledge." ¹⁰

Hence, Locke explains that faith has a unique ground by which it is induced. This ground is God, whose testimony alone is suffcient to secure belif. Man gives assent to the revealed truths because he belives that it comes from one

"who canot err, and will not deceive"11

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Thus, Locke implies that faith, though founded on probability, is suffcient to persuade man to the revealed truths of the Scripture. In the *Reasonableness*, he contends that even though some doctrines of religion can be demonstrated and are therefore certainly known the common people accept such doctrines and others upon mere faith. In his view, either people lack the time and inclination, or they are incapable of carrying on such demonstration. To quote him,

"The greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for Demonstration, nor can they carry a train of proofs which in that way they must always depend upon for conviction." 12

By this, Locke nm_r orts that ordinary people can apprehend miracles done by divine power more easily than they can follow a chain of proofs.

Locke also emphasizes that religious truths are too high for the grasp of our natural powers of experiencing and reasoning. Hence, we require

"some light from above."13

i.e., direct revelations of these truths by God. He reminds us that although some of the revealed truths may be confirmed by reason, that does not

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entail that these truths are derived from reason.

In order to vindicate the necessity of revelation, Locke produces five reasons in the *Reasonableness*, which are as follws:

- 1. Knowledge of God
- 2. Knowledge of the correct forms of worship
- 3. Knowledge of man's duties
- 4. Knowledge of immortality, encouraging virtue and piety
- 5. The promise of assistance of the Holy Spirit.

Locke asserts it as a historical fact that mankind has not clearly discovered the true nature of God and all of man's duties before Jesus revealed them. According to Locke, the teachings of the ancient thinkers on these matters were too hard to be comprehended by ordinary people. He lays stress on the fact that it is difficult for unassisted reason either to establish all of the parts of morality by reason, or to convince people about it. In his view, it is Christ who has provided men with an 'unquestionable' morality. The truth and obligation of his precepts have been established beyond doubt by the evidence of his mission from miracles and his resurrection. Locke thinks that for the majority of mankind,

"Hearing plain commands, is the sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice." ¹⁴

As another ground of necessity for revelation, Locke holds that it is Christ who has taught men about after-life in which the virtuous who has suffered in this life is rewarded. Being rewarded in the after life, in Locke's view, is a great incentive for leading a virtuous and pious life. Christ has testified the existence of the after life by his resurrection.

Having descussed the necessity of revelation, Locke attempts to authenticate it by miracle and prophecy fulfillment, which serve as the ground of faith. According to him, the essential beliefs of Christianity are above reason, nevertheless, they bear the authenticating marks of miracle and fulfilled prophecy. In A Discourse of Miracles, he defines miracle as:

"a sensible operation, which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine." ¹⁵

Reason or Revelation? Locke on the Ground of Religion

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In Locke's contention, prophecy fulfillment as an accurate prediction of a future event also justifies a revelation as divine. Hence, Christianity is reasonable in Locke's interpretation. It is simple also because the core of Christain faith, in Locke's view, lies in the belief that Jesus is the Messiah (Messenger) of God. The essential revelation of Christ is that God is merciful and forgives the sinner who truly repents and aspires to live a moral life. In course of the end part of the Reasonableness Locke expresses that justification by faith is the subject of this treatise. By this, he entails that God considers those as just (even though they are not fully so), who have belief in Jesus as God-sent as well as in the morality of charity, love and divine mercy. Hence, we find that Locke believes in the uniqueness of Christianity which has been delivered to the poor, ignorant and illiterate with the clear, authoritative divine revelation of man's moral duty. In his view, the reasonableness of Christianity lies in its simplicity, intelligibility and effectiveness. His adherence to the belief in revelation thus sharply separates him from the Deists. Although Locke comes close to the Deists in assigning pre-eminence to the ethical teaching of Christianity, he differs from them significantly. In his view, Christianity has the force of faith in the moral realm, which the rational relligion of the Deists lacks. Locke clarifres his view about the revealed religion of Christianity in the Reasonableness, in the following words.

"...as Christians, we have Jesus the Messiah for our king and are under the law revealed by him in the Gospel. And... every Christian, both as a Deist and a Christian, be obliged to study both the law of nature and the revealed law, that in them he may know the will of God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent." ¹⁶

This paragraph not only highlights Locke's commitment to Christian faith, but also contains his reply to the Deists who refute the need of revelation in Christianity.

Conclusions

Thus, a study of Locke's religious thoughts in the *Essay* and in the *Reasonableness* with reference to their proper contexts reveals that his religious aspiration in both the works is the same. As a defender of revelation, he seeks a simple, moral Christianity based on faith. All throughout his

works, Locke is

"struggling to establish a basis for the essential claims of faith in a manner reasonable and convincing without thereby diminishing the independence, vitality and ultimate significance of faith." 17

His shift of emphasis regarding reason and revelation, has been found to be the need of the time. While in the *Essay* he strives to guard faith from the Enthusiasts and the Authoritarians, his effort in the later work is to save faith from the Deists. It is in the endeavour to establish a defensible base for religious faith that Locke's various approaches to the subject find unity.

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QUANTIFICATIONAL PARITY AND VERNACULAR DISPARITY [ALL: WITH "ANY," "EACH" AND "EVERY", "SOME" WITH "AT LEAST ONE"]

KANTILAL DAS

It is a matter of great concern of logic in general whether it enables us to cope up with the richness of ordinary standard language. Quantification logic is not free from this charge. In quantification logic one may cast doubt whether simple application of the use of quantification is adequate of capturing all the logical relevant features involved in the vernacular use of the particles of quantification. The same problem is raised in sentential logic by claiming whether the logical functors, viz, '.' (dot), 'v' (vel) etc. are enabling to cope-up with their ordinary standard employment of and, or, etc. As far as vernacular disparity of language particles are concerned the doubt seems to be plausible. Although it is true that P.F. Strawson in his book Introduction to Logical Theory has made a painstaking attempt to reflect the pros and cons of logical parity between logical constants (functors), viz, '.', 'v', '⊃', '-', '≡' with their ordinary (vernacular) standard employment of 'and', ;or', 'if-then', 'not' 'if and only if', he does not pay much attention to the quantifiction import of language particles, such as, all, each, any, every etc. In his book Strawson was of the opinion that the logical constants did not cope-up with the richness of ordinary standard employment of and, or etc. In quantifiction logic it is found that by circumventing vernacular disparity of language particles logicians are prone to admit quantificational parity among language particles. In quantification logic the language particles all, each, every and any have been apprehended with regard to universal quantifier, namely, (x), On the other hand, the language particles 'some' and 'at least one' have been rated with regard to existential quantifier, such as, $(\exists x)$. For example, the

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propositions All men are mortal and Any man is mortal have been logically paraphrased as: For all values of x if x is a man then x is mortal. In symbol :(x) $(Mx \supset Nx)$ (Mx stands for: x is a man and Nx stands for : x is mortal).Again the propositions: Some men are mortal and At least one man is mortal have been logically paraphrased as; For some values of x such that x is a man and x is mortal. In symbol: ($\exists x$) (Mx.Nx). From the logical point of view the technique thus stipulated is not difficult to follow. It is found that the initial word of a sentence is started by either any, every, or each then it should be translated into sentence of the form all, and if the initial word of a sentence is started either by the word 'some' or by the word 'at least one', then it should be translated by existential quantifier. But as far as vernicular use of the particles of quantification is concerned there underlies some genuine problem. The problems are: Is simple application of the theory of quantification capable of capturing all the logical relevent features involved in the vernacular use of the particles of quantifiction? Are ordinary language particles, such as, all, every etc. have the same quantifiction import so that they can be rated in the same logical voice? In what sense 'any' can be equated with 'all' when 'any' is logically paraphrased in terms of universal quantifiers? These and many more burdens are related to this paper. Here I shall first of all explain the quantification parity among all, each, every, and any. Then I shall pass on to discuss the vernacular disparity of these language particles. Finally, I shall focus on an important issue in what sense logicians are prone to regard the ordinary word some as at least one. Let us pass on to explain these in turn.

Quantification Parity Of Language Particles: All, Every Each

It is well known to all of us that in predicate logic the language particles, all, each, every, and any have been equated with universal quantifier, viz.(x), and some and at least one can be equated with existential quantifier, viz. ($\exists x$). As far as symbolic form is concerned a proposition starting with the initial word all can be logically equated with the proposition starting with the initial word each, every, or any. For example, the proposition 'All men are mortal' has been logically paired either with the proposition

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'Each (every) man is mortal' or with the proposition 'Any man is mortal'. Similarly, a proposition starting with the initial word some can be logically paired with the proposition initially starting with the word at least one. For example, the proposition 'Some men are mortal' can be logically paired with the proposition 'At least one man is mortal'. One reason for this incorporation is that logicians seem to have believed that the proposition initially containing the particle all logically implies the proposition initially contaning either the particle each (every) or the particle 'any'. Or in other words, the language particles' each', 'every', 'any' are nothing but the part of the meaning of all'. Similarly, the proposition initially starting with the particle 'some' logically implies the proposition initially starting with the particle 'at least one'. Or one can say that the particle 'at least one' is part of the meaning of the particle 'some'. Consequentially, it is thought that the logical force of one particle sustains the logical force of another particle. Let us examine in what sense one particle upholds the logical force of another particle.

Assuming an office having five honest officers. Let us again presuppose that the names of the officers are: x, y, z, u and v. Now if it is admitted that sentences in which the initial word is being started with 'any',' every' and 'each' and hence are taken to be translated into sentences of the form 'all' then we have the following sentences which are supposed to be logically equivalent with one another:

- 1) All officers in this office are honest.
- 2) Each officer in this office is honest.
- 3) Every officer in this office is honest.
- 4) Any officer in this office is honest.

Propositions [1] to [4] are logocally equivalent with each other and can by symbolised in terms of universal quantifier, '(x)'. They are logically paraphrased as: Given any individual whatever if he is an officer then he is honest. In this proposition the relative pronoun 'he' occured in two places refer back to the individual and they have the same indefinite reference. Accordingly, they may be replaced by 'x', where 'x' stands for an individual variable, and the proposition can be reparaphrased as: Given any x, if x is an officer in this office then x is honest. It appears that the proposition

under consideration is conditional (hypothetical). It is a law-like statement as it is not at all related with existential import. It does not lose its sense even if the class of officers under consideration is thought to be empty. It presupposes, but not entails, that for any values of x, if x is an officer then x is honest. So this hypothetical proposition can logically paraphrased as: Given any x, if x is an officer in this office $\supset x$ ix honest. Symbolically, $(x) (Ox \supset Hx)$ (where Ox stands for x is an officer in this office, Hx stands for x is honest)

Here the symbolic schema (x) $(Ox \supset Hx)$ is regarded as a close sentence (proposition). We have an open sentence such as $Ox \supset Hx$ from the closed sentence by applying UI on it. Likewise we can return back to the closed sentence from the open sentence by applying UG on it. Here the variable x in the open sentence refer to any individual or officer in this office. But importantly, it is supposed to refer to them one at a time and the application of (x) means that what the open sentence says of x is true of all officers in the office taken them one at a time. Here the phrase one at a time is important to be understood. It means either 'any at a time'. 'each at a time', 'every at a time'. It is important to be noticed here that although the language particle 'all' is used in the sense of collectivity, it reveals from the logical analysis that this collectivity is sustained via distributivity. The variable x in the open sentence acts as, as Rescher puts it, 'a shorthand synopsis of a multiplicity of statements' comprising an infinite set of results each of which has been proved separately. The open sentence will temain true in each (every) or any substitution of the individual variable 'x' It will remain true if it is substituted either by x, z., u or v. This means that if Y is an officer in this office then Y is honest, if Z is an officer in this office then Z is honest, if U is an officer in this office them U is honest, and if V is an officer in this office then V is honest. In this sense it can be shown that for any values of x, if x is an officer in this office than x is honest. This makes sense to say that each (every) or any officer in this office separately (distributively) proved as honest and by way of proving each officer as honest we have a collective set of reselts by which we claim that 'all of the officers in this office are honest'. In this sense the language particle 'all' is logically squared with either 'each', 'every', or 'any'. In this process 'each', 'every', or 'any' will reach to 'all' by examining one of la

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one by one distributively. Let us pass on to examine the vernacular disparity of language particles.

II

The most striking and of course obvious vernacular difference among the particles under consideration is that 'any' and 'all' are used in the sense of plurality and 'each', and 'every' are used in the sense of singularity. This distinction is, of course, a grammatical one. Grammatically, the language particles 'each' and 'every' are followed by the singular form of the noun and the language particles 'all' and 'any' are followed by the plural form of noun. Of course, some logicians cast doubt over the grammatical form of sentence as they seem to have believed that the apparent grammatical form of a proposition may not be its real form. For them the real form of a proposition lies submerged and it can only be revealed if the proposition under considertion is to be analysed with regard to logical syntax. May be it is true that the grammatical form of a sentence occasionally fails to reflect its true logical form, but this does not mean that it loses its base totally. Let us examine the following propositions:

- 1) All men are mortal.
- 2) Any man (men) is (are) mortal.
- 3) Each man is mortal.
- 4) Every man is mortal.

Look at the verb form of the above propositions. It seems clear that the language 'all' is used in the sense of plurality, whereas 'each' and 'every' are used in the sense of singularity. The language particle 'any' plays dubious role as it can be used both in the sense of singularity as well as plurality.

It also seems clear from the above that in the proposition (1) the language particle 'all' designates a collective force. It asserts that the class of men collectively belongs to the class of mortality. The proposition (2) plays a dubious role. If 'any' is used in the sense of plurality (two or three or four. etc.) then it means to say that the class of two or three men belongs to the class of mortality. But if 'any' is used in the sense if singularity, then it is, of course, used in the sense of distributivity. But the propositions

(3) and (4) are used in sense of distributivity. Each of them says that each men separately or distributively *included* in the class of mortality.

Another important disparity between 'all', 'each', 'every' on the one hand and 'any' on the other hand is that 'all', 'each', and 'every' are determinate, but 'any' is indefinite and indeterminate. Let us again consider the earlier example:

All officers in this office are honest.

Each officer in this office is honest.

Every officer in this office is honest.

Here 'all' in the first sentence is used in a determinate manner as it includes five officers in this collectively. 'Each' and 'Every' are very much definite as 'each' means one by one, while 'every' means or stresses exhaustiveness. But what do we actually mean by uttering the sentence:

Any officers in this office are honest.

Does it mean 'any two' or 'any three' or 'any four' officers in this office? Certainly, it may be used to mean either any one of the following:

Any one officer in this office is honest.

Any two officers in this office is honest.

Any three officers in this office is honest.

Any four officers in this office is honest.

This makes sense to say that 'any' varies from sentence to sentence. But can we say that 'Any five officers in this office are honest'? Certainly not as the office is being comprised of only five honest officers. It appears that 'any' has no specific sense. It may be used in differnt sentences to mean differnt officers. But it has a limitation in the sense that unlike 'all' it lacks exhaustiveness.

Another pivotal disparity among language particles is that 'each' and 'every' without exception or reservation connote exitence. Any never connotes existence. 'All plays double standard rule as it by itself never connotes existence but when it (all) is combined with definite articles of demonstrative pronouns, it connotes exitence. Here we consider a few examples from Strawson's book *Introduction to Logical Theory*.'

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According to Strawson the statement 'All the books in his room are by English authors' seems to be absurd if the room referred to has no book at all. In this statement the language particles 'all' co-exists with a definite article 'the' and hence it connotes existence. Again consider the classic example given by Strawson. The statement. "All moving bodies not acted upon by external forces continue in a state of uniform motion in a straight line' may well be true even if there never have been or will be any moving bodies not acted upon by external forces.'4 Similarly the statement: "All human beings free from bacteria are not free from disease" has been regarded as true if there is nothing as a human being free from bacteria. In these statements the language particle 'all' does not go with any definite article and hence it is used without exitential commitment. One may, of course, express reservation regarding these statements claiming that since they are law-like statements or statements stating principle, the question of their truth or falsity in terms of existential commitment simply does not arise. But we do not regard this charge as substantive since it can be possible for us to cite an example which will no longer be regarded as a law statement and in which the language particle 'all' does not co-exist with any definite article. The statement. "All message you might have sent would have been intercepted" is very much admissible inspite of the obvious vacancy of exitential import. In this statement 'all' is used without a definite article. But the statement: "All the messages you sent were intercepted"5 can not be accepted without admitting existential import. In the first statement the particle 'all' is not backed up by the definite article 'the', but in the later statement the particle 'all' is so backed up. Our all important observation is that as far as existential import of the language particle 'all' is concerned whether a statement is law-like statement or not a law-like statement is not decisive. What is conclusive is to notice whether in a statement the language particle 'all' is backed up by a definite article or not. If 'all' is co-existed with a definite article, then it will connote existence, otherwise it does not. Let us call on to 'each' and 'every'.

It is claimed that 'each' and 'every' connote exeistence and their existential commitment can be grasped easily. Is it not absurd to say that 'Each (Every) book in this room is written by English' author if there is no book found in the room? Certainly it is. Suppose somebody has claimed

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that 'Each (Every) child of John is asleep'. In what circumstance the person has claimed this assertion? Naturally, he would not claim it unless he believed that John had children who were asleep. Suppose the person was mistaken as John had no children. What, then, we think about the person's statement: 'Each (Every" child of John is asleep'., Should we say that the statement under consideration is true or false. We should not Rather it is reasonable to claim that the statement is senseless or pointless and the question of its truth or falsity simply does not arise. That statement is to be meaningful and hence may be considered as either true or false, if it has been admitted beforehand that John has children. Likewise the statement: 'Each (Every) book in this room is written by English' author is supposed to be meaningful (true or false) if it has been admitted that there are books in the room. Let us pass on to 'any'.

It is observed that unlike 'each', 'every' and 'all' along with definite article, the question of existential presupposition in the case of 'any' simply does not arise. The statement: 'Any book in this room is (are) written by English author (s) does not lose its sense if no books are found in the room The logical force of this statement is conditional (hypothetical). It asserts that if there is (are) any books (s) in the room then it (they) is (are) written by English author (s)'. The statement is based on a presupposition, but no an entailment. The logical implication of this statement is that 'if the books are not written by English author then they are not books found in this room. It makes sense to say that any object fulfilling the condition specified by the antecedent is subject to the condition spelled out by the consequent It asserts that if a thing satisfies the former it also satisfies the latter. Ou all important observation is that when the language particle 'all' is used by itself, it will act as a law-like statement and hence it lacks existential import In this sense 'any' is paired with 'all'. 'Any' is used as a law-like assertion an open hypothetical. "Any' proposition, says Vendler, "is an unrestricted warranty for conditional statements or forcasts and ... for contrary-to-fac conditions."6

Since 'any' is unrestricted, an open hypothetical the logical behaviour of the language particle, unlike 'all', 'each' and 'every', is very much indifferent to the size of its immediate scope. It is hard to decide how many individuals the language particle 'any' means when it is used in the

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sentence like: 'Any apple in the basket is red'. It posseses a dubious limitation. It renders one's freedom of choice vacuous. What the statement: 'Any doctor will tell you that cloroquine prevents maleria' means? Apparently the statement seems to be a conditional like the following: If you ask any doctor, he will tell you that cloroquine prevents malaria. You may perhaps be satisfied if you are going to ask so many doctors of which every one of them informed you that cloroquine prevents malaria. So the statement: 'Any doctor will tell you that cloroquine prevents malaria' is to use a bland warranty for conditional predications. It depends on you whether you would like to ask any doctor or not. If you ask Dr. Robinson he will tell you the same thing. if you pick 100 other doctors and ask them, they will tell you that cloroquine prevents malaria. And if you do not ask anyone, you do not use the blank. What is important to be noticed here is that by uttering the sentence 'Any doctor will tell yout that cloroquine prevents malaria; one does not make a ststement which assertained as either true or false. Nor does he make predication which can be rated as either correct or incorrect. What he really is to use a blank guarantee for conditional predications which may be reliable or not, confirmed or disconfirmed. But by uttering such statement, the utterer throws a challenge which may be accepted or not. If anybody is willing to take this offer he would be satisfied by the sentence: You may select any doctor you may trust, you may consult with them as many as you please, and if none of them is disagreed then you may arrive at a conclusion that the statement under consideration holds good. This again is confirmed that in the above case one may apply his freedom of choice, he may take advantage, as he likes, of the indifference of the number of the doctors. Since the freedom of choice is open in case of 'any' particle, the particle in one sense is incomplete. It has no sharp boundary and as a matter of fact the principle of complete verification is absolutely abhorrent in 'any' sentence.

On the basis of the above consideration we can precisely sort out the vernacular disparity among language particles in the following ways:

1) 'Each' and 'Every' are associated with singular noun (with a subtle distinction that 'each' means one by one, but 'every' means completeness or exhaustiveness). 'All' is accompanied by a plural noun.

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'Any' plays dubious role.

- 2) Since 'each' and 'every' are hanged around with singular noun they denote distributivity. 'All' denotes collectivity. 'Any' plays dubious role.
- 3) 'All', 'Each' and 'every' are definite, complete, but 'Any' is indefinite and incomplete. The principle of verification is repugnant to 'Any' and 'All', but the principle of verification is not sickning to 'Each' and 'Every'.
- 4) 'Each' and 'Every' do possess existential import. 'All by itself has no existential import, but 'All' backed up by a definite article has existential import. 'Any' has no existential import. As far as existential import is concerned 'Any' can be paired with 'All by itself'. Likewise 'Each' and 'Every' can be paired with 'All backed up by definite article'.

Upto now we have examined quantification parity and vernacular disparity of language particles 'all', 'each' and 'any'. Let us pass on to the next section to examine the logocal significance of considering the language particle 'some' as 'at least one'

III

In ordinary standard grammar the language particle 'some' has played a dubious role. At times it bears the implication of singularity and at times it carries the implication of plurality. This is made clear by focussing on the verb 'to be'. Let us consider the following propositions:

- 1) Some man is beautiful.
- 2) Some man are beautiful.

In proposition (1) the language particle 'some' is backed up by a singular noun 'man' followed by a singular form of to be verb 'is'. But in the proposition (2), The language particle 'some' is backed up by a plural noun 'men' followed by a plural form of the verb 'are'. The first proposition is logically equivalent to the proposition: At least one man is beautiful, and proposition (2) is logically equivalent to the proposition: More than one man are beautiful.

But very interestingly in logic the language particle 'some' has been taken or interpreted as 'at least one' irrespective of its meaning. One may

simply cast doubt about the logical interpretation by saying that it hardly bears the ordinary force of the language particle 'some'. It seems absurd to say that 'Some men are playing there' logically means 'At least one man is playing there'. The ordinary implication of the statement 'Some men are playing there' is, of course, meant 'More than one man is playing there'. But logicians have regarded 'some' as 'at least one'. One reason for this consideration is to overcome the ambiguity of the ordinary word 'some'. Logic by its very nature can not cope-up or live up with ambiguity. It requirs precision and accuracy. Logicians have thought that there is no inconsistency in considering the ordinary word 'some' as 'at least one'. For them the phrase 'at least one' is nothing but the meaning of the word 'some'. But the fact is that whatever the logical force of the phrase 'at least one' may have, ordinarily it can be equated with 'some' when 'some' is squared with 'more than one'.

Should we say at this juncture that logicians have failed to apprehend this problem? If there is any mistake on the logician's part, it is the mistake committed by the logicians deliberately. Logicians, of course, do not consider it a mistake. Rather they would consider it a reservation of the ordinary word 'some'. They put a reservation on the ordinary word 'some' so as to consider it as 'at least one'. If they do not interpret 'some' as 'at least one', then the principle of contradiction between A and O propositions as well as between E and I propositions has to be sacrificed. It is claimed that without the principle of contradiction no other principle of the traditional interpretation of the Square of opposition of Propositions has been retained. But the principle of contradictoin has been retained only by imposing some stipulation on the ordinary word 'some'. if the ordinary word 'some' is not to be taken as 'at least one' but to be taken as 'more than one', then the principle of contradiction has to be ruled out. Let us examine in what sense the principle of contradiction has been retained if the ordinary word 'some' is taken as 'at least one', and the principle of contradiction has been dropped out if the ordinary word 'some' is taken as 'more than one'.

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least one', then from the proposition 'Some men are beautiful', we have the following table:

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| (O) At least one man is not beautiful | (A) All men are beautiful |
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It appears from the above truth-table that if the language particle "some" is taken as "at least one" then the principle of contradiction between "A" and "O" as well as "E" and "I" holds good. If "I" is true then unquestionably "E" is false and if "I" is false then "E" must be true. Again if "O" is true then "A" is unquestionably false and if "O" is false then "A" must be true. But if the ordinary language particle "some" has been interpreted as 'more than one', then from the proposition under consideration we have the following table:

'some' means 'more than one'

(I) More than one man is beautiful

T
F
F
U

(O) More than one man is not beautiful
T
F
F
U

(A) All men are beautiful
F
U

U

It is clear from the above table that the principle of contradiction has not been held back. If both I and O propositions are supposed to be true then we have the contradictory truth value in E and A respectively. But if both I and O are supposed to be false then we do not have the contradictory truth value in E and A respectively. Here if I is held to be false then E is undetermined, and again if O is held to be false then A is undetermined. The proposition 'More than one man is beautiful' is held to be false under two possible circumstances, viz, (1) Just one man is not beautiful, and (2) All men are beautiful. Now on the basis of these assertions

Quantificational Parity & Vernacular Disparity

we have the following table.

The falsity of 'I' means:

(I) Just one man is beautiful

F

(2) No men are beautiful

F

(1) Just one man is not beautiful

F

(2) All men are beautiful

F

(E) No men are beautiful

U

(E) No men are beautiful

F

(A) All men are beautiful

U

(A) No men are beautiful

F

The above table again confirms that from the falsity of I and O proposition we do not have the contradictory truth value in E and A respectively. Ambrose and Lazerowitz⁷ have said that we are not in a position to say that the falsity of I and O implies the truth of E and A respectively. Thus it can be said that if the ordinary language particle 'some' has been logically interpreted as 'more than one' then the contradictory form of 'some' is to be 'none'.

Up to now we have examined the quantification parity and vernacular disparity among language particles. Then we have explored the logical significance of the ordinary word 'some' to have been taken as 'at least one'. We have seen that logic has failed to reconcile the richness of ordinary language. But we do not think that the failure of this reconcilation of the richness of ordinary language is the failure of logic. Ordinary language is very much rich as well as contextual. Logic is not so much rich like ordinary language and it remains context free in most cases. Since ordinary language is rich, Ontextual and in most cases the terms of ordinary language play dubious rule, logic cannot harmonise with it. The very nature of logic is to assert something precisely and accurately. The ordinary word 'some' as we saw is ambiguous as it acts both as to denote singular as well as plural noun. Logicians would like to interpret it as 'at least one 'and thereby impose a stipulation on it. One motive, of course, lies behind it. But this does not mean that logic is unable to analyse the concept 'more than one.' With the help of the concept of identity one can easily symbolize the concept

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of 'more than one'. If it is presupposed that by the phrase 'more than one' we mean 'at least two', then we have the proposition, "At least two men are beautiful'. This proposition can be symbolized like this:

$$(\exists x) (\exists y) (Mx. Bx. My. By. x \neq y)$$

It means that there is at lest one x and there is at least one y such that x is a man and x is beautiful and y is a man and y is beautiful and x is not identical with y. The history of logic has witnessed an advancement. Logic has been trying to reconcile as well as attempting to make a close attachment with ordinary language. But logic does not or even perhaps cannot negotiate with the ambiguity of ordinary language. Logic attempts to overcome the ambiguity of ordinary language and by way of doing this logic puts forward to make a close attachment with the standard employment of ordinary language. There is no urgency to close-up with all varites of ordinary language. Quantification logic attempts to make a parity among language particles which are no longer inconsistent with each other. Failing to reconcile vernacular disparity does not ignore quantificational parity of language particle.

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HEIDEGGER AND THE TRANSITION TO POSTMODERNITY

MUHAMMED KAMAL

The notion of postmodernity has recently become a subject of academic as well as popular debate. It is associated with the emergence of a new understanding of reality, which aims at transforming not only Enlightenment knowledge, values and culture, but also universalism, the idea that human history follows a rational progression, and the claim of reason to apprhend the absolute truth. According to the adherents of postmodernism, modernity has not led to the realisation of freedom but to the creation of bureaucratic rationality and a new form of oppression. The modern spirit has eroded much of the remaining confidence in itself. It is doomed to turn against human freedom in the name of liberation by transforming itself into a system of universal oppression and advocating of the logic of domination. Postmodernity, as a reaction against the bureaucracy of reason, brings with itself a new philosophical outlook to combat the challenges of contemporary civilisation.

The term 'postmodern' was first employed by Rudolf Pannwitz in 1917 in describing the "nihilism" of Nietzsche, but it did not attract the attention of Western intellectuals until 1960, when a group of French philosophers, including Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, began to critically analyse the meta-narratives of modern thought Since then the set of debates on the meaning of postmodernity has been conducted in a variety of forms and contexts. It has been associated with post-Marxism, post-colonialism, post-industrialism, feminism, pluralism, anarchism, gayism, lesbianism and so on.

Lyotard, one of the leading thinkers of postmodernity, has relied,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 1 January 2002

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like Pannwitz, on the concept of Nietzsche's nihilism in articulating the meaning of postmodernity, which he defines as the "incredulity towards meta-narratives" and the rejection first of the modernist discourse, which view human history and culture as a single unified progress towards perfection, and second of the belief that this progress has an unchangeable foundation and can be interpreted in the light of a meta narrative 2. Lyotard disproves the validity of the foundations and the monopoly of metanarratives, calling for re-evaluating all values and deconstructing the modern understanding of reality: purpose should be replaced by game, teleology by chance, system by anarchy and homogeneity by heterogeneity. Disillusionment with the practices of the communist party in France led Lyotard to the conclusion that the Marxist meta-narrative was no longer capable of transcending the libidinal impulses of individuaals, because these inpulses were unpredictable. instead, Marxism tried to suppress them and, in so doing, produced an authoritarian system.3 Lyotard also stresses the point that conflict in history is no longer determined by commodity or wealth but by knowledge or, more specifically, by information technology. The political power of a nation will be determined by its control of knowledge.4 Foucault, another postmodern thinker, tells us to prefer what is positive and multiple, to favour difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems, and to believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic. 5

According to postmodern thinking, the cultural changes in our times have taken us to a stage where the meta-narratives, traditional fixities and universal theories are no longer adequate. As Lyotard puts it, "Let us wage a war on totality, let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable, let us activate the differences and save the honour of the name." The meta-narratives, for example dialectic methods, resist revision and reinterpretation in the light of changing cultural events. Their advocates, whether Hegelians or Marxists, strongly believe that the meta-narratives transcend temporality and the contingency of the events, and that their universal validity is unquestionable. But the problem that arises here in rejecting meta-narratives, is one of making value judgments. How do we continue to analyse the meaning of historical changes in society, when the Marxist narrative, for example, is dispensed with? How do we construct value judgments in the

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absence of a meta-narrative? Lyotard insists that, without a meta-narrative to rely on, we need to deal with situations pragmatically on a 'case by case' basis, and he agrees with Foucault that in this process the little narratives emerge as inventive and significant in the postmodern world. As we can see, heterogeneity, fragmentation and the distrust of large-scale theoretical interpretations with universal application are the hallmarks of postmodernity. The rejection of any universal validity for meta-narratives, accompanied by the emphasis on difference and on the discontinuity of history, and by the shift in ideas about place and the significance of the 'other', form the core of this new development in philosophy. ⁷

The antifoundationalism of postmodernity led Derrida to demonstrate the instability of language and the unavailability of the necessary relationship between the signifier and the signified, according to him, some slippage of meaning is possible. The best example of this slippage of meaning is a concept called 'différance', a French word derived from difference, meaning both difference and deferral.⁸ These two words are pronounced the same, the difference between them is revealed only in writing. For this reason, one may accept the view that linguistic meaning is a changeable phenomenon and that the 'difference' should be taken into account in interpreting cultural discourse. For this postmodern thinker, Western traditional philosophy is logocentric, based on the Aristotelian principle of identity and the Platonic metaphysics of an eternal and immutable reality. The principle of 'difference' deconstructs the foundation of such philosophising.

According to Robert Young, postmodernity is the outcome of the Algerian war of independence, because a number of French thinkers, who developed postmodern thought, were either from French Algeria or were marked by the Algerian revolution against French colonialism. Young also defines postmodernity as a process of decolonising Western culture. Akber S. Ahmed, in *Postmodernism and Islam*, relates postmodernity to the omnipresence of the media, and tries to situate the emergence of Islamism in the contemporary Muslim world within the context of postmodernity. Ahmed's understanding of postmodernity in its relation to the rise of Islamism is similar to the view of Bernard Iddings Bell, a British theologian who wrote in 1939 that the term postmodern could be interpreted

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in relation to the failure of secularism and a return to religion.¹² As I understand it, postmodernity has its own features and characteristics and it does not include everything stands against modernity. For example, Islamism strongly advocates the universal validity of its meta-narrative. There is nothing in common between the anti-foundationalism of postmodernity and Islamism except that both of them fight a common enemy.

If these depictions are correct, then in my view, Heidegger's contribution to postmodern philosophy is undeniable. Postmodernist thinkers such as Rorty, Derrida and Vattmis, to name a few, admit their debt to Heidegger. In developing their own philosophy, these thinkers have employed his deconstruction of Western philosophy and the metaphysical tradition. But at this point, the legitimacy of this view must be established. Since it is agreed that the meaning of postmodern philosophy is revealed only in its relation to the meaning of modernity, I shall attempt, first, to explain Heidegger's understanding and criticusm of modernity, and, second, I will discuss the philosophical transition to postmodernity initiated by Heidegger.

Every stage in human history presents a way of disclosing things, of interpreting itself. Modernity, in this regard, is characterised by the disclosure of all things as raw material to be modified and utilised by consciousness. Modern philosophy, the metaphysical roots of which go back to Plato, has provided logical conditions to legitimise this disclosure. Plato's metaphysical outlook brings with itself a vital consequence: it defines being as the idea and all discourse of being as aiming at assimilation to that model, to the accommodation to the idea; "to be" thus means to be raw material and to be produced. The mountains reveal themselves as coal mines, the forest as timber and the dams as electric power. Plato's metaphysics, as Michael Zimmerman describes it, is productionistmetaphysics, and according to Heidegger, it is the foundation for the modernist-technological view of the world. 13 The history of Western thought is, therefore, a process in which productionist-metaphysics has degenerated, because technology has dehumanised society and compelled mankind to treat itself and all other kinds of beings as "standing-reserve" (Bestand) for total mobilization:

The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual

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threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus where enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense.¹⁴

The problem is not in technology itself but in its philosophical foundation, which is inherent in the metaphysical outlook of modernity, in its hostile attitude towards both human existence and nature. Heidegger believes that modernity has squeezed the world between the Soviet system and American capitalism. From the metaphysical point of view, these systems are two sides of the same coin: "The same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man." 15 To Heidegger, both systems have symptoms of the darkening of the world. the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the transformation of human beings into mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative. 16 Productionist metaphysics sees nature as an alien force to be controlled and utilised, at the same time reducing human existence to an object for investment and productivity. It extends the market to every aspect of human life and replaces creative thinking with the ligic of calulation, leading to an "inauthentic" way of working and producing. For Heidegger there are several features of the darkening of the world and the rise of this demonic culture: one of them is the misinterpretation of human existence and capacity as intelligence of cleverness in examining, calculating and modifying given entities. This intelligence has also been subject to organization, and as a consequence, intelligence has fallen to the level of a tool in the service of the others. 17

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'Inauthenticity' is one of the key concepts for understanding Heidegger's criticism of modernity and his contribution to postmodern thought. Heidegger employed this term in *Being and Time, Sections* 126-28, to describe phenomenologically the 'everydayness' of human beings in modern society. His description revolves around the "inauthentic mode of existence" imposed by modern industrial-technological society on human beings. 18

Inauthenticity 'uneigentlichkeit', prevails as one of the symptoms of the darkening of the world, as the result of the standardisation of human

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beings through the rejection of the elements of difference and heterogeneity and replacing these elements with homogeneity and uniformity. The inauthentic mode of existence signifies that I conform to what others think, believe and do. In falling into the abyss of inauthenticity, my distinct way of being, which makes me different from others, is not only unrecognised but also forcibly eliminated. The best example for understanding the inauthentic mode of existence of modernity is the cultural condition imposed by Fascism and Stalinism in the first half of the last century. These systems practically employed measures to standardise human beings and eliminate the difference.

The inauthentic mode of existence affects every aspect of human life. It modifies even speech and the primordial task of language in revealing the truth, because inauthenticity changes the state of language to idle talk (gerede), and human quest for truth to curiosity: "Idle talk is so mething which anyone can rake up, it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer." The intelligibility in idle talk is "ambiguity", a characteristic of thinking in the modern age, because everyone also knows already how to talk about what has to happen first about what is not yet up for discussion but 'really' must be done. Already everyone has surmised and scented out. ²⁰

One of the problems we face in dealing with Heidegger's impact on the postmodren thought is his fundamental ontology or an inquiry into the meaning of Being as a ground. But in my opinion his analysis of the meaning of being is beset with perplexity. There is also a disparity among the commentators on this issue. Kockelmans interprets Heidegger's being as a process or an activity that reveals the truth.²¹ Dreyfus rejects Kockelmans interpretation, stating that Being cannot be understood as a process or an event.²² Zimmermann thinks that Being is history shaping ways in which entities can reveal themselves and become real.²³ In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines Being as the Being of the entities, and aslo, in sections 36 and 37 of the same book, he identifies Being with phenomenon, and ontology with phenomenology. In his "Letter on Humanism", Being has become a "quiet power".²⁴ and finally in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger states:

All things we have named are, and yet, when we wish to apprehend beings, it is always as though we were reaching into the void. The being after which we inquire is almost like nothing, and yet we have rejected the contention that the *essent* in its entirety is not. But Being remains unfindable, almost like nothing, or ultimately quite so. Then, in the end, word "being" is no more than an empty word. It means nothing real, tangible, material. Its meaning is unreal vapour. Thus in the last analysis Nietzsche was perfectly right in calling such "highest concepts" as "the last cloudy streak evaporating reality."²⁵

However, I do not intend to focus on the ambiguity and relative inaccessibility of the meaning of Being in Heidegger's philosophy. What is relevant to the theme of this paper is that Being can be understood as both temporality and nothing, and that what remains as a foundation is contingency, flux and heterogeneity. Being, unlike Plato's idea, is dynamic: an emerging power that "issues from concealment" into unconcealment or the truth.26 Unlike the First Principle of Aristotle's metaphysics, Being is irrational and blind. It is also neither this nor that entity, but unfindable and simply nothing. As a consequence, the eternal changes to the temporal, the necessary into the contingent, and foundationalism into nihilism. In one way, Heidegger's ontological discourse is nihilism, because it treats being as a nothing, and the term "being" as meaning nothing. 27 Heidegger believes also that modern thought has neglected this genuine philosophical issue and, as a result, is alienated from the truth. When human thought falls into negligence and alienation, it becomes lost in cultivating calculative thinking and in dominating what already is present, but creates nothing new. It engages itself in preserving the past and the art forms and beliefs that fill the jug of everyday life with meaning.

Heidegger's critique of modernity is extended to include modern philosophers such as Descartes and Hegel. Descartes created a new philosophical tradition by turning to the thinking subject as the foundation of knowledge. This new philosophical tradition continued in both trends rationalism and empiricism and Kant's critical philosophy emerged to reaffirm the importane of the Cartesian turn. The turn to the subject was a departure from the classical metaphysical tradition and one of the essential

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features of modern philosophy, but it has not been able to grasp the meaning of the subject in a cultural context. At the same time, it retained Aristotelian coategories to describe the being of the thinking subject. In transcending the shortcomings of modern philosophy, Heidegger, unlike Descartes, does not begin with the metaphysical subject or the being of the subject as a self-substance. In order to break through to a new understanding of the subject, he employs the term 'Dasein', which simply means "being there". Dasein is not a self-substance but an entity that exists only in the world, projecting its own existence wothout having a prior essence:

The Essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand, they are in each case possible ways for it to be and no more than that.²⁸

Dasein escapes a modern apprehension of its meaning for two reasons. First, this entity is not the Cartesian self substance the essence of which precedes its existence. Second, since Dasein has no prior essence to its existence and its existence is the projection of possibilities, then possibility is prior to actuality. Dasein is not only an actual ectity but a possibility of various ways of existence. This feature of Dasein indicates that, unless Dasein articulates all its possibilities or fulfils itself, it cannot be defined and it will remain without having a prior nature or essence. This understanding of human existence is the rejection of the Cartesian theory of self-substance and the Kantian transcendental illusion. It is the death of the self as a metaphysical subject. This analysis of Heidegger should be taken with seriousness, because it is a genuine contribution to the postmodern philosophical debate. This bold departure from the Cartesian tradition, in its deconstruction of the concept of the metaphysical subject, inspired thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, to rethink about the meaning of the subject.29

Being in the world ia an ontological constitution that entails Dasein's involvement in the world. This involvement is not interpreted from the viewpoint of a detached observer of events, but from the viewpoint of a dweller and an actor within the world. Dwelling and acting shift the focus

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of the cognitive relationship between human beings and the world to a new and pragmatic understanding of this relationship. As Heidegger puts it, human beings are not in the world the way that a chair is in a room. Human existence is being in the world and it should be understood as essentially a worldly phenomenon. The world is not an external space but a place where Dasein dwells. The world is an ontological condition, the environment and home without which Dasein cannot exist.

The things Dasein encounters in the world are not just present at hand, or the objects of theoretical investigations, but handy, or ready to hand for definite purposes. Dasein's involvement with ready to hand entities is primordial to a theoretical investigation. Dasein makes use of things, encountering them not as mere objects of contemplation but as equipment:

...the less we just stare at the hammer thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly it is encountered as that which it is as equipment.30

Against the modern view of human relationships with the world, Heidegger argues that theoretical relationships are not the only possible way of having contact with things. The craftsman for example, does not view the hammer as an entity with certain physical properties, but as something for hammering. As a consequence, the world does not become a collection of extended things in space, but a web of significance. Dasein's approach to this web is a practical one of circumspect concern. It is noteworthy that the primordiality of the practical approach does not reduce the significance of theoretical cognition. Heidegger does not say that ready to hand is metaphysically prior to present at hand, nor that this use of ready to hand entities is at the same time blind. It has its own sight, which guides the manipulation of the entities. The craftsman knows what a hammer is for, but does not need to know the physical properties of a hammer in order to use it.

The world of Dasein is not only populated by ready to hand and present at hand entities. There is another class of being, which turns Dasein ontologically into social being. This class is the being of the other or Mitsein. The being of the other is an ontological condition like being in the

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world is for Dasein. This implies that the existence of the other does not require proof, as the being of Dasein presupposes the being of the other:

The entity which is 'othter' has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards others, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. The relationship of Being which one has towards the other ... then becomes a projection of one's own Being towards oneself; into something else', the other would be a duplicate of the Self.³¹

The esixtence of the other is neither problematic nor a threat to my existence. My relationship with the other is a projection towards myself because the other is a duplicate and Dasein like me. But this does not signify that the other is identical with the self, and hence the differences between them are eliminated. Dasein is in each case mine, and my being is unique and different in the sense that I have my own way and my own possibilities, which constitute my essence. The other, like the self, also has its own way and its own possibilities.

Being authentic, eigentlich, in contrast to being inauthentic, is being different from the other. The self and the other in the authentic mode of existence mutually recognise their differences. The being of Dasein is essentially being in the world with others, and the self and the other mutually recognise their differences. In addition, Heidegger believes that this relationship is not only epistemological, it is also built on the existential of "care" or Fürsorge. The recognition of the difference between the self and the other is an indication of the way these two entities care for one another. It is not shared ideology, not race or faith, which shapes the cultural life of human beings. Contrary to modern understanding of standardisation, it is "Care" and the submerging of difference which porvide a new ground for understanding culture. Heidegger's interpretation of the existence of the other is the rejection of solipsism, Cartesianism and Hegel's social anthropology.

Another important point is Heidegger's understanding of language and the priority of speech, which has influenced Derrida's analysis of the distinction between phonocentric and logocentric, and the remoteness of the latter from originating thought. Language for Heidegger is primarily

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cop und of t phonocentric, and speech (*Rede*) is the ontological foundation of language. His analysis begins with "Understanding", not as a faculty in the human mind but as an ontological condition prior to theoretical cognition. Understanding is also a prior condition for interpretation (*Auslegung*), because Dasein cannot interpret the meaning of an entity unless it understands it in the context of its fore structure.³² Language is proper to Dasein, because Dasein has privileged access to being or truth. But the language of the inauthentic mode of existence of modernity is characterised by ambiguity, and Dasein's relationship to the truth remains in oblivion. In heidegger's "Letter on Humanism", language is considered to be the house of Being, Dasein dwells in this house and is its custodian.

As mentioned before, inauthenticity reduces language to idle talk and thinking to calculation. The question that arises here is: how can Dasein as the custodian of the dwelling commit itself to the revealing of the truth? How can it regain its creative power? The answer to this question cannot be found in the productive metaphysics of industrial technological society. The saving power, as suggested by Heidegger, to end the darkening of the world is creative work or art. In this resolution, the work of art can play a central role to delineate Dasein as a custodian of the truth. Art, unlike technology, does not depend on calculative thinking and does not ravage the world, instead it reveals and guards the truth. In the work of art, Dasein is engaged in creation and producing authentically. Writhing against the despotism of modernity, Heidegger turns towards art as the only hope to rescue us and the world from the destructive forces of industrial technology. At the end of his essay on "The Question Concerning Technology", he concludes with a quotation from Holderlin:

But where danger is, grows

The saving power also...³³

As we know, Plato degraded the work of art. He considered it a copy, not creation, and excluded the poets from his Republic. Against Plato's understanding of art and his metaphysical speculation, which become one of the foundations of modernity, Heidegger restores the work of art to its true essence and accords the healing power to the poetic.

In conclusion, his phenomenological analysis of Dasein in the world,

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ess of narily and his emphasis on difference and authenticity, and on the destruction of the metaphysical subject, mark Heidegger's bold departure from modernity. This thinker has opened up the possibility of a new understanding of human existence, society and culture. Finally, I would like to say that, if my analysis of Heidegger's philosophy has some value, it is in starting a debate on his contribution to postmodernity, not finishing it.

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CAN MORAL REASONING BE PURELY DEDUCTIVE ?

GAUTAM SINHA

I

The topic strikes at a problem which has been very controversial in contemporary ethical thoughts. The Aristotelian model of deduction, has to its credit wide acceptability and applicability. There is a widespread belief that if any reasoning is rigorously logical, it has to be deductive. But such a reasoning demands the fulfilment of certain necessary and basic conditions. Our problem, at present, is to see whether moral reasoning is capable of meeting those demands.

In order to do this, paper intends to proceed in and through the following stages. First, it would try to outline, in a very general way the basic features of a really deductive reasoning. That would porvide the basic tools for making our final assessment. Then, the paper would consider the question as to why such a problem has come to demand considerations? We shall notice that there have been explicit examples of some models of moral reasoning advanced by some prominent ethicists like G.E. Moore, R.M. Hare, A.J. Ayer, Toulmin, Baier and others who deliberately put the examples of moral reasoning in the form of deductive reasoning. For the sake of brevity, here, we shall examine only G.E. Moore's model as a paradigm.

II

In a deductive model, the relation between premises and conclusion depends on rigorous rules of inferences. The premises and the conclusion are so related that once we accept the premises to be true, we have to accept the conclusion to be true, as well, and this is done not by the way of

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our own choice but by the command of the rules of inferences. There is no room for any personal decision or choice in such a case. whether what is stated in the premises is materially true or not has no bearing on the validity or invalidity of the reasoning. An example of a model of deductive reasoning can be shown in this regard:

All Men are God.

I am a man.

Therefore, I am God.

In the above reasoning, though the premises are not actually true, the conclusion still follows logically from them. If the premises are true, the conclusion has to be true, that is all that validity requires. The above model of deductive reasoning is valid because it is done in accordance with the rules of inferences.

It is important to note that there is a distinction between validity and truth. In a valid reasoning the premises need not be true, it is only required that the conclusion logically follows from the premises. It means that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.

Hence, it can be said that a deductive reasoning can be either valid or invalid. The conclusion of a valid deductive reasoning is contained in its premises. It means that conclusion is deducible from the premises. A deductive reasoning is invalid only if it is shown that it is possible for some arguments with the same form to have true premises and a false conclusion. For instance:

All Men are mortal.

Aristotle is mortal.

Therefore, Aristotle is a man.

The above reasoning is invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises, although all the premises happen to be true.

Ш

Now we have to begin with G.E. Moore's account of moral reasoning. What we gather from the preface of his book *Principia Ethica*, it appears that he opts for the deductive model of reasoning. He attempts to determine the general nature of moral reasoning and then explicate the role which a

moral reasoning has to play in moral talks, conversations and sermons. This becomes clear from his observations given as under:

"I have endeavoured to discover what are the fundamental Principles of ethical reasoning and the establishment of these principles, rather than of any conclusion which may be attained by their use, may be regarded as my main object".

Further, in order to drive home the point he starts by posing a question:

"...What is the nature of evidence, by which alone any ethical proposition can be proved or disproved, confirmed or rendered doubtful."²

And to meet the answer of the above question, he details the steps of his reasoning. He says that moral reasoning consists of a set of statements of both kinds, a statement regarding a self evident intuition, and a statement of causal relation. Its major premise is self-evident truth known as an intuition and its minor premise is such which states a causal relation. In other words, the minor premise provides a causal link between the premises and the conclusion. To prove the statement 'X is good', Moore argues thus,

Y is intrinsically good.
X causes Y.

Therefore, X is good.

The first premise of the above reasoning is a statement of intrinsic value and the second statement is causal in its nature. These two statements are a set of premises which entail the conclusion, "X is good", Thus, Moore seems to maintain the view that there is a logical relation between premises and the conclusion and the whole processes of reasoning is strictly governed by rigorous rules of inferences. Like a strict logician, Moore too, maintains that to accept the premises to be true and not to accept the conclusion to be true involves us into self contradiction. This gives us sufficient grounds to maintain that for G.E. Moore, reasoning applicable to moral pursuits is purely deductive in its nature.

IV

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Thus, we have outlined in a general way, the basic features of a

deductive reasoning and then we have also given the example of an ethicist like G.E. Moore who is thinking that moral reasoning can be deductive in its nature. Now we have to see as to whether the nature of moral reasoning in general is able to stand to test demanded by the pursuers of the deductive model of reasoning? In order to see this, we shall have to analyse deeply the basic features of the nature of a genuinely moral reasoning.

It appears that the passage involved in the case of a moral reasoning in between the premises and the conclusion is somehow not as rigid as it is supposed to be in the case of usual deductive reasoning. One significant point of a moral reasoning is the presupposition of moral commitment. The acceptability of a moral judgement, say 'Z' becomes expedient only when it is given under the reference of a system of commitment. When X tries to convince Y to accept the judgement 'Z', he intends to show that when Y accepts a system of moral commitment, he is also committed to accept the judgement 'Z' provided 'Z' is a judgement belonging to that paritcular system. That is to say, to accept a system of commitment to be true and not to accept the judgement belonging to that very system is to become inconsistent. The relation between these two is also logical, but it is not as rigorous as that of the relation of entailment. To be committed to certain moral systems under one frame work is logically weak but not self contradictory as it happens to be in the case of deductive reasoning.

Moral commitments are generally expressed in the form of generalisations. Prof. Rajendra Prasad in his paper "Justification of Ethics" has rightly conceived that:

"A maxim is more general than a singular judgement in the sense that the latter can be subsumed under it or treated as an exemplification of it"³.

Thus, a maxim is more general than a singualr judgement in the sense that the latter can be subsumed under the former, whereas a moral principle cannot be subsumed under any singular judgement. This cannot be an instance of any moral judgement whatsoever. On the other hand, in order to justify a singular moral judgement, one has to show that it is an instance of a moral principle which the opponent is committed to accept. Thus, a moral reasoning has, as its constituents, some maxims, some singular

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statement, and a statement of facts as their consequences. For example, suppose X gives this judgement to Y, 'The terrorists ought to be condemned for what they are doing in Jammu and Kashmir'. Now X may proceed to justify it by arguing thus:

- i) their actions are against national integrity and solidarity.
- ii) All actions which are against national integrity and solidarity ought to be condemned.

In the above reasoning ;(i)' states some facts '(ii)' expresses a maxim which is relevant to moral evaluation of such actions. The Judgement in question is justified on the ground that if one accepts '(i)' and '(ii)', then he is morally committed to accept the judgement in question and if he refuses to accept it, then his position apparently turns out to be inconsistent. This shows that the justification of a singular judgement necessarily involves a reference to the moral maxim or a principle. It is important to note that this reference is not always explicitly made. Most of the time the maxim is left unmentioned. This is a special feature of a moral reasoning that it is generally enthymematic in its character.

However, one more specific character of a moral principle is that it is not as strict as the general propositions of formal logic. Axioms and principles of formal logic do not admit of any exception, whereas the axioms and principles of ethics do allow such exceptions. For instance, stealing is wrong is a moral principle and it does have some exception because in some specific situtaions an act of stealing may not be wrong. Hence, it is not logically inconsistent to say 'in most of the cases stealing is wrong' instead of saying that 'stealing is wrong'. In this context, Prof. Rajendra Prasad again emphasises.

"It is because of the important role human decision plays in it that ethical reasoning becomes less rigorous than that of scientific reasoning. It is clearly not as rigorous as formal reasoning where decision plays (almost) no part."

Thus, 'The element of decision' seems to play a very significant role in moral reasoning, whereas in deductive reasoning there is no room for decision making. For example, the statement 'fire generates heat' to which a scientific law 'heat causes expansion' is applicable. This law is so

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precise that hardly it requires anybody to take a decision whether it is case of heat or not?

The notion of the heat used in the above example is more precise than that of the case of the theft referred in the moral law. This is the reason why a disagreement in moral discourse is not easily resolvable. Now since 'the element of decision' is an essential factor of a moral reasoning in it the relation between premises and conclusion cannot be that of entailment in the strict sense of the term. This line of thinking suggests yet another relevant point making out a difference between moral reasoning and a strictly deductive reasoning. For a deductive reasoning, examples are not at all relevant, the validity or the invalidity of the argument nowhere involves a reference to concrete facts, it is valid or invalid by dint of the very form of it. But contrary to this in moral reasoning, instances are invariably important and they have a role to play in determining the validity-invalidity of the reasoning.

Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, moral reasoning may be presented in a syllogistic form, although it has to be remembered that the relation between the premises and the conclusion is not as rigorous as in the case of a deductive reasoning. Some ethicists developed an appreciation towards the relation of entailment, hence, they attempted to introduce entailment relation in the model of moral reasoning. They feel that by doing so they would succeed in making moral reasoning scientific and thereby retaining a sort of a logical rigour in it. But this is a mistaken attempt based on improper understanding of the peculiar nature of moral reasoning. It seems that they are not able to appreciate fully the important and distinctive role that 'decision' has to play in moral reasoning.

Thus, in moral reasoning the relation between premises and conclusion is not as rigorous as it is in the case of deductive reasoning. In a deductive reasoning the inference is so strict and rigorous that it is not possible to accept the premises to be true and to deny the truthfulness of the conclusion. On the other, in case of moral reasoning, it would not be a contradiction to accept a moral rule 'everyone ought to keep one's promises' and a factual statement 'I promised something to my wife' but not to accept the judgement.' I ought to fulfil that promise to my wife'. Even though after a

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good promise sometimes due to extraordinary situation one is not able to fulfil one's promise. Such situations are not rare in one's moral life. This shows that the specific character of a moral reasoning is not exactly similar to that of a deductive reasoning. Hence, any attempt to introduce the entailment relation in the model of moral reasoning is not proper. The discussions made above give us sufficient ground to conclude that the reasoning acceptable in morality cannot be purely deductive in its nature.

V

But, at this point, one important clarification has to be made that, 'the decision element' of moral reasoning does not distort its objectivity. A moral judgement is justified by its reference to a moral maxim or a principle. That gives to moral reasoning a sort of an objectivity and universality. Such a reasoning works among those who are committed to give credence to and to accept that particular law of morality or maxim. Now, everybody who accepts that particular law or the maxim cannot afford, without being inconsistent not to accept the judgement subsumed under it. The maxims referred express some moral commitments which are acceptable not only to one individual alone but also acceptable to all those who are the members of that particular society to which such commitments belong. Hence, moral reasoning becomes public and objective. Moral maxims are also authoritative on the ground that they are not creation of an individual alone but an outcome of their use during the long period of time. They are, in fact, handed down to us from generation to generation as a part of our social and cultural heritage.

Thus, we can conclude that although moral reasoning may be presented in a sysllogistic form but the relation between premises and conclusion cannot be that of entailment because 'the element of decision' seems to play very important role in it.

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- 2. Ibid, VIII,
- 3. Prof. Rajendra Prasad, "Justification in Ethics," The Indian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, (1959) p. 6

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THE CONSCIOUS PENDULUM: A PHYSICIST'S APPROACH

RADHEY SHYAM KAUSHAL

1. Introduction

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It is now well known that the laws of objective sciences in general and that of physics in particular show ^{1,2} limitations as and when the role of consciousness and/or of free-will of the being (sometimes known as "uncontrollable parameters" from the point of view of science) in the description of a phenomenon is invoked. For example, an inanimate piece of stone when thrown in space will follow a parabolic trajectory, however, not necessarily an alive bird. While several examples can be cited to this effect, here in this article, we shall concentrate on the case of a so called 'simple' pendulum.

The simple pendulum, very widely studied and used in physics and engineering since the time of Newton, is, in fact, an idealized picture not only in mathematical terms but also in terms of mental constructs. As a matter of fact the simplicity of such a system is attributed³ to the facts that (i) the string used is assumed to be massless, (ii) the suspended mass, (called 'bob') is assumed to be a (geometrical) point mass. On the top of these two assumptions there is a third one, namely (iii) during the oscillations the restoring force on the point mass at any instant is (linearly) proportional to Its displacement from the mean position. Such an idealized picture when used to explain a variety of phenomena, whose occurrence in Nature ranges from micro (atomic) scales to mega and giga (cosmic) scales, has provided highly satisfactory results in the lowest-order itself vis-a-vis experiments. As far as the use of this mental construct at different space-time scales is concerned the same has been carried out mainly on the basis of structural

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analogy⁴ which either appears or someimes made to appear at different levels in the description of the phenomenon.

Departures from such a simplicity of the "physics pendulum have been discussed3.5 at length in many books (starting from school level to research level) and in many ways on all the three fronts arising from the underlying assumptions or ingredients of the pendulum mentioned above. In this context, an extensive literature can be found where not only the cases of a massive string (with reference to assumption (i)), an extended suspended bob (assumption (ii)), a nonlinear force-law (assumption (iii)) can be found but also the cases6 of time varying length and/or mass of the pendulum are discussed. To the best of my knowledge the role of consciousness in the use of a simple (!) pendulum has not so far been invoked in the description of a phenomenon. In fact in the description of physical phenomenon one does not require this role of uncontrollable parameters, particularly when the bob (suspended mass) and the observer of the time of oscillations of the pendulum are the inanimate objects. As a matter of fact the laws of physics work ideally for such a situation. But there are several other situations (with a reference to the biological systems) where the laws of physics are bound² to fail. Besides biological systems the situation can as well arise in the modelling of phenomenon in ecology and social sciences.

Now the question arises as to how to account for these uncontrollable parameters attributed to the consciousness either of bob or of observer or of both. To this effect we shall make use of a philosophical atom-type model^{7,8} (in brief called 'patomic' model) of the human being for the conscious bob and/ or observer and see as to what extent the role of consciousness can be quantified as far as the study of such processes is concerned. Before proceeding further a mention of the patomic model of human being at this stage is essential. For the human being, who happens to be the common factor in the processes of realizing (an inward-subjective process based on the outward experiences) and describing (an outward-objective process based on inward experiences) a phenomenon occurring in Nature, this model offers⁷ an arrangement of the essences of life within the framework of the Vedantic philosophy. While this arrangement is capable of accounting for the functioning of both the inner and outer faculties

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suspe (c₁) a of understanding (at least in the lowest-order) of the human being, is, however very much similar to the Bohr atomic model of matter.

In the next section we categorize the situations pertaining to the conscious pendulum and introduce the terminology needed to describe these situations in philosophical terms. The process of measurement of the time period in different situations are analysed in detail in Section³. In section⁴, we look for an account for the consciousness arising from various essences of life of the being and suggest some possible ways (of course under highly simplifying assumptions) to accommodate it in the formal tools of physics. Concluding remarks are made in Section⁵.

2. Conscious Pendulum and the Types of Interactions

As compared to the past, the 'simple' (physics) pendulum at present seems more idealized in mathematical terms and definitely very far from the reality of Nature, in view of the presently advanced computing techniques. Moreover, in the spirit of the three-world concept of Popper and Eccless⁹, one can understand the role of physics pendulum as follows. One world is that which actually exists in Nature (absolute reality), the second one which a human being perceives through its sense organs including mind, intellect and the faculty of memory, and the third is one which physical laws (or mathematical models) describe. It is perhaps the last world (i.e., only a restricted component of the whole) that is dealt with by the physics pendulum. Depending upon the characteristics of the bob and of the observer (who is measuring the number of oscillations or the time period, defined as the time required for one oscillation of the pendulum) one can have the following three situations:

- (A) The bob is performing the oscillations and an instrument (say a photo-cell arrangement) is measuring the time period or counting the oscillations in accordance with the rules set by the physical laws.
- (B) The bob is performing the oscillations and a human being (student) is directly measuring the time period and counting the oscillations in the laboratory with a stop watch.
- (C) An alive object (say, a bird, or a charming girl is singing) suspended from the string (rope), is performing the oscillations and then (c_1) an instrument is measuring the time period and counting the oscillations,

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ent is ulties and (c_2) a human being (student, say a boy) is directly measuring the time period and counting the oscillations. There are several other particular situations of the case (c_2) , namely when (c_3) the oscillating mother is watched by her crying baby who is waiting for the breast feed and also counting the oscillations, (c_4) the oscillating bird is very hungry and the student in close proximity is holding a piece of bread (to the liking of the bird) in his hand while counting the oscillations.

(D) When the oscillating being itself is measuring the time period and there is no external observer.

Note that it is only the case (A) in which the laws of physics perfrom a fair play after accounting for all the departures from the simplicity of physics pendulum discussed in Section 1. Of course, we neglect in this case also the interactions between the pendulum and the measuring instrument and write the physical Hamiltonian H_{phy} purely for the motion of the pendulum including the effect of damping due to air resistance. While the consciousness is going to play an important role in all the other cases (cf. cases (B)-(D)), the case (B) and (c₁) can be considered alike to some extent. In cases (B)-(D), in addition to H_{phy} one should also have another term $H_{nonphys}$ in the total Hamiltonian of the system under study beside the role of the measuring apparatus, mainly to account for the role of nonphysical processes or of uncontrollable parameters.

Before embarking on the role of consciousness in these processes through the H_{nonphys} term in the Hamiltonian (a measure of energy) H in the next section we introduce here, following our earlier work (of. Ref (8), chapter 4), some more terminology for the purpose. In fact, within the framework of the patomic model we present the following alternative (or suplementary, depending upon the situation) ways to classify the above situations at subtle level.

1. If x is the physical (p) matter (as detected by the instrument/apparatus alone), then x+ consciousness is defined ⁸ as the epiphysical (EP) matter (as perceived by a living being, say a human being). If x also happens to be the source of consciousness (living being), then it would be designated as x + consciousness + source of consciousness and denoted by SEP, i.e., the special epiphysical matter, Note that S, E and P here may

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refer to the same or different objects and a prime on them will be attributed for different objects.

2. In the reduced version of the patomic model one groups the ingredients (WO, B, SE, M, I, E, SO), of a human being into three subsets, namely $\mathfrak{G} \equiv (WO, B, SE)$, $\mathbf{M} \equiv (M, I, E)$, $\epsilon \equiv (SO)$ and respectively terms them as 'gross', 'micro' and 'causal' bodies of the being. In fact, while the presence of he subset \mathfrak{G} is essential for the existence of a being, the human being b is the union of \mathfrak{G} . \mathbf{M} and ϵ , viz., b $\equiv \mathfrak{G} \cup \mathbf{M} \cup \epsilon$. Further, for the puroses of describing the interactions between the human beings one needs 8 only five (minimal number) quanta (Tanmātrās) for b-b interaction, namely $^t\mathfrak{G}\mathfrak{G}$, $^t\mathfrak{G}\mathfrak{M}$, $^t\mathfrak{G}\epsilon$. $^t\mathfrak{M}\mathfrak{M}$, $^t\mathfrak{M}\epsilon$ under some simplifying assumptions.

3. Description of Interactions

Note that the space-time motivated physical laws account only for a limited part of the total interactions taking place within and among the living beings. The socalled 'motion' of an oscillating bob itself is purely an outcome of the space time structure of Nature. It is the space time concept which leads to the physics terminology like motion, position, velocity, acceleration etc. and finally the nature of various physical forces, such as contact force, action at a distance, action at a time and to some extent action at a space time type forces. While the contact and action at a distance type forces are much talked about in physics and physical processes, the discussion of the third, action at a time and the fourth, action at a space time type forces, is tactfully avoided often either by incorporating convenient assumptions in the theory (such as the constancy of velocity of light in vacuum) or by limiting the validity of physical laws in terms of the causality principle. No doubt there is enough scope for a 'generalized' causality principle in the Vedantic philosophy8, however, physicists are afraid of entering in a domain beyond space and time since "even angels fear to tread" in that.

For the 'physics' pendulum a highly limited local part of the totality of interaction, described by the Hamiltonian $H_{phys} = (p^2/2m) + (w^2x^{2/2})$, where M is the mass of the bob and $T = (2\pi/w)$ is the time period of the pendulum, is found to describe the physical (space-time based) properties

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of the system. Of course a damping term (again of local nature) is also present in H_{phys} which accounts for the air resistance during the motion. In these descriptions, not only some important nonlocal (derived again from the space and time) interactions but also the interactions beyond the domain of sapce and time are ignored. In what follows we outline briefly some processes (of. different situations of Section 2) whose origin can be attributed to this latter class of interactions, namely the interactions (of their effects) which are not based on the space-time structure of Nature, however, manifest through the time period of the pendulum. Clearly, the situation (A) of section 2 is well within the domain of physics. For other situations of section 2, the follwing description, based on the patomic model of human being, can be advanced. (B) In this case the student measuring the time period of the suspended bob can be considered as the extended 'apparatus' (in the language of Von Neumann¹⁰⁾) in the sense that beside the gross body 9 (which plays the role somewhat similar to the physical apparatus of case (A)), the student is also using his micro body M in the presence of ε . As a matter of fact, the actions like holding the stop watch in his hand and later seeing the time in it while counting the oscillations etc, are the functions of B and SE in 9 and the same are performed in the presence of M and SO. In fact it is the intellect I of M which records the increasing time in the watch and the rules of measurement 11) as well. Further, the faculty of memory E of M, where the numerals are stored for the purpose of counting, is also used by the student. Besides the mood of the student (attributed to the role of mind, M, in the measurement process), B, SE, I and E all work in consonance and that too in the presence of the consciousness which originates from SO, the ultimate observer in the language of Vedantic philosophy 12. Thus, in the situation (B) the interactions are EP - SEP type. (C) In general, this is the case of interaction of two beings (designated as b-b type or S, E, P, - SEP type (cf. Ref. (8), Chapter 6). If both the suspended bob and the measuring instrument are replaced by the human beings (cf. case (c,)) then in general all the five quanta of interaction ^t 9 9, ^t 9 M, ^t 9 E. ^t MM, ^t ME. will come into play, otherwise some of them will be suppressd for other beings (like bird) and also for some particular situations (cf. cases (c3) and (c4)) of the b-b' case, However, if the measuring apparatus is a physics instrument (cf. case

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 (c_1)) then this situation is analogous to the situation (B) since in that case one considers the SEP-EP interactions provided the instrument need to be watched by a 'living bob'. As in situation (B), the exchanged quanta here will be ${}^{\tau} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{G}$, ${}^{\tau} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{M}$, ${}^{\tau} \mathcal{G} \mathcal{E}$, which will mediate the interaction. On the other hand, if the instrument is watched by another 'living' observer, then this is the case of SEP - É, P, interaction.

Now consider the cases (c₃) and (c₄) as examples of the suppression of some of the interactions. In these cases the self-organizing forces, which orginate from the domain of m and manifest through the domain of \mathfrak{G} , will come into play and clearly dampen the motion and thereby enhance the time period of the oscillating system. To elaborate further, in both cases (c₂) and(c₄) the essence of life M will dominate the interactions by suppressing more I and relatively less E. However, in the two cases different biological processes (attributed to the essence. B) will take place and the interaction will be mediaated through different vertices in the same domain of §, i.e., through SE. Even in SE, the skin in consonance with M will dominate the process in case (c3) whereas in case (c4) it is the toungue which will dominate the process in consonance with M. In either case the time period is going to decrease provided the crying baby (or the student holding the bread-piece) is near the equilibrium position of the pendulum. If they stand near either of the end points of the pendulum then the situation will be different and the chances of enhancing the time period of the pendulum are there. On the other end, the crying baby in case (c3), hopefully, is unaware of the processes going on inside the mother, whereas the boy holding the bread for the hungry bird in case (c4) is very well aware of the weakness of the oscillating bird and can as well play some tricks to control the time period further.

(D) This is an interesting case in the sense that one can visualize/ realize the role of self reference/consciousness and see as to how hte consciousness can create the space and time. If the oscillating being b decides (the role of 1) to withdraw from the extroworld and uses his free-will toward, SO, then the role of space and time even as a functional of E may not be there. Otherwise, the space and time start originating in E and project themselves in the extroworld (constituted by WO) through all or some of the essences of life out of I, M, SE and B. Again at the level of I,

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out of many choices for the space and time which can finally be projected through SE and B for the search of a reference point outside (extroworld) to recount the time period, the being b decides one such a choice. Also, this reference point outside could be sensitive to any of the sense organs in SE through which the consciousness will manifest in the process of counting the oscillations. Note that the time period will again depend not only on the priorities predecided at the level of the functionals of E, I and M but also on the situation of the reference point outside.

4. Accounting for the Counsciousness in Physical Theories

In this section, we make an attempt to quantify various interactions taking place in the process of measurement of the time period of the conscious pendulum and that too under highly simplifying assumptions. Note that for the case (A), as mentioned before, the Hamiltonian H_{phys} describes the system in a restricted sense, i.e., when one ignores the effects of interaction of the bob with the physical apparatus (PA), otherwise for the total Hamiltonian, in general, one should write

$$H_{tot} = H_{phys} + H_{int} . {1}$$

where $H_{int} = H_{p-PA}$ is the interaction of the suspended bob (P) with the apparatus PA. For the case (B), the H_{int} takes the form

$$H_{int} = H_{b-p} + H_{b-pA} = H_{p-pA}$$
 (2)

where H_{b-p} and H_{b-PA} are the interactions arising due to the presence of the living being b and attributed mainly to its consciousness manifesting in the system (which now consists of both the suspended and the measuring objects). As a matter of fact one can as well consider the student, who is measuring the time period, as a part of the extended measuring apparatus which will now consist not only of PA but also of B, SE, M, I and E as well. Within the framework of the patomic model one can, in general, write Hb-p as ⁸

$$H_{b-p} = H_{B-P} + H_{SE-P} + H_{M-P} + H_{1-P} + H_{E-P}$$
(3)

and a similar expression for $H_{b\text{-PA}}$ In fact it will be only the $H_{b\text{-PA}}$ - type term on the r. h. s. of (2) that will be present for the case (C_1) . Here onward we use a prime on the quantities designating the suspended object.

While the interaction Hamiltonian H_{int} will be very simple for case

The Conscious Pendulum : A Physicist's Approach

(D), namely $H_{int} = H_{b' \cdot b}$, for cases (c_2) - (c_4) however the being-being interaction ¹³⁾. $H_{b' \cdot p}$ will come into play and H_{int} in general will involve 32 terms within the framework of the patomic model, viz.,

$$H_{int} = H_{b-PA} + H_{b'-PA} + H_{b'-b}$$

$$= H_{b-PA} + H_{b'-PA} + H_{B'-B} + H_{B'-SE} + H_{B'-M} + H_{B'-E} + H_{B'-E}$$

$$+ H_{B'-SO} + H_{SE'-B} + H_{SE'-SE} + H_{SE'-M} + H_{SE'-E} + H_{SE'-E}$$

$$+ H_{SE'-SO} + H_{M'-B} + H_{M'-SE} + H_{M'-M} + H_{M'-E} + H_{M'-SO}$$

$$+ H_{I'-B} + H_{I'-SE} + H_{I'-M} + H_{I'-E} + H_{I'-E} + H_{I'-SO} + H_{E'-B}$$

$$+ H_{E'-SE} + H_{E'-M} + H_{E'-I} + H_{E'-E} + H_{E'-SO}$$
(4)

As such it is difficult to analyse the effect of these 32 terms in a process. Indeed the various terms in (4) involve highly varying degree of couplings (strengths) in terms of consciousness. The relative importance of these terms is decided on the basis of the phenomenon under study in the intro and extro-world8. It is the consciousness which creates 8 the space, time and geometry pertaining to this phenomenon. However, some simplificatios can be achieved for the following reasons. Recall that all the essences of life, namely B, SE, M, I, and E are active (or operative) only in the presence of SO of b, i. e., in the presence of the consciousness. Also, SO of b and SO of b are the manifestations of the same⁸ cosmic consciousness. As a result, one not only ignores the terms H_{so'-so} and H_{so-so'} in (4) (as they provide the cosmic background for the existence of objects) but also ignores $H_{SO'-B}$, $H_{SO'-SE}$, $H_{SO'-M}$, $H_{SO'-I}$, $H_{SO'-E}$ and notes that $H_{B'.B} = H_{B.B'}$, $H_{SE'.SE} = H_{SE.SE'}$, $H_{M'.M} = H_{M.M'}$, $H_{I'.I} = H_{I.I}$ and $H_{E'.E} = H_{I.I}$ H_{E-E}, hold under certain approximations. Thus, some of the terms in (4) can easily be dropped to avoid double counting of the effect or due to their relatively less importance in the sense of intensity of consciousness.

Alternative 'y, one can start with the reduced version of the patomic model to write (4) as

 $H_{inl} = H_{b-PA} + H_{g-sg} + H_{g-m} + H_{g-e} + H_{m'-m} + H_{m'-e}$ (5) where again some of the terms like $H_{m'-sg}$, H_{e^-sg} , H_{e^-sm} , H_{e^-sg} are dropped for the reasons mentioned above. Corresponding to the last five terms on the r. h. s. of (5), there xist 8 five qunata of interaction between the human beings as mentioned in section 2.

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With regard to the situations in cases (c_3) and (c_4) only a few terms in (4) will dominate and the rest can be considered as perturbation. For example, for the case (c_3) , $H_{B'-B}$, $H_{SE'-B}$, $H_{SE'-SE}$, $H_{M'-B}$. $H_{M'-SE}$, will dominate the processes. On the other hand, the processes in case (c_4) are more complicated from the point of view of analysis. In case (c_3) , while the baby has resorted to crying only, in case (c_4) the student holding the breadpiece has lot of free will. Suppose the student decides to feed the bird emotionally, then beside the interactions $H_{b-PA'}$, $H_{b'-PA}$ the other dominating interactions in (4) are $H_{B'-B}$, $H_{B'-SE}$, $H_{B'-M}$, $H_{SE'-B}$, $H_{SE'-SE'}$, $H_{SE'-M}$, $H_{m'-B'}$, which will help the bird in snatching the bread-piece from the student.

Broadly speaking whenever a living being is involved in the system under study the total Hamiltonian can be written as:

$$H_{tol} = H_{phys} + H_{nonphys}, \tag{6}$$

where H_{phys} now accounts for all space-time mediated interactions, and $H_{nonphys}$ accounts for all other interactions attributed to noncoutrollable parameters arising from the free will of the being. The Hamiltonians (3) and (4) account for some of these interactions at the level of fine-tuning of subtle nature. In the quantum domain, if H_{tol} in (6) alongwith its pieces is hermitian, then, in general, the effects of measurement and consciousness together will manifest 8 through the physical 'action', viz.

exp [-i
$$H_{phys}$$
 t/h - i $H_{nonphys}$ M/g] $|\psi\rangle$ (7)

where $|\psi\rangle$ is the wavefunction of the system¹⁴ which now includes the apparatus and the human being. Here u is the meditation parameter responsible for the change of decisions of the free will in the being and its role in the action (7) can be considered to be the same as that of t in H_{phys} , and g is another Planck-like constant analogous to h. The constant g can appropriately be attributed to the quantum of consciousness if the same plays any role what so ever in the above mentioned situations, even though at the quantum level.

5. Concluding Discussion

With a view to quantifying the role of consciousness in physical theories, the example of a simple pendulum from physics is investigated in great detail with reference to different choices of the oscillating bob and

the measuring apparatus. The patomic model of the human being is frequently used to analyse the underlying (non space-time mediated) interactions and the corresponding processes. While the space-time mediated interactions, which account for the laws of physics and the physical processes, are however found inadequate for the description of consciousness-manifesting-phenomena in nature. An explanation of this latter class of phenomena definitely requires the interactions which are beyond the concept of space and time. In that domain, however, the variables like meditation parameter, the number of degrees of freedom of the free will of the being b etc are introduced in this work for the first time. The effect of different physio-psychic processes on the time period of the 'conscious' pendulum is analysed and demonstrated through examples.

It may be mentioned that the physical laws are capable of accounting for every characteristic of the bob (e.g., when the bob is massive, charged of magnetic etc.) except for its conscious character, if it is there. This may be because of the lack of understanding of this concept in living beings or due to the inadequacies persisting in the methods used for this purpose. In the present work the efforts are made, perhaps for the first time, to accommodate both these features through the popular example of simple pendulum. Moreover, an account of these features in the formal tools of physics can not be denied indefinitely in view of the advancing technologies in science in general and in biosciences in particular.

It is true that in physics we always come across the space-time based observables and their origin lies again in the sapce time mediated interactions. In recent years, several experimental situations have been noticed^{2,15} (and many more are expected in future) where non-space-time inspired innteractions can affect the space-time-based observables discussed in this Article. Conversely, space-time based interactions of physics can as well affect the non-space time inspired observables in the process of measurement such as the pain, pleasure, feeling etc. The conscious pendulum discussed here is one such example from classical mechanics. In the quantum domain, however, there have been considerable efforts since the birth of quantum mechanics (1925-26) to understand properly its foundational aspects, however by keeping aside the consciousness again. It may be of interest to study a conscious double-slit

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experiment on the lines of the present conscious pendulum. This might give some clue towards the role of consciousness in quantum measurement problem.

NOTES

The author expresses his gratitude to Dr. D. Parashar for a critical reading of the manuscript and Dr. R. S. Mital for several useful discussions. Thanks are also due to Professors R. K. Mishra, V. K. Bharadwaj and S. R. Bhatt for their encouragement to look into this demanding and obscure subject of consciousness in the domain of physics.

- See, for example, Pro. First National Conf. on "Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness" ed. by Sangeetha Menon et. al (National Inst. of Ad. Studies, NIAS, Bangalore, 1999)
- 2. Roger Penrose, "Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness", (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1994)
- 3. See, for example, R. S. Kaushal, "Is the Simple Pendulum Really Simple?: A Theoretical Perspective", to appear in 'Physics Teacher' (Calcutta), and the references therein.
- 4. Radhey Shyam Kaushal, "The Role of Structure Analogy in Physical Sciences", Ind. Phil. Quarterly 26 (1999) 543-73.
- 5. See, for example, D. S. Mathur, "Mechanics", (S. Chand & Co., Ltd., New Delhi, 1985), P. Hagedorn, "Non linear Oscillations" 2nd ed., (Oxford Univ. Press, 1988).
- R. S. Kaushal, "Construction of Exact Invariants for Time Dependent Classical Dynamical Systems", Int. Jour. Theo. Phys. 37 (1998) 1793-1856.
- 7. Based on the spirit of Vedantic philosophy, in this model the essences of life, namely wordly objects (WO), biological body (B), ten sense organs responsible for the knowledge and action (SE), mind (M), intellect (I), ego (E), the innermost existence in its purest form, i.e. soul (SO), and the seed of life, i. e., being (b) constitute the ingredients. The functioning and the arrangement of these ingredients in the human being is quantified in analogy (see, for example, R. S. Kaushal, Ind. Phil. Quarterly 26 (1999) 543) with the

atomic model of matter, viz., WO≡nucleus, b≡electron, B, SE M, I,

E≡discrete energy levels in a loose sense, SO≡continuum. The being b,

philosophical atom-type model (appropriately coined as 'patomic' model) is designed for the human being (the 'perfect' creation of God), it can as

well be used for other living beings with appropriate changes with

references to the essences of life. For further details see, Radhey Shyam Kaushal, "Human Beings: From the point of view of a philosophical atomic

model", Journal of Scientific & Ind. Res. (New Delhi) 49 (1990) 578-82 and

when placed in one of the states B, SE, M, I and E (which are arranged in an ascending order towards the continuum SO), is capable of performing both upward (rare) and downward (frequent) transitions in the same way as the electron performs the transitions in an atom. Such an arrangement is eading considered as to be placed in the field (the finest possible one) of cosmic ssions. consciousness of which the SO is a part and the same is manifestly in tune dS.R. constantly with the functioning of b in this world (characterized by WO) bscure since the downward transitions of b are more frequent than the upward ones. As a matter of fact the upward transitions. In some sense provide (emanate) relatively more peace to the individual whereas the downward ophical ones lead to more pleasure as the peace and pleasure are complementary in al Inst. their essence "ananda" (unlike the emission and the absorption processes in the case of Bohr model of matter). It may be noted that while this

Ref. (8) below.
 Radhey Shyam Kaushal, "The Philosophy of the Vedānta: A Modern Scientific Perspective", Garib Das Oriental Series No. 179. Sri Satguru Publications, Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1994, Also see, Radhey Shyam Kaushal, Ph. D. Thesis, "Patomic Model of the Human Being in the Context of Modern Science" (unpublished), Delhi Univ., 1998.

9. K. Popper and J. Eccles, "The Self and the Brain" (Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1981). Actually, the definitions of the three worlds of Popper and Eccles is slightly different in philosophical terms. What is given here is their somewhat simplified version.

 J. Von Neumann, "Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics" (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1955)

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- As a matter of fact it is conciousness of the human being in general (or of any other being for that matter) which creates space and time. This fact can 11. easily be understood as follows. Suppose a person, who has withdrawn himself from the extroworld (namely from the functional domains not only of the biological body B but also of the ten sense organs SE) is trying to sit in 'Samdhi' to concentrate on the questions of "where", "When,", "Who", "Why", "Whom", "Whose" etc. with reference to a particular event occured in his actions/behaviour. For him, it is only the answer of "where" and "when" which will bring in the maximum role of space and time respectively in an understanding the event during the meditation, otherwise the answers of other questions can be sought without any reference to space and time. The meditation again comprises of three sub-processes. namely the processes of feeling, analysing and recalling which respectively can be attributed to the functional domains of M, I and E of b. Note that out of the infinite degrees of freedom of the free-will of b which come into play at the initial stages of the Samadhi/meditation, the search for the answers of "where" and "when" requires only two degrees of freedom of the free will and the same leads to the concept of space and time for b with reference to its extroworld.
 - 12. Srīmad-Bhagvad Gītā, Chapter 3, Verse 42.
 - 13. R. S. Kaushal, "Human Communication and Cognition: A Scientific Outlook in Vedantic Philosophy". *Int. Jour. of Commun.* 5 (1995) p. 111-124, Also, in "Indian Theory of Language and Knowledge" ed. by R. C. Sharma (Bahri Publications, New Delhi, 1996).
 - 14. Radhey Shyam Kaushal, "Plurality of Consciousness in Vedantic Philosophy and its role in Scientific Observations", in Pro. First Nat. Conf. On "Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness" ed. by S. Menon et al. (National Inst. of Ad. Studies, Bangalore, 1999) p. 346-361.
 - 15. R. K. Mishra and Shashi Wadhwa, "The Reality of the Experiential: The 'First Reason' in Series on the Living State the Mind, Science and the Puzzle of Yoga, Issued on the occasion of Conf. on Beyond the Brain-Ill, St. John's College, Cambridge, U. K., August, 1999.

FREE WILL AND VALUE

Maushumi Guha

In this paper, I shall explore the relationship, if any, between the concept of a person as a free individual and the concept of a person as a responsible and moral individual. I shall develop my argument in a manner as to show an intimate connection between freedom and value in our conceptual framework. I shall attempt to show, that our conception of a human agent or a human person essentially involves the conception of one, who has freedom of the will and is thereby responsible for one's actions. To define the limits of my enquiry, I shall concentrate on three articles 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person' by H. G. Frankfurt (1971)¹, 'Responsibility for self' by C. Taylor (1976) and 'Free agency' by G. Watson (1975). The article by Frankfurt contains a view that I consider inadequate for a complete understanding of the sense in which a person can be called a free and responsible individual. After an attempt to show the inadequacies of that view, I shall launch into my positive thesis. In that, I shall take the help of the other two articles, which in my opinion provide a better understanding of the relation between freedom and value in the context of human action.

The Will of a person and the Two Senses of 'rational'

In his article, Frankfurt reacts to an earlier conception of a person as someone who can be ascribed both physical and psychological characteristics². Central to Frankfurt's conception of a person is the structure of the will. According to him, the will of a person is defined by both first order and second-order desires. Second-order desires are desires about desires. On the one hand, a person is capable of having desires like,

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'I want to have a cup of tea' and 'I want to read this article' and on the other, she is capable of having desires like, 'I want to want to have a cup of tea' and 'I want to want to read this article'. This capacity to have second-order desires enables a person to evaluate her first-order desires. As Frankfurt says, a person has 'the capacity for reflective self-evaluation'.

The difference between first-order and second-order desires easily leads to the difference between a will and a desire. Suppose, in the examples given above, I want my desire to read the article to take effect and so, instedad of a tea break, I continue to read. Under the circumstances, my desire to read the article becomes my will -it makes me read the article. Whereas, my desire to have tea is a mere desire that is subdued, even though I like the idea of having tea. It is not translated into action and so it does not constitute a will. As Frankfurt says, 'An agent's will is an effective desire'. So, even though every will is a desire, every desire is not a will.

It is clear from the above discussion that not all first-order desires constitute a person's will. In a similar way, not all second-order desires go to make a person's will either. All 'second order desires relevant to the formation of the will are what Frankfurt calls, 'second-order volitions',. To take the examples given above, my desire to desire to read the article is a second-order volition because it makes my desire to read the article, a will, It makes that desire materialise. But my desire to desire to have tea is not a second-order volition because it does not allow my desire to have tea to take effect. So it seems, that a kind of evaluation³ takes place at the level of second-order desires. A person has 'the capacity for reflective self-evaluation' not just because she has second-order desires, but because she has second-order volitions.

If a person is one who has second-order volitions, a non-person is one who does not. Frankfurt calls a non-person, a 'wanton'. Going by his conception, a wanton is one who either has no control over her first-order desires, or has no desire to control them. This is mostly because she has no second-order desires whatsoever. Even if she does have *some* second-order desires, they are not of the kind that makes volitions. A rat that eats corn and destroys crops is a wanton by Frankfurt's definition, because it does not *think* wherher it wants to destroy the crops or not (in all probability, it does not even know that it is destroying the crops). It has no

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second-order desires about its first-order desire to eat corn. It simply has a desire and it acts to fulfil that desire. On the other hand, a drug-addict may consume prohibited drugs even though she has a second-order desire not to have the desire to have drugs. By Frankfurt's definition, even she is a wanton because her second-order desire does not move her to act. She does not stop from having drugs. Her second-order desire is not a volition.

To say that a wanton is not capable of second-order volitions is not to say that she completely lacks rational capacities4. For instance, the drug-addict mentioned above may be a great mathematician or a famous lawyer. Even if we do not go that far, she may be able to make rational calculations to see how much money is required to buy a packet of heroin etc. What Frankrurt seems to say is, that the way in which a wanton may be called 'rational' and the way in which a person may be called 'rational', are defferent. A wanton is 'rational' in the minimal sense of that term, the sense in which she is capable of calculating how to make ends and means meet. A person, on the other hand, is rational in a more developed sense of that term, a sense in which she is capable of evaluating her desires and actions practically or prudently. She is rational because she aims at coherence, and thinks how to maximise the fulfilment of desires by maintaining order and consistency at the same time. Frankfurt says, 'What distinguishes a rational wanton from other rational agents is that [s]he is not concerned with the desirability of [her] desires themselves'. Unlike a drug-adict or an alcoholic, if a rational person wants to smoke or drink, she does not succumb to her desire without giving it some serious thought. She thinks whether her desire is one that she would want to satisfy or not-whether it is a desire that should itself be desired or not. In other words, she uses her rational capacities to decide whether she wants her desire to have drugs to be her will or not.

From the above discussion emerge two senses of the term 'rational'. For frankfrut, a person is rational in the second sense of the term. That is the sense in which she is capable of making prudent choices, of taking practical decisions. For instance, a person who always uses the pedestrian crossing and follows traffic rules is practical, for that way she avoids accidents as far as possible. She is sensible and rational because she

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understands that a smooth flow of traffic will not only protect her life but also cause minimum loss of time. In being rational, she makes use of her capacity to evaluate her first-order desires and decisions, keeping in mind their practical implications.

Freedom of Action and Freedom of the Will

The question is, does rationality in the above sense (in the sense in which Frankfrut conceives a rational person) imply the activity of a free will? In other words, how does Frankfurt conceive the relation between a free will and a person? More importantly, what is a free will according to Frankfurt? Frankfurt thinks that a person can be called a 'free agent' in two ways. This is because the word 'free' can be used to denote either a free actoin or a free will. A person may either have a free will or enjoy freedom of action. So she can be said to be a free agent either because she enjoys freedom of the will or because she acts freely. The way in which an action is free is different from and independent of the way in which the will is free. A person need not necessarily have both freedom of action and a free will. So, for Frankfurt, the concept of a free will is not essential to the concept of a person.

How is the freedom of action different from the freedom of the will? The freedom of action has to do with the fulfilment of first-order desires. The freedom of the will has to do with the fulfilment of secondorder volitions. I may have tea when I want to have tea. Then my act of having tea is a free one. If a first-order desire is translated into action, then that action is free. Animals can be said to enjoy freedom of action in this sense. A rabbit wants to eat a carrot and eats one Nobody prevents it from eating a carrot. So, it is free to eat a carrot. We can understand the notion of a free will by drawing an analogy with the notion of a free action. A person is free to act when she is free to do what she wants to do. A person has a free will when she is free to will what she wants to will. To take an example, I may want to have tea and I may also want my desire to have tea, to materialise. Then, if I have tea, not only do I act freely, my action expresses my secon-order vloition to have the will to have tea. A person does not have the freedom to act when she is not free to translate her first-order desires into actions. Analogously, a person does not have a free will when she has first-order desires that she does not want to become life but e of her in mind

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effective but which take effect nonetheless, or when she cannot have effective first order desires that she wants to be effective.

So we have seen how the word 'free' can be used in two different ways, to describe a free action and a free will. Let us see how Frankfurt shows, that the freedom of action and the freedom of the will are independent of each other. According to him, the freedom of action is not a sufficient condition for the freedom of the will. An individual can have the freedom to act without having the will to be free. This is best illustrated in the case of animals. The rabbit, which eats a carrot because it wants to, enjoys freedom of action. But it would not be relevant to say of it, that it enjoys a free will, because in eating a carrot it does not exercise a will at all. This is because it does not have any second order desire about its desire to eat a carrot. So, we can talk of the freedom of action without having to talk of the freedom of the will.

According to Frankfurt, the freedom of action is not a necessary condition for the freedom of the will either. It might so happen that a person is free to will something, but is not free to act on that will. For instance, there are many women in India who would like to have an education. Even though they have the will, they do not have the means to achieve what they want (either because they do not have money or because they do not have their guardian's permission). They are free to have the will but they are not free to act on that will. Frankfurt would say that examples like this show that freedom of action is not a necessary condition for the freedom of the will

Freedom and Responsibility-the two senses of 'Responsibility'

The notions of freedom and responsibility are closely tied up in our conceptual framework. We are given to believing that a person is an individual who necessarily enjoys freedom of the will. We also tend to believe that the concept of responsibility can be understood only in relation to the concept of a free will. So we usually believe, that a person is responsible for herself and is answerable for her actions because she enjoys a free will. As we have seen in the above section, Frankfurt does not believe that there is a necessary connection between the notion of a person and that of a free will. Instead, he conceives a person as one for

whom the freedom of the will may be a 'problem', because she may either have it or not have it. If that is the case and if we are to say that a person is responsible for her actions, then we would have to say that the notion of responsibility is not tied to that of a free will. So, according to Frankfur responsibility can be ascribed to a person even if she enjoys only the freedom of action, without at the same time having a free will. The argument seem to run like this- if a person is one, to whom we can ascribe responsibility but if she does not necessarily have a free will, then responsibility must also be linked to her capacity to act freely.

Here, Frankfurt seems to evoke two senses of the tern 'responsibility', which run parallel to the two senses of the term 'freedom' In the first sense, a person can be responsible for her actions if she act freely. This is the barest sense of 'responsibility', so one does not profi further to see whether a person's actions were devised by a free will not. I shall call this, the 'weak' sense of responsibility. But a person canh responsible in a stronger sense, when she is responsible not only for doin what she did, but also for willing to do what she did. I shall call this, the 'strong' sense of responsibility. For Frankfurt, a person can be responsible in this strong sense because she is rational, where the word 'rational' used in the sense of being prudent or practical. It is because she is ration and she can have a free will, that she can be responsible. Therefore, ideal person for Frankfurt is a being whose second-order volitions at expressions of prudent reasoning, and who can be responsible in the strong sense because of her capacity to exercise her will freely. That is for Frankfurt, a person at her best, and the best we can hope for- a person with a free will and the capacity to act in accordance with some practical rational principles.

The Inadequacy of Frankfurt's Thesis

Even though Frankfurt realises that the word 'rational' can be use in more than one sense, he fails to capture what I believe to be the more important sense of that term-the *moral* one. A person, in my opinion, is moral agent. She has a sense of right and wrong, of good and bad (in the moral senses of those terms). So a person as a *rational* agent is not just logical or prudent, but *moral*. A person, in principle, enjoys a free will at

can be called 'responsible' only in the *strong* sense. The weak sense of 'responsibility' is not applicable to human persons. This is because freedom of action and freedom of the will cannot be dissociated in the context of a person. But to say that a person is 'responsible' in the 'strong' sense is not to say that a person has a free will in Frankfurt's sense. A free will must express itself through the making of moral judgements and the translation of them into actions. In other words, a person can be called 'responsible' because she is capable of making moral judgements and of acting according to them. Lastly, it is not enough to say that a person has a free will when she is free to will what she wants to will. For freedom is not an expression of some arbitrary or random choice. Since freedom and responsibility go hand in hand, all free choice and free action must be moral- rational and responsible.

The Third Sense of 'Rational' - person as a moral agent

Frankfurt's analysis of the concept of a person begins on a very encouraging note. He characterises a person as one who has the 'capacity for reflective self-evaluation'. The capacity to reflect upon the desirability of one's first order desires is a rational capacity. A person is able to decide which of her first-order desires she wants to translate into action and which she does not. Her rationality is expressed in the formation of her will. The question is, what kind of rational consideration goes into the formation of the will? It is true that the kinds of considerations that model the will are not merely calculative, but also practical. By distinguishing between 'calculative' and 'practical', I do not mean to exclude all kinds of calculus from the realm of practical thinking. Many would say, that practical rationality or practical reasoning involves calculatios, which enable one to assign values to various possible (or available) alternatives and to arrive at the best (or most feasible) one among them. When I talk about 'being calculative' as opposed to 'being practical', I emphasize on mathematicological calculations. So, an individual may be able to solve complex mathematical problema but may not be able to decide what to do in a practical situation. Such things are known to happen in certain disorders of the nervous system. This distinction is also needed to maintain a qualitative difference between calculating machines and human beings. I am obviously assuming, that such machines cannot be ascribed the power of practical

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My point against Frankfurt is that the above two kinds of considerations do not exhaust our list rational considerations. Apart from the above two types of rational thinking, a person has the capacity to engage in rational considerations of a *moral* kind as well. To take an example, I may be in the habit of feeding birds every morning, which I consider to be a good habit. Suppose that I forget to perform this ritual one morning. What happens? Either I do not feel anything about it or I do. If I do, it is most likely that I feel sorry. But my feelings may owe either to the sense that I have neglected the poor creatures or merely to the sense that I have not done something that I do as a matter of habit. People would mostly agree, that the mark of a truly rational agent (a person) being moral thinking, it would suit me (as a truly rational agent) to feel sorry for those creatures and reprocach myself for my negligence (so much so that I tell myself that such lapses will not occur again, unless there is some genuine reason).

So, it seems to me, that Frankfurt's analysis of the concept of a person and the typical sense, in which we call a person 'rational', is incomplete. The rational 'capacity for reflective self evaluation' that a person has, is in truth a moral capacity. A person judges the 'desirability of (her) desires', not just from a prudential or practical perspective but also from a moral perspective. Even though Frankfurt's person is not rational in this sense, he points in the right direction when he says, '...the essence of a person lies not in reason but in will'. The will of a person is a moral will. In virtue of possessing a moral will, a person is capable not only of making prudent choices, but also of making moral judgements.

However, to say that the will of a person is a *moral* will, is not to say that a person *always embraces* the morally right, dutiful or good course of action. What it means is that a person possesses the *moral capacity* to judge and choose between what is right and what is wrong, what is dutiful and what is irresponsible, between what is good and what is bad. It might, in some cases happen, that the person is unable to take the morally acceptable path in actual practice. Such cases have to be counted as *exceptions*. In saying that, I also mean to say, that a person who chooses the moral way must in *most* cases, also *act* morally. An extreme discrepancy between the character of the *will* and that of the *action* of an individual

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should raise serious doubts about whether that individual is a person at all. Yet, in some cases, a person may not act in a morally good way, in spite of engaging in moral deliberation. The essential differece between a person in the true sense of the term and Frankfurt's person is that the second-order volitions of the former are not morally neutral, while those of the latter are.

By saying that the kind of rationality a person ought to exhibit is that which involves moral thinking, I am not subscribing to any particular view of morality. I am not making any attempt here, to show the philosophical basis of moral thinking. The philosophical argument here is for an understanding of the concept of a 'free will', we must make an a priori claim about the reality of moral thinking in our daily lives. Without this assumption, we cannot do full justice to our understanding of a person as a free and rational agent. In order to explain the concept of a 'person', must be able to understand the moral implications of terms like 'good', 'bad', 'ought', 'right', 'wrong', 'commendable' etc. which only meant that we must be able to understand something by the terms 'moral', 'immoral' and 'amoral'. Once this is granted, we will realise that there is a missing element in Frankfurt's analysis of a person as a rational individual a very important element at that, namely, the moral element. We need not go any further to analyse the philosophical foundation of the element (that can be taken up as a separate philosophical project).

Support from Taylor and Watson

Like Frankfurt, Taylor also recognises the significance of second-order evaluation in our understanding of the concept of a person. Unlike Frankfurt though, he argues that the *kind* of evaluation relevant to the concept of a person is *moral* evaluation. In his article, he distinguishes between 'weak' and 'strong' evaluation and takes the latter to be the mark of a person. He says, 'we are not beings whose only authentic evaluations are non-qualitative...if evaluation of desires is essential to our notion of the self, it is strong evaluation and not just weak evaluation which is in question'. The primary difference between weak and strong evaluation is that the former is non-qualitative while the latter is qualitative. Weak evaluation is non-qualitative because it is used 'simply to determine

convenience, or how to make different desires compossible'. Strong evaluation is qualitative because it involves the classification of desires into 'such categories as higher or lower, virtuous or vicious... noble or base'. The former makes no difference to the moral quality of one's life. The latter does.

In weak evaluation, a course of action is *taken to be good* simply because it is desired. All further calculations depend on that basic premise, which is not questioned. In a strong evaluation, that basic premise is itself questioned what is questioned is the very *desirability* of a desire, where 'desirability' is 'moral desirability'. So, the first and most important step in a strong evaluation is to decide whether what is desired *ought* to be desired or not. Therefore, in a strong evaluation, if something is *judged to be good*, it is judged so not because it is *desired*, but because it is *morally desirable*. So, if something is judged to be *good* in a strong evaluation, it is judged to be *morally good*.

Watson seems to make a similar observation in his article when he distinguishes between 'wanting' and 'valuing' He says, '...it is one thing to think a state of affairs good, worth while, or worthy of promotion, and another simply to desire or want that state of affairs to obtain. Since the notion of value is tied to (cannot be understood independently of) those of the good and worthy, it is one thing to value (think good) a state of affairs and another to desire that it obtain. However, to think a thing good is at the same time to desire it. The essence of Frankfurt's second-order volition lies not in the fact that it is a desire about a desire, but in the fact that it is an evaluation of a desire. A second-order volition expresses what a person most values, not just what a person most wants. That means, the evaluation of desires is a rational, moral activity. A person is one who is capable of evaluating her desires. As Watson says, a person '...cannot dissociate (her) self from all normative judgements without forfeiting all standpoints and therewith (her) identity as an agent'.

Responsibility and Freedom of the Will

For Frankfurt, a person is *not* one who *essentially* enjoys freedom of the *will*. He says, 'It is only because a person has volitions of the second-order that (she) is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the

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will'. So, he distinguishes between free will and freedom of action and conceives responsibility in two ways in the weak and strong senses. Weak responsibility is that which is found in relation to the freedom of action-if a person is free to act, then she is responsible for her actions in the weak sense. Strong responsibility is associated with freedom of the will if a person has a free will, then she is responsible for her actions in the strong sense. Also, for Frankfurt, having a free will and being responsible in the strong sense, are conditions that are satisfied if a person is able to judge her first order desires prudently. I will first show, that in the context of human freedom, the idea of free action is intimately connected with the idea of a free will-free will and the freedom to act cannot be divorced. I will then show, that the concept of 'responsibility', in the context of human person, cannot be understood independent of the concept of a 'free will' weak responsibility is not relevant in this context. Lastly, I will show that the concepts of freedom, responsibility and rationality are intimately linked with the idea of moral thinking. So the concepts of free will, responsibility and rationality are to be understood in relation with the concept of a person as a moral agent.

Frankfurt says that freedom of action is not a necessary condition for the freedom of the will. Can we really understand what it is to have a free will without the freedom of action? Without optimal freedom of action, freedom of the will becomes meaningless⁵. A will is, by definition, an 'effective desire' a desire one wants to translate into action. If an individual is never able to act according to her will, can we regard her will to be free? In fact, it is difficult to conceive an individual who has a free will and yet does not enjoy freedom of action under ordinary circumstances. By Frankfurt's own standards, a second-order volition is a desire to put a firstorder desire into action. Unless such second-order volitions lead all the way to activity, they do not deserve the name 'volition'. I do not mean to say that all volitions are satisfied in action or that all actions are acts of volition. I only mean to say that under usual conditions, volitions should be translated into the relevant actions. In the very concept of a will or volition, one can feel the force of action. To have a free will is to be able to come as close as possible, to action. It is necessary that a person who has a free will, also act freely in more cases than not. So, free will and free action 90

are not conceptualy or logically independent as Frankfurt claims.

Frankfurt also says that the freedom of action is not a sufficient condition for the freedom of the will. In the context of human freedom, can we really make sense of free action without free will? Within that context, we must distinguish between spontaneous, habitual and impulsive activity on the one hand, and discrete, rational and moral activity on the other. It is only the latter kind of activity that defines a person. When a rabbit eats a carrot because it wants to eat, it is acting on instinct. There does not arise any question about its acting on a free will. To take Frankfurt's own example, if someone is moved 'naturally' by kindness. then kindness is a mere disposition in her. It is not different from eating because one is hungry or sleeping when one is sleepy. Such activity does not involve any second-level thinking at all. Someone who acts on mere instincts and dispositions cannot be called a 'person' by any standard. Such an individual cannot be called a responsible and moral being⁶. Mere compliance with first-order desires is not the kind of freedom desirable in a person. Therefore, the distinction between freedom of the will and the freedom of action loses significance in the context of human freedom. If that is so, the weak sense of 'responsibility' also loses significance in that context. So, responsibility can be ascribed to a person only by linking it with freedom of the will. The kind of responsibility relevant to a person is then, strong responsibility.

But that is not all. The *kind* of strong responsibility relevant to person goes with the *third* kind of rationality-rationality in the *moral* sense. Just being strong-willed and translating second-order volitions into actions is not the mark of a person as a free and responsible agent (as Frankfurt would have it). A person must be capable of making moral judgements and of acting according to them. For example, if a strong-willed person decides to translate her *desire to go on a world tour* into action, that does not make her a responsible individual. Apart from considering the practical implications of the trip (how much money she would be spending, how much time et cetera), she must consider the moral implications of it as well (whether she is leaving her incapacitated parents alone, whether she is leaving her work incomplete et cetera). So, unlike Frankfurt, we do not commonly believe that a person has 'all the freedom it is possible to desire

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or to conceive' when she has a free will and is rational in the prudential sense. The kind of freedom that we desire and which is certainly possible to conceive is the kind that comes with moral thinking.

What we commonly believe to be the essential characteristic of a person is, therefore, a free and moral will. Having such a free and moral will is a logical assumption that we make when we hold a person responsible for something. An individual, who has no capacity to evaluate things freely and morally, is not one whom we can hold responsible. Let me give an example to show how the concepts of freedom and responsibility take a deeper shade of meaning in human persons. A tiger who turns into a maneater can be 'held responsible' in the 'weak' sense of that expression. Even if we do hold it responsible in that sense, we do not believe that the tiger became a man-eater by exercising its own free will. On the other hand, if a bank-robber shoots a hapless customer, we hold him responsible for his action not only because he performed that action but because he chose to perform that action and exercised his free will in doing so. That means, the robber culd have exercised his free will in morally acceptable way, by choosing not to shoot at the customer. It is evident that the kind of responsibility tied to the freedom of action found in non-persons (like animals and children, is not the kind of responsibility tied to the freedom of action found in persons. This is linked with the idea that a person has the freedom to judge the moral worth of a course of action. So, it is only a person who is capable of identifying herself strongly with a certain course of action. The actions of a person are statements of the kind of being she is-the kind of being she decides to be.

In this context, let us take a look at Watson's distinction between one's 'valuation system' and one's 'motivational system'. A person's valuation system consists of moral considerations or moral values, which when used in actual practice, enable her to decide which course of action she *ought* to undertake in a given situation. A person's motivational system consists of those conditions, which make her act in a certain way in a certain situation. According to Watson, a free agent must possess a valuation system, that is, she should be able to make judgements of the sort, 'I ought to do this under the given circumstance'. She 'must assign values to alternative states of affairs, that is, rank them in terms of worth'.

More importantly, her 'valuational system must have some (considerable) grip upon (her) motivational system'. So, Watson's conception of a free agent is one who 'has the capacity to translate (her) values into action, (she is one whose) actions flow from (her) evaluational system'.

Free Will and Moral Value

We have seen that the freedom of the will and the capacity for second order evalutaion are essentially connected in our conceptual framework. We have also seen, that when we evaluate our desires, we use certain standards. These are rational, moral standards. The question is, why must second-order evaluation be moral? Why must we choose between moral alternatives? Why isn't freedom, the freedom to choose and to do whatever one wants to do? In other words, why must choice be rational choice?

To be free is to be capable of self-evaluation. Self-evaluation must be rational. So, to be free, one has to remain within the bounds of moral reason. Outside this rational standard, freedom loses its meaning and borders on randommness. Outside such a standard, true choice becomes inconceivable. As Taylor says, '...a choice utterly unrelated to the desirability of the alternatives would not be intelligible as a choice'. The value of such rational choice lies in its capacity to decide for a person, what *kind* of being she is going to be. In other words, freedom in the human context is essentially linked with moral value.

NOTES

- All quotations from Frankfurt have been taken from this article. Similarly, all quotations from Taylor and Watson have been taken from their respective articles.
- 2. Referring particularly to Strawson's concept of person as found in his *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959) and also to Ayer's conception of the same, which is to be found in his *A Concept of a Person* New York: St. Martin's, 1963. As quoted in Frankfurt 1971.
- 3. My disagreement with Frankfurt is about the kind of evaluation that takes place at this level. This will become clear when I discuss the types of rationality that Frankfurt talks about and the types of rationality that I

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- 4. She may not completely lack the capacity to evaluate her first-order desires but she may lack the capacity to evaluate it in a particular way.
- I am not making any logical claim about the relationship between free will and freedom of action. I am arguing against such a claim made by Frankfurt. My intention is to show, that the kind of logical independence Frankfurt demands, between free will and free action, cannot be suported. In fact, there is a strong conceptual link between these two types of freedom, when it is the freedom of a person we are talking about. We cannot call an individual a 'person', if she has only the freedom to will and not the freedom to act. Without the optimal freedom to act, freedom of the will would be nothing but the freedom to think and to imagine.

I can think of two cases in which an individual may not have the freedom to act. In one case, there may be physical (physiological) obstacles towards the enjoyment of such freedom, as in case of a man in a wheelchair. In the other case, the freedom to act may have been curbed externally, as in case of a girl in prison. In the former case, it is most likely that the man is aware of the constraints under which he has to act and so, he will not will to do anything that he cannot actually do. Of course, he is free to dream, to hope, to imagine a time when he is free from those constraints. There is also the chance that medical advancements will enable him to regain normalcy. But until that happens, he will most likely be aware that he cannot do certain things. In the latter case as well, the girl will be aware that she has to act within some restraints. For example, she can imagine that she is having dinner with her parents at home but she must at the same time be aware that she cannot actually do so. It would perhaps be right to say that she has no will to have dinner with her parents but she wishes she could. My point is, that it is usual for a person to form her will keeping in mind her capacity to put that will into action. A will without the desire and the capacity to translate into action, is not a will at all.

I can think of another case in which the freedom to act has been unjustly curbed. Take for example, one of our freedom fighters. In spite of her will to fight, the British authorities curbed her freedom. They imprisoned her. Would I say that she was not a *person* by standards? I would put it

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differently. I would say, that her status as a person has been forcefully taken away or curbed. Violations of rights are of many types. There may be violations of the rights of animals and all those that under normal conditions have the freedom to act. (It is still a matter of debate whether the curbing of the freedom to act is in the case of non-persons, a curbing of the freedom of the will. For it is questionable whether non-persons have a will at all. If they do, I cannot see why they should not be considered persons. I, for one, have nothing against calling a parrot, 'a person', given that it has a free will along with the freedom to act). Again, there may be viloations of the rights of persons, who under normal circumstances have the freedom not only to act but also to will. If there is a violation of thier freedom to act, then there is a violation of their freedom to will. In other words, if their freedom to act is forcefully taken away, there is a gross violation of their status as persons. Rape, for example, is a not just physical violation. It is a violation of the will.

6. I have in mind, not only those that are *below* the level of persons but also those who are *above* that level-sub-persons and super-persons, so to say. Among sub-persons, I include not only animals but also human children or those human beings whose rational faculties have not developed in the normal way. They may have the freedom to act, but they cannot be said to have a free will. Similarly, if there is an individual who always acts compassionately, who does not have to think before performing a moral act, whose faculties are so developed that she requires no second-order deliberation before performing an act, then that individual is not a person either. She is more than a person. A person is one for whom moral issues arise, one who requires to think about such issues and to choose between moral alternatives. In choosing one alternative over another, a person exercises her free will. Someone who does not face moral dilemmas because she always acts morally is not a person but a super person.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Prof. Jane Heal, President, St. John's College, Cambridge University for providing me with the articles mentioned above.

My sincere thanks and regards go to Dr. Amita Chatterjee, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for her constant guidance and for helping me improve the philosophical quality of my paper.

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DIGNAGA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PERCEPTUAL UNIVERSE

SHYAMALI SANYAL

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The purp ose of this paper is not a detailed study of Dignāga, the leader of the Buddhist logical schools of the fifth century A. D. In this paper, an attempt has been made to classify Dignāga's attitude as reflected in his Pramāṇa - samuccaya, a compilation of aphorisms on pramāṇa or valid knowledge. The above book is a criticism and also a continuation of the principle of the four schools Buddhism. The perceptual universe has been explained by Dignāga in a phenomenological way, because he has introduced an objective element in it. His point of sensibility is transcendentally controlled and not intellectually. According to him, inference can have no reference to ultimate reality and non-reality, because the function of inference turns wholly on the destinction of subject and predicate, a distinction which is illusorily imposed on reality by thought (kalpanā). Inference has just as much reality as the ideal-construction to which alone it applies. The whole business of knowledge and its object is on the phenomenal plane.

While explaining the perceptual universe and the inferential knowledge, let us first explain what Dignāga's interpretation of pramāṇa is. According to him, pramāṇa, its object and the effect are not actually three different entities. They can all be represented by a single piece of cognition. The object would be the cognized aspect (grāhyākāra), pramāṇa would be the cognizing aspect (grāhyākāra), and the cognition itself would constitute the effect.

Dignāga accepts two pramānas-----perception and inference. So far as inference is concerned, Dignāga is a thorough going idealist.

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It is only in his doctrine of pure perception, as something putting us in touch with the unique moments of existence which constitute the ultimate reality that realistic tendencies show themselves in his logic. When we have removed all the ideal elements which overlay the pure percept and constitute what is ordinarily called perception, something still remain. But, of course about this "something" nothing at all can be said, which is in Udyotakara's language *Muka svapnavat* i.e. like a dumb man's dream or as Wittgensteins says "where of we cannot speak, we must keep silent". But from this paper, it will be seen that Dignāga is continuously speaking but he is not heard."

The thinker of the four Buddhist schools Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogācāra were interested in the intellectual analysis of the presented perceptual universe, but only tentatively. Since a thorough, study of Dignāga's works only reveal the fact that a complete shape of developed Buddhist logic can be traced to Degnāga alone and not to his predecessors. His predecessors could not reach the stage of Dignāga new dynamism. In Mādhymika philosophy and also in Yogācāra philosophy we find that their main aim was to prove the śunyatā of all intellectual modes-the roots of the presented universe, by drawing attention to the resexperience, which is transcendent (atīndriya). The transcendental experience, being neither intellectual nor sensuous, is realized only by the Buddhist triadic discipline viz. conduct (śila) meditation (samādhi) and insight (prajñā).

According to Dignāga, positively the ultimate reality (paramārhi sat) i.e. the, real is the efficient (arthakriyākārin) and negatively it is not ideal (nirvikalpaka). The ideal is the constructed, the imagined, the workmanship of our understanding (kalpanā). This word kalpanā needsto be explained here. Dignāga's definition of perception is pratyakṣan kalpanābo dham nāmajātyādyasaṃyutam. (pramāna samuceaya chapte I). That is, perception is that which is devoid of any preconception, and unconnected with name, genus etc. Kalpanā is of five types nāma, jā dravya, guṇa and karma. Santarakṣita in his Tattva samgrahs (verses 12) ff) has objected to this five fold classification of kalpanā. He argues the nāma kalpanā is the only form of genuine construction and the other form of kalpanā cannot be admitted on the ground that, firstly that universal

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etc. are themselves unreal and secondly these cannot be separated from their substrata, hence they do not have any separate existence of their own. He thinks that Dignāga has actually referred to two classes of kalpana, viz. nāma yojanā and jātyādi yojanā. According to Santaraksita, in the cases of constructing a universal or the like, the meaning is always conveyed through a nāma and thus all the forms of kalpanā may be included under the only class of nāma kalpanā. This controversy regarding the number of kalpanā is a separate issue. We are not concerned here with the number of kalpanā. But it should be remembered that the special form of perception peculiar to the Buddhist view is first mentioned by Dignāga, who however, does not offer any further indication as to its exact nature or a full fledged definition.

Now, according to Dignaga, the real, which is grasped only by means of pratyaksam, is a process or efficiency, but this efficiency is not intellectual. It corresponds to pure sensation alone (Sāttā Mātram) as distinguished from pure reason (Śuddha kalpanā) or imagination. For him, the transcendent experience of pure sensation is unique, absolutely dissimilar. It has no extension in space nor duration tn time, it is a point instant (K,sana or svalakṣaṇa), it is infinitesimal time, the differential in the running existence of a thing indivisible, ultimately simple, pure existence (Sattā Mātram), pure reality (Vastu Mātram) the own existence (svalakṣana) particular (Vyakti) and efficient. It stimulates the understanding in the sensible aspect to construct images and ideas but by itself it is transcendental (nirvikalpaka) and unutterable (anirvacaniya) It is only something which "I know not what", but it is not zero. It is the only reality, the ultimately real element of existence, all other reality is borrowed from it. An object which is not connected with a sensation, with sensible reality, is either pure imagination or a mere name or a metaphysical object. Reality is synonymous with sensible existence, with particularity and a thing-in-itself i.e. vastusattā-svalak saņa-paramārthasat. It is opposed to ideality, generality and thought construction, i.e. avastu-anartha-sāmānya- āropita-parikalpita. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire i.e. to say its burning and cooking is real. But the fire which we extend mentally to all fires, to all burning and to all cooking, represents its general shape, it is not at all real. This general fire can neither burn, nor cook, it can only be imagined.

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To compare the real with the empirical order of experience, we find that they are correlated as the real and the unreal, the particular and the universal. That is, they are mutually defined as the negation of one another. It is the transcendent basis of all empirical experience, without the sensuous empirical character it cannot be abstractly located as 'there'. The pure sensuous reality of the moment is unutterable- a reflex whose scope is strictly limited to the objective reality of one moment which cannot be conceptualized hence unutterable i.e. without any linguistic expression. It is not a vacuity, but a productive experience in so far as it produces a sensation which is followed by a vivid image (sphuta-pratibhāsa) as distinguished from vague image (asphuta-pratibhāsa), which is produced in memory by the thought process of an object or by the name in speech The vivid image as referred to in the case of momentary experience is before the operation of conceptual thought or productive imagination, e.g. the jar is not the extended body having a definite shape or colour but the efficient moment represented in the fact of pouring water, the rest is imagination. The external reality is the force which stimulates imagination but not the extended body -stuff or matter, it is energy alone, our image is only the effect of the efficient reality. Thus the reality is dynamic without the intellectual imagination. All elements of the world are forces in the background of inspiring transcendental experience, the forces are the unique points of sensuous efficiency - the particulars, the reality refers only to a "transcendent pure sensation "of the moment, stimulating the intellect to construct an image, but it is not that constructed image in actuality. This affirmed reality is only existentially it self, it cannot be expressed as it is for that world be repetition, nor can it be expressed as it is not for that would be contradiction (e. g. we can say "there is a cow" and "there is no cow". If the concept of a cow did imply existence, the judgement'the cow is' would be superfluous, it would contain a repetition, and the judgement 'the cow is not' i.e. 'there is here no cow' would contain a contradiction) It should be noted that here the reference is to a sensible point, it is not a purely intellectual process of imaginary experience of a sky flower, it is also distinguished from the illusory and hallucinatory experiences of any concrete sensible, a situation which one finds in one's day to day experience as a tendency but not as a fact. This is the view adhered to by Dignaga Dig1

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Thus by real he means the transcendent experience which is a sensibility (efficiency) without sensation or without ideation, i.e. it is not a deduction from a sensous experience or from a concept; it is prior to a formed sensation or ideation. It is the transcendent core of sensous experiences and has transcendent existence before there is any shaping of a sensation or glimmering of an intellectual activity. It is an external object in the sense of efficiency only of a transendent background, it is the first flash of sensation and the point where the subject and the object coalesce, hence it is the absolute experience-the transcendent situation. Thus the real is the transcendent non-sensuous experience and not post intellectual construction. It is a discipline of controlling oneself to a sensibility before it is a sensation. Perceptual experience, to Dignāga, is such a discipline, a dynamic situation, not just there.

Thus Dignāga's transcendent experience is a disciplined condition of a pure efficiency of sensation, which is the bare particular, the point, the unique, unrelated, dynamic, non-extended, unutterable, non-enduring experience, yet stimulating the intellect for the production of a corresponding image or imparting vividness to image, and constituting an assertive force of a judgement. It cannot be empirically cognized, it is not a predication. It is nirvikalpaka, it is pure sensation. But pure sensation and the corresponding pure object are not two things existing on equal terms of reality. They are one ultimate Reality, dichotomized into subject and object by that same faculty of constructive imagination (grāhya - grāhaka kalpanā) which is the architect of the whole empirical world and which always works by the dichotamizing or dialectical method. The forms-idealism and realism-are mental constructions from Dignāga's standpoint and hence they are to be shown off. The dichotomizing intellect has always to be distinguished from the pure intellect-transcendentally based.

Dignāga is critical of the formal or static view of the universe which might follow the Nyāya -Vaišeṣika doctrine of the classification of the universe from seven possible aspects as dravya, guna, karma, višesa, sāmānya, samayāya and abhāva. He puts forth his five fold dynamic modes-proper names (nāma), classes (jāti), quality (guṇa), motion (karma) and substances (dravya), not as things but as names only. (these are panca vidha kalpanā. In his view of the perceptual situation, a dual process

is involved, viz (a) a process of analysis or differentiation and (b) a process of synthesis. In the first aspect, the movement of thought is from the point of pure sensation to the images; here the passage is from unity to plurality. In the second aspect, the movement of thought is in a reverse direction viz. from the images to the point of pure sensation. The jar e.g. to Dignage in perceptual situation, as the transcendent point of pure sensation, is only an efficient moment from a transcendent basis, representing the fact of pouring water, and in the aspect of its image (which is its intellectual aspect it is variously interpreted as having a shape, colour etc. Judgement, in these dual aspects, is a continuous process of establishing identity of similarity between the apperently dissimilar aspects of analysis and synthesis in togetherness. It is a process of projection and a return to the original position or transcendent condition. Hence the whole emphasis of the intellectual process as a projection should be on the transcendent basis and not on the apparent sphere of perceptual experience.

The realistic (or rather objectivistic) element in Dignaga's reflection becomes clear when he tries to show that the perceptual judgement is line between the reality reflected in pure sensation and the image constructed by the intellect. Perceptual judgement is really an actual intellectualising process and not a mere glimmering of intellect due to the stimulation of the point of pure sensation. Dignaga says, however, "A soon as our intellectual eye begins to glimmer our thought is already best with contradiction". The whole process of perceptual judgement can be compared with the present day advanced physics as media. The moment our thought has stopped running and has fixed itself upon an external point so as to be able internally to produce the judgement say 'this is blue', w have separated the universe of discourse into two equal halves, the limitate part of the blue and the less limited part of the notblue. The definite though or judgement of the blue is nothing more than the definite thought of the not blue. There is nothing intermediate. Thus to Dignaga to think actively to think dichotomisingly and phenomenologically, but at the same timen losing the transcendent basis.

According to Dignāga, the terms construction (Kalpanā) and dichotomising (vikalpa) in their application to thought are synonymous they embrace every act of consciousness. To Dignāga, the terms conception

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representation, presentation and judgement express constructive imagination and also dichotomisation and at the same time possess the transcendental basis. Thus the similarity or identity as well as the process of dividing or separating are both important in thinking, with the transcendental basis, of course. Thus for Dignaga, the intellectual function as expressed in perceptual judgement is not accepting of a presentation (sense-datum) merely, but selecting it from its opposits or from other aspects which oppose it in some ways and behind all these a unifying process, an inner sense is implied. According to him, in all perceptual activity, we find the negative judgement and the judgements implying otherness both of which are quire independent kind of judgements standing at par with the actual perceptual judgement. Here in the case of such negative judgements and judgements implying otherness the reference is not to the basic general character of negation or otherness operative behind the perceptual judgements but to such concrete situations of an inner feeling where the judgements themselves are definitely of a negative sort or of the types implying judgement of otherness. As Dignāga says "just as we arrive at the negative judgements viz. there is no jar on this place after hypothetically imagining its presence on this place and after having repudiated that suggestion, just so do we decide that the blue is not yellow, after having hypothetically assumed the presence of blue on the yellow patch and having repelled that imagined presence. This judgement with a dual consciousness, according to Dignaga, is not possible without a unifying core, transcendentally based.

Now from the above discourse, we know that the intellectual activity is a kind of outspeaking, an effort to utter, while its stimulating background is unutterable. The intellectual activity and utterability are inextrinsically bound together. The intellectual activity and language, therefore, are on the same line, they are stimulated by the point of pure sensation, but they cannot touch the point or reality which is only existentialist standpoint of an impulse to utter, perhaps has no paralled in Western thought and yet it is not a mystic notion in the sense of a vague experience. It is an inner continuous consciousness transcendentally inspired. Rahul Sankrityāyana in his preface to his commentary on Dharmakīrti *Pramāṇavārtikā* considers Dharmakīrti as the central figure round whom all the creative minds of India resolved, "but one must bear in mind that the germ of his reflexion

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can be traced back to his master Dignaga.

NOTES

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ANEKĀNTAVĀDA AND AHIMSĀ : A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

ALOK TANDON

Though some commentators, like Uno Tantinen, do not wish to relate the principle of Ahimsā to ontology as ontological differences are "irrelevant for the practice of non-violence", it seems to me that one's view of reality has got ethical implications and as such, obviously affects one's social practices. That is why, the concept of Ahimsā, though advocated by many traditions, is conceptually different in each of them. No one can deny that Jaina view of ahins ā is not what Buddhists or Advaita-Vedāntins imply by it. Therefore, it seems important to find out whether or not Anekāntavāda provides a valid and consistent ontological basis for the practice of Ahinsā and how it compares with other Indian traditions. It would also be interesting to reflect upon the relevance of such understanding for initiating interreligious dialogue for the purpose of getting rid of religious violence. This paper is modest effort in that direction. It comprises of three sections. Section one deals with the relationship of the Jaina concept of anekānta with that of ahimsā. In section two, Jaina framework for inter-religious dialogue is elaborated with instances from the past and section three focuses on efficacy of the Jaina framework in solving religious conflicts, besetting in many parts of the present world, compared to some other approaches.

I

Before one begins inquiring into the relationship between anekāntavāda and ahimsā, one needs to have a fairly consistent understanding of the concept of anekanta for the purpose. Without going into the details of the controversy related to various formulations of the concept, we can safely state that the concept of anekānta is central in

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 1 January 2002

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Jain philosophy. Mahavira is usually accepted as the original propounder of the anekānta doctrine. It is a unique contribution to the philosophic tradition of India. Literally put, the word anekānta means 'not one' or 'more than one'. Therefore, the term 'anekānta-vāda' means the theory of non-onesidedness or, to be more precise, 'the theory of many-sided nature of reality'. The basic connotation is, that reality is essentially anekāntic in character. Thus the doctrine of anekāntavāda can be briefly described as acceptance of the manifoldness of reality'. No philosophic proposition, as it claims, can be true if it is simply put without any qualification. If a proposition is asserted unconditionally, it excludes other rival possibilities and then it becomes ekānta one sided. Such unconditional assertion violates the principle of anekānta and thus, it is to be regarded as false.

What usually happens in philosophic disputes is that a thesis propounded by a particular school is rejected by a rival school by putting forward a contradictory thesis. Each school claims its own thesis to be the absolute turth and does not wish to understand the point made by the opposite school. The arguments and counter arguments made by the rival schools only lead to dogmatism in philosophy. All one-sided philosiphies are open to this evil of ekānta. But, according to anekāntavāda, rival propositions can be integrated together as they may all contain some element of truth. Only thing to be done is to present these rival propositions with proper qualifications. Thus, anekāntavāda is a philosoiphy of synthesis-an attempt to synthesize different ontological theories of ancient India. But any such attempt to synthesize the opposite viewpoints in philosophy will alway present some problems. Being aware of such problems and in order to solve them, Jaina philosophers developed a philospohic methodology consisting of naya-vāda (the doctrine of stand points) and syād-vāda or sapta-bhangi (the seven fold predication). By this dual doctrine, Jainas tried to defend their anekāntavāda.

To make it more clear, anekāntavāda is to be contrasted with ekāntavāda which stands for a definite categorically asserted philosophic position. But aneka 'many' is not diametrically opposite to eka 'one', for many includes one. Different ekāntavadās may thus be only constituents of the anekānta doctrine³. Also aneka does not stand for indefinite or infinite, for, as any Jaina scholar would point out, anekāntavāda is certainly

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However, it is useful to make a distinction between the two senses of anekāntavāda. First, the term is used to denote Jaina view of reality, the metaphysical doctrine that reality is manifold and each reality consists of diverse forms and modes, or innumerable aspects. Secondly, term anekānta-vāda is also used for the Jaina philosophic method which allows for reconciliation, integration and synthesis of conflicting philosophic views⁵. Thats why, sometimes anekāntavāda is called syād-vāda⁶, although the latter term is usually reserved for 'the dialetic of sevenfold predication.'

Now, we can disuss how anekāntavādaā as a metaphysical doctrine as well as a philosophical method, leads to an ethic of ahimsā. Since reality is manifold, an ordinary person is not expected to know all its characteristics. This means many limitations, many extensions, many relations, many points of view. A thing may be known from various angles and all such views may be correct in their own limitations. Thereforee, anekāntavāda is a doctrine which keeps a knower in his own limitation. So, whenever he crosses his own limitation and declares his knowledge as right and complete one and that of the other being as totally wrong and incomplete, he commits himsā. This himsā can be seen in two ways:

- 1. $Sva-hi\dot{m}s\bar{a}$ (self-injury): The person who presents his partial and incomplete knowledge as a full and complete one, he commits his own injury caused by egoism.
- 2. $Para-hims\bar{a}$ (Injury to other): When he proclaims that only he possesses correct knowledge because of its completeness and other person has wrong knowledge because of its incompleteness, he commits $para-hims\bar{a}$, i.e., injury to other by pinching his heart. For nobody wants to be declared as a person with wrong knowledge⁷.

We have seen above how anekantavada as ontological doctrine saves one from self-righteousness and thus from committing himsā to himself as well as to others. But, anekāntavāda when expressed as method leads to syādvāda which guides how to present the limited knowledge so that knower may save himself from committing injuries. Adding a word 'syāt' to a proposition makes it to be considered as limited. This saves one from presenting his incomplete knowledge as complete. He does not try to

impress upon other persons wrongly. Other persons do not feel threatened. At the same time, other persons do not feel that they are wrong and the person who has expressed his knowledge knows the whole truth. Thus, both sides try to understand views of each other and can enter into a dialogue, resulting into the tolerance and respect for the views of others. This creates an intellectual atmosphere where in conflicting propositions of rival schools may be presented with qualifications so that they may lead to, if possible, a new synthesis, if not possible, to a peaceful coexistence.

We may not be sure whether or not the doctrine of anekāntavāda was present in rudimentary form in Jaina philosophy from the very beginning, but we know with considerable certainty that Mahavir was a contemporary of the Buddha, while Parśvanāth must have appeared before the time of the Buddha. It was Parśvanāth who propounded the four fundamental rules of ethics which were accepted by both Mahavir and the Buddha, but he did not seem to uphold any philosophical thesis such as anekāntavāda. Thus, Jaina notion of ahimsā is more ancient compared to anekānta doctrine, the beginning of which can be traced in the teachings of Mahavira. However, Mahavir added a new dimension to the meaning of ahinsā as we shall see now.

Jainism offers us, unarguably the most extreme conception of ahimsā. Although the requirements for the householders are not as strict, Jain monks must adher to severe restrictions on thier actions and observe extraordinary precautions so that they may not harm anybody with intention of harming⁸. According to Jain philosopher, N.D. Bhargava, *ahimsā* must be totally unconditional and unrelational, its practice is successful only by disengaging from the world of 'give and take⁹'. He fruther contends that non-violent action is 'independent of society¹⁰! Non-violence is possible and possible only without interrelationship because interrelationship is dependent on others and cannot be natural¹¹. This is surely a call for extreme asceticism. For the purpose, Jains insert upon totally autonomous, self sufficient and isolated view of the self.

Mahavir, too, was a man of vary strict principles, never soft on the ācāra. He did not regard self-mortification as violence done to self. He preached that we may not even dream of killing a living being. This does not mean that killing of any kind is sinful. However, we should live in this

world in such a way that we do not have to kill living being. We should cultivate a feeling of kindness and compassion for all living creatures, and killing, or inflicting pain upon others will be allowed when and only when it is unavoidable¹². This is possible only when one accepts all the living creatures as equal to one's ownself and therefore tries not to harm anybody with the intention of harming.

The uniqueness of Mahavira's contribution lies in carrying the above concept of *ahims ā* from the domain of practical behaviour to the domain of intellectual and philosophic discussion¹³. Thus, it seems, as Kapadia has pointed out, Jaina principle of respect for the life of others gave rise to the principle of respect for the views of others¹⁴. He further contends:

".....this doctrine of anekāntvāda helps us in cultivating the attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold a different view and how the seeming contradictories can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards syncretism¹⁵.

Thus, simply put, anekāntvāda is another name of ahimsā in thought. This philosophic doctrine of Jainas is characterized by toleration, understanding and respect for the views of others. This does not mean that one holds no position of one's own but the most admiring thing is that a sincere attempt is made to understand the position of the adversary, in accordance with the ontology one holds dear. This does not, however, absolve us of the responsibility of finding out whether the fundamental assumptions of anekāntvāda are correct, or not. But the close relationship between anekāntvāda and ahimsā in thought and the resulting catholocity of Jaina outlook can not be denied.

II

As seen in the previous section, for the Jaina tradition, the personal application of non viclence extends to how one forms and holds opinions about others, fully acknowledging that differences exist in the world. If one assumes a posture of rigidity in defence of one's views, others may find this offensive. But if one holds no view of one's own, or has no sense of propriety, then one would be groundless, without purpose or identity. In such case, he may presumably accept even violent actions. Both these

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extremes are *ekāntic* in character and therefore violate the principle of *ahimsā*. Thus, rather than developing a form of absolutism or utter relativism, the Jaina outlook towards the ideas of others combine tolerance with a certainty in commitment to Jaina cosmological and ethical views.

In this section, we shall discuss how Jaina approach towards traditions that do not share their world view, can be used as an effective device to initiate inter-religious dialogue and reduce religious violence. Much violence in the world today emanates from fundamental religious disagreement. If persons with divergent cosmologies and ideologies can be given a framework through which to tolerate one another, peace can prevail.

The Jaina tradition may be considered 'fundamentalist' in the sense that its cosmology and ethics have not been subject to revision. The fundamental teachings of Jainism state that the world is divided into living and non-living components, that innumerable life forms have existed since beginningless time, and that life can be liberated through a fourteen fold process. The emergence of two groups, Digambaras and Svetāmbaras can be traced to other historical issues since both exhibit a "remarkable unwillingness to depart from their basic doctrine and practice." However, this fundamentalism is tampered by a fervent concern that the points of view held by others are not be dismissed but rather that they be explored, understood, and then contextualized in the light of Jaina doctrine. With this in mind, the Jainas have exercised great care in articulating how their position differs from those of others, while not condemning alternate views as incorrect...only incomplete.

The Jainas have shown great care to understand and respect the position of others. For the purpose, they have been engaged in a form of dialogue with other traditions that has broadened their knowledge without altering their own faith and commitment. Record of it is found in the earliest texts of the Jaina canon. The Sūtrakrata included in the second section of Jaina canonical literature, critiques of other systems of Indian thought in the light of Jainism. In the fifth century, Siddhasena Divakaras' sanmatisūtra investigates various view points as being non valid when asserted in an absolutist manner. And in the thirteenth century, Mallisena's Syādvādamanjari offers a comprehensive critique of non-Jaina philosophical

schools and religious practices. Buddhists and Hindus are also known for referring to positions of others to clearly articulate their own views. However, these traditions have also developed new forms that integrate and synthesize preexisting traditions. Jainism, by contrast, did not develop substantially new forms, holding fast to its teachings on karma, jīva and ahimsā.

On the basis of our foregoing discussion, we can now delineate salient characteristics of the Jaina frame work for inter-religious dialogue.

- a) Reality is manifold in character (anekāntvāda)
- b) Notion of partial truth. Each truth is a partial one (naya) and no one statement can ever account for totality of reality (doctrine of stand points)
- c) Seven fold analysis of reality (Saptabhangi) that specifically disallows the holding of any extreme view.
 - d) Intellectual ahimsā (tolerance for the views of others).

Jaina philosophers, like Mallisena as mentioned earlier, applied successfully the above framework in their dialogue with other systems of thought, acknowledging their partial truths and hence validated, though not applauded. Given the fact that India has long grappled with an issue that has come to the forefront in the West during the last thirty years: how to deal with plurality of world religions coming regularly into contact with one another, the validity of the Jaina framework cannot be minimized among the various models suggested.

III

Today, when we are witnessing religious fundamentalist viloence in various parts of the world and some emminent thinkers of the West are propounding the thesis of clash of civilizations in the years to come, the questions naturally come to the mind: will the traditions more clearly define and maintain their integrity in light of their contact with other traditions or will traditions begin to melt together? Which approach is most valid for inter-religious dialogue?

Paul Knitter¹⁷ provides us a comprehensive survey of a host of positions taken up by Western thinkers on the above questions, which include:

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- a) all religions are relative (Troeltsch),
- b) all religions are essentially the same (Toynbee),
- c) all religions share a common psychic origin (Jung),
- c) Christianity is the only true religion (Barth),
- d) revelation is possible in other religions, while salvation is not (Tillich),
- f) all religions are ways to salvation (Rahner),
- g) theocentric model (Knitter)

Comparing the various above models with that of the Jainas, the combined positions of Jung, Barth and Tillich seem closest to that of Jainas. Like Jung, Jainas see a commonality amongst Jīvas, all hold the potential for liberation. Like Barth, the Jainas are convinced of the sole effectiveness of their own tradition in achieving their goal. And like Tillich, they agree that partial truth is found elsewhere as well.

Solutions given by Troeltsch, Toynbee, Rahner and Knitter himself are more problematic from the Jaina perspective. Radical Relativity would negate the efficacy of the Jaina system. Commonality of traditions (Toynbee) is in direct contrast to the perceived content of the respective traditions as well at the idea that all religions are ways to salvation (Rahner). Jaina would find theocentrism as most troublesome to accept because it would remove the religious process beyond human control as the Jainas refute the notion of any external devine force and assert that all religious experience comes from one's own initiative.

Three potential approaches can be discerned from this survey of inter religious encounters: conversion, accomodationist syncretism often in the form of a super inclusivistic metatheology and tolerant or flexible fundamentalism.

Conversion is the first real option. No doubt, some persons get converted consciously, some unconsciously and nothing seems to be wrong with it. But when such conversions take place on a large scale they not only create suspicion about the real motives of those aiding such activities but also make communities feel insecure about losing one's religious identities. This results into much hatred and violence as can be seen in the recent cases reported from Orisa and Gujrat in India. It is an exercise of

religious domination, not toleration that ultimately leads to break in inter religious dialogue.

Accomodationist syncretism has been long standing tradition throughout Asia. In China, Korea and Japan, we find interpenetration of Taoism, Buddhism and Confueianism. Successive religious adaptations were made in India when Sramanic and Vedic traditions merged, when Shankara infused Hinduism with Buddhism, when Guru Nanak brought Islam and Hindu Ideas together. The same trend can be easily seen in the efforts of Akbar, Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Swami Vivekanand too. One difficulty with such an approach (this should also include inclusive ideologies such as benevolent humanism) is that the rigorous study and logical consistency that characterizes the 'great traditions' becomes tenuous, though these matters should not be the litmus test for spiritual experience.

Tolerant or flexible fundamentalism, preferred by the Jainas, allows and in fact requires that the religiously informed person be well acquainted with how different traditions have approached the basic issues of human limitation and transcendence. It encourages respect for others perspectives and yet allow one's primary comitment to remain rooted in that which one feels most authenticated. This approach allows for various possibilities, but does not deny or relativize the validity of one's own position. It also allows traditions and persons to discover commonalities without heralding those commonalities as absolutes. For example, The World Wild Life Fund has brought together religious leaders and scholars from various faiths to conceptually deal with the pressing problem of environmental decay. The solutions may proceed from different ideologies, often non-religious ones yet there need be no assumption that the ideologies themselves need to be changed.

Fundamentalism is often viewed disparagigly as a blind devotion to a fixed set of beliefs to the point of excluding all other views. however, in order for a religious tradition to perform effectively, certain world views need to be agreed upon by its adherents. These world views of different religions, understandably at times, come into conflict with each other. A solution to this dilemma is found in the Jaina logical frame-work, as discussed in the previous saction, that allows for and respects innumerable positions yet holds to its own cosmological and ethical view. Thus, the Jaina model

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of flexible fundamentalism offers one option for validating a fundamentalist devotion to basic teachings while still acknowledging the validity of divergent views within their own context.

The Hindu approach to multiplicity has often been termed as inclusivist¹⁸. This may seem to indicate that the variant positions included are part of an over arching schematic, or answerable to some sort of central diety of monistic absolute. To the contrary, if we examine some of the many ideas included in what some characterize as Hinduism there seems to be no such possible absolute. Just as the many gods of the Vedas are effective in different situations, so the many yogas are prescribed in the *Geetā* without compromising or subordinating one to another. Mutual paths are allowed to exist in complementarity. If one needs ot act, one uses Karma Yoga, if one needs to meditate, one uses Dhyana Yoga. This text is written with a gentle tolerance, allowing various practices and positions to be pursued, but unlike Jainism, without insisting upon a unified or even consistent view.

Similarly, in the *Yoga Sūtra* of Patanjali, various paths are announced, but no judgements are pronounced. no teaching is said to be higher or better. Differences between the various systems of practice are not denied, nor are they even discussed. His techniques coexist as compliments, not as competitors.

The juxta positional accommodationist model of Hindus, like multiperspectival tolerance of the Jainas, allows one to account for and to respect the other without denying, contradicting or converting. But does it lead to inter religious dialogue or acceptance of another's view point? Mere Juxta position of different view points may lead to an uneasy, indifferent dolerance. Equality of status to other view points is not denied but in case of dispute unlike the Jaina model, no logical device is proposed to resolve it.

In most violent acts of religious fundamentalist variety, an underlying superiority of one's own position and non-acceptance of another's view point is easily discernible. It seems impractical, in contemporary situation, to expect people to shed their belief in superiority of their respective religions. But religious bigotry can surely be curtailed if they are made to

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understand partial truth content of opponent's belief systems. The Jaina framework of intellectual non violence serves the purpose better, compared to other models, as it requires a commitment to one's own belief system accompanied with an ability to tolerate the positions of others. But can it celebrate the difference? Perhaps then it will have to accept the partial truth value of one's own religious belief system. That requires thinking about the issue of anekāntika afresh from the way Jain thinkers have thought about it. Are we ready to accept the challenge19?

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THE INDIAN TRADITIONAL VALUES & THEIR INDI-CATIONS FOR EDUCATION IN INDIA IN THE MODERN AGE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 1

D. D. VADEKAR

Introductory

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The problem set for this Seminar is the Harmonising of Modern science and Technology with the Indian Traditions and Values: and the purpose of taking it up for consideration is to utilise our solution of that problem, whatever it comes to be, as the background for the development of a National System of Education for India.

Now, in the confrontation of these two sides (Indian traditions and values, and modern science and technology) for their harmonisation with each other, it must be kept in mind that harmonisation is a bilateral process, in which the necessary and suitable modifications of either or both of these two sides may have to be visualised as legitimate and desirable for that harmonisation. But in the context of our present problem and its specific formulation actually given for the Seminar, it would appear as if it is only one of these sides, viz. modern science and technology, which is to be subjected to its harmonisation with the other, viz. the Indian traditions and values. The real situation is that both the sides may have to be subjected to mutual harmonisation, each one of them having to harmonise with the other, if necessary and desirable.

But even in this situation, it has, further, to be remembered that, in our actual broad historical context, one of these two sides, viz. the Indian traditions and values, has already and long been with us (though not as a consistent, unitary or homogeneous entity), and that it is the other side, viz.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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modern science and technology, which has come in for that confrontation with it, though it has now been with us for a century and more and has already been having its significant impact on the first.

This Paper is divided into two Parts: (1) Identification of (the main) Traditional Indian Values, and (2) Educational Indications of the Traditional Indian Values.

I. Identification of Traditional Indian Values

Let us begin with seeking to formulate, for our present purpose, a representative image of the Indian traditional values. It must be remembered, however, that the Indian traditions and values, which we are in search of, in the present context of our efforts to determine our educational goals and values to suit the requirements of our contemporary life in a scientific and technological world, need not be the transcendentally philosophical or religious ones. Philosophy and religion are, doubtless, very important sectors of our spiritual life. But evidently they are the speculative and intuitive essays of the human spirit, which, at their highest level, ultimately and in the last resort, impinge upon the transendental and the cosmic. They have thier own place, and very legitimate and valuable too, in the intellectual and spiritual life of man, and cannot be surrendered on any account. But the transcendental and the cosmic cannot serve as suitable bases for a secular social theory, of which educational theory normally constitutes a part. A philosophy like Sankara's or Bradley's, or a religion that should be co-eval with it in its speculative sweep, may be a lofty achievement of the human intellect and spirit and the highest possible approximation to the ultimate that man is capable of : but at the same time it must also be realised that such a philosophy or religion has a perpetual tendency to cast a pall of unreality on our actual mundane life, which is and should be the basis for our working out a theoretical understanding of and orientation for that life, if we want to take that life seriously at all! This is where Indian speculative traditions and values will need some adjustment for their harmonisation with the conditions and the needs of our secular life in the modern age. Accordingly, the Indian traditions and values, which we want to identify in the present context, are the secular (i. e. pertaining to the present world, civic or civil, as opposed to the clerical or the transcendental traditions and values, those that would be suitable bases for social life as we actually live it and would like to live it.

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Now, the Indian tradition is a very complex thing and not an articulated or self-consistent or unitary concept, and so are the values incorporated in it. India, through the long course of her history, has been the stage of interracial, inter-cultural, inter-religious and inter-philosophical confrontations and even conflicts. But, by and large, the dominant and operative traditional values in Indian life have been, fortunately, the values that can be stated, for our present purpose, in broad and categorised terms. I propose, in what immediately follows, to locate and identify three such typical cardinal traditional Indian values, broadly corresponding to the three sectors of man's life: (1) intellectual-speculative, (2) social-cultural and (3) moral-spiritual. To enlarge on these values:

(1) Intellectual-Speculative Values:

In the intellectual and speculative history of the Indian mind, there is no value more impressive than the emphasis laid by it on the pursuit of knowledge and on the investigations of the logical-epistemological methods and means of knowledge. The Indian mind is, of course, perpetually oriented towards the attainment of the ultimate goal of life, which is said to be moksa or liberation (which is usually conceived in transcendental or otherworldly terms though): but the basic thing, significant in the present context, is that knowledge is universally agreed to by the Indian mind to be the main, if not the exclusive, means of the attainment of that goal. It is on this account that the Indian mind, throughout its speculative history, has devoted so much attention to the study of the means and the validity of that knowledge, the study of the pramāņas and the prāmāņya. Nor let anybody say that the Indian speculative mind has been merely scholastic and authority-ridden, unquestionably accepting the testimony of the śabda as the ultimate source of knowleage. Sabda has certainly enjoyed importance in Indian logic and epistemology. But its nature and scope, as also its limits, have been so systematically thrashed out in Indian thought, that it would not be fair to characterise the Indian mind as merely authority-ridden. Sense-perception and reasoning have also been deliberately studied and used as the legitimate sources of Knowledge, as also the yet other means of knowledge. Especially it must be noted that Indian thought is more than

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comparable to the Western thought in regard to the significance which is attached therein to reason and argument. As Dr. D.M. Datta has said "Reason and argument find their full place here (in Indian Philosophy) as in Western philosophy". (C. A. Moore, Editor: Essays in East-West Philosophy, p. 88) In fact, a comparison of the Indian epistemological studies through the centuries with their Western counterparts contemporaneous with them, would, I believe, enable us warmly to appreciate the supreme value attached by the Indian mind to knowledge (as the basis of life's activities) and the methods of attaining it. Nor let it be said that Indian logic and epistemology, however conversant with the logical. speculative dialectics, were yet utterly lacking in inductive-scientific thinking Of course, Indian logical-epistemological thinking was done in the prescientific times; and in India, the scientific era, in the modern sense, dawned only after its contact with Western knowlege and culture. Even then, it is agreed by historians of Indian logic and epistemology that even scientific methodology, at least in its incipient forms, finds expression in certain of its strands and at certain stages. A careful glance through Dr. B. N. Seals' The Positive Sciences of The Ancient Hindus will enable a student of Indian thought to realise that scientific (including physical, chemical, biological) investigations and scientific methodology figured to a significant extent among the intellectual preoccupations of India. This only indicates that even modern scientific thinking can be suitably tackled on and assimilated to the traditional Indian thought and cannot be said to be incompatible with it. All in all, it is obvious that the Indian lore of the pramāṇas is the supreme and cardinal traditional value of India's intellectualspeculative life that needs to be one of the bases for the orientation and designing of our plans for the future set-up of our life in India.

(2) Social-Cultural Values:

The supreme social-cultural traditional values of Indian life have been the values of mutual tolerance, of accommodation and assimilation. These values have been a source both of the strength and the weakness of the Indian community as a whole,- of her strength because they have enabled India to accommodate most of the incoming elements without much internal conflict or disruption in her life, and of her weakness because

Indian Values and Their Modern Educational Indications

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they have rendered India vulnerable and unable suitably to deal with the more importunate, aggressive and resourceful elements, which have tended, directly or indirectly, to seek to replace the indigenous multi-faceted pattern by their own unitary or monolithic ones, creating internal conflicts in the process. These latter developments came in handy for the political purposes of our foreign ex-rulers, who, far from seeking to soften or adujst the importunities of those developments, actually tried to encourage and profit by them. And when they had to leave, which they ultimately did, they left for us a continuing legacy of problems of inter-caste, inter-cultural and inter-religious integration and harmony, which have still to reach satisfying solutions. Fortunately, even in this situation, it is still the ancient traditional values of tolerance, of accommodation and assimilation, that are bound to help us through, provided these values are sought to be implemented on an impartial, yet firm, basis in our social theory and action. It is not yet clear that our dominant and operative sociol-political organisation of the day, even after our attainment of independence, has developed or will be able to develop, sufficient vitality and dynamism so as to be able to discharge its expected function in this behalf adequately and satisfactorily, as indications are still by no means lacking that this organisation also is following the ways of its predecessors, trying to profit, in its own self-preservative interest, by internal conflicts and by seeking to appease the intransigent, intolerant and aggressive elements in those conflicts. However, even in this situation, it remains true that the Indian traditions and values bound to help us are those of tolerance and co-existence, accommodation and assimilation. The dominant and abiding Indian traditions and values are and should be tolerant and inclusive, not intolerant and exclusive: the terms kafir and pagan have had and should have no place in the Indian vocabulary of life. it is true that the terms mlenchha and yavana are found used in the Indian vocabulary in a communal sense in regard to foreigners; but they do not appear to be employed in any operatively exclusivist sense or with and proselytizing context or purpose. In fact, the most representative socioreligious text in Indian thought has said, 'those devotees (likewise) who, endowed with faith, offer worship unto other divinities: they, O Son of Kunti, offer service, (albeit) not in the prescribed mode, unto none but myself'. (Bhagavad-Gita, IX 23.) If India wants to pursue democracy and

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humanism as her goals in her national life, it is thus tolerance-accommodation and assimilation that must be marked out as one of her central values.

(3) Moral-Spiritual values:

India has had a long and chequered religious history, in the course of which have emerged deverse faiths, persuasions and cults, which however have lived together, on the whole, in comparative kinship and accommodation with each other and with the dominant trend of Hinduism. with the exception of Islam and Christianity, these latter having on the whole sought to maintain their separate identity and integrity. The historical and contemporary Indian scene has been and is that of a welter of religions and subreligions, the three dominant among them being Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. Now, anthropologically, moral values in human history have originally emerged in a religious garb: and it is no wonder that in our Indian religious contexts in the historic times, the strictly moral values have, on the whole, tended to be identified with religious values, right up to the stage in our history when we came to be under the impact of Western culture and education, which has gradually conditioned us to a distinction necessary and desirable, between the strictly religious and the secular, the merely civic or social. It is obvious that in a community of citizens sharing different religious persuasions, the strictly ethical or moral concepts cannot be indentified with the strictly religious ones. It is the impact of the Western social and political theory that has enabled us to assimilate this distinction: and that is all to the good. It has enabled us to see that every individual in a society has his moral obligations as a dutiful member of the society, as a good citizen, even if he has also his religious obligations as a good Hindu, or a good Mussalman, or a good Christian, and that it must be the care and anxiety of every good citizen to see that the two types of his obligations, social and religious, do not come into any possible conflict with each other. It must also be his further care and anxiety to adjust the religious side to the social, rather than vice versa, as any decisive or compelling priority given to merely religious considerations over the civic considerations governing the life of a multi-religious pattern of society is bound to spell disharmony and conflict in that life. This is the true meaning and message to us of the modern values of democracy and humanism, which we half assimilated from the West. Plato's conception of 'Justice', or F. H. Bradley's

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famous phrase 'My Station and Its Duties' and the traditional Indian Term 'Swadharma' ('One's Own Duty') very well crystallize, in a non-religious and secular way, the supreme traditional moral value of Indian life, which, again, will bear being highlighted as a basis for our plans for the re-orientation of the future set-up of our life in India.

Here may be added some supplementary remarks on the terms 'spiritual' and 'secular'.-The Term 'spiritual' is a very slippery term in our vocabulary, meaning as it does, in the different contexts in which it is used, 'religious', 'mental', 'other-worldly', 'moral' etc. I submit, though I have no sapce here to argue, that the 'spiritual' need and should not be used as a synonym for the 'religious', the 'mental' or the 'other-worldly', and should bear only the meaning of the 'moral'. The only distinction between the 'moral' and the 'spiritual' that needs to be made is that the former may be taken to refer to the social aspect of moral character, whereas the latter may be taken to refer to the personal or the intrinsic aspect of it, so that our use above of the phrase 'moral-spiritual values' may be said only to refer to the character values in their social and personal aspects.-The term 'secular' also has suffered from some ambiguity, as it is found to be used in a variety of senses- 'this-worldy', 'non-religious', 'civic' or 'social'. I would prefer to use it, though again I have no space here to argue for it, in the last sense, so that the secular values are really the values of civic or social life, of which, as I have held above, the traditional! Indian value of the 'Duties of My Station' or 'Swadharma' is the highest or the worthiest. to be preserved in all our future set-up.

I have pleaded above for the acceptance of 'One's Own Duties' (duties of one's station) or 'swadharma' as the supreme Indian traditional moral-spiritual value as the basis for the reconstruction of our future designs. But I now wish to add some brief remarks in order to bring out a feature of that value that also enables us of the different religious persuasions to look at it from a standpoint that would enable us to assimilate it in a truly 'religious' way, without any denominational exclusiveness in doing so. That feature is the feature of sanctity, holiness or reverence, which are peculiarly religious terms, though not belonging to any particular religious denomination. For a sound social theoty for a multi-religious social community in the modern times, the urgent need is to invest the supreme moral values with the spiritual

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sanctity or holiness and to make them the objects of not merely of our respect, but also of our reverence, which would veritably make them 'religious' values, without however making them religious in any accepted exclusivist or denominational sense. I have said above that the 'moral' values are the character-values in their social aspects, while the 'spiritual' values are just the same character-values in thier intrinsic-personal aspects. I am pleading for the identification of these spiritual values as the charactervalues in their personal or intrinsic aspects, with the values of sanctity and holiness, so that the moral-spiritual values are really the values of 'One's Own Duty' or 'Swadharma' in their social and personal aspects, which in their personal or intrinsic aspects evoke, by their sanctity or holiness with which they are invested, our Highest 'religious' sentiment and reverence. This means that in the context of a social theory for our modem life, our highest 'moral' values (character-values for social life) must ultimately merge into our highest 'spiritual' values (character-values for intrinsic personal life) invested with a sense of 'religious' holiness and sanctity and representing the highest water-mark of the development of our social life by means of the morally 'good' and the spiritually 'holy'. The Bhagavad-Gītā can be quoted, as Plato also can be, where they both, directly or indirectly, mean and say or imply that the commands of moral goodness are, in the last resort, the commands of the cosmos, the ultimate, the Holy-of God. The highest value, according to them, is thus the value of Duty which is the embodiment of goodness-holiness. In all our future reconstruction, therefore, the supreme traditional Indian moral-spiritual values of 'Swadharma' must be held aloft as the embodiment of moral goodness and spiritual holiness! The Good is and must also be the Holy in all our social life!

The upshot of this, the first, theoretical Part of this Paper is that there are three supreme traditional Indian values of (1) the intellectual-speculative, (2) the social-cultural and (3) the moral-spiritual sectors of the life of man, which merit and need to be preserved in all our efforts in the future educational reconstruction of our national life, viz. the values of (1) Cultivation of Knowledge and the Methodology of Knowledge, (2) Tolerance,-Accommodation and Assimilation, and (3) Inculcation of Swadharma as the principle and embodiment of Moral Goodness and

spiritual Holiness and Sanctity.

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II. Educational Indications of the Traditional Indian Values

We now propose, in this second Part of the Paper (which we want to make briefer), to make a few broad suggestions, not necessarily systematic or exhaustive, towards the formulation of our general educational orientation and system in the modern scientific and technological set-up. These suggestions may be both such as are directly connected with the traditional Indian values we have identified above for our purposes, as also those which are only incidentally connected with our situation as it is.

In the first place, it may be realised that there is hardly anything spotted out above which cannot suitably harmonise with the relevant requirements and implications of modern science and technology for our life in our contemporary situation. Science and technology imply industrialisation, urbanisation and formation of large-scale extra-religious communities and groups, in whose life religion, in the revealed authoritarian, denominational or exclusivist sense, is bound to develop, as it should, more and more a personal significance, rather than its old uncivic or exclusivist importunities, which it may also be discouraged from doing. And yet in the life of such communities and groups, the operation of our values can be ensured by suitable educational means and methods, which can be suitably worked out by our specialised educational theorists and educationists. We shall now proceed to make some relevant observations about the educational indications of the three main traditional Indian values which we have identified in the first Part of this Paper.

(1) Regarding the Intellectual-Speculative Values :

One of the most fundamental points for our educational planning, which directly arises out or the intellectual-speculative values we have referred to above, is that our whole educational policy for the planning of our education, at all its stages, should be oriented towards the inculcation in our educands of an attitude of avidity for knowlege and creative and constructive thinking, and their relevant methods. (A special effort may be made, if and as necessary in this context, to enable them to cultivate acquaintance with the Indian achievements, whatever they are and unless they are irrelevant to the set-up of modern knowledge and practice, in

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their own relevant fields.) This is again a matter for the specialists in education to work out and must be left to them. Broadly, it may be suggested that the 'doing' method may be appropriate for the elementary level, whereas the 'project method may be appropriate for the secondary level and the 'research' method for the higher university level.

In particular, a deliberate attempt will have to be made especially to inculcate the appropriate scientific attitude and scientific methodology in all the studies of our students at all the stages and in all the branches of their studies-the Humanities, Science and Technology. In the University context especially, care may be taken to provide for the study and inculcation of the scientific methodology relevant and appropriate to the branch of learning specialised in, and with a practical bias given to that study. All the ingenuity that our educational theory and practice are capable of will have to be brought to bear on the achievement of this most important educational goal.

Another consideration that will have to be taken care of by our national political and Governmental leaders in this context is that no limits arising out of the so-called 'saintly' political ideas and ideals will be permitted to determine the scope and the limits of our research activities in science and technology. All science and technology, even the technology of the atomic science and missiles, must be included within the scope of our research, unless we, even as a free and independent nation that we now are, plan our life and want to live it only at other's mercy. It is the ends for which we use our science and technology that will determine our moral grain, and not our refusal even to tackle them in their areas and sectors which have dangerous possibilities in them. (It is by our determination not to use science and technology for any aggressive or destructive purposes, but to use them only as a means of self-protection and for constructive purposes, that we must seek to harmonise science and technology with our traditional values.) Considerations of mere self-preservation and selfrespect, if we value them at all, would require us to assimilate even the 'dangerous' techniques and processes, even if it would be necessary to remain perpetually alert about the prevention of their misuse. The argument that the first charge on our means and resources is our Plans of economic development and not scientific and technological research, is both guilty of

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the fallacy of inverted priorities and suicedal. For one thing, advanced economic development depends on and can come only after national self-preservation and integrity; and then again, this preservation and integrity in the modern setup of the world depend to a significant extent on our seicntific and technological advance relevant to our defence requirements. It should thus be clear that even our national economic development plans also depend, for our undisturbed pursuit of them, on our progress and equipment in the defence science and technology, and that our neglect of this latter equipment is bound, directly or indirectly, sooner or later, seriously to jeopardise our very independent national existence and integirty and thus to prove suicidal!

A further suggestion also arises out of the context of the intellectualspeculative values under reference at the moment, viz. the suggestion that these values are by no means confined only to science and technology, and must be cultivated also in the context of the Humanities-literature and the historical and the social sciences. In the study of literature, an attitude of critical outlook and appraisal has to be fostered, and creativity has to be encouraged, also a liaison has to be maintained with our past heritage of achievements and ideals to encourage and maintain the national character of our development in it. And these considerations must also apply to the historical and the social sciences. Especially in the study of history, the need for an objective study of and research in our own history is very great, and special care must be taken to prevent the development in it of myths and legends and personality-and doctrine-cults which are the pets of our dominant parties and groups. One does not feel sure these days that the fears regarding these developments are altogether imaginary! And then again, there also remains the need in these our studies for deliberately maintaining our healthy and useful contact with the historical and social developments and studies outside India for our own information and guidance, if we do not want to be parochial and chauvinist in our outlook to our own disadvantage. There would also be the need for us to encourage and support the studies, even for their mere intrinsic academic interest, of the historical and contemporary conditions in and problems of the foreign countries, if we want to emulate the more advanced of them, who encourage and support many more of their scholars in their Indian studies than we encourage and support our own scholars for their studies re the foreign

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A point re our educational provision for the inculcation of intellectual. speculative values, which may look small but is of no small importance, is that special care must be taken regarding provision in our educational set. up for the adequate inculcation of the broad human values and outlook especially in our science and technology courses. Science and technology by themselves, have no particular culture and are value-free and inculcate no particular human values, though they considerably affect and transform our lives, and therefore, special provision will have to be made to inculcate human outlook and values in our budding scientists and technologists during the period of their training itself and to prevent their being turned into mere human automations. This provision may have to take the form of inclusion, on some small scales, of suitable courses in the humanities and the social studies in the teaching of science and technology.- A corresponding care will have also to be taken re the students of the Humanities and the social sciences, so as not to allow them to remain totally innocent of the developments in science and technology, by including in their studies some suitable scientific and technological orientation. These precautions will not only conduce to the rounded development of our educands, but will also stimulate inter-disciplinary studies in them, which will be all to the good. Experience in this behalf of foreign universities, especially those in America, has been very refreshing and useful indeed. Last, but not the least, is the point, in our intellectual-speculative life, re the need in all the branches of our studies, especially at their highest levels, so to orient those higher studies as to enable those undergoing them to realise their basic assumptions and implications in a truly philosophical sense. It is to be noted that such a realisation is but bound to foster and facilitate further creative thinking in those engaged in such higher studies.

(2) Regarding the Social-cultural Values:

Coming now to social-cultural values and their educational indications, the main point, which arises for our consideration and action in the educational context and as a background for our educational effort, is the need for our social and political leaders for once to make up their minds n the scope and the limits of our traditional values of tolerance, of accommodation and assimilation. These leaders must ensure that these tual. ce, is setook. logy, lcate form lcate uring mere ision. ocial g care social of the some ill not ll also good. nerica is the hes of higher ptions sucha cing in

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values serve as sources of our strength and development, rather than those of weakness and deterioration. Accommodation means readiness to admit the incoiming elements to an equality-status for pruposes of co-existence, and willingness to make civic adjustments in the interest of that co-existence on the basis of humanism and democracy, and it is accommodation in this sense that makes for strength and that tends ultimately to develop into mutual civic assimilation, and has often operated in that way in India's historic development. But when this accommodation, in its aspect of civic co-existence, comes to be worked and to operate as mere passivity and submission of the one element in response to the external or internal aggression and proselytism of the other, it makes for conflict, and for the weakness and deterioration of the civic organism, as it has done at certain significant stages, during quite a few centuries, in India's history. India has suffered very heavily on this account, and she ought to take a lesson from that experience of hers in the interest of her own future reconstruction on the right lines. It is for our social and political leaders in charge of the nation's destiny to take due care in respect of the internal forces that militate against mutual accommodation and assimilation and not to encourage them or treat them with any premium, and to dissuade them from ways of intolerant aggresson or importunate proselytism. Their ways of dealing with such forces have to be those of impartiality, coupled with considerateness as well as firmness also, in the interest of the nation itself. It is only against such a favourable social and poltical background and in the civic climate created by this background, that education can work for the realisation of our social-cultural values of accommodation and assimilation. The main thing to do in this behalf in education would be to inculcate, in the younger generation, attitudes of loyalty and devotion to the secular, civic and national values in social life and a sense of their priorty over all other values in the social context, including their priority over the values of denominational religion. Claims of the highest priority for these latter (i.e. denominational) values and the consequential behavioural tendencies and attitudes and loyalties must be demonstrated to them as inferior and harmful to the national interest. Teaching of denominational religion, except in the historical context and for the historical or cultural purposes, in public educational institutions must be discouraged, if not quite

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disallowed. The dangers and evils of extra-territorial or extra-national loyalties from the standpoint of the national life and national interest must be brought home to the students and a stigma of social and moral inferiority must attach to those nourishing or cherishing such loyalties. Religion, for social and political purposes, must be taught to mean national morality touched with the emotion of the holiness of the nation. The inculcation of this National Religion or *Rashtradharma* in and through education will enable us to realise in our actual life our traditional Indian values of tolerance, of accommodation and assimilation, on an operative basis.

The concepts of accommodation and assimilation also imply as their bases, as has already been indicated above, the concepts of humanism and democracy, both of which uphold the principle of the status and dignity or value of the human individual as a supreme end to be served in all our accepted social and political theory and action. True humanism finds its consummation in democracy, and true democracy finds it in democratic socialism, which is our accepted Indian creed in social and political theory. Accordingly, our educational implementation of the Indian traditional and cultural values of accommodation and assimilation must now, in our modem set-up, be visualised in terms of democracy and socialism and in their service. Educational indications and implications of such a position for educational theory are clear enough. The supreme values of the individual as the ultimate unit of social and political life and organisation must be inculcated as the basis of all our educative processes at all their stages, the details of which can best be worked out by our educational theorists and practitioners. The only precautions, indicated in this behalf as necessary and desirable, are that we must ensure that in the teaching of the democratic and socialist value of the individual, there must be maintained a democratic balance between the rights and duties of the individual, and that our socialism does not degenerate into its totalitarian variety.

(3) Regarding the Moral-Spiritual Values:

Regarding the moral-spiritual values and their educational indications we shall be briefer still in our remarks. We must carefully visualise the exact nature of the problem for the educationist in this context. That problem is to invest, in the minds of our educands, the supreme moral value of one

own duty or swadharma in our secular national life, with a sense of religious sanctity and holiness without any exclusivist denominational commitment, but also with a denomination-like attachment all the same. It must be realised that the transcendent and the religious have a peculiar fascination for and a peculiar hold on the human mind, and that, though they have a tendency to develop into the denominational and the exclusive, they have an appeal for the human mind which cannot be equalled in its strength by the merely secular or the moral. The elements of formal ritualism and faith in its transcendent significance traceable in all religion explain this fascination and hold of religion in human life. The problem for the educationist is the fostering and cultivation of this fanscination and hold in favour of the value images held to be the highest in the moral-spiritual life of man in its civic and social context. It is not an easy problem, but it may not be impossible of solution either. After all, as Dr. Bhagavan Das has impressively brought out in his Essential Unity of All Religions, all religions are the vehicles of a broad moral and spiritual culture: and they have also elements of a broad and universal human appeal, providing for the cardinal elements and ways of human nature. It should, therefore, be possible for the educationist to devise ways and means to present and inculcate in the younger generations the values of duty or Swadharma through the use of this 'religious' appeal, without allowing its transmutation into the denominational exclusiveness of particular religions. Use of common humanist literary anthologies of the religions, evolution of common behavioural mores, comparative study of the purely ethical aspects of the religions with a view to bringing about the realisation of their essential unity, etc. are some of the educational means that could be suggested for consideration in this behalf. Attempt may also have to be made to think out the concrete or the material contents of duty or Swadharma in the modern set-up and suitably to propagate them. The old basis of concepts like the varnaśramadharma or of similar concepts, which had a significance relevant to the particular historic stages of our social evolution, will no longer be quite adequate or suitable for this purpose. A new and suitable conceptual basis will have to be evolved in close relation to the social-functional differentiations as they have developed under the modern conditions of our life, and a veritable modern smrti or moral-spiritual

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code for our modern life may have to be worked out, assimilating in it all the vital and continuing fibres of Indian traditional culture and welding them with the indications and needs of our modern life and culture under the impact of scientific and technological development. This is where the Indian traditions will need to be adjusted to and harmonised with our modern conditions of life as they have developed under the impact and influence of science and technology. If such a smrti or code can be formulted by our leaders of thought and action who enjoy popular confidence, it will be for the educationist to formulate the ways and means to propagate it in and through our educational processes.

[1. Paper Contributed to the Education Commission's Seminar on 'Modem Science and Technology and Their Harmonising with Indian Values and Traditions in the Context of a National System of Education for India', Held in Poona, 18th-20th May 1965. Reprinted from the *Journal of the University Poona*, Vol. XXIII, 1965. pp. 63-74.]

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INTERROGATING KNOWLEDGE GLOBALIZATION

ASHOK R. KELKAR

Part I HANDLING KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM DIVERSITY

I. A Historical Perspective

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The problem of the proper handling of the diversity of knowledge systems is being faced by human civilization for the very first time in its history.

Earlier, mankind has had some occasion to handle the diversity of belief systems as such, whether these belief systems be ideologies of the sacred (That is to say, religions) or secular ideologies (such as confucianism, Sthaviravadi Buddhism, Libertarianism or Dialectical Materialism). Broadly speaking, two trends have emerged in the course of this handling. One trend is represented by Islamic notions of infallibility and kufr (the denial of this ideology amounts to ingratitude to God) or the Marxist notions of ideological correctness and bad faith. The other trend in the opposite derection is represented by the Jaina notion of intellectual nonviolence (the key expressions being anekānta, naya, and syāt reality being inherently many-layered but its knowledge being one sided, any knowledge-claim is at best entitled to qualified assent) or the European Enlightenment notion of tolerance. Later, impressed by the diversity of flora and fauna and of languages in the rest of the world, the European civilization invented the 'comparative method' and, having applied it to botany, zoology, and philology, extended it to religion, literature, and the arts, and finally, to philosophy, without quite realizing the full implications of its extension from natural diversification to ideological and intellectual diversification.

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Until recently, however, mankind hasn't had any in-depth experience in the handling of the diversity of knowledge systems as such, whether these knowledge systems are epistemic disciplines (such as Euclid's geometry, Bhartrhari's grammatical theory, or the Chinese science of botany) or technical or useful disciplines (such as Pāṇini's grammar and phonetics or the Arabic horse lore or shipping lore). Civilizations freely 'borrowed' specific useful facts or skills or even specific fascinating insights or attitudes and grafted these on to their 'own' knowledge system without any hesitation or reservation. (Thus, Yunani medicine of the Islamic civilization is almost wholly made up of borrowals from Classical Greece, Yunan, that is Ionia, to the Arabs and Classical India, Ayurvedic treaties being translated into Arabic. Venetian merchants freely borrowed the Indian zero and the Papal whimpers fell by the wayside.) But all that remains piecemeal borrowing. The signal examples in human history of wholesale borrowing of knowledge even involve borrowings from a conquered people by the conquerors (thus, Romans from the Roman province of Greece, from 146 BC onwards, or Mongol rulers from China from the time of Kublai Khan in 13th c CE.)

But then came a loss of such cheerful innocence. The secularization of European philosophy and the concurrent transformation of European natural and moral philosophy into modern natural and human sciences and of European mechanical and medical useful arts into modern engineering and medicine was to erode this happy unselfconsciousness about diverging knowledge systems. There were also other factors contributing to the loss of innocence: (a) European exposure to various non-European civilizations and the eventual European hegemony of the Ecumene (that is, the known inhabited world.) (b) the semitic religious habit, to be seen in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, of advancing monopolistic belief suasions getting carried over into monopolistic knowledge claims, (c) the initial lack of clarity in the distinction between belief systems and knowledge systems (a case in point being Marxist ideology getting presented as a science. Note, incidentally, that the expression 'human sciences' being used here comprises not only the canonical social sciences of economics, sociology, and political science but also psychology, anthropology, linguistics and others, and that the expression 'European' being used here is inclusive of Europeanized soci

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The loss of innocence in dealing with divergent knowledge claims critically affected the handling of diversity both within and across the boundaries of European civilization. In the history of modern European science, one finds it plausible to use a terminology reminiscent of the history of religious or political ideology. One could thus speak of schisms in certain cases. (Is anagenesis entirely self-engendered, as Darwin said, or largely environment-engendered, as Lamarck did? Does the cosmos have a single centre or many centres or none at all? Human beings are alike in some respects but unlike one another in other respects--are these resemblances and differences largely nature-made or largely man-made?) But one could speak rather of mainstream revolutions in certain cases. (Vitalism was discarded in organic chemistry. Evolutionism replaced creationism in biology.) And one could end up speaking only of marginalized heresies in certain other cases. (Homoeopathic medicine seceded from mainstream medical science.) The 'paradigm shifts' in Thomas Kuhn's account of the structure of revolutions in European science sound painfully like disorderly gang wars rather than orderly debates. Again, in the history of European attitudes towards non-European knowledge systems, Europeans selfconsciously looked upon them with fascination (how exotic the native lore is !) with hegemonic arrogance (it is nothing but sheer superstition !) alternating with benevolent indulgence (ethnic science offers some amazing insights !), and, in turn, in these post-modern times, with penitential recompense (how could we possibly have ignored non-global or local science!). It is as if Europeans often treat knowledge systems as belief systems. A magnificent and trend-setting exception to this sorry tale was Otto Böhtlingk's quietly adopting the Pāninian model when called upon to analyse a Siberian language, Yakut. Whitney's carping criticism of clumsy Hindu grammarians simply fell by the wayside of history.

Again, in the history of non-European attitudes towards European knowledge systems, non-Europeans in their turn self-consciously looked upon these with cultivated horror or indifference, or with abject uncritical acceptance, or in these post-colonial times, with cultivated nativistic hauteur. (Thus, Ayurveda and Acupuncture are no longer seen as mere ancestral relics but 'our' still viable medical systems.) Vishwanath Rajwade, the

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historian from Maharashtra, and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, the philosopher from Bengal, are some of the exceptions for whom Western thinkers were no more and no less than colleagues across the seas. When it comes to the attitudes of the Indian intelligentsia towards non-dominant knowledge systems of women, lower castes, and tribes one sees a somewhat comic reprise of the treatment dished out by Europeans to traditional Indian knowledge, one sees the attitudes of fascination, arrogance, indulgence, and penitential recompense by turns!

It will be readily seen, therefore, that a simple uncritical distinction between global and local knowledge systems may turn out to be problematic if not questionable even in these globalizing times. An interrogation is certainly in order.

It is the responsibility, then, of the contemporary generation to work out the appropriate strategies for handling the diversity of epistemic and technical knowledge systems of the ecumene of today.

To summarize the argument so far, mankind has been handling diversity of belief systems for quite some time, it has done so either dogmatically or tolerantly. Faced with the diversity of knowledge systems, however, people responded with a certain innocence in the past but lately with a far from innocent self consciousness after the emergence of European secularization of natural and moral philosophy and hegemony of the known inhabited world. A historical perspective thus reveals the dubious character of any proposed distinction today between global and local knowledge systems.

II. The Question of Political-Economic Motivation

Now that the problem of knowledge system diversity is being squarely faced for the first time in human history, one certainly needs to look into the considerations of political attitude or economic exigency that are liable to enter into the selection, whether appropriate or not, of strategies for handling the problem.

An improper handling of this diversity has been motivated in the past by notions of the civilizing and globalizing mission of Europe. The civilizing mission was naturally defined in Graeco-Roman and Judget Christian terms, and the globalizing mission in Roman-Catholic and Roman.

Imperial terms. Just as the Islamic civilization never forgave India for her passive resistance (refusing to be swamped by Islam the way Egypt or Persia were swamped), so did the European civilization find it impossible to forgive India for offering a civilization that just had to be taken seriously (any arrogance or even patronizing beginning to sound unmistakably ridiculous.)

A more respectful handling of this diversity in these post-modern times has been motivated by political correctitude (which is the 1968 descendant of the 'ideological correctness' of Marxist vintage.)

Motivation, however, is not justification. Considerations of political exigency (such as the post-colonial North-South ambience) or even of political attitude (such as extending power sharing to the sharing of knowledge-as-power) are essentially irrelevant to the selection of appropriate strategies for the handling of knowledge diversity. True, improper handling is often traceable to wrong-minded attitudes and proper handling to well intentioned attitudes. But such unhappy or happy circumstance is no help in identifying what is proper and what is improper in handling knowledge diversity. Convincing arguments for such discrimination have to be looked for elsewhere.

This is even clearer as we turn from political attitudes to economic exigencies. Improper handling of this diversity has been motivated in the past by considerations of economic exploitation of non-European peoples as ready sources of raw materials, trainable labour, and captive markets. Thus, the 'native' textile technology of India was an obstacle rather than an asset to the newly mechanized textile industry of Britain. But then the contemporary trend towards a more 'enlightened' handling that reserves a corner of the market for 'ethnic' textiles may equally be motivated by the very same economic considerations. Enlightened self-interest is still self-interest, only being more adaptive to the contemporary global North-South set-up than the more old-fashioned rapacious self-interest would be.

What about the econamic and political considerations brought into play by globalization? A clearer understanding of the process of globalization and its historical roots is called for at this point in our argument. The revolution of intensive riverine agriculture in ancient Egypt and elsewhere

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led to the accumulation of surplus goods and the acquisition of surplus land and labour through land conquest and labour migration. This led to the rise of extensive civilizations out of local cultures and of large empires out of local principalities and republics. This as well as mercantile and adventuring explorations together led to the gradual enlargement of the ecumene. This in turn created a favourable milieu for proselytizing ideologies (such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, or Marxism), and for the widespread acceptance of classical languages and literatures (such as Sanskrit, Greek Chinese, Arabic and others.) The European hegemony of the Ecumene (complete by mid-19th c) facilitated the ecumene-wide adoption of modem science and technology and of the notions of public instruction and constitutional government (howsoever etiolated these may be). It also created conditions for the ready cosmopolitanism of the cinematic art and of the communication media (whether linguistic, audial, or visual). The current spurt in globalization is thus only the latest phase of an age-long process. Owing to a combination of certain circumstances, the drive to export one's surplus goods turned, around 1980, into a drive to produce goods specifically for export in order to meet previously identified local needs. This was the Japanese policy of dochakucha (global localization), that consists in adapting exported goods and services to changing local needs and demands rather than depending solely on the adapting of existing local needs and demands through advertising to changing marketed goods and services. It will be seen, therefore, that contemporary giobalization is not by any means an unanticipated upstart or a cunning manoeuvre and, more reassuringly, that it has built into it mutually contrary tendencies, the tendency seen in centralization, standardization and co-ordination on the one hand and the tendency seen in decentralization and encouragement of variety and local initiative on the other hand. The paradigm case is the progressive globalizing of language (adopting and developing an insight from Otto Jespersen's essay on the dialect): the gradual replacement of local idioms each imposing a uniform pattern of cognition and communication on their users by widely intelligible literacy languages that place a rich variety of styles and vocabularies at the disposal of the speaker'listener who is then invited to choose from among them accordance with the needs and inclinations. In Medieval north India, for

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example, what were basically local or social idioms (the Braj of Mathura, the Avadhi of Ayodhya, and the pilgrims' contact language of Varanasi) got assigned to religious modes (bhakti of Kṛṣṇa, Rāma and the abstract godhead respectively). A more problematic case is that of single-control production (patent, copyright, demand preference) with widespread marketing. This may turn out to be exploitative rather than protective in practice. Imposing uniformity, Euroeentric or otherwise, in the name of globalization, will indeed be a travesty of globalization as a truly understood historical dispensation.

A proper handling of knowledge system diversity naturally presupposes that one has correctly understood the diverging systems in the first place, at least carefully studied and reconstructed them. Sheer curiosity and fascination undoubtedly motivated Europeans to undertake such study, which was often followed by comparative study, pace Edward Said. But then political and economic self-interest also came to motivate the study of non-European cultures, belief systems, and knowledge systems in all their particularity. Teams of Orientalists, Africanists, and Americanists of earlier times and, more recently, institutionalized 'area studies' offered useful inputs to effective governance, effective exploitation, and yes, effective proselytization.

Political and economic considerations also affect the response of various non-European civilizations to the study of knowledge systems. Thus, the doctrine of swadeshi in India got extended beyond the boycotting of foreign goods to the revitalization of traditional Indian knowledge systems, whether philosophical, scientific, technical, or artistic. At this point, it is worth recalling the controversy between the orientalists and the occidentalists in the early 19th century India among British policy makers as well as among some Indian intellectuals in respect of the content and the medium of public instruction. The orientalists lost the battle but not completely so. The new university-educated Indians espoused a combination of occidental and oriental learning and gloried in their double heritage. In contemporary India, the controversy has shifted from the content of education to the language medium of education. Macaulay's dream of a generation of brown sahibs is being fulfilled today to all appearances, at least in the professional, administrative, and managerial cadres. To the intellectual, swadeshi no longer holds any appeal. The scientist, the

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technologist, or the thinker does not argue in favour of giving primacy to 'our' tradition over 'their' tradition, but rather is slowly veering round to the doctrine of swaraj rather than swadeshi. Let us not be content to play second or third fiddle to the European initiative, but rather let us feel free to draw upon both the European and the Indian heritages and to seize the initiative where we can, and let us in this way repay the intellectual debt we owe to the European civilization.

In sum, now that the problem of handling knowledge diversity is being squarely faced by mankind, it is all the more important to realize that political nad economic considerations are legitimate as motivators, but not as arguments in selecting the proper mode of handling the diversity of knowledge systems. The tide of globalization offers both centralizing and decentralizing, assimilative and variationist possibilities towards the proper mode of handling diversity.

III. Ideological Considerations

The discussion so far is predicated on a rather sharply drawn distinction between belief systems and knowledge systems, that is, between religious and secular ideologies on the one hand and epistemic and technical knowledge disciplines on the other hand. Diversity is something ingrained in belief systems and so is effort at persuasion. Knowledge is inherently uncomfortable with diversity, it is content with just making the claim along with presenting evidence by way of validation. Belief systems are ultimately made up of persuasively used statements and mands; knowledge systems are ultimately made up of factively used statements and mands.

Before we proceed further with the argument a terminological digression is in order. In the course of their use, sentences exhibit both the functions of language, namely, the communicative function and the cognitive function. Language performs the communicative function of conveying mental contents from sender to receiver and thus helping people to gain access to social life and secure cooperation. Language, at the same time performs the cognitive function of processing mental contents and thus helping people to gain access to the world and feel at home in the environment that the world has to offer. In performing the communicative function, sentences take the shape of either statements or mands or language gestures. (Language gestures comprise exclamations, greetings, abuse

or the like and need not detain us any further.) statements offer either or the like of the like of reality (It is raining), or comments, that is, observations on reality (Rain was untimely). Statements are supposed to fit reality or else stand rejected as unsupported. In the course of communication, if statements chiefly call for their actual fulfilment in reality. they are being used factively, but if they chiefly call for the acceptance of the report or comment, they are being used persuasively. Mands are distinct from statements, imperatives, wishes, calls for attention, and questions are all mands. Mands stake either a claim from reality by way of a demand (Rain, rain, go to spain!) or a claim on reality by way of a recommendation (If only it rains!). Reality is supposed to fit mands or else stands rejected as unsupportive. Mands too can be used factively or persuasively in the course of communication, if they chiefly call for their actual fulfilment in reality, their use remains factive; if they chiefly call for the acceptance of the demand or recommendation, their use is persuasive. To use a statement (or mand) factively is to take the stand that, since one is offering the right description (or prescription) that is being supported by reality, its suasion, that is, acceptance by the addressee can take care of itself. On the other hand, to use a statement (or mand) persuasively is to take the stand that, since one is offering the ascription (or inscription) that is rightly being accepted by the addressee, that is, effecting suasion, its validation in reality can take care of itself. Knowledge systems, whether epistemic desciplines or technical disciplines, are on the whole content to offer statements or mands in factive use. Belief systems, whether religious ideologies or secular ideologies, are on the whole intent on offering statements or mands in persuasive use.

This account of knowledge and belief systems should now be of help to us in understanding how the two are distinct but not wholly separable kinds of systems that offer an understanding of reality. True, knowledge systems are affected by ideological considerations and belief systems are affected by factivity considerations. On the whole, however, the two perform distinct functions in the life of people. Thus, when a certain group within a community establishes its hegemony over other groups in political and economic terms, it tends to consolidate its hegemony by getting the other groups to accept not only its belief system but also its knowledge system. That is what Antonio Gramsci's argument was all about. Again, when a

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certain community within the ecumene establishes its hegemony over other communities in political and economic terms, it tends to consolidate its hegemony by getting the other communities to accept not only its belief system but also its knowledge system. That is what the suspicions and reservations about any Eurocentric proposal for globalization of knowledge that are so rampant in non-European civilizations are all about.

One must not lose sight of the fact that ideological considerations do not have equal weight in varying knowledge systems. To begin with, one needs to differentiate between epistemic disciplines in which statements predominate and mands subserve them and technical disciplines in which mands predominate and statements subserve them. (Technical disciplines include not only engineering and technology in the narrow sense but also agriculture, animal husbandry, medicine, education, the useful arts of management and communication, and so forth.) Diversity of technical disciplines can be countenanced when linked with diversity of natural environments and diversity of lifestyles. Farming systems in tropical and subtropical wet lands and in subtropical and temperate semi-dry and dry lands are bound to differ. Even global plant science can profit from inputs from local plant lore, but the latter cannot be expected to survive competing plant science. But then even farming systems may involve ideological considerations concerning the whole relationship between mankind and natural environment. The use of inorganic fertilizers, organic manure, and 'natural' straw-mass are successively less invasive methods. Likewise, with successively less invasive methods of disease management in medicine. Global Eurocentric medicine is primarily a management of illness deformity and injury and degeneration; the Indian medical system of Ayurveda is primarily a way of health-maintenance. The latter could certainly offer worthwhile ideological inputs to the former, over and above specific remedies and therapies. But then Ayurveda is already coming to terms with the disciplines of anatomy and physiology proposed by the global Eurocentric epistemic system.

Further, one also needs to differentiate between two kinds of epistemic disciplines, namely, natural sciences and human sciences. In natural sciences, factivey used statements (with subservient mands) tend to exercise a fuller control over persuasively used statements (with

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subservient mands). In human sciences, the control is not so complete; subserviols subser ideological statements. The underlying reason is not, as is often supposed, the greater exactness and quantifiability of the former than of the latter. Exactness is not simply a matter of number-crunching so much as a matter of logical rigour. Quantifiability is not just a matter of calculability but also a matter of statistical assessment of probability. Both of these requirements enter into both groups of sciences. Again, the underlying reason is not, as is often supposed, the greater scope for determinacy in the former and contingency in the latter. Contingency comes into play in natural sciences (chaos theory, evolution theory) and determinacy in human science (regularity of sound change in linguistics and the general equilibrium theory of Walras in economics). Rather, the underlying reason for the difference between natural sciences and human sciences is twofold. Sciences vary from one another in respect of (a) the degree of context-intrusion into events and objects under observation and (b) the degree of observer intrusion into the observation of and on reality (inclusive of manipulative observation involving instrumentation and experimentation.) In both these respects, life sciences are intermediate in character between physical sciences with their minimal context-intrusion and observer-intrusion and human sciences with their maximal context-intrusion and observer intrusion. Physical sciences, of course are not entirely free from context- intrusion (terrestrial and cosmic space-time, microscale object-events and macro-scale object-events) or observer intrusion, (Heisenberg uncertainty, work in relation to kinetic and potential energy, recoverable and 'lost' information-where 'information' stands for the way matter and energy get distributed over space and time and where 'recoverable' stands for being open to observer-interpretation of space-transmitted or time-recorded messages whether natural, as with spectroscopy or carbon-dating or man-made, as with sending our/looking for outer space signals or leaving behind/looking for imprints and other geological messages.) In human sciences, the context-intrusion amounts to the decisive presence of natural and human history and geography and the observer intrusion amounts to the decisive presence of ascribed object properties and event properties and corresponding relations along with purely describable object-properties and event-properties and corresponding

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relations (thus, phonemes weigh more than phonetic facts, gender and conjugal relation mores weigh more than the facts of human sex.) (The biology of humans is of course a life science and not a human science.) In life sciences, of course, the picture is intermediate in character. Given this peculiar state of affairs, ideological considerations progressively weigh more as one moves from physical sciences through life sciences to human sciences. Consequently, the proper handling of knowledge system diversity is seen to be even more of a challenge than the proper handling of belief system diversity.

In view of their close relationship with each other, knowledge systems and belief systems are liable to be confused with each other. A knowledge system may be mistaken for a belief system (consider Christian fundamentalist objections to Darwin). Alternatively, a belief system may be mistaken for a knowledge system (Christian science is a case in point) The secularization of philosophy qualified it to be deemed a knowledge system rather than a belief system or ideology, and yet Hegelian cosmology and account of human history and its projecton into future have come to be looked upon by some as secular myths within a secular ideology. Together, knowledge and belief systems constitute the worldview of human beings, and play connected though distinct roles in human life. The two shape each other and shape the worldview as a whole; the worldview in its tun shapes the knowledge and belief systems encompassed by it.

In sum, while diversity and hopes to persuade are ingrained in belief systems hopes to validate and the minimizing of diversity are ingrained in knowledge systems. Ideological considerations shape knowledge systems technical disciplines and human sciences more so than other knowledge disciplines. Ideological considerations, therefore, influence our strategy for handling knowledge diversity, but influencing the selection does not amount to justifying its appropriateness. Ideologies and knowledge discipling operate within a human worldview.


IV. Philosophical Considerations

It should be clear by now how a historical perspective, political economic considerations, and ideological considerations all help us had understand how knowledge system diversity can be a serious problem



today, but these cannot help us to find out what the appropriate strategy of today, but the problem will be. To this end, we need to do three things: (a) to understand what knowledge systems are all about, (b) to distinguish between two kinds of relationships between knowledge systems, namely, diversity and complementarity, and (c) to set our possible alternate strategies to the handling of diversity from which to make an intelligent choice.

We have already seen (at the end of section III) that belief systems and knowledge systems together constitute the worldview of human beings. Human beings interact with their environment. They seek to cope with the environment, modifying it if need be, through their practices and procedures. At the same time, they seek to understand that environment through their beliefs and their knowledge. The practices and procedures adopted by human beings constitute their lifestyle. The beliefs and knowledge accepted by human beings constitute their worldview. The worldview is naturally shaped by the lifestyle and the lifestyle by the worldview. The lifestyle and the worldview together shape and are shaped by human life.






Figure 1 Knowledge Systems in Perspective

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Human lifestyle is mediated by the personality of the coping human being, by the society surrounding the person, and by the culture modifying enriching, or diminishing the coping by the person. Human worldview mediates between the objects and events (the object-events, for short) together with their properties and relations on the one hand and the understanding subject equipped with certain capacities and disposed along certain inclinations on the other hand-in other words, between the incoming given and the processor. The processing may be on line and so relatively quick or off-line and so relatively leisurely-in other words, belief yielding and knowledge-yielding respectively. (One may note in passing that language gestures, unlike statements and mands, partake in the relevant personal, social or cultural lifestyles rather than any worldview as such.)

Being the outcome of relatively leisurely processing, knowledge is more amenable to scrutiny and to systematizing than belief is. The traditional British definition of knowledge as justified belief is not wholly satisfactory. but it certainly serves to underline the scrutiny-friendly character of knowledge. Turning to its system friendly character, one has only to tumto the Continental Europeans grappling with the two rival conceptions of truth the relatively unsophisticated correspondence conception of the truth of a proposition or the reference of a term and the apparently more sophisticated coherence conception of the truth of a proposition or the reference of a term. A consideration of complex systems of theory-laden propositions and theory-laden terms from ideologies and sciences strengthened the case for the coherence conception without quite detracting from the down to earth appeal of the correspondence conception. A viable compromise was struck: in the case of theory laden propositions and terms, the correspondence to look for was not between isolated propositions and terms and isolated facts and object-events. But rather between coherent groups or systems of propositions and terms and system contextualized facts and object-events. (W.V.O. Quine was of course the author of this compromise, though he may not probably care to be so designated.) Given this insight, scrutiny friendliness consists in the amenability of groups of systematized propositions and terms to correspondence with groups of facts and object events, while system friendliness consists in the amenability of propositions and terms to derivation from relatively more primitive propositions and Interi

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terms. We propose to adopt this insight in our consideration of knowledge and belief systems without losing sight of the permeability of the boundaries of these systems to single propositions or single terms. Indeed, in the course of history, knowledge disciplines typically arise as a consolidation of what till then has been little better than a knowledge aggregate: thus, star lore is systematized into astronomy. Occasionally, knowledge disciplines may degenerate into aggregates or, worse still, into bricolage, to use Claude Lévi-Strauss's term. The astronomy underlying latter-day astrologies is often little better than degenerate astronomy. Folk Ayurveda would be another example. Knowledge systems have typically been losing out by relying excessively on correspondence (Ptolemy's astronomy was so smug about its correct identification of objects and predictions of events that it overlooked the increasing incoherence of its epicycles on circular geocentric orbits) or excessively on coherence (Freud's psychology or Marx's political economy were so smug about the elegant coherence of the apparatus of propsoitions and terms that they overlooked the increasing untenability of the predictions and tenuousness of reference of the terms.) Systemfriendliness and scrutiny-friendliness are both important. Knowledge systems need not be hermetically sealed, but then they should not be utterly porous either. Knowledge systems need not hug the observational ground all the time, but then they should not utterly take to the clouds either.

Any knowledge system has a certain anatomy: It comprises the following components (with varying degrees of explicitness, to be sure), namely, (a) a domain, (b) its treatment, and (c) the underlying approach:

- (a) It has a furniture of objects and events, which are delineated either through a set of concrete images or a set of abstract concepts or some mixture of the two. In terms of language, this turns out to be a set of names or nomenclature, a set of terms or terminology, or a combination of names and terms, and of course a syntax yielding epistemically well-formed statements and mands. This component serves to set out adequately the facts that constitute the *domain* of the knowledge system. Setting out the facts adequately is setting them out exhaustively, relevantly, precisely and accurately.
- (b) A furniture of first and second order insights. The first-order collational insights set out, for example, simple positive or negative

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correlations between object-events of various sorts within certain domains, or more complicated functions linking inputs and outputs of the processor. The second order explicational insights offer explications either through certain manifestations of potency or energy or through certain interactions of forces.

The historically earlier of the two explicational strategies invokes the notion of participation and operates from the following principles: (i) The discrete and complex be traced to the continuous and simple. (ii) The determinate be traced to the contingent. (iii) The apparent be traced to the potent, whether immanent or transcendent.

The historically later of the two explicational strategies invokes the notion of efficacy and operates from the following principles: (i) The continuous and complex be traced to the discrete and simple. (ii) The contingent be traced to the determinate. (iii) The apparent be traced to the interactive.

In terms of language, this turns out to be a system of primitive and derived sentences. The sentences may be either statements with subservient mands or mands with subservient statements.

This component constitutes the heart of the knowledge system offering a treatment of the domain.

(c) An apparatus of the practices and procedures of discovery-making and claim scrutinizing. In terms of language, this turns out to be a set of mands setting out the practices and procedures of knowledge seeken and a set of statements distinguishing between the presupositions and the demonstrables within the system. This component constitutes the approach underlying the treatment of the domain of the knowledge system.

A historical aside. The separation of domain, treatment, and approach partially resembles the three limbs of a discipline *šāstra*, namely, uddes (pointing out and attending to), lakṣaṇa (characterizing), and pariṣṇaṇa (examining) in traditional India. The separation of collational and explicational partially resembles the differentiation between induction and abduction proposed by C.S. Peirce. The disjunction of participation and efficacy explicational strategies broadly correspond to: (a) in classical Greece Plato's methéxis (Phaedo) and Aristotle's efficient cause; (b) In traditional

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India; the satkārya-vādins and their allies and the parināma-vādins and their allies, (c) in Modern Europ: the distinction between the primitive mentality and the scientific mentality (looking for atom-like units, predictabilities, and interactive vectors). Mediaeval European scholars translated methéxis as participatio in Latin, the term picked by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and others in describing the explicational strategy through manifestations of potency.

A knowledge system offers an understanding of some domain. What offers, then, an understanding of that knowledge system? In other words, how does one go about interpreting a knowledge system? Such an interpretation can be undertaken from various points of view:

- (a) It can be undertaken purely as a faithfully explicit record of the three components of the knowledge system in question or alternatively as an edited version designed to show off the knowledge system to the best advantage. As Immanuel Kant once put it not in a spirit of bravado but in a spirit of humility (*Critique of Pure Reason* B 370), our job is to understand Plato better than he understood himself. This is interpretation amounting to a sympathetic elucidation rather than a mere record.
- (b) The interpretation can be undertaken from an insider's point of view (the Verständnis as acvocated by Dilthey, Weber, Schutz and others) or from some stranger's point of view (early European Orientalist interpretations of Indian and other knowledge systems are a case in point) or from the Archimedean point of view of a truly 'neutral' observer (this still remains a desideratum). 'Neutral' here means neutral as between human communities offering their differing knowledge systems.
- (c) The interpretation may be undertakne so as to connect the knowledge system to its historical motivation (Hellenic geometry can be understod as a way of measuring land and traditional Indian astronomy as a way of rightly timing a ritual) or its historical intention (early economics was intended to show how 'the invisible hand' of demand and supply worked better than any governmental intervention).
- (d) The interpretation may be undertaken so as to find out about the exact status of the sub-systems recognized within some knowledge system. Do these sub-systems merely offer treatments or the respective subdomains

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within the over-all domain of that knowledge system? (Frequency-wise segments within electromagnetic radiation within the object-events of physics.) Alternatively, do those sub-systems offer respective modes of treatment of the same sub-domain within the over all domain of that knowledge system? (The same sub-domain of zoology such as sleep, sex or locomotion is being treated under the sub-systems of physiology, ethology, or ecology operating within zoology.) Such an interpretation may serve to reveal unresolved contradictions within a knowledge system. Such is liable to be the case, for example, when the knowledge system attempts to syncretize two sources that are separated in space and time or separated in ideological motivation. Unresolved contradictions within a knowledge system, as an incipient split into schools, or as unresolved tensions within the historical motivation or the historical intent underlying the knowledge system.

Having attempted an understanding of what knowledge systems are all about, let us now move on to distinguish diversity from complementarity between connected knowledge systems. Two knowledge systems may complement each other. Thus, modern chemistry complements modem physics, physical chemistry being the measure of that complementarity. Traditional Indian medicine makes references to traditional Indian atronomy or chemistry. Indian medicine, Indian chemistry, and Indian poetics all use the term rasa in similar ways by virtue of similar presuppositions concerning the rôle of an active principle. (This last observation I owe to the Late D. K. Bedekar's discussion of Indian poetics.) This is complementarity and not diversity. But then two knowledge systems may compete with each other. Thus, in Medieval Islamic civilization, the classical Greek medicine and the traditional Indian medicine came to be drawn upon at the same time. This is diversity (between Greece and India) in action and not complementarity. The domain is approximately the same, but the treatment or the approach or both diverge from each other. The notion of knowledge system diversity can also be applied to major shifts within the same tradition Physics before and after Newton and later, before and after Einstein and Quantum Mechanics exemplify such diversity. The many schools of psychology, whether flourishing simultaneously or not, also exhibit true diversity. It will be seen from these examples that knowledge system

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diversity may exist across civilizations or within a single civilization, across major historical periods or within a single period: the problem presented in all such cases is essentially the same. Indeed there may sometimes be greater resemblance between systems that are widely separated historically or geographically than between systems not so separated. Medieval European medicine resembles Hellenic, Yunani and Ayurvedic medicine far more than it resembles modern European medicine. All these premodern systems, for example, recognize the rôle of an 'active principle' in a medication or recognize the rôle of cosmic elements as 'humours' of some sort. Handling diversity between competing systems is quite different from handling division between complementary systems: schools are one thing but branches are quite another thing.

What now remains to be done is the setting out of possible alternate strategies for the handling of diversity from which to make an intelligent choice. The strategies available for handling diversity, whether of belief or of knowledge, differ from each other in respect of two crucial questions: (a) Should the system be bonded to the specific sort of object events to be understood? Should knowledge system, for example, offer a treatment or even an approach that is specific to the domain? If specific, how relativized? If non-specific, how universal? (b) Should the system be bonded to the understanding subject? Should a knowledge system, for example, offer a treatment or even an approach that is specific to the knowing subject? If specific, how relativized? If non-specific how universal? since the knowing subject is also a living human being, the specificity of the knowing subject is bonded to the personality, the society, or the culture that define the lifestyle of that human being. Further, since the human being needs to have some direct or indirect access to the knowledge domain, the problems, mentioned earlier, of context-intrusion and observer-intrusion also make themselves felt in all their complexity at this point.

The questions of domain-secificity and of human-subject-specificity are of course correlated respectively to the cognitive function of reality-fulfilment performed by a sentence, whether a statement or a mand, and to the communicative function of acceptance-by-the-addressee (or suasion, for short) performed by a sentence, whether used factively or used

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Having first made a scrutiny of divergent knowledge systems (or belief systems, as the case may be) one may then adopt, broadly speaking one of three alternate strategies, namely, (a) Anarchism, (b) Absolutism and (c) Relativism. Anarchism takes the position that the domain-bondage and the subject-bondage be maximal. Let the system be so selected that it is suited to the specific body of object-events to be understood and suasive to the specific body of understanding subjects. This strategy often makes a virtue of being eclectic and ad hoc. The more the merrier, as it were Absolutism takes the position that the domain-bondage and the subject bondage be minimal. Let the system be so selected that it is valid for the whole body of object events and deserves to be suasive to the whole body of understanding subjects. This strategy often makes a virtue of being grandly comprehensive in coverage and dogmatically orthodox, saying in effect that the selected knowledge-claim is alone valid and deserving to be suasive and no other competing knowledge-claim. This strategy should and often does cheerfully accept the responsibility of showing how the rejected knowledge-claims are in error and why they are undeservedly suasive to the understanding subjects in spite of making erroneous knowledge-claims. Relativism takes the position that the domain-bondage be reduced to the extent feasible or the subject-bondage be reduced to the extent feasible or both. The strategy often makes a virtue of being domainwise flexible and subject-wise liberal and thus equally shunning anarchism and absolutism. Relativism certainly has a level-headed sanity about it that is missing in the other two, but then Anarchism and Absolutism have a certain heady daringness about them that is missing in the tepid middle position of Relativism.

It will be seen that anarchism is the most flexible and liberal strategy and encourages exploration of alternative points of view, that absolutism the least flexible and liberal strategy and encourages resolution of all differences within some all-inclusive framework and that relativism occupies a middle position and encourages level-headed moderation.

Let us recall (the opening of section III) that belief systems are on the whole hoping to offer persuasively used statements and mands, but that knowledge systems are on the whole content to offer factively used

statements and mands. Belief systems can afford to be more accomodative, more flexible and liberal, but are often not so. (Religious or ideological dogmatism is proverbial.) Knowledge systems cannot countenance anarchism without abdicating their function of making a reliable and successful understanding of the world available to human beings engaged in the business of life; they cannot afford to be accomodative, but are often so. (The way physicists lived comfortably for a period with wave and particle theories of llight and other electromagnetic radiation is legendary. The qualification 'for a period' must not of course be lost sight of.)

Having tackled the preliminary philosophical questions of the character of knowledge systems of their diversity and complementarity and of the available alternate strategies for handling diversity of knowledge (and incidentally, also belief), we are now ready to address ourselves to the main question: how to select the strategy appropriate to the kind of knowledge systems in view? Some broad principles could be set out, for each principle, other things shall of course remain equal.

Let us recall (from section III) that epistemic desciplines give priority to statements over mands and technical disciplines to mands over statements. Technical disciplines involve the living human being not just as the knowing subject but also as the acting subject aiming at the fulfilment of the mand. In consequence, technical disciplines need to be more accommodative, more concerned with flexibility in domain-bondage and liberality in subject-bondage than epistemic disciplines need to be.

Let us recall from section (III) that physical sciences give priority to factively used statements over persuasively used statements to a higher degree than life sciences and human sciences and that life sciences do so to a higher degree than human sciences. This is by reason of progressively higher context-intrusion and subject intrusion. In consequence, there is progressively higher scope for domainwise flexibility and subjectwise liberality as one moves from physical sciences through life sciences to human sciences. This principle of course applies to epistemic disciplines (such as physics, biology, or anthropology) as well as technical disciplines (such as engineering, medicine, or education).

Does this mean that Eurocentrism in human epistemic disciplines

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such as psychology, sociology, or economics, for example, is excusable? so, to what extent? Eurocentrism is certainly excusable to the extent that the accessibility of the human domain was mostly limited to European persons, societies, or economies especially during the formative phase in the history of these disciplines. Have the knowledge-claims based on such llimited exposure to the domain ever been tested since then beyond European data? Even more damaging is the criticism, if historically borne out, brough against Freud's psychology that it was entirely based on Viennese middle. class Jew patients? It is more damaging because it is not just a question of imperfect access to the human domain but also a question of the treatment of the domain being permeated by observer-intrusion in terms of a circumscribed lifestyle. Globalizing should be harnessed not only in overcoming limited access to the human domain but also to overcomine parochialism of treatment. Will an Indian sociologist have free accessin European society in the study of politically 'sensitive' sub-domains like discrimination based on race even as a European sociologist has free access to Indian society even in the study of politically 'sensitive' sub-domains like discrimination based on ritual status? A realistic answer is probably negative. Will a Eruopean psychologist ever draw upon the ideas stored in traditional Indian psychology? A realistic answer is, again, probably negative. Eurocentrism in global human science is too rampant for comfort. Should we then prefix the qualifier 'so called' to the phrase 'golbal human science'? If political correctitude motivates European knowledge-seekers to be more intellectually hospitable to non-European knowledge systems and to rid themselves of any remnants of nativistic fervour, and if nativistic fervour motivates non-Eruopean knowledge-seekers to resist firmly a wholly Eurocentric globalization of knowledge systems, that is all to the good, Bul in working out appropriate strategies for the handling of knowledge system diversity, let philosophical considerations be our guide rather than political correctitude, however well-intentioned, and nativistic fervour, however constructive.

We have not brought into this complex picture formal knowledge systems such as the epistemic disciplines of logic and mathematics and the technical disciplines of rhetoric and statistics. Formal epistemic disciplines are, paradoxically enough, anarchist and absolutist at the same time. Being

free to choose definitions and axioms, they can afford to be maximally flexible-liberal, being bound to follow rigorously the consequences of their choice, they have to be minimally flexible-liberal. Kindly permit me to share with you my suspicion that it is this paradox that motivates and possibly underlies the controversy as to the covenantal or real character of mathematical objects and properties (say, the controversy between David Hilbert and Bertrand Russell) or the controversy about the impossibility or possibility of viable conceptual translation across knowledge systems (say, the controversy between W.V.O. Qufne and Donald Davidson). Formal technical disciplines can be somewhat more accomodative of both flexibility and liberality in a relativist fashion within the limits set by their formal character.

We have also not brought into this complex picture philosophical disciplines such as the epistemic disciplines of the philosophy of reality and understanding or the philosophy of life and coping-with-life and the technical disciplines of the philosophy of lifestyle-criticism (such as the philosophy of moral action, political action, or artistic creation) and the philosophy of belief systems (such as the philosophy of religion, magic or secular ideologies). To begin with, the secularization of philosophy in Classical Greece, Classical India and Renaissance Europe has ensured that there need be no confusion about philosophical disciplines being knowledge systems rather than belief systems. F. H. Bradley's bon mot that philosophy is the finding of reasons for what one instinctively believes was probably meant as a jibe but turns out really to be a compliment. (In Britain, the term 'technical philosophy' is sometimes used for emphasizing that philosophy is being considered as a knowledge system and not as a belief system. This British use should not of course be confused with our proposal to separate epistemic and technical disciplines in philosophy.) Unfortunately, the comparative study of philosophies across the boundaries of civilizations is still in its infancy and is plagued by the problem of translating abstract concepts and concrete images, and by the European failure to verstehen non-European philosophies. We have just seen the paradox about formal knowledge systems and the underlying reason, philosophy probably shares the paradox but the underlying reason is probably not the same for philosophy being anarchist and absolutist at the same time.

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In sum, human beings interact with their environment. Their worldview, made up of beliefs and knowledge, constitutes their attempt to understand that environment. Their lifestyle, made up of practices and procedures, constitutes their attempt to cope with that environment, modifying it if need be. Human lifestyle is mediated by the personality, the society and the culture associated with the coping. A human worldview mediates between the objects and events being understood (in terms of the properties and relations thereof) and the understanding subject (given certain capacities and dispositions of the subject).

Before one could suggest a proper mode for handling knowledge system diversity, one needs to understand how knowledge systems operate and how they function within human life. Two knowledge systems may be no more than complementary branches within some larger domain or they may offer treatments of broadly identical domains thus exhibiting true diversity. Knowledge-seekers, like belief-holders, adopt alternative strategies differing in object-wise flexibility and subject-wise liberality. Philosophical considerations should help us in selecting a strategy appropriate to the kind of system. Other considerations, however well intentioned, cannot really help us; at best they can only motivate us.

Our immediate quest was to find out why we need to handle the diversity of knowledge systems with particular care and how one couldgo about doing so in the proper way and so avoid some of the improper ways being proposed and canvassed lately. We have then come to the end of the immediate quest.

But this is much more than a simple intellectual exercise. For what is at issue here is the responsibility of the contemporary generation to work out the appropriate strategies for handling the diversity of epistemic and technical knowledge systems of the ecumene of today. In what follows therefore, we propose to do the following. We shall begin by taking up concrete case study, sketching and comparing two available knowledge systems of comparable domains, comparable sophistication, and yet will quite distinct presuppositions. By watching such strategies for handling diversity in action, we could reassure ourselves about the feasibility of such projects. Finally, we shall move on to consider the prospects of a truly humane globalization of human knowledge and to the ways we could about it.

Part II

THE PHILOSOPHERS' RESPONSIBILITY

v A Sase Study

What we propose to do here is to sketch two divergent epistemic knowledge systems with comparable domains and with treatments of comparable sophistication which are widely separated in period and location. Then we shall follow this up with a broad comparative assessment. The systems selected for this modest exercise are traditional Indian psychology and contemporary European psychology. The sketches, especially the first one, are in the nature of an elucidative record in the spirit of Kant's comment on understanding Plato (cited in section IV), and are something of a consensual statement that is largely confined to the furniture of objects and events. In the account of traditional Indian psychology, the Sanskrit terms are given at the first occurrence; their literal gloss in English is also given parenthetically where this was deemed useful.

First, a sketch of the traditional Indian psychology (there is no traditional name for the discipline any more than there was one for the pre-modern European pshchology).

- (i) Within the universe $vi\check{s}va$ (all that there is) or the human-world jagat (that which keeps going) is placed the human-being $manu\check{s}ya$ a living-being $J\bar{v}a/pr\bar{a}nin$ among other species yonis. The human being has a person $deha/\check{s}ar\bar{n}ra/k\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ that is a site $adhikarana/\bar{a}laya$ of various operations $k\bar{a}ryas$.
- (ii) The two main sub-sites are the gross $sth\hat{u}la$ and the subtle $s\hat{u}ksma$ person. The person is in contact samnikarsa with the rest of the world vastu (that which stays put). The operations basically form two flows: the one initiated at the point of contact with the rest of the world is the flow of cognition $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ and the other terminating at the point of contact with the rest of the world is the flow of action karman (action is inclusive of doing something or making something).
- (iii) The gross person has its own constituents *angas* (head, shoulders, etc.), ingredients *dhātus* (bone, flesh, etc.), and three operation systems, namely, the fluid system *kapha* (phlegm), the heat system *pitta* (bile/choler), and the message system *vāta* (wind).

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
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- (iv) The subtle person comprises its own faculties karanas (instruments), outer and inner, with their respective operations.
- (v) The outer-faculties bāhya-karaṇas/indriyas (Indra's restive horses) comprise five cognition outer-faculties (of sight and such) and five action outer-faculties (of handling and such). The cognition outer-faculties receive sensing sariwedana through the gross person which in turn receives pre-sensing vedana from the rest-of the world and the action outer-faculties transmit pre-effort ĉeṣṭā to the gross person which in turn transmits effort prayatna / vyavasāya to the rest of the world.



The notes 1 to 8 are incorporated in the body of the text.

Figure 2

The Furniture of Objects and Events in the domain of traditional Indian Psychology

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(vi) The inner-faculties antah-karanas comprise the minding-faculty manas, the disposing-faculty citta, the controlling-faculty buddhi, and the self-referral faculty asmitā (am-ness)/ahamkāra (I-making). The innerfaculties have a cognition side and an action side each.

- (vii) The minding-faculty, on the cognition side, receives presentation pratyaksa (in-front-of eye) from the congnition outer-faculty concerned and transmits awarenes bodha to the controlling-faculty. On the action side, it receives decision niscaya from the controlling-faculty and transmits prefiguring samkalpa to the action outer-faculty concerned. Thus, the online processing initiated at the contact with the rest-of-the-world comprises experience anubhava, that is, pre-sensing, and behaviour carita/ācāra/vartana, that is, decision, prefiguring, pre-effort, and effort, on the action side, so terminating at the contact with the rest-of-the-world.
- (viii) The disposing-faculty and the self-referral-faculty are engaged in some off-line processing. The disposing-faculty receives and stores impressions samskāras from the life span-up to that point of time pūrvaāyusya/āyus and transmits memory retrievals smṛtis on the cognition side and dispositions citta-vṛṭtis on the action side to the minding-faculty. The self-referral-faculty monitors all processing and subjects it to self referral abhimāna for the benefit of the inner-self antar-ātman.
- (ix) The inner-self is that which all the subtle person faculties are faculties of and which the gross person is the embodiment of. It is the seat of consciousness samuitti/samjñā.

A flow-chart will serve to render a quick overview of the main objects and events of the domain of human psychology. (See Figure 2.) The notes that follow add some refinements and details. Under refinements, for example, the main departures from the consensual view by Yoga (as proposed by Patañjali), Lokāyata, Buddhist, Jaina schools are set out. The consensual view is mainly the achievement of Sāmkya school (as available in the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$. The numbers refer to Figure 2.)

1) The rest of the world presents objects in contact arthas, whether $\frac{\text{objects-at-cognitive-contact visayas or objects at action contact } uddistas/$

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- 2) The gross-person shares certain states with nonhuman species, namely, hunger and thirst, lust and fear, swoon and sleep. The gross person presents five cognition organs šrotras, namely, ears, eyes, skin, nose and tongue transmitting their respective sensings, namely, hearing, sight, touch, smell and taste; and five action organs gātras, namely, hands, feet, speech apparatus, anus, and procreative-urinary organ transmitting their respective efforts, namely, handling, footing, speaking, defectaion and coition urination. The cognition and action organs correspond to the cognition outer faculties with their respective sensings and to the action outer-faculties with their respective pre-efforts.
 - 3) Lokāyata does not accept belief in rebirth. For the rest of the schools, which accept belief in rebirth, the previous lifespan is inclusived the previous embodiments. Such inclusion serves to explain otherwise inexplicable retrievals and dispositions.
 - 4) Most Upanishadic thought as also Yoga do not separate minding and disposing faculties and name the minding and disposing faculty manas and citta respectively.
 - 5) Experience is typically figure defined sa-vikalpa, but can be figureless nir-vikalpa also, as with pre-sensing, neonates, non-human species and certain kinds of trance. Awareness can be awareness of thoughts vicāras or emotions vikāras/bhāvas. Thoughts comprise present actions, minding generated presentations mānasa-pratyaksas, figurings out vikalpas, and configurations kalpanās. Emotions can feed into thoughts or prefigurings, emotinos whether stable or passing, are disposition-guided and directed to objects-in-contact. The cardinal emotions comprise pleasure pain sukha-duḥkha and attraction repulsion rāga-dveṣa. The over all disposition šīla is shaped by impressions and emotions.
 - 6) The decision transmitted by the controlling faculty consists in the sorting out *viveka* between right-wrong *sāra-asāra* (Whether on the cognition side or on the action side) so that on the cognitive side there is discovery *pratyaya* (reaching) and on the action side there is intention *udde šya* (reaching-out). In so far as some of the decisions of the controlling faculty involve some sort of a leap, they are attributed to a special aspect of the controlling faculty: high-cognition *prajāā* underlies such discoveries

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and high-prefiguring $pratibh\bar{a}$ (in-front-shining) underlies such intentions (whether of doing something or making something).

- 7) Most Upanishadic thought as also Yoga, and Buddhist thought do not separate controlling and self-referral faculties and name the controlling and self-referral faculty vijñāna. The self-referral transmitted consists in the sorting out viveka between pertaining to self sva and pertaining to other para.
- 8) Lokāyata does not accept the separation of any inner self from the person and speaks of person-as self dehātman. Buddhist and Jaina thought does not recognize any gross body outlasting inner self but speaks only of an individual place time holder pudgala/ālaya/samtāna that is susceptible to rebirth. Sāmkhya and others accept the inner self that is susceptible to rebirth. The inner-self (or its counterpart in another school Kārana śarīra) is susceptible to certain distinct aspects: knower jnātr and agent kartr aspects in respect of interaction with the rest of the world, being-awake jāgarti, dreaming svapna, dreamless sleep susupti, and possibly, trance samādhi (bringing-together) states avasthā in respect of consciousness and detached tatastha/alipta and involved lipta aspects in respect of self referral. (There may be differences in view over the possibility of combinations. Thus, Bhagavadgītā in expounding its beliefsystem accepts detached action as a possibility but Sāmkhya does not.) Buddhists accept consciousness, but do not accept faculties of inner self as there is no inner-self to speak of, but they accept bundles of operations skandhas. Some Upanishadic thought accepts inner self along with its layered sheaths košas. The broad correspondences between the Upanishadic, the Buddhist and the mainstream thought can be set out as follows:

| The gross person The subtle person Outer faculties Minding | The sheaths consisting-in | The bundles-of operations | The faculties |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| | anna | rūра | sthūla-deha |
| | olene of the His | nāma | sukṣma-deha |
| | prāṇa | vedanā | bāhya-karaṇa |
| | manas | samjñā | manas |

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| Disposing | manas | sa ṁskāra | citta |
|---------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
| Controlling | vijñāna | vijñāna | buddhi |
| Self-referral | vijñāna | vijñāna | asmitā |
| Inner self | ānanda | pudgala | antar-ātman |

Note that under the faculties, Yoga conflates minding and disposing faculties into citta and controlling and self-referral faculties into vijnāna,

It is to be noted that in Notes 3, 4, 7 and especially 8 we have indulged in an exercise in what is admittedly imperfect cognitive translation across the Indian schools to do some justice to the fact that traditional Indian Psychology is not a monolithic product but a productive process of understanding embedded in more than one worldview and evolving overa long period (circa 8th century BC to 8th century CE).

A word of elucidation will be useful at this point in respect of the impact of the two logically distinct but historically closely associated beliefs, namely, the belief in rebirth *punar-janma* and the belief in fruit-of-action *karma-phala*. These appeared on the Indian scene after the vedic period and before the period of intellectual ferment that produced Upanishadic, Sāmkhya, Jaina, Buddhist and Lokāyata thought (around 8th-4th c BC). It is plausible to see the beliefs not as some strange and peculiar elements in a certain ideology but as extrapolations from certain reasonable-sounding observations on the following lines. (I owe the basic insight to Linda Hess, writing on Kabīr.)

On the one hand, one's thoughts and emotions (recall note 5 to figure2) condition one's actions and so one's actions are a comment on the validity of one's thoughts and actions. But then, on the other hand, one's actions need not remain dormant but go on to condition one's subsequent thoughts and actions. This creates a causal feedback loop, as it were. One gets to be what one has done just as one gets to do what one has come to be. Such is the unbroken round-of-life samsāra, as one may observe.

Given the round of life, some may come to believe in the round of rebirth. Because one was born, one will die. By analogy, because one has died, one will be born again unless something interrupts the round of life (Compare the notion of rites of passage that make one born-again and the

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Again, given the round of life, some may come to believe in fruit of action. One's previous Life's actions will have conditioned one's present life and one's present life will condition one's future life's actions. So much so, that there is hardly any circumstance in life that is not traceable to some previous action and hardly any thought or emotion that is liable to condition one's life's actions that is not traceable to one's past actions. (Compare the notion of action leading to reward/punishment and these in turn affecting future action and the notion of one's mode of work and social interaction leading to one's mode of thought and emotion, which are available in certain non-Indian belief systems.)

The point of the foregoing intervention is to show how traditional Indian psychology does not presuppose either the belief in rebirth or the belief in fruit of action, but how it certainly does lead to the notion of the round of life. The intervention also serves to show how knowledge systems and belief systems are closely related yet quite distinct facts of human life.

Now, a sketch of contemporary European psychology (the name 'psychology' dates from mid-17th century CE and the discipline from mid-19th century CE). (Earlier, there was no traditionally recognized discipline by that name.) Such an attempt to present a consensual view is worthwhile even though this is not easy in view of the presence of schisms and heresies. To remind the reader once more, the sketch is an elucidative record and the consensual statement is largely confined to the furniture of objects and events.

Human beings not only have a body like other animals but also a mind that somehow goes beyond animal behaviour and yet somehow remains tethered to the animal body. The human mind has certain functional modes and its processes are subject to certain overall distinctions. The functional modes may be taken up first.

i) Cognition: This is a grouping of certain sub-functions: (a) sensation and perception; (b) learning, that is, acquisition (through the undergoing of experience) of novel content by way of modifying and extending existing contents whether they are inherited or acquired, (c) storage and retrieval

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of life. and the of contents (that is, memory), (d) problem-solving through intelligence rather than retrieval, (e) acquisition of contents in a manner that bypasses all the foregoing sub-functions (that is, intuition). The contents of cognition comprise facts or insights or skills and attitudes. The contents may be represented in concrete image form or in abstract concept form. Concrete image forms are relatable to the forms of external objects and events together with the landscapes and scenarios embedding them. Abstract concept forms are relatable to the properties and relations of objects and events together with the field of attention in which the objects and events are embedded.

- (ii) Imagination: This is the proliferation of concrete images by way of recovery or innovation and the effecting of global or sequential patterning of representations (whether concrete or abstract). This proceeds consciously (and not out of awareness) but not always through free choice. Dreamlife and fantasy-life are also processes in this functional mode.
- (iii) Emotion: This is a way of effecting a transition from awareness to behaviour by maintaining tension consciously but not always through free choice.
- (iv) Action: This is an undertaking of behaviour (a) by virtue of a felt deprivation of want by way of a motivating drive that is subject to reinforcement or attenuation such that (b) the behaviour so undertaken comprises a pattern of activity towards a goal, and (c) the outcome may be either failure and frustration or success and subsidence of want or renewal of behaviour with or without modification of the pattern of activity.
- (v) Integration: This consists in: (a) the continuing development of the human being, (b) into an integrated and individuated person, (c) through self-referral and self-imaging.

Any given mental process is subject to certain overall distinctions, may be conscious or unconscious, freely chosen or compulsive, sequential or global, and may proceed from sources that are acquired or inherited normal or abnormal, individual or social.

Finally, a comparative assessment of these two knowledge systems. The comparison hopes to be broad without being vague and sympathetic to both without being indulgent. In presenting the sketch of traditional Indian psychology we have resisted the temptation to present it through conceptual

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very accer translation, even risking the use of clumsy coinages like figurings-out or controlling-faculty. In consequence, some of the English renderings of the Indian concepts and images depart from Indological practices. Even at this stage, we shall refrain from undertaking any ambitious conceptual translation of Indian into European psychology or of European into Indian psychology in view of the severe limitations of this whole exercise. Even so, certain broad observations may usefully be made.

- (i) An eventual conceptual translation will be worthwhile in that the comparison will not be a hopelessly unequal one betwen a naïve and a sophisticated knowledge system. Both systems are fairly complex and sophisticated. It is perhaps worth noting that traditional Indian psychology, not being a distinct discipline, was simply incorporated in traditional Indian cosmology and that European psychology continued to be tied to the apronstrings of philosophy for a generation or so even after it acquired the status of a discipline in mid-19th century CE.
- (ii) While both knowledge traditions have been subjected to schisms and heresies, the Indian system appears to be better integrated in spite of them than the contemporary European system. It may be that the better integrated Indian discipline has a poorer data base and a less rigorous discovery procedure, while the more poorly integrated European discipline happens to have been caught in the throes of multiple innovations and on the threshold of a fresh integrative effort at the present historical juncture-in short, in a phase of ferment.
- (iii) The Indian system does attribute learning avagamana to the minding faculty, while it attributes creativity to the minding faculty (as kalpana) as also to the controlling faculty (as prajñā or pratibhā) (see notes 5, 6 to Fig. 2), However, there is on the whole an underplaying of the processes of learning and creativity. Such is the case probably because of a highly tradition bound lifestyle. See also note 3 to Figure 2, which is also very relevant here. Note incidentally that, while human creativity was accepted in India in 5th-6th centuries CE (see note 6 to Figure 2), the European civilization dared not accept human creativity till late 18th early 19th century CE probably because this was felt to be blasphemous in the Christian ideology or belief system.

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(iv) While the European system makes a great play of the capacity to learn as well as ofr the over-all distinctions conscious-unconscious, free compulsive, inherited-acquired, and the rest, the Indian system makes some play of the over-all distinction attention-inattention and involvement detachment / indifference. Actually, the distinction inherited-acquired gets obscured in the Indian system, since inheriting or acquiring may be confined to the present life-span upto the moment or may go back to one's previous life-span (on life spans). Any claim, therefore, to novelty in learning or creativity is comewhat suspect. Consider how the European teaching system emphasizes the distinction between learning on one's own and mere memory retrieval while the Indian teaching system failed to do so with disastrous effect. Obviously, the Indians made no use of their wise distinction between ready memory upasthiti, routine explication vyutpatti, and innovative explication upapatti.

- (v) The European system has had to outgrow the classical Greek idea of somehow putting a body and a *psychē* together to make up a man (the idea received a new lease of life from Descartes), the Christian idea of somehow joining together an animal body (the 'flesh' image) and an angelic soul (the 'spirit/breath' image), and the unesay Mediaeval European compromise of the body-mind-soul triad. Modern psychology consigned the soul (sometimes even mind) to the limbo of belief. The Indian system, in contrast, had a headstart by an early recognition of a composite entity and a deft use of the gross subtle distinction between the readily accessible (gross) and the poorly accessible (subtle) aspects of the person. (Traditional Indian medicine not only integrated hygiene and pathology but also spoke of hygiene, pathology, aetiology, and therapy in body-and-mind terms.)
- (vi) The European system has had to struggle with Plato's reason-passion dichotomy and the Roman thought-action dichotomy and to make do with a triad of cognition, emotion and conation. The triad was later abandoned to make room for the Enlightenment's reason-imagination dichotomy and the late 19th-early 20th century idea that the integration of the human person is not an inheritance to be taken for granted but an achievement that is often painful and sometimes in danger of getting damaged if not lost. The Indian system, in contrast, consistently operated

with a simple dyad, cognition and action, based on the simple biological fact of the two interfaces of covert responses and overt responses between the living being and the rest of the world. The flow-chart representation (of Fig. 2) reminiscent of information-processing terminology comes naturally in attempting to bring out the system's simple unidimensional-butbidirectional model. The notion of the feedback loop comes naturaly to this way of thinking as one may see in the Indian notion of the round of life (and the belief in fruit-of-action) as well as the Indians' recognizing that one may become the recipient of one's own outgoing message. The feedback loop may thus be either causal or informational. Emotion and Imagination are neatly tucked away along with Memory as functions of the minding faculty and the disposing faculty, as also Integration as a function of the self-referral faculty. Note further that the disposing and self-referral faculties operate in off-line processing. Some Indian thinkers, for example Buddhists with their bundles-of-operation, for which the individual-placetime-holder is no more than a site (in place of the mainstream idea of faculties serving an inner self), have shown a persistent scepticism about the reality of integration in the human person; Lokayata accepts personas-self but no distinct inner-self as such

(vii) The Europeans have shown a certain preoccupation with the distinction between inborn and acquired elements and, among acquired elements, between individually achieved and socially absorbed elements. The Indians appear to be casual about such distinctions, probably because the idea of rebirth helps in accounting for elements for which the Europeans invoke genetic inheritance and occasionally even the dubious Lamarckian idea of 'racial memory' and because the Indian lifestyle appears to put a premium on socially-passed-on parampaāgata elements.

In sum, it was found worthwhile to sketch and then compare the traditional Indian and the contemporary European psychologies by way of a case study, which illustrated ways of matching domains and the concrete image forms and abstract concept forms featured in the respective domains. The exercise was seen to be feasible though by no means easy. The discussion of the notion of the round-of-life and its extrapolations will have shown how delicate and complicated the link between knowledge and belief systems could be. As we have already seen, knowledge systems are not

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hermetically sealed, they are permeable. One hopes that the sketches were equally sympathetic and the comparison neutral to both. European psychology appears to have much to learn from Indian psychology: a ready acceptance of certain radical insights and a consequent reorganization may help European psychology to put its house in order and improve its explicative treatment without losing the rigour of its discovery and scrutinizing procedures. The hope for a truly global conflation of human knowledge systems that compete in a given domain will thus be seen to be not all that unrealistic.

The call for a truly global knowledge system is thus a call for a system that is not merely a European knowledge system masquerading as a global knowledge system.

VI. Towards a True Globalization of Knowledge

It is one thing to urge the proper handling of knowledge system diversity at the present juncture and to consider the historical, political economic, or ideologial motivations and the philosophical justifications that should help one to select the proper mode of handling knowledge system diversity. (That was our immediate quest in the first part of the present study.) It is quite another thing to assess the actual prospects for a project for arriving at a truly global knowledge system in the context of the present tide of ecumene-wide globalization.

There is probably a certain appropriateness in the fact that the present study was first presented at an Indo-German symposium on global and local knowledge systems. India is the one non-European civilization in the contemporary ecumene that is known for its tradition of continued intellectual hospitality and openness that goes well beyond grudging intellectual 'tolerance' of knowledge and belief systems outside one's own worldview. And out of the European civilization that appers to be all set to press its 'global' claims consigning the rest to the limbo of 'local' claims, the German-speaking community is known for its early initiative in shedding hegemonic arrogance and showing a graceful readiness to take pagan India seriously: one has only to recall Goethe and Schopenhauer and Böhtlingk and Jung among others; the lineage is apparently still not extinct.

What is going to be the shape of the project for a step-by-step

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accomplishment of a true globalization of knowledge in the face of sharp actual diversity? True globalization will promote the creation of a human pool not only of facts and skills but also of available alternatives by way of insights and attitudes. The pioneering work, for example, of Joseph Needham's Science and Civilization in China (1954ff) at one end to John Hoffman's Encyclopaedia Mundarica (1930ff) at the other end of the spectrum needs to be emulated and reciprocated by non-Europeans casting a critical eye on European civilization. (India certainly needs a centre for European studies.) Then, in the sweat of their brow, knowledgeseekers (inclusive of seekers of knowledge of belief-holders) will have to work out bidirectional translations and comparative assessments between knowledge systems available in the ecumene. Eventually, some inspired genius will, rising above parochialism, work on truly anthropocentric (if not cosmocentric) lines in each knowledge and belief domain. The hardest work will have to be invested in the human epistemic and technical disciplines. Assuming, against all indications to the contrary, that all goes well, the project should keep mankind busy for the good part of a century. It is a job that demands patience without exasperation, sympathy without indulgence, clear-sightedness without mechanical rigour, and confidence without a loss of nerve. But then there is probably every possibility that, in the process, the knowledge industry will cease to be the over-centralized, capital-intensive heavy industry that it has become in this late phase of the European civilization and will once again come to wear the more humane and less intimidating face of a light industry with generous room for amateurs. The Internet and its future successors will certainly come in handy in the whole enterprise. One only hopes that one result of such a change would be that knowledge Industry will generally show greater initiative and inner motivation rather than wait for a cue from the powerful offering capital investment in direction of their choice. (I learned to take the idea of knowledge industry to be a useful idea and not a sarcastic joke from the economic writings of Kenneth Boulding.)

The diversity of human knowledge systems needs to be seen in the context of the diversity of human belief systems and the diversity of human lifestyles as seen in terms of personalities, societies and cultures. Mankind is slowly, with painful sloth indeed, coming to friendly terms with diversity

of belief, personality, culture and even technical knowledge (witness the parliament of religions, multiculturalist programmes, the acceptance of non-mainstream healing systems). So far as the globalization of diverse lifestyles is concerned, the Indian tradition of friendly coexistence of lifestyles without any forced unification or assimilation already offers a good model for ecumene-wide cultural globalization that is more humane than either the Roman model or the Islamic model. (One wonders about the Chinese model and the treatment through the ages, of non-mainstream lifestyles in China and its empire.)

Diversity is no mere spice of life, it is nothing less than a value in life. Living organisms variously work out their survival in interaction with the specific environment they happen to cope with over a time span. Different species within a given habitat work out different equations that mediate this process. Different varieties within the species make different contributions to the overall gene pool. This is what biodiversity is all about.

Within the human species, different human cohabiting groups variously work out their different way-of-life equations in coping with the natural environment and of course, with the human environment. ('Cohabiting' is of course to be taken in both the senses of that term.) Each way of life, that is each paired lifestyle and worldview, makes its own precious contribution available to the rest of mankind. This is what ethnodiversity is all about. (The concept of ethnos or a human cohabiting group is not to be confused with the concept of race or genetic variety of the human species.)

Having a worldview to subserve the lifestyle is of course a peculiarity of the human species associated with the 'new brain'. (Having made that crack about philosophy, F. H. Bradley went on to say with some reason that to find those reasons for what we believe upon instinct is no less an instinct.) Having that worldview split into a belief system and a knowledge system was probably made possible by the hemispheric specialization in the new brain. But of course the mere possibility did not become the actual split till the great axiological revolution (6th cBC-6th c CE) in human history took place and led to the emergence of a prosaic-didactic-ethical-technical-anthropocentric worldview by the side of a poetic-mythic-ritual-magical-

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ethnocentric worldview. (The Indian intellectual ferment mentioned earlier inconnection with the round-of-life and its two extrapolations was probably a part of this revolution. The first thinker to spot this event in human history was probably Hegel. As for systematic philosophy, Alfred Kroeber, in his Roster of civilizations and culture, credits Classical India and Greece with being the fountainheads of systematic philosophy and systematic linguistics in human history-another achievement of the same revolution.)

The precipitation of the age-long process of globalization was brought on by European hegemony conjoined with the industrial and communicative revolution (19th-20th c). As we have seen earlier, globalization has both a centralizing-assimilative tendency and a decentralizing-variationist tendency.

Our immediate concern is of course the achievement of the humane globalization of human knowledge systems in the coming times. We said a little earlier that the project should keep us busy for the good part of a century if all goes well. Will it go well? One anticipates difficulties, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the project. Let us consider the intrinsic difficulties first.

The separation of knowledge from belief leads to the paradox (section IV), namely, that belief-holders can afford to be more accomodative, but are often not so, while knowledge-seekers cannot afford to be accomodative, but are often so. The precipitation of globalization has made the consequences of the paradox more acute. Knowledge systems cannot let flexibility and liberality be carried to anarchistic lengths without abdicating their function of making a reliable and successful understanding of the world available to human beings engaged, with their worldviews, in the business of life. (The days when a seriously ill orthodox Hindu would rather die than imbibe European medicine are over.) And yet the overall climate of opinion favours flexibility and liberality in the name of giving our not especially humane times a humane face. Any humane globalization of knowledge has to consider the intrinsic limits of flexibility and liberality without losing out on the accomodative open-mindedness in handling knowledge diversity.

Again, different kinds of knowledge systems differ in their amenability object-flexibility and subject-liberality (section IV), depending on whether

they are epistemic or technical, physical, life-related, or human, actuality validable or formally-validable. The human disciplines (like psychology or linguistics or like medicine or management) are badly in need of early humane globalization.

The first obvious extrinsic obstacle to humane globalization is the fact that knowledge comes handy for the acquisition and maintenance of power. Knowledge helps the power-seeker and the power-wielder not only to enhance the brute force (through weaponry) and the pecuniary force (through accumulation and saving of goods, services, labour, and land) but also the reconciliatory force (through controlling motivation, alliance, and dissension in such a way as to dissuade others from exercising force). Now, the powerful will not part with the advantages of knowledge monopoly without resistance. Humane globalization of knowledge will not suit them in that it promotes dissemination and wide availability of knowledge and combines unification of knowledge carried out in an accomodative and inclusive spirit. The European civilization, along with the subjection subdued and the subjection-seekers among the non-Europeans, are going to welcome an inhumane globalization of human knowledge with steamrolled uniformity and monopoly of knowledge initiative if not of knowledge availability and resist humane globalization. We have had an occasion to salute the humane knowledge-seekers like Böhtlingk and Schopenhauer among the Europeans and the emancipated knowledge-seekers like Rajwade and K. C. Bahttacharya among the non-Europeans. Will these swallows add up to a sizable flock?

The second group of obstacles have to do with human resistance to enlightnment. There is unenlightened self-interest, which will continue to harp on monopoly and exclusivity, dead uniformity and assimilation even in areas in which these are counterproductive. There is unenlightened political correctitude, which will continue to harp on diversity for diversity's sake. Should we not dissuade conservative Brahman women and tribals from say, ruining their health by following their ancestral ways? Earlier we have had an occasion to welcome the changing European climate of opinion that favours multiculturalism and such. At the same time, we cannot ignore signs of a certain ill-tempered backlash to be detected in the European climate of political and academic opinion (especially in its outer American

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And of course there are brutalized versions of each of these obstacles. which are powered by human cunning, rapacious greed, power-hunger and sheer cussedness. A few swallows do not a summer make, but a few vultures can certainly devastate the intellectual landscape and foul up the scenario of an overall humane globalization, including the humane globalization of knowledge. The brutalized versions of course need to be overcome by applying the appropriate brute, pecuniary, and reconciliatory

Brutalized obstacles apart, the philosophers have a major rôle to play in the humane globalization of knowledge. The step-by-step accomplishment of the project will call for not only hard work but a certain broad vision and intellectual penetration that philosophers are eminently qualified to offer to the knowledge-seekers (and belief-holders too). They can render wonderful assistance by way of providing conceptual analysis and logical infrastructure to the discipline specialists and to the historians of lifestyles and worldviews. Also, philosophers can spread enlightenment as an antidote to unenlightened self-interest, unenlightened political correctitude and unenlightened conservatism. After all, aren't philosophers (like the enlightened and emancipated and enterprising swallows) the first citizens by right of the humane commonwealth of knowledge. They don't have merely a rôle to play but a responsibility to fulfil.

To sum up, globalization? Yes! European recolonization? No!

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented under the title 'Handling knowledge system diversity' at the Symposium on Global and Local Knowledge systems held at Indira Gandhi National museum of Mankind, Bhopal on 19-23 February 2001 as a part of the German Festival in India 2000-2001. The author has benefitted from the various discussions there as also from comments on the earlier Version by Professor Ashok Aklujkar (Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver), Mr. G. R. Patwardhan (Pune) and Dr. Shyamala Vanarase

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My intellectual debts are too many to be usefully recorded in a bibliography. I must however mention my senior friend the late Professor K. J. Shah, who was so passionate about the need for India's intellectual decolonization.

May I take the liberty of suggesting that the paper will bear a quick first reading followed by another slow ruminating reading for yielding its full import?

In revising the paper before publication, I changed the title and organized the material in two parts, namely, I. Handling knowledge system diversity and II. The Philosopher's responsibility. The second part takes up a case study sketching and comparing two diverse psychologies, Indian and European, and then goes on to assess the worthwhileness and feasibility of any true globalization of human knowledge.

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The reader may have noticed that there are a number of digressions in the present study occasioned by my reluctance to make do with the received wisdom concerning certain topics that were germane to my argument such as the nature and origin of globalization or the alternate strategies of anarchism, absolutism and relativism for dealing with knowledge and belief diversity. On some of these I have offered fuller discussions elsewhere. The references follow. The bibliographies appended to some of these should also serve to indicate many of my intellectual debts for the present study as well.

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DOES ARISTOTLE BELIEVE IN LIBERATION?

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ALPANA CHAKRABORTY

This paper is an attempt to answer a very important question, that is, 'Does Aristotle believe in liberation?'. Soul and matter are the two coeternal principles of reality in Aristotle's philosophy, yet the role of soul is supreme and to realise the supremacy of soul is ultimate in Aristotle's philosophy. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire philosophy of Aristotle is a conscious endeavour to establish the supremacy of soul over matter and to liberate the soul from the limitations of matter. The question arises then, 'what do we actually mean by liberation?' Before establishing my thesis, I would like to state in brief. what we actually mean by liberation, which is as follows:

By liberation we mean certain limitations overcome by the knowledge of the self. It is setting the self free from the material superstructure it is subjected to i.e., liberation can come only through the true discrimination between soul and matter. This liberation from material nature is the immediate goal of soul. The quest for liberation, together with its awareness of bondage is a necessity in any dualistic philosophy. Liberation is thus, first of all, the separation of the soul from its bodily limitation. This entails a certain kind of discrimination between the self and the body. And since, body in its wider sense represents everything that is material, the discrimination of the self from the body is to be understood as the separation of the self from the material universe. A minimum degree of discrimination is, therefore, necessary to set off on the path of liberation. My endeavour in this paper is to explain in what way Aristotle establishes the supremacy of the soul over matter, by liberating the soul from the bondage of matter, This I propose to do as follows:

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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Aristotle is eager to find out the exact nature of the first cause and he states in his metaphysics that, it is of being as such, that we must grasp the first philosophy.

What is being? In his Metaphysics' Aristotle takes his first philosophy as a science of 'being' as 'being as such' and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. 'Being', he states, could be understood as follows: i. as a particular of the verb, 'to be' it signifies the same as existence and ii. as noun, signifies whatever actually has existence in no matter what way whether actually or possibly either from itself or from another etc. (being and qua being) i. e., whatever has some essence and whatever is 'not nothing'. We are using both, in the second sense here, because this definition is wider. The question arises, 'what do we mean by the notion of being? We mean by the notion of being the following:

Being is - i, Something which is most abstracted from the senses. because through the notion of being our intellect represents to itself what is common to all things, without pointing to itself those special determinations by which things are differentiated among themselves., ii, is most easily known, and is distinguished from nothing., iii, most simple, because it expresses a list which can be grasped about a thing, namely that, which is not nothing and therefore, cannot be divided into any other simple notions. iv, strictly universal, the greatest extension, because it expresses in what can be predicated of all things. v, first in the logical order, in so far, all other ideas are just as many determinations and modifications of being when the notion of form is included in all others, and these others are ultimately resolved into the notion of form or being., vi, first also in the chronological order, in as much as it is the idea which the intellect furnishes to itself before all others. Hence, it can be both apriori and a posteriori Apriori, because our intellect, since it proceeds from more imperfect and indeterminate acts or ideas, must begin from the idea of being which is more imperfect and more indeterminate of all ideas. Aposteriori, because, it is evident from experience that concerning something we first know that the thing is a form or being, then one after another we acquire notions of the same thing and, thus by degrees, our ideas become less imperfect and indeterminate.

What follows from the above is that, being is predicated of all things analogically, by similarity, because all things are similar in being something and in being opposed to nothing. Then, 'What is being?' Aristotle's answer is that to be determinable means determinable by an attribute and whatever is determinable by an attribute is being existent. And to be determinable is to be determinable in discourse. Thus, whatever can be brought about in discourse has being.

What Aristotle actually means by determinability of objects by attribute in discourse is that the indispensable property or the essential properties which can be talked about in discourse. The question arises 'what are the essential priperty or the indispensable properties'? Aristotle's answer is that essential properties are those properties by reference to which an object is conceived to be of such and such a kind and is determinable in discourse. Aristotle, in *Topica* states that, attributes of an object form part of that object's essence (and properties and essentially attached to it), so to say that, they are what make the object what they are or providing 'being', for 'to be' is to be something or other. What are the essential properties of a physical thing? Aristotle answers the essential properties are those properties which enable things to exist as physical things.

Essence is usually declared by stating that, it is that by which something first is being, or that by which, something is differentiated from other things, or the collection of perfections strictly necessary for constituting and understanding the things that by which a thing is what it is. Aristotle says "The essence of a thing is that which it is said to be 'per se'. 'What is essence then'? From the foregoing discussion, essence could be characterised as follows:

(i) Whatness, because through essence we answer what the thing is, (ii) form, because through essence a thing is constituted in its own proper formal, specific being., (iii) reason of the thing, because through essence a thing is understood or explained. (iv) substance, because essence is the foundation holding up of other beings, that is accidenta. (v) nature, essence is the principle from which come all properties and operations.

Essence is both physical and metaphysical. Essence is physical,

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because, without the physical essence (without the physical elements constituting things) the thing could not exist. How could vegetables and animals exist without their proper matter and their proper soul (principles of life?). Essence is mataphysical, because, it is found concretely and fundamentally in all things as to that which is represented and is independent of the mind, in so far as, it is something concretely and singularly existing in all individuals of the same class or species.

The question arises 'in what does a thing's essence consists?' According to the proper usage of the term, Aristotle states that, in fact 'essence' belongs to, (a): just as what a thing is, does, primarily and simply to substance, and (b): to the other categories, being in this case not essence, in the full sense, but the sense of a quality, quantity etc. 'What is essence then?' 'Is essence definable'? Aristotle says that, substance alone is definable and essence belongs only to substance or to them alone in the proper primary and unqualified sense and so it is manifested that "definition is the fourmula of essence", 'Does the essence of a thing consist in its substance? Aristotle's answer is that, it is because of essence the how and why of a thing comes to be what it is. Normally, the essence of a thing is its final cause, or in other words 'essence' consists in form. The essence of a thing consists in the form it has achieved, and achieved form is actually realised in a concrete thing. Thus, the concrete individual object is the essence, that is substance for Aristotle.

'What exactly is substance'? In the words of Aristotle, "The word being has a variety of senses which are listed in my Treaties on the serveral meanings of words? It denotes first 'what a thing is', (i.e., its individuality), and then, its quality, quantity, or other category. Not all of these which 'being' may have, the primary sense is clearly 'what a thing is', for this denotes substance" and it is by virtue of substance that each of the other categories 'exist'. Therefore, "that which is "primary (i.e. not in any qualified sense, but absolutely) must be substance".

Aristotle calls substance as primary on the following grounds. He states, "while there are several senses in which a thing may be described as 'primary', substance is so in every one of them: in definition, it knowledge and in time. It is primary in the definition, because the definition

of a substance is involved in the definitions of everything else; in knowledge, because we know a thing best when we know what it is, and not simply its quality, quantity, position etc. and in time, because substance alone among the categories can exist apart."5

Thus an answer to the question 'what is being?' is an answer to the question 'what is substance?' It was substance that many of the early philosophers described as one or many, as numerically finite or infinite; so that it must be our first and principal". Aristotle's answer is that, it is because of essence, the how and why of thing comes to be what it is. Normally, the essence of a thing is its final cause or in other words, essence consists in form. The essence of a thing consists in the form that it has achieved, and achieved form is actually realised in a concrete thing and the concrete individual object is the essence that is substance for Aristotle.

In Aristotelian terminology substance means: i) The simple bodies (earth, fire, water and all such things), and bodies generally and the things composed of them, living creatures as well as the stars and their parts. All these are called 'substances' because they are not predicated of them. ii) The immanent cause of being in the foregooing class of beings, as the soul is the being of animals. iii) The parts immanent in such things, defining them and making them out as individual, and by the destruction of which the whole is destroyed. iv) The essence, whose formula is definition.⁷

From the above characterisation of 'being', 'essence' and 'substance' it follows that, whatever thing is being has essence, and whatever thing has essence is the subestance and it is by virtue of substance that each of the other categories 'exists'. And whatever thing has essence, that thing consists in form. The essence of a thing consists in the form it has achieved and achieved form is actually realised in a concrete thing. Therefore, form is one of the fundamental principles in Aristotle's metaphysics by means of which he seeks to explain the entire universe. And, hence, it is necessary that we must understand its nature thoroughly.

According to Aristotle, form is the essence or the primary substance and hence forms are substantial. Things increase in actuality by acquiring form, Matter without form is potentiality. Individual beings as real substances are constituted under the control or direction of form. Forms are universal

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features common to all things and are eternal. Forms are of two types i) Immaterial and ii) Material. Immaterial, though related to matter, nevertheless, do not depend on matter in their being. Material, matter does not always preserve and keep the same identity, same form, but change them and lose certain form to obtain new form. Such forms are never subsisting and depend on matter for their being. The material non-subsisting forms are corruptible and when separated from matter, they immediately perish actuality, and return to the potency of matter. The immaterial subsisting forms when separated from matter they survive.

'What is matter then?' Aristotle recognises matter as substance, for in all change from one opposite to another, it is matter which underlies the change - e.g., in respect of place, in respect of size, in respect of quality. Similarly, in respect of substance, it is matter which is now in course of gereration and now in course of destruction. In course of destruction, it underlines the process as the individual thing, in the case of generation at the privation of positive character. Aristotle offers the following items to indicate that, they have matter. These are substances in the sense of i) matter (which is potentially a 'this'); ii) the definition or shape (which is a 'this' and is separable in definition); and iii) the union of these two, (which alone is subject to generation and destruction, and is capable of separate existence in the full sense).

The last kind of change, involves all the others. The principle of change is matter. 'Why?. His basic consideration is that, once it is so recognised that there must be something that changes, it must also be recognised that in order for it to change, that something must be such as to be able to change or become different. And it is such an ability and capacity or potentiality for being other and different that Aristotle calls matter. For him, matter is simply potentiality and potentiality, in turn, is always constructed as a potentiality for something or other. That potentiality Aristotle would call material thing or substance. Without matter the things and substances of the world would never change. Aristotle states that, malting potentiality and is eternal, unproductive and gives uniqueness to substances. Matter per se inheres in all things and is absolute and is devolved all qualities. It is moreover indefinite and qualityless mass.

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Theoretically, matter and form are opposed but in real practice they co-exist. still, the essential whatness of every material object is form not matter. The reason of differentiation between different objects is form not matter, because, it is in virtue of form, that matter is some one definite thing. Matter as conceived by Aristotle "is not self sufficient....it is matter which is inseparable from form, co-existent with it. Matter assumes different form, one form following another, the form first it had does not change into another form but a new form fashions the matter". 10

In the words of Aristotle "It is precisely matter which differentiates individuals".11

Reality is a plurality of individual substances each of which is a fusion of form and matter. These substances are ordered in a continuous series according to the pre-domination of form over matter. Individual beings as real substances are constituted under the control or direction of form. Matter changes, form does not change, it is the principle of permanecne.

Therefore, form has the following characteristics. i) essential whatness of any object; because the becoming of the matter is determined by form. ii) substance, because it is the actualisation of the material body. iii) universal, because, form pervades in all things. iv) chief in virtue of form matter is some one definite thing. Matter is the possibility of form. v) principle of permanence, and existence, form is without motion and change and is therefore, existence. vi) first grade of actuality of a natural and potential body. Therefore, form is the origin of movement, the essence of matter, the being and the end. Form is the very life of the body, and therefore, form is the cause, that incite activities and motion into matter but by itself does not move. It is the unmoved mover.

"It is obvious then, from what I have said, that the thing in the sense of form or essence is not produced; that the concrete thing; which gets its name from form is produced; that matter is present in whatever comes into being; and that one part of any such thing is matter, another form"¹²

The specific determination of things are simply forms. Form is not made, nor does production apply to it. The specific determination of all things is form, 'what is soul then?' Aristotle is eager to find out an answer

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to this question. Form being defined by Aristotle as the principle of determinacy in things, in virtue or which each sort of thing is a kind of thing that 'it is' and not some other kind, to such substantial forms as are determinate of living things. being the sort of things they are, Aristotle simply gives the name of psyche or soul.

A soul is a substantial form, the 'what it is' of a certain kind of thing, moreover, that of which the soul is thus the 'what' or, the substantial form can only be the body. Human being is only a kind of substance with a distinctive soul, namely, an intellectual or rational soul. To say that, a substance has a rational soul is to say that it is informed by a substantial form which is at once the formal, final and efficient cause of what are the characteristic human functions and activities - distinct from plants and animals, all those functions which are distinctive of and peculiar to man, rational knowledge and cognition.

In general, thus, soul may be regarded as a form in virtue of which the body is the particular kind of body, that it is, and so able to perform the characteristic functions that are appropriate to it. In other words, soul is the essence, the effect, the determinate nature of the body. Soul has a causal role to play and the soul must be the formal cause of that of which it is the substantial form. And if soul is the formal cause it is also the efficient cause or the moving cause as well, because, it brings developmental change internally. A moving cause is an action of an agent upon, is thereby in process of being changed and the changes are changes in the bodies, not in the soul.

Apparently then, it appears that soul is both the formal cause as well as the efficient cause and the final cause. Hence, the soul as the substantial form of a living body serves no less as the final cause than as the moving cause of the various characteristic changes that living or animante bodies undergo. And so, the entire doctrine of the causal role of the soul is summed up by Aristotle in the words:

"The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body in all three senses which we actually recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it (b) the end, it is (c) substance (in the sense

Does Aristotle Believe in Liberation?

of substantial form) of the whole living body".13

Soul is the cause of the body in three recognised senses. These are; i. the essence of the whole living body, ii. the source or the origin of movement iii. it is the end, all accidents depend on a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentiality within it. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means, it is the essential whatness of a body of the character just assigned.

According to Aristotle, soul has two distinctive features namely; intellectual and causal. *The intellectual part* of the soul is what it is because it becomes all things, and there is another part that is what it is because it makes all things. That it is the cause or agent only in the manner in which light produces colours by falling upon objects, i. e., as the sun is the cause of the light on earth without it is really acting with purpose in respect to the earth.

To establish the superiority of the soul Aristotle writes: "this intellect is separable and impassive and unmade, being in its essential nature and activity. For that which acts is superior to that which is acted upon, and constitutes the cause of matter". 14

After much investigation Aristotle concludes that, the soul must be the substance in the sense of form of a natural body having life potentiality within it, and if substance is actuality, the soul must be the actuality of the body and as the possessor of knowledge soul is pure thought.

'What is body then?' Aristotle states that, from matter and substantial form joined together, there arises a substantial composite, namely a body. In living beings, the material principle that is thus co-relative with the soul or form is simply the body. The relation between soul and body is the same as the relation between form and matter. The body is organic body and is separable of life or may be said to be potentially alive.

Body can be characterised as follow:

i) The body property has being and existence. Matter and form so exist that only in the composites they are mutually completed. Matter and form are co-existence. ii) Body property is the substance for form and matter are the only substantial principle, incomplete substances. iii) body is

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y e the principle of all operations and properties. iv) body is what is properly change i.e., generate and corrupt. For generation and corruption consists only in substantial change, in fact, matter of somebody acquiring a new specific form, having lost that which it had before.

'What is the cause of motion in matter, the actualisation of motion in matter? Aristotle answers that, the actualisation of the world becomes possible through the dynamism and motion released in matter, and the diversity of the worldly objects, are due to different proportions of matter and form in various objects. However, the initial push for motion is provided to matter by *Pure Form. is the Prime Mover of the world*, the final cause of nature, the drive and purpose of things, the form of the world, the principle of its life, the sum of its vital processes, the internal growing of its growth, the energizing entelecthy of the whole; 'this is pure Ontology'.

Everything is guided by certain direction from within, by its nature and structure and entelecheia having (echo) its purpose (telos) within (ontos). This design is internal and arises from the type and function of the thing. In this ascending series from potentiality to actuality there is a progressive realisation of a greater preponderence of form over matter.

Thus the distinction between form and matter is the distinction between potentiality to actuality and this distinction is parallel. When a thing has reached its growth, it has realised its meaning, its purpose and form. The form and soul is the true being, its realistation and completion. Aristotle states "Further we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of the body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship" 15

As to the relation between soul and body Aristotle says that, the soul plus the body constitutes the animal. Body and soul are inseparable, or at least certain parts are not inseparable. The possibility of separation is due to the fact of the actuality of some parts of the soul, being nothing more than the actuality or potentiality of that part. Again some can be separated because they are not the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship.

In another chapter of *De Anima* Aristotle describes the mind and its functions. The soul is equated with the mental life of an individual. The discussion above seems to equate form and soul. In his descussion of mind

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Aristotle says "mind must be related to which is thinkable, as sense to the sensible". 16 Why Aristotle says so is that thinking is a process in which soul is acted upon by the thinkable, directly or indirectly. Thus, the intellectual part of the soul, which is impassible, is regarded as capable of receiving the form of an object, or at any rate it must be potentially indentical with the character of the object but not with the object. Aristotle says that, the soul is the cause or the essence of the living body. Mind is not perishable but is more Divine and impassive. Body is perishable.

The intellectual part of the soul is what it is because it makes all things. Aristotle states "this intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity. For that which acts is always superior to that which is acted upon and constitutes the cause of matter".¹⁷

Aristotle further states that, the actual knowledge is identical with things which are known and potential knowlede is prior in time to actual knowledge for the individual, but not in the universe at large. The active intellect, does not at one time know and at another not know. In his own words:

"Only in separation from matter is it what it really is, and this (its essential nature) is alone immortal and eternal. But we do not remember, because the reason of which we are in separation is impassive, while the intellect which can be affected is perishable, and without the former does not think at all".18

Aristotle feels the need of realising the inner being of man, because this realisation identifies the inner being with purity, which is pure activity (actus purus) and this realisation is important because this realisation leads towards liberation. But this realisation is not possible as long as the soul is confined by the matter. The immortality and eternity of the soul is realised only when it is free from the limitations of the world. That time the soul attains purity and without this realisation the soul is lifeless and unthinking matter. This realisation is a kind of unity or the realisation of an actuality to that which it is the actuality.

'What is liberation then?' Liberation is not union with god but to realise the process of God. When the realisation of the soul is more perfect

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thus brings about liberation. Liberation can come only through the the low discrimination between form and matter by ratiocination.

The main philosophical concept of Aristotle is to obtain the liberation or the freedom of the soul from the bondage of the matter. Returning again to the *Ethics* and to the life of contemplation that seems to be recommended in the concluding book Aristotle says:

"....where the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore, augmenting its activity...".¹⁹

"Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of its humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine, and by as much as this something is superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life... but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him, for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest". ²⁰

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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND HUMAN DIGNITY

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KOYELI CHAKRAVARTI & APURBO ROY

In this paper we will explore the possibility of realizing harmonious interpersonal relationships. Twentieth century philosophy has witnessed a growing interest in the problem of human relationships. Importance attached to behavioral sciences in the curriculum of western educational institutions is far greater than that attached to theology. Although preoccupation with the problem of human relationship is an important characteristic of contemporary philosophy, many thinkers had drawn attention to it long before the present century. Both Plato and Aristotle had emphasized the fact that man is basically a social animal, a communal being. Humanist philosophers of the nineteenth century, too, had laid emphasis on the same truth. But the earlier approach and the contemporary approach differ in an important respect. Not only were the earlier philosophers less interested in man than in nature, they hardly saw any problem, so far as human relationships are concerned. They had greater faith in the harmony of interpersonal relationships. Many contemporary thinkers, on the other hand, do not have faith in the possibility of realizing harmounious interpersonal relationships. However, there are some contemporary thinkers, who have great faith in harmonious human relationships. To the former group belong thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre, while the latter group has Buber, Jaspers and G. H. Mead among others.

Let us first consider the views of the former group of thinkers. That interpersonal relationships of our everyday life are not authentic and harmonious is a point on which nearly all existentialists agree. Our everyday being-with-others, they believe, does not truly involve our inner selves,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002 despite the fact that we are in continuous interaction with one another Although we continue to live and act together, the true spirit of community life is said to be missing. Kierkegaard believes that other human beings can act as obstacles if one tries to develop a relation with God or tries to realize his own individual being. He believes that everyone should be cautious of having interaction with others and that basically conversation should take place only with God and oneself. Thus he feels that to have an authentic relation with God, one must become a 'Single One'. Indeed this conviction was reflected in his own life. It is well known that he was engaged to a lady called Regina Olsen but he broke off the engagement because he felt that God had claim on him as an extraordinary individual, and that this engagement conflicted with that claim. Kierkegaard had very little respect for the herd sentiment or the 'crowd' or the 'public'. He hardly got any sympathy from them in his own life and career. As an individual, Kierkegaard was strongly opposed to collectivism and institutionalism, the stifling effect of which he felt in his own life. It appears then, that to Kierkegaard, there can be no question of human dignity, so far as interpersonal relationships are concerned. One can realize one's true dignity only when one is a solitary individual. He summons the individual to come out from the crowd and take responsibility for his own being.

Similar observations have been made by another existentialist thinker, viz. Nietzsche, who uses the term 'herd' to denote the interactions between different human beings. Nietzsch, too, believes that the life of the individual is controlled by a value- system devised by the herd, and that the herd has replaced the prerogatives of God. So to Nietzsche also there can be no question of human dignity so long as an individual is merely a part of the crowd and thus fails to realize his true individual being.

What Nietzsche describes as 'herd', Heidegger describes as 'they' (das man)¹. The 'they' is an anonymous power that controls the lives of individuals-it prevents the individual from making his own decisions and thus frees him from the burden of responsibility. Hence the common tendency to evade responsibility by taking refuge in the anonymous 'they'. Although Heidegger's view is similar to the views of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in this regard, it would be wrong to conclude that Heidegger has no faith in the existence of human dignity in interpersonal relationships.

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my s the e looks when Heidegger draws an important distinction between the 'they-self', i.e. the self of our everyday life, and the 'authentic self' that we must strive to become. He believes that an individual has daily interaction with other individuals, but these interactions deprive him of his true selfhood. This, however, does not imply that Heidegger considered all interpersonal relationships to be devoid of human dignity. The term used by Heidegger to describe the relation between one individual and another is Füsorge which has been translated in English as 'solicitude'. Solicitude may manifest itself in two opposite ways. One is the dominating mode, which we have noted above to be widely prevalent in our everyday interactions with other human beings. Here the other is used as an instrument for the attainment of our own well-being. This mode of solicitude fails to give due recognition to human dignity. The other mode is one where we respect the other as a person and treat him as an end in himself. It is in this mode of interpersonal relationship that human dignity gets its due recognition.

Both Kierkegaard and Sartre seem to offer the same reason when they consider other people to be obstacles, although they do so from two different points of view². To Kierkegaard, the other appears as an obstacle when we try to relate ourselves to God. Sartre, on the other hand, is an atheist to whom God is only a name standing for a perfection, a goal that everyone of us tries to attain. As a finite being, every man wants to be God. But this desire meets with frustration because the world is full of many finite beings. Hence the other appears as an obstacle to the fulfilment of existence. Our body plays an important role in interpersonal relationships. Our interaction with others is possible only through our having a body. My body can become an object for the other just as much as his body can become an object for me. If another person looks at me, I become aware not only of his existence as the other, but also of my own existence, as the object of his look or gaze. This is the common experience of shame or shyness.

Sartre thus believes that it is the look of the other which constitutes my self. My being for myself is constituted by my being-for-others. It is the existence of the other which is my 'original fall'. It is when the other looks at me that I feel guilty, feel alienated from myself. I also feel guilty when I, in turn, look at the other, when the other is constituted as an object

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for me and the other has to accept it. That Sartre had very little faith in the possibility of harmonious interpersonal relationships or of the role of dignity in human interactions becomes explicit when he speaks of the 'original sin' or of the 'original theme of guilt' from which there can be no escape. He believes that the fact that I exist in a world where there are others is what constitutes the original sin.

Sartre considers interpersonal relationships to be inherently frustrating. We will understand this point better if we discuss the concent of inauthenticity that Sartre refers to in this context. The duality of my being-for-myself and my being-for-others, Sartre believes, can give rise to inauthenticity in two different ways. The first kind has its extreme manifestation in masochism. A masochist is one who desires to be an object for the other, to be manipulated and humiliated in order to experience the weight and solidity of being-in-itself which our freedom prevents us from experiencing. A masochist enjoys being seen as an object, because when he exists in the presence of a look, he feels that he is becoming more compact and concentrated. To him this is a relief that he welcomes, because he does not have to bear the responsibility of his 'disintegrating self' any longer. The second kind of inauthenticity finds expression in sadistic tendencies of man. A sadist enjoys looking at others, manipulating and humiliating them. He tries to reduce them to objects, treats them as mere instruments and as such robs them of their freedom. It may be noted that this form of inauthenticity has been recognized by all existentialists, but Sartre is the only one to recognize that as a kind of inauthenticity, sadism has an opposite pole, viz. mascochism and that masochistic tendencies are equally common and undesirable³.

Interpersonal relationships, Sartre observes, give rise to frustrations and unending ambiguities. Persons interacting with one another often oscillate between love and hate. They want both to possess and be possessed by the other. If I do not want to become an object in the eyes of the other, that is to say, if I want to be treated as a person, I will try possess the other through love. But this can happen only when the other person too loves me, and the other can love me only if I allow myself become an object of the other's love. Thus the relationship becomes endlessly ambiguous.

Some commentators of Sartre believe that Sartre does not deny the possibility of respecting dignity in human relationships. Olsen⁴, for example has argued that Sartre explicitly says in *Being and Nothingness* that he does believe that interpersonal relationships can be authentic. Sartre is said to have reaffirmed this in the introduction to a book on his philosophy by Francis Jeanson. To Sartre, authenticity in the context of human relationship does not imply an absence of conflict. Olsen observes that Sartre considers conflict to be not only an essential element in human relationship, but to be also the very foundation on which human relationships can develop.

Olsen's observations seem to suggest that one must be cautious of making any sweeping statement about Sartre in this context. Any serious view of human relationships must take note of the fact that there is a possibility of conflict whenever human beings interact with one another. The real challenge that lies before us is how to minimize that possibility and make room for harmony as much as possible.

We now proceed to consider the views of those philosophers who have great faith in harmounious human interaction. Let us see why some thinkers consider respect for human dignity to be essential for any interpersonal relationship. To Buber, the fundamental fact of human existence is neither the 'single one' nor the social aggregate, but man with man. Human existence is basically a dialogue, and it is by relating to another self that man becomes a whole self. Whoever truly experiences the world, experiences it as a duality, and to overcome this duality by action is the real problem that man has to face. Buber believes that life is essentially a complex of interpersonal relationships, and that man can build up personal relationship with different things be it nature, other human beings or God. Love, which is the basic fact of life, means directing one's life towards the being and needs of the other. These two poles of interpersonal relationship, according to Buber, are I and Thou. A relationship can be perfect only when it is mutual. Thou must affect I, as I must affect $Thou^5$. Human experience has two dimensions: one is personal response made towards Our fellow beings and the other is manipulative adjustments made towards different things that we confront. Buber calls the former an I - Thou

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relationship and the latter an *I- It* relationship. In the latter there is greater emphasis on possessing and using something, and the *I* is separated from the *It* in the subject object antithesis. The *I-It* mentality violates human dignity when it applies to man's interactions with other human beings. We do not respect human dignity when we treat man as things, as instruments for furthering our own ends. A man sees a prostitute as a mere sex object, who can be used and discarded as situations arise, but he may see his wife as the beloved person, playing a unique role in his life. Dealing with people is different from having relation with them, and it is this *relation between person* that characterizes the *I - Thou* would.

Buber, however, points out that the Thou is bound to become an lt. a thing for us at one time or another, that man cannot continue to exist in the I-Thou relationship, and that he has to leave it again and again. As we have already said, Buber considers this to be the basic problem of man. This does not, however, mean that Buber considers the world of I-It to be an evil in itself. He does not regard the world of Thou and the world of lt to be totally incompatible. But he firmly believes that it is-not worthy of man to live in the world of It alone, that it is beneath one's dignity to let oneself remain confined within the walls of the I - It world. "Without It man cannot live, but he who lives with It alone, is not a man".6 It is only when the I meets the Thou, that life becomes truly meaningful. Yet man has a tendency to treat other men as It, and it is then that evil results. Many examples of this situation can be given and human dignity, Buber believes, is violated in all such cases. A scientist may treat human beings as things when he studies them for research and investigation, a politician or a propagandist may treat human beings as means for furthering his own ends, an employer may treat human beings as mere commodities or pawns. In all these cases, human beings are not treated as existing in their own right.

Buber is right so far as politicians, propagandists or ruthless employers are concerned, but the case of the scientist is somewhat different. It is undoubtedly true that when a psychologist studies an individual, he studies him or her as an object of research. An individual *qua* individual is unique, and the scientist fails to do justice to this uniqueness. But what distinguishes the case of the scientist from that of the politician or the propagandist is

that the scientist's selection of the different human subjects of his experiment is based on a prior consent of the subjects themselves, whereas no such prior consent is involved in the other cases. It may be noted, however, that the question of taking prior consent of the human subjects does not arise in some cases. Mentally unsound people, extremely senile people and very young children are some examples.

The role of dignity in interpersonal relationships has also been studied by Gabriel Marcel. 'Availability' and 'fidelity' are the two concepts that he uses in this context. Availability stands for man's capacity to place himself at the disposal of others. It is a deplorable fact that human beings do not make themselves available to one another. Man's existence, Marcel believes, is something which he has, and it is because he is anxious to maintain his own existence, that he makes himself unavailable to others. Human dignity is violated when men lead 'closed' lives and do not make themselves available to others. Man's dignity lies in making himself 'open' to others.

Marcel further believes that it is availability that enables a person to be *present* to another. Here 'presence' stands for something more than mere physical proximity. To be 'present' to another means coming out of oneself or transcending oneself towards the other. Here we are tempted to draw a parallel between Marcel and Ravindranath Tagore. Tagore, too, feels that true humanity lies in making oneself available to others. In one of his poems⁷ he asks man to come out of himself and stand outside. This coming out of oneself, he feels, would evoke response from the world at large.

How precisely do we transcend ourselves and make ourselves 'open' to others? Marcel thinks that one of the most typical ways of doing this is by making pledges, promises or engagements. These are all basically human activities and the structure of our social life rests on man's capacity to make commitments and keep them. Anyone who fails to keep commitments also fails to act with dignity. This is what Marcel calls 'fidelity'. A life of dignity is thus a life of fidelity.

Belief in harmonious interpersonal relationships can also be found in the philosophy of G. H. Mead, though Mead was not an existentialist like

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Buber or Marcel. Mead⁸ believes that man is basically a 'social self'. A human being truly develops as a person only through interpersonal communication. The feeling of selfhood or self-identity develops only when man stands over against another. The more an individual participates in his group, the more is he able to take on the attitudes of his society, and the more highly conscious of himself does he become. An individual is born into a world of other persons, into a group which has culture. Mead has great faith in the possibility of harmonizing individual interest and social welfare. Conflict among different human beings, he believes, is due not to lack of goodness or good will on the part of man, but to ignorance or immaturity. Mead's confidence in man's intelligence and good will is understandable. He believes that the human self is basically social and has taken the values of the social process. Thus for Mead, the problem of human dignity being violated in human interactions hardly arises.

Critics have accused Mead of holding an unduly optimistic view of human nature, and we think that to a certain extent their criticism is valid. Mead, indeed, seems to be not fully aware of the strife and conflict, failures and frustrations that are quite common in human interactions. As we have pointed out earlier, any serious view of human relationship will have to take into account that there is always a possibility of conflict and disharmony. It is true that human life is not and cannot be solitary, that it is always lived in a community. However autonomous an individual is, he cannot see himself as detached from all social particularity, because the very idea of seeing oneself as detached from all social particularity can develop only in one particular setting or another. An individual cannot speak of himself as distinct from other individuals unless he has grown up in a social environment, unless he is a particular 'individual' with a particular history. His growing up from childhood to maturity is a slow and gradual process. The family in which he grows up, the groups outside the family in which he participates all contribute to shape and fashion in various ways his beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. The language in which he expresses himself, the moral concepts that he uses, the moral judgments that he makes are all capable of being developed in a social environment alone. An individual cannot be an autonomous alone autonomous alone are all capacito social environment alone. autonomous moral agent unless he is an empirical agent, with certain social particularity as his past. We believe that both Buber and Mead deserve

Interpersonal Relationships and Human Dignity

merit for drawing our attention to this truth which we are apt to forget, whenever we lay excessive emphasis on individual autonomy. But to bring home this truth does not mean that the path of human interaction will always he smooth and free from strife and conflict. We have seen that both Buber and Sartre believe conflict to be inevitable, and indeed, therein lies our challenge: how to make room for human dignity in the midst of conflict and disharmony. We are inclined to think that a recognition of the fact that we are all biologically distinct individuals, with different capacities, tendencies and inclinations, along with a sincere faith in self-respect and respect for others would go a long way in minimizing the friction that characterizes our interactions. Indeed this is basically what Plato long ago described as minding one's own business, while he was explaining the nature of justice in the Republic. A just man, Plato says, is one who is at peace with himself. We feel that a lot of human conflict would be minimized if we try to be at peace with ourselves, because it is only then that we can let others be in neace.

NOTES

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A PEEP INTO ETHICS AND METAETHICS

ABHA SINGH

Human beings on this earth are regarded as species belonging to a bigger class 'animal'. As members of this species, human beings have some traits common with other animals. But, whereas other animals are very much limited to their sense-pereception, to the perceptual world of various phenomena, human beings have a tendency to tanscend the mere phenomenal world. This transcendence or the tendency to move from the perceptual to something beyond or ideal assumes different forms-one expression being that man's life is governed by some notions of 'ought'. Probably this is why, while pointing out the essential nature of man and place of ideal in his basic nature, Brand Blanshard says. "Value is so fundamental in human life that its true character can be seen only against the background of human nature".

Having made it clear that in man's life there is a special place for something ideal, we, at once, find that human beings have developed a philosophy for themselves, a way of life, a culture and, above all, good set of traditions in the form of a well developed code of conduct, whereby they make a distinction between 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', 'ethically praiseworthy' or 'ethically condemnable'. All these phenomena have given rise to a separate branch of study commonly known as moral philosophy or ethics. Giving vent to this expression Surma Dasgupta has said:

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From the very remote period of human civilisation, when men had just begun to be awaken to newer problem of life, and had learnt to think in a subtle and refined way in response to the need of something higher than the mere satisfaction of biological demands, he had been, in a way or another, trying to think out a systematic account

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of the mysteries of life and set before himself an ideal to be achieved.2

The branch of study known as 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics', which at first sight seems to be very simple one, curiously enough turns to be not so when we endeavour to make precise what it takes as its subject-matter and particularly when we try to pin-point some problems studied by it. Our difficulties become enlarged, particularly in view of the fact that there have been lack of unanimity among the ethicists to consider a particular set of questions as not coming to its area. Probably on account of this consideration, a great contemporary philosopher A. J. Ayer has expressed that it is not something homogeneous in nature. To put in his own words:

The ordinary system of ethics, as elaborated in the works of ethical philosophers, is very far from being a homogeneous whole. Not only is it apt to contain pieces of metaphysics, and analyses of non-ethical concepts, its actual ethical contents are themselves of very different kinds. We may divide them, indeed into four main classes, there are first of all propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions. Secondly, there are propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes. Thirdly, there are exhortations to moral virture. And, lastly, there are actual ethical judgements.³

The recognition of the fact that ethics does not have a homogeneous character leads us to make a somewhat serviceable distinction between different ethical concepts (not terms), which are closely connected and are generally reckoned as constituting the different stages of ethical enquiry. It should be mentioned here that 'morals', 'morality', 'moral reflection', 'casuistry' and 'theoretical ethics' are various levels of enquiries which go to constitute, broadly speaking, the realm of ethics. To this list a new name of a subject is now-a-days added, and this is very commonly known as metaethics or meta-moral analysis. It may be contended that the distinction between them is only a relative one, but, even then, this distinction is important in view of some academic interest of man, because by making a distinction between them, one is able to understand in what respect the subject-matter of one is different from that of the other.

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Human being, all of us know, is a social being and, as a member of some society, he not only functions as an agent who performs certain action but, by virtue of his capacity to reflect on what is done by him or his fellow beings, he, at once, makes various moral pronouncements. As an agent in the society, man performs various activities-some of them are deliberate or voluntary, while others are not so. There are innumerable actions performed by human being, but only some of them are brought under the purview of moral reflections, assuming the form of moral evaluation or ethical judgement. Basically there are two things in it. On the one hand, we have certain actions, motives etc. These actions or motives have certain attitudes pro or con, which are applied to the actions or the motives, and the result is that we have various ethical judgements such as 'X is good', 'Y is bad', 'A is right', 'B is wroing', 'Z is our duty', 'S ought to be performed' 'Ahimāsa is the greatest virtue'. This reflection may assume one of the innumerable forms. If an action is something physicomental in the sense that the analysis of an action reveals certain mental stages, and when it is overtly performed, it goes through a physical stage. But moral reflection, on the other and is somewhat a purely mental thing, because in this stage a man applies his attitudes to certain actions and, if possible, tries to bring those actions to the purview of moral reflection. In relation to actions, moral reflection is something of second order nature, because first an action is performed, then comes moral reflection. May be, that the gap between the two is so negligible that they may seem to be simultaneous. In order to perform an action a man has to simply go through certain physico-mental state-be that the state of desires, conflicts, decision and performance. But the performance of an act does not require a great deal of mental maturity. Moral reflection, on the other hand, requires intellectual maturity in the sense that, unless one is not fully equipped with the set of norms to be applied to actions, one is not able to reflect on the actions and, thereby, to determine the ethical nature of that action.

Our discussions so far, have been confined to, what we call, 'moral actions' and 'moral reflections'. 'Moral reflection' is some intellectual enterprise of man in which a man expresses his reaction against certain actions through language, and the special feature of it is that, at least, one thical term is used in it. There is a good number of terms known as ethical

terms such as 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought-not', 'duty' and 'not-duty', 'virtues' and 'vices', 'fittingness' and so on. It is a matter of simple observation that most of these terms are used ethically, as well as non-ethicalyy, and when they have a place in moral judgements, they are used exclusively in the ethical sense. It should also be noted that when in an ethical judgement a particular ethical term is used, it is not simply mentioned. In linguistic philosophy there is tradition to make a distinction between using a term and simply mentioning a term. When we use a term to refer to something beyond it, the term is said to be used, and when we just talk about the term itself, we simply mention it. While bringing this distinction between 'using a term' and 'mentioning a term', Paul Edwards says'. "when a word is employed in order to refer to something beyond itself, it is said to be used, but if something is said about a word if the word itself is the subject matter of discussion, the word is said to be mentioned."4 In course of using ethical terms in ethical expressions we have innumerable ethical judgements and in fact these ethical judgements serve as bases in formulation of an ethical system. Before we actually discuss what is the realm of ethics proper, it is desirable to say that 'moral judgement' has been variously understood. When G. E. Moore says that "In the vast majority of cases, where we make statements involving any of the terms 'virtue', 'vice', 'duty', 'right', 'ought', 'good', 'bad', we are making ethical judgements..."5, this fact has been stressed. Similarly, laying stress on the real and formal character of ethical judgements, Paul Edwards makes an assertion to the effect that "Accordingly, I propose to mean for the time-being by the term 'moral judgement' any sentence in which an ethical predicate is used, whether it is employed in a characteristically ethical sense or not."6

We have hitherto seen that there is one set of ethical phenomena generally termed moral or ethical judgements. A study of ethical judgements is doubly significant because of the consideration that it is this set of judgements that provides bases for three kinds of enquiries-casuistry, ethics and metaethics, and secondly because of the considerations that ethical judgements form some kind of first-order ethical discourse in relation to not only reflection but also systematization of various ethical judgements, or even in presenting a metaethical point-of-view in regard to their meaning.

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There are basically two points-of-views in studying any ethical judgement, viz. the structural point -of-view, and secondly, the nature of the content expressed by them. Structurally, there is nothing very unique in the structure of ethical judgements, save and except one thing that, at least, one ethical term is employed in it. The real controversy (we shall examine, in detail, later on) centres round the problem, what is the nature of content expressed by a moral judgement, whether it is descriptive of fact, whether it expresses feeling or a sentiment, or an emotion, or a wish, or an attitude, or a command? There have been various theses to develop one or the other point of view on this theme, giving rise to various types of metaethical discussions. Suspending our discussion on this theme for a short while, we now proceed to examine the nature of yet another somewhat general enquiry, namely 'ethics'.

As, we have seen in our previous descussions that, the character of ethics is very hetrogeneous and many levels of things are included in it. It would be natural, in view of the lack of homogeneity in character of ethics, to just make a passing reference of two other allied subjects called 'casuistry' and 'morals'. Both of them take as their starting point, some 'moral actions' and 'moral judgements'. But the approach, they adopt, to these phenomena are not only different in themselves, but also is quite different in relation to ethical enquiry. Since we are tyring to locate the significance and place of moral actions and judgements in casuistry, we are naturally led to a problem: What actually is casuistry? And what is its 'subject matter? Putting briefly a reply to these problems, W. Stark says:

The word casuistry (literally "concern with individual cases") has been used in three different, if connected meanings. In its widest sense, it has described a mentality which pays closer attention to the concrete instance than to abstract generalities. In a narrower sense, it has been, employed to characterise legal systems... In its narrowest sense, it refers to the uses of subtle definitional distinctions in the handling of ethico-legal or purely ethical problems with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between what is permissible and what is not.⁷

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The definition of casuistry reflects that it is a subject which takes its starting point the questions, what things are good when they happen? casuist's job mainly consists in the preparation of a list of good or batthings, virtuous actions or vices. While making a distinction between ethic and casuistry, G. E. Moore says:

We may be told that casuistry differes from ethics, in that it is much more detailed and particular Ethics much more general. But it is most important to notice that cauistry does not deal with anything that is absolutely particular - particular in the only sense in which a perfectly precise line can be drawn between it and what is general."

It should be said here that most of Indian ethical philosophers had not done any ethical job, rather they had functioned like casuists. This is evident from the consideration that many renouned names in Indian ethics, such as Manu and Praśastapāda, had mainly engaged themselves in presenting a casuistry rather than ethics. Probably this is why N.K.Devaraja has levelled a charge against Indian Philosophers that there is a dearth of ethics in Indian philosophy, the reason seems to be that he had made a distinction between ethics and casuistry, because the formers a theoretical study and casuistry is applied ethics, and is not ready to take the one for the other.

Having made a very synoptic treatment of what is casuistry, we are now better placed with some facts to consider two other things, 'morals' and 'morality'. All of us know that these two terms 'morals' and 'morality' are so much common that even ordinary persons, who are not aware with any kind of philosophising, make use of these terms very frequently in their discourse. But when we actually ask: what is their actual connotation what do they really mean? are they one and the same things?, many of usingly fail to reply to these simle questions in a precise manner. And probably this is why putting forward a point of view of holding a distinction between the two has become a matter of importance now-a-days.

Needless to say that the term 'moral' has been etymologically derive from 'mos' or 'mores', which means customs or traditions or social habit Man, all of us know, is a social animal. The society in which he is born and

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brought up has certain traditions. The family members make him aware with the various social practices and sometimes it is thought that a moral action consists in action or behaving in accordance with social tradition, practices or customs. Society plays a very important role in the acquistion of certain moral traits in an individual, may be that it is not the only factor in man's moral life. There is a possibility of man's life being spent in isolation, but this does not prove the complete independence of mankind. Daya Krishna has pointed out:

Actions outside the context of play and ritual is, however, another matter. It, in the first place, makes one dependent on others as most of the ends we want to achieve through actions can hardly be achieved by the effort of a single man alone. This dependence, makes man social in the sense that he comes, to realize more and more the essential interdependence of all men upon one another. This leads to a sense of community, the sense of belonging to a large whole, but only on the condition that other co-operate in the facilitation of what one wants to achieve. ¹⁰

Having made some reference to the customary character of 'morals', we now see that 'morals' and 'morality' have not been uniformly used, and a large penumbra of uncertainty hovers their meaning. ¹¹ It goes without saying that the term 'moral' itself has been used in two different senses. Inits wider meaning, any action which is liable to be adjudged 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong' etc., is termed 'moral' and in its narrow sense only those actions are regarded as 'moral actions' having some positive ethical values such as 'goodness' or 'rightness'. 'Moral', used in the wider sense, is opposed to 'non-moral' but includes 'immoral', whereas moral, used in the narrower sense, is opposed to 'immoral'. It is also noticed that from a point of view of grammatical structure of sentences, moral sometimes finds place as a common noun and at other times, as an adjective.

But 'morality' is something different and at the same time related with 'morals' in the same sense that 'morality' referes to a system of 'moral beliefs', 'moral ideals', 'moral code of conduct'. In the case of 'morals', we see that 'moral' is opposed with 'non-moral' but we do not however, used the term immorality in his writings. Similarly the term

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'morality' is sometimes used as opposed to 'immorality' as when we that the essence of morality is love or speak of the morality of an action. Yet another distinction between them is that 'moral' is regarded as adjection applied to a noun or a pronoun (in its adjectival sense) and so it cannot qualified, by a possessive case particularly in its form of adjective e.g. very often, say, 'moral consideration' but the expression 'my more consideration', does not sound much. But in the case of 'morality' we set that it is always used as a noun. This character of 'morals' and 'morality particularly in the case of 'moral consideration' not to be qualified mine or yours reveals that 'morals' has a very important customary sense as distinct from the 'reflective morals'. John Dewey say, "The intellectuded distinction between customary and reflective morality is clearly marked. The former places the standard and rules of conduct in ancestral habit, the latter appeals to conscience, reason or to some principles which includes thought." 13

It is also seen that the quality 'moral' has a distinct feature and the basis of this feature it is contrasted with one set of epithets and it varying context with other sets of epithets e.g. we use 'moral duty' at 'legal duty'. 'Moral duty' is sometimes contrasted with another kinds 'duty' or 'legal duty'. But this is not the case with 'morality'. Realizing this, G. Wallance and A.D.M. Walker have maintained that 'moral duty can be contrasted with 'legal duty'. On the other hand, 'moral consideration may be opposed to (contrasted with) 'legal', 'prudential' or 'aesthetic consideration'. 14

Our discussions, so far, have put emphasis on morals and morals, and the possible point of differences between them. Our aforesaid account of the two amply shows that, 'moral' is a point-of-view, be it a custometer or reflective or critical, wheareas morality is something as a system of morals. When we make a departure to study what is actually ethics moral philosophy, this distinction helps us in the sense that ethics can be treated in its manifold perspectives.

To begin with, an ethical point-of-view and distinguishing it for other approaches, it can be just mentioned that whenever we talk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in the stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in the stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in the stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we stalk in tensor of 'good' and 'bad', 'good' and 'good' an

certainly entering into the ethical domain or ethical point of-view. G.E. Moore observes, "It is very easy to point out some among our every day judgements, with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, 'so and so is a good man', 'or that fellow is a villain', whenever we ask 'what ought I to do? or 'is it wrong for me to do like this'?, Whenever we hazard such remarks as 'Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice'-it is, undoubtedly, the business of Ethics to discuss such questions and such statements..."

The problems of ethics are no doubt of great human concern. But this does not, in any way, lessen our burden that these problems are complex in their ramification. It would be, therefoe, in right earnest to consider at least the two levels of enquiries - 'the customary ethics' and 'the theoretical ethics', as system of ethical ideas and ideals. W. K. Frankena, however, adds a third kind of enquiry also under the name ethics but he prefers to call it 'metaethics' which we shall consider later on. According to him there is a descriptive, historical, emprical, psychological, sociological and anthropological side of ethics and on the ohter there is some kind of normative thinking presenting a system of ethical beliefs, ideas and ideals. W. K. Frankena says that "normative ethics deals with general questions about what is good or right and not when it tries to solve particular problems as Socrates was mainly doing in the Crito. In fact, we shall take ethics to be primarily concerned with providing the general outlines of normative theory to help us in answering problems about what is right or ought to be done. "16

The distinction, that we have borught, between the traditional or customary character of ethics, and this as a system of ethical ideas opens out two considerations for us, viz. ethics considered etymologically and the special factors of ethics as system of ethical beliefs, ideas and ideals.

ETHICS ETYMOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED

Though it is not a matter of much significance, yet it can be said that 'etymologically' ethics is that branch of philosophical knowledge which deals with such conduct or pattern of behaviours which have some sanctions by customs and usages. This is evident from the considertion that the two

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terms 'ethics' and 'ethical' have been derived from 'ethica' and 'ethica' itself has a derivative from a German word 'ethos', which had been used to mean customs, usages, traditions etc. Similarly, a term 'moral philosophy' is also sometimes synonymously used in place of ethics. 'Moral' deriving its origin from the root-a latin term 'mores' or 'mos'. In fact ethics, in the beginning, started appearing in the form of ethos, customs or traditional pattern of behaviours. But, as the time advanced, people became prone to new way of things. Customary ethics or ethics in the form of ethos, although did not disappear but was substitued by a new mode of thinking in which some kind of reflection on the existing moral codes and traditions began. The result has been that we could get a new dimension in ethical thinking opened in the form of presenting a system of ethical ideas, ideals and beliefs.

ETHICS AS A SYSTEM

In order to have a better understanding of 'what is ethics as a system?', it would be serviceable first to mention various factors which constitute the bases for such enquiry. First, we find that this contains certain forms of judgements in which particular action of set or actions and even persons and their character are said to have various kind of moral qualities such as 'goodness' or 'badness', 'rightness' or 'wrongness', 'moral obligation' and 'responsibility' etc. Secondly, we have certain set of arguments, or reasons, or proofs to vindicate a particular stand-point. Thirdly, we have certain general principles, rules, list of ideals, virtues assuming the shape of some general rules, and these rules are made applicable with particular cases. Fourthly, we have also certain natural or acquired characteristics or patterns of feeling or attitudes which accompany these judgements. Fifthly, we have sanctions which point out what are the additional sources of motivation or obligatory forces.

Considered on the basis of above mentioned factors we, at once, see that a normative ethics is nothing but such a system of ethical ideas and ideals in which certain ethical idea (ideas) and ideal (ideals) work as fundamental ones, and rest of ethical ideas are reduced into those termed fundamental. Acceptance of some fundamental ethical notion is one of the

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basic features of modern normative ethics. In these ethical systems only some ethical ideas or ideals are regarded as fundamental ones, and the rest of the ethical phenomena are deemed reducible notions, for example when J. S. Mill attempts to explain his Utilitarianism in terms of 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' the following two propositions become fundamental:

- (i) "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." 17
- (ii) ".....the utilitarian standard, for that standard is not the agents's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether..." 18

Mills' division of Utilitarianism into its meaning, sanctions, proofs ets. is an attempt to strengthen this claim that ethics is a system of some well pronounced ethical ideas. Reasons and sanctions supporting them. When Karl Britton tries to develop Mill's ethical ideas he has particularly this consideration in his mind. And similarly when some recent attempts to bring out definition or essential features of ethical enquiry are seen, we get a reflection of this tendency in all such attempts. To mention a few:

By Moral *philosophy* is meant enquiry into the fundamental principles that underlie all the problems of ethics, especially into the meaning of those predicates, such as *right*, *wrong*, *good*, *bad*, *ought*, *ought not*, which moral judgements apply to various kinds of acts. Ethical theory, as the term is used here is virtually synonymous with moral philosophy.²⁰

Similarly when many writers on ethical philosophy make an attempt to define it as a scientific enquiry, their contention is comewhat directed to same goal. To mention just a few definitions from the text books of ethics:

"Ethics is the science that deals with conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad".21

"We may define ethics as the normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies-a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong to be good or bad, or in some similar way".22

of the

Still another declaration by C. D. Broad that "Ethics may be described as the theoretical treatment of moral phenomena", and John Hospers' point of view that "...normative ethics. is the attempt to discover some, acceptable and rationally defensible view concerning what kinds of things are good (worth aiming at) and what kinds of acts are right and why..." are the expressions to the effect that theoretical ethics is somewhat a systematic study of ethical ideas and ideals.

TYPES OF ETHICS

Under this sub-head, it is intended to present the various types of ethical theories. In presenting the types of ethics it is of some significance to throw some light on a difficulty posed before us in the form of a question' in what way this division is maintained?' This question relates to the problem of fundamentum divisionis i. e. the basic stand point to be adopted in order to make a division. If we confine ourselves to the question of the fundamental character of a particular set of ethical concepts, basically there are four types of ethics variously called, (i) teleogical ethics, (ii) deontological ethics, (iii) ethical dualism and (iv) ethical pluralism.

Before we present the basic hypotheses of a particular type of ethical theory it is of great importance to have some acquaintance with the various ethical concepts. We know that many terms like 'good' or 'bad', 'ought' and 'ought-not', 'right and 'worong', duty,' and, 'not-duty', 'evil', 'virtue' and 'vices', 'the maximum good', 'not the maximum good', 'ethically praiseworthy' and ethically forbidden' are used in ethical discourse. Structurally, some of them are monadic while others are dyadic. From another point of-view, some of them are used for actions e.g. right, wrong duty, not-duty, ought, ought-not, some others are used both for actions and persons such as good or bad, virtue or virtuous etc. while still others refer to things or state-of-affairs e.g. good, bad, the maximum good, not the maximum good. 25 Basically, there are two kinds of ethical concepts, the 'telic concepts'-which have some reference to end or purpose, and the 'deontic concepts' which do not have any direct reference to end or purpose of an action. The of an action. They are used, sometimes, in utter disregard to what consequence or result they can produce or are liable to procude. For example, the ethical conservation the ethical concepts 'good' and 'bad' are telic concepts, whereas 'right', 'wrong' 'duty' at 'wrong', 'duty' etc. come in the category of deontic concepts.

The aforesaid classification of ethical theories into four types centres round the basic controversy whether telic concepts are fundamental and other deontic concepts are reducible to them, or whether deontic concepts are fundamental and the telic ones are reducible into them, or whether none of them is fundamental, both types of concepts have their won area of use and none can be reduced into the other or whether all the different concepts are fundamental.

THE TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS

The fundamental hypothesis of a teleological ethics is that telic concepts are fundamental, and other concepts are reducible to them. According to this type of ethical theory, the consideration of end or consequence or ideal is fundamental and an ethicist must be careful in presenting an ethical system in which the concpet 'good' or its negative counterpart 'evil' or 'bad' must have a superme place. This implies that all other concepts as 'right' or 'wrong', 'duty', 'ought' etc. should be reducible to good or bad. There are various examples of ethical philosophers maintaining this position G. E. Moore, for example, makes the assertaion" I may say that I intend to use Ethics to cover more than this - a usage, for which there is, I think, quite sufficient authority. I am using it to cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: the general enquiry into what is good."26 This shows that the notion of intrinsic goodness is very fundamental in ethics. What is meant by intrinsic goodness? Whether this is something good as an end or, something good in isolation? Moore in his Principia Ethica is inclined to take it not only as something good as an end, but also good in isolation. In his essay on "The conception of intrinsinc Value" he puts forth the view. He says, To say that a kind of Value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.27

Teleological ethics, we have seen, makes a persistent attempt to show that the term 'goodness' has a central place in ethics, and all other ethical terms like 'right', 'duty', 'ought' etc. are reducible to it. This contention of a teleologist is evidenced not only in the writing of H. Rashdall who makes the pronouncement that the attainment of the maximum amount

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of intrinsic goodness is our sole motive behind all actions and, of course, he includes goodness for animals as well in the concept of maximum intrinsic goodness. He declares, "It is to my mind a perfectly clear deliverence of the moral consciousness that no action can be right, except in so far as it tends to produce a good, and that when we have to choose between goods, it is always right to choose the greater good".²⁸

G.E. Moore goes to the extent in his *Principia Ethica*, Chapter V, that even ethical terms like 'right' and 'duty' are reducible to intrinsic goodness. In his words, "Our 'duty', therefore, can only be defined as that action which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. And what is right or morally permissible only differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible alternative".²⁹

Having made a synoptic treatment of the basic hypothesis of ethical teleologism, we are in a position to state that out of the controversialists' stand-points on the issue whether end justifies the means, the teleologists make an affirmative assertion to the effect that ethics is mainly end oriented. Although the teleologists have agreed on a basic issue regarding the fundamental character of good as a primary notion, yet they are very much divided into several camps on the issue whether goodness refers to a natural property or a supernatural property, or a non-natural property. Consequent upon this variation in teleological stand-point we have, on the one hand, a naturalistic teleologism propounded by J. S. Mill and others, a kind of supernaturalism roughly supported by Aristotle, and a non-naturalism advocated by G. E. Moore and others. There can be still many other sub-divisions on the aforesaid views such as objectivism, subjectivism and relativism or relationalism, all of them maintaining different hypotheses but agreeing on the major issue. To put it in the words of W. K. Frankena: "The final appeal, directly or indirectly, must be to the comparative amount of good produced, or rather to the comparative balance of good over evil produced".30 Before we close our discussion on ethical teleologism a passing reference should, however, be made on Frankena's remark "that for a teleologist, the moral quality or value of actions, persons, or traits of character is dependent on the comparative non-moral value of what they bring about or try to bring about". 31 Here he is inclined to restrict ethical teleologism to a type of naturalism or super-naturalism, but our recognition of some nonnaturalistic view, especially propounded by G.E. Moore and H. Rashdall as upholders of teleologism, makes us amend the position held by Frankena, and it should be said that an imposition to treat teleologism restricting to some non-value ends is not warranted.

DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS

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While discussing ethical teleologism we have made it clear that the ethicists of this group have made an attempt to accept morality as endoriented and also they have regarded good in some way or other the central concept of ethics, and have tried to reduce other ethical notion to goodness. The fundamental hypothesis behind the type of ethical theory we are going to discuss in the section under the heading of deontological ethics is, although conflicting to the hypothesis of teleologism cannot be at the same time regarded as contradicting the fundamental postulates of the former. Particularly in view of the questions whether in ethics terms denoting rules or set of rules have an independent status, whether terms like 'right', 'duty', 'moral obligation' etc. are fundamental, the deontologists try to establish that all these notions cannot be reduced to goodness, rather they enjoy somewhat an independent status either in isolation from the consideration of the end or by going side-by-side with goodness attached to actions or persons. Realizing this feature of a deontological ethics and stating its basic assumption Frankena observes, ".....a deontologist contends that it is possible for an action or rule of action to be the morally right or obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest possible balance of good over evil for self, society, or universe".32

The ethical deontologists, we have seen, have developed a particular kind of attitude towards the status enjoyed by the ethical terms like 'right', 'duty', obligation etc. We do not intend to enter into the details of historical aspect of this type of ethical theory, but a passing reference is needed. It should be said that deontologism in a suggestive form is as old a view as Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, for the reason there are some statements in it which show that he held this view. Making a case for interpreting Aristotle as an act deontologist W. K. Frankena has made the observation, "Such a view was held by E. F. Carritt (in Theory of Morals) and possibly by H. A. Prichard, and was, at least, suggested by Aristotle when he said

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that in determining what the golden mean is 'the decision rests with perception".33

In Christian ethics some emphasis is laid on the independent character of moral rules and particularly some of the commands but we do not find a clear case for treating this ethics as belonging to deontologism, but in modern times several stories, like Cudworth, More and Clarke, have made a case for deontologism and particularly in certain classical works of Kant and Butler we find their clear inclination towards this view. Whether Kant is out-an-out a deontologist is a bit controversial matter, particulary in view of Paton's recognition of Kant as a teleologist. Paton says, particularly under the caption 'Goodness is fundamental', "Kant is so in true perspective we must remember that for him goodness is fundamental, and there is no warrant for supposing that he even entertained the conception of a duty divorced from goodness".34 Of course, Paton has made a good case for treating Kant in a teleological manner, for he finds the ground in Kant's insistence on accepting Good will as the only thing in this world or even beyond it which can be said good without limitation or intrinsically good. But we should remember that, if one holds a teleological position and he also sticks to some kind of deontology, it does not amount to holding two contradictory statements. Kant has also laid emphasis on the notion of duty for duty's sake and formulated certain abstract rules which never have any reference to consequence, and this consideration leads one to conclude that although there is some element of teleology in his ethics, yet he is basically a deontologist. Probably this is why W. K. Frankena regards him as an upholder of rule deontology. In his observation, "The best example of his monistic kind of rule deontology is presented by Immanuel Kant. We may here confine our discussion to what he calls the first form of the categorical imperative, 'Act only on the maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law'. "In this dictum, Kant is taking a principle, very similar to those quoted from Sidgwick and Rashdall, and offering It as the necessary and sufficient criterion for determining what more concrete maxims or rules we should live by.35 Besides Kant, we also find some statements in Bulter's Five Sermons suggesting some kind of deontological position especially when he says',"... any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, A Pe

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or is it wrong?...I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance (without any general rule)".36

In recent times deontologism, as a revolt against ethical teleologism, appeared mainly in the writings of H. A. Prichard and E. F. Carritt. Prichard, in his famous article entitled "Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?" is inclined to give a negative reply to the aforesaid question and puts emphasis on obligation regarded as independent of consequence whatsoever. And the world could see E. F. Caritt's insistence on accepting adeontological position in his *Theory of Morals* and *Ethical and Political Thinking*. 39

In the twentieth century itself there appeared W. D. Ross's *The Right and The Good* and *The Foundations of Ethics*, and a person like B. Blanshard finds Ross's view quite akin to deontology, but here, in our opinion, he is more nearer to a dualistic view than to be branded a deontologist, and therefore, we propose to discuss his view in the following section.

The ethical deontologists have shown some kind of unanimity in regard to its fundamental postulate, but they very much differ on the point as to, whether the basic judgements of obligation are, particular or general. Consequent upon this, variation in the opinions of different deontologists, W. K. Frankena prefers to bring a classification of deontological ethics as act-deontological and rule-deontological theory, the second also admitting of two forms the concrete rule deontologism and abstract rule deontologism. According to him: Act deontological theories maintain that the basic judgement of obligation are all purely particular ones like "In this situation I should do so and so", and that general ones like" We ought always to keep our promises "are unavaliable, useless, or at best derivative from particular judgements.. Rule-deontologists hold that the standard of right and wrong consists of one or more rules-either fairly concrete ones like "We ought always to tell the truth" or very abstract ones like Henry Sidgwick's Principle of Justice. 40

ETHICAL DUALISM

At the very outset it should be made clear that in discussing ethical

dualism and its fundamental hypothesis in a separate section as an independent type, we are mainly guided by the consideration that, certain telic concepts like 'good' and deontic concepts like 'duty', 'not-duty' 'right' and 'wrong' 'moral obligation' etc. on the other, are not reducible to each other. This admission is warranted particularly in view of the fact that a particular kind of theory we are going to discuss here has been mainly discussed as a deontological theory by some eminent writers like W.K. Frankena⁴¹, T. E. Hill⁴², Bland Blanshard⁴³ and others. The view in question is that propounded by W. D. Ross in his two books The Right and The Good and The Foundations of Ethics. May be that certain writers, in discussing Ross as a deontologist, have been guided by the consideration that a man can very well be a deontologist and at the same time he preserves certain elements of ethical teleologism. But we have preferred to give separate category to the aforesaid view, the fundamental hypothesis of which is that neither certain telic concepts like 'good' or 'eviel' or 'bad' are reducible to deontic concepts like 'right', 'wrong', 'duty', 'moral obligation' etc. And also, we have assumed that ethics is, no doubt, sometimes end centric but it possibility cannot be ruled out that in certain cases actions can be regarded 'right' or 'wrong', 'duty' or 'morally obligatory' even without any consideration of end.

W. D. Ross, while discussing the meaning of right makes this announcement: "The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the natur, relations, and implications of three conceptions which appear to be fundamental in ethics- those of 'right' good in general', and 'morally good' Ross' recognition of three fundamental ethical concepts viz. 'right' 'good in general', and 'morally good' has led PapitaHaezrahi⁴⁵ to discuss him as a pluralist, but this fact cannot be ignored that 'good in general' and 'morally good' and 'right' seem to be fundamental. Ross has tried to show that right is an irreducible notion to goodness and there are certain prima facie 'right acts' irrespective of the result they may produce. His own assertion is:

"Any one who is satisfied that neither the subjective theories of the meaning of 'right', nor what is for the most attractive of the attempts to reduce it to simpler objective element, is correct, will indefir same to certain ethical terms

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probably be prepared to agree that 'right' is an irreducible notion"46. And,

"That his act will produce the best possible consequences is not his reason for calling it right."⁴⁷

W. D. Ross not only recognizes 'right' as an irreducible and indefinable notion but has also taken 'good' as an irreducible and at the same time, an indefinable notion to any other term or concept. However, in certain non-ethical senses 'good' comes nearer to other notions but in its ethical sense it is wholly irreducible and indefinable notion to any other terms or concept. However, in certain non-ethical senses 'good' comes never to other notions but, in its ethical sense, it is wholly irreducible and indefinable notion which refers to a consequential attribute. We do not intend any more to make a detailed study of his view but suffice it to say that his view comes nearer to some kind of ethical dualism.

ETHICAL PLURALISM

Having given a brief account of three types of ethical theories, viz. Ethical Teleologism. Ethical deontologism and Ethical dualism, we have thrown some light on the important types of ethical theories, but there still remains one more possible view preferably termed Ethical Pluralism the fundamental hypothesis of which will be that the different ethical concepts such as 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'duty', 'obligation', 'ought' 'ought-not' are either fully or in their main sense not reducible notions, they have their own realm of use. We find a pluralistic account of ethics in Pepita Haezerahi's *The Price of Morality* and certain cases have been discussed therein, but since we have discussed Ross' view in the preceding section here we propose to take this as a possibility alone, and so we do not think it warranted to provide it in its historical perspective. With these observations regarding some basic problems of ethics, its nature, realm and types, we proceed to discuss yet another branch of ethical philosophy, developed as a separate subject, metaethics.

METAETHICS

The twentieth century philosophical world would find emergence of many philosophical currents. History of Philosophy reveals that it was

in the twentieth century that the idealistic movement reached to its climater that the form of realistic and almost side-by-side some kind of revolt in the form of realistic movement has also been evidenced. But, nevertheless, some kind of metaphysical quest remained there. But this too received a setback in the hands of logical positivists followed by the Philosophy of linguistic analysis and asa result not only a general revolt was visible in the metaphysical world but also a very persistent attempt had been made to declare metaphysical sentences as pseudo statements and metaphysical concepts as pseudo concepts, and the whole metaphysical pursuit was made sterile. This was the negative side of the philosophical picture but, at the same time, emphases were laid on the problem of meaning, criterion of truth and the result has been that linguistic analysis could occupy a central place in philosophy by becoming a very important philosophical tool. Here a distinction between 'philosophy of language' and 'linguistic philosophy' is warranted. To Dull the distinction in the words of J. R. Searle. "Linguistic Philosophy consists in the attempt to solve Philosophical problems by analysing the meanings of words, and by analysing logical relations between words in natural languages... The Philosophy of language consists in the attempt to analyse certain gereral features of language such as meaning, reference, truth, verification, speech acts, and logical necessity". 18 Analysis, which had very central place in the philosophical pursuits of more than three decades, was itself not one pattern, and defferent trends in it have been there, those represented by realists like Moore and Russell and earlier Wittgenstein and that represented by later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle and a third one known as the Austinian trend. Whatever basic differences be there as 10 the mode of analysis, one thing was clear that in all the different pursuits study of language has been the focal point of attention, be it language of ethics or religion or mathematics or logic or epistemology or of any walked philosophising. The result has been very obvious in the way that we could find emergence of several newer branches of enquiries such as melareligion, meta-logic, meta-mathematics, meta-epistemology and of utmost significance metaethics.

ABOUT THE WORD 'METAETHICS' AND ITS MAIN **PROBLEMS**

The coinage of the word 'metaethics' cannot be traced back 101

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very older period. Of course, some kind of metaethical pursuits were developing undercurrent and A. J. Ayer, who in his 'critique of Ethics and Theology' undertook this problem, never used this word in his Language, Truth and Logic, nor has this expression been made popular by C.L. Stevenson, although he has made a declaration in the very beginning of Ethics and Language that' This book deals not with the whole of ethics, but with a narrowly specialized part of it. Its first object is to clarify the meaning of the ethical terms-such terms as 'good', 'right', 'just', 'ought', and so on. Its second object is to characterize the general methods by which ethical judgements can be proved or supported." So far I could come across this term first of all appeared as late as 1949 with the first publication of A. J. Ayer's "On the Analysis of Moral Judgement', where he uses this term in the sentence "neither in expounding my meta-ethical theory am I recommending the opposite."

In the fifties of 19th century R. M. Hare preferred to use the term 'ethics', though his contention was to mean 'metaethics'. He made a use of this term 'metaethics' along with so many other terms like the 'Logic of ethics', 'Theoretical ethics', 'Philosophical ethics'. His own words are. "The student of ethics will nevertheless have to get used to a variety of terminologies, he will find plain 'ethics' used for what we have just called 'morals' (normative ethics' is another term used for this), and he will find, for what we have just called 'ethics', the more guarded terms' the logic of ethics', 'metaethics', 'theoretical ethics', 'philosophical ethics', and so on." Now this term is much in vogue in the writings on ethics.

We have not still said anything as to the meaning of 'metaethics'. The prefix "meta" used with "ethics" has a special sense. This signifies 'about' or 'after'. 'About' in a sense, we, in a metaethical discussion, talk about the language of ethics, and 'after' in the sense 'ethics' stands in relation of precedence to it. But it should be said that the prefix "meta", unlike used in metaphysics, when used with metaethics, generally stands for 'about'. Now, what is its subject-matter is clear from the previously quoted statement of C. L. Stevenson. By way of recaptulation it would be serviceable to reproduce it here along with another statement by R. M. Hare. The two statements are:

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"This book deals not with the whole of ethics, but with narrowly specialized part of it. Its first object is to clarify the meaning of the ethical terms-such terms as 'good' 'right' 'just', 'ought' and so on. Its second object is to characterize the general method by which ethical judgements can be proved or supported."⁵²

And

"Ethics, as I conceive it, is the logical study of the Language of morals."53

It has now become clear that metaethicists are keenly interested in the various problems pertaining to the language used in ethical discourses. But this raises an important question as to: what we mean by the language of ethics? There is no controversy on the matter that some kind of language is used in order to give vent to our ethical beliefs or attitudes, or arguments so on and so forth. If we look at the structure of ethical expressions wedo not find anything of a very unique nature. Structurally we see that there are some ethical words like 'good', 'bad', 'duty', 'not-duty', 'obligation', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought-not' etc. There are some sentences like 'X is good', 'Y is my duty'. 'A ought to be performed', 'K is wrong', 'B' is evil'. There are also ethical paragraphs containing some ethical sentences. Besides these we have also a set of particular or general rules such as "you should not speak a lie", "You should not hit a man when he is down" and also many arguments supporting one or the other standpoint. All these constitute the language of ethics and when a metaethicist tries to study the various problems pertaining to language he takes into account ethical language as such, suggests some analysis about its meaning, functions and also examines certain problems pertaining to suitability and modus operendii of various types of ethical arguments. There are some important problems discussed by a metaethicist. The various problems pertaining to metaethical enquiry have been enlisted by W. K. Frankena⁵⁴ in the following manner:

(i) Problem regarding the meaning or definition of ethical terms or concepts like 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought', 'ought-not', 'duty', and 'not duty, 'moral obligations' etc. To be precise, this assumes the form: what is the nature or meaning or function of

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such terms or concepts in an ethical sentence or judgement.

(ii) We know that many terms enlisted above have a non-moral sense also and naturally a metaethicist is also one faced with the question how is one to distinguish between the moral sense of these terms and the non-moral meanings of the said terms.

(iii) The third category of problem discussed by a metaethicist relates to somewhat non-ethical problems or related terms to ethics. This relates to the analysis of certain terms or concepts like 'actions, 'conscience', 'free will', 'intention', 'promising', 'motive', 'responsibility', 'reason', 'voluntrary' etc.

(iv) We have also certain problems discussed and these problems relate to the methodology of metaethics. Problems discussed here are: What kind of justification or proof be given for ethical and value judgements. To be more precise what is the nature of moral reasoning or argumentation.

Of the various problems enlisted above, basically there are two categories of metaethical problems. Those belonging to the meaning, analysis, use or functions of, to use a broader word, 'ethical expression' and secondly, those belonging to the field of ethical methodology, particularly concerned with the mode, workability and suitability of various ethical arguments and also to the question of validity, invalidity, truth and falsity which are used in common arguments, whether ethical reasoning or arguments stand on par with other modes of arguments. To these problems various point-of-view have been presented by different metaethicists and consequently we get several types of metaethical theories propounding one hypothesis, rejecting or partially accepting other hypothesis.

However, various attempts of metaethicists have been subjected to bitter attacks by those writers who expected some kind of normative ethics from them. They particularly allege that metaethics runs into some kind of moral agnosticism or scepticism and they find some kind of ethical bankruptcy in the analytical approach of the metaethicists. T. E. Hill has not only termed all these endeavours as sceptical but also makes a very sarcastic remark about the approach of metaethicist by saying: "Worst of all, their convictions about basic meanings have often been at opposite

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poles, so that what each has affirmed others have denied, and what each has denied others have affirmed. Touching here and there upon the area of today's ethical thought, one has the impression of being confronted by a jungle in which trunks, branches, vines, and briars are interwined in rich but tangled profusion quite without unifying principle or common purpose."

We find that metaethics and metaethicists venture to provide ethical philosophy a new dimension have been viewed by some critics with anguish. We share our feelings with those writers who find some kind of ethical bankruptcy in today's ethical writings, but we must also assess our expectations and demands. In fact, a metaethicist is engaged in presenting certain analysis of ethical language including ethical arguments, and if we allege them for not doing any normative ethical job the fault does not lie in what they are doing but in our expectation itself. Suppose if we say that a rickshaw puller is not driving his vehicle at the rate of 100 mph. or suppose we allege him of not flying his rickshaw in the sky as it is done by a pilot in the case of an aircraft, then really the fault is not of rickshaw puller. His job is something else and if we are expecting him of doing some other job and if he fails in that we accuse him of some shortcomings. This is certainly worng. The same consideration is applicable with the allegations levelled against the metaethicists of this age.

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METAPHORS & MORALITY

NANDITA BAGCHI

In "Feminism, Objectivity and Economics", Julie A Nelson points out that metaphors are not merely decorative appendages to language. They perform the functions of organizing cognition and ensuring successful communication quite efficiently. They also clarify the meanings of abstract concepts by reference to basic physical experiences. In association with perceptions of up/down, for example, metaphors organize our cognition in terms of following kinds of classification: "good is up", "bad is down", "reason is up", emotion is down. In the palce of "up", it is easy to substitute 'in, "center", "control", "rational". All of these physical experiences of "up", center etc. are characterized by metaphorical associations "superior" and "masculine", she states (depending heavily on the work of Jack Lack off & Mark Johnson, Metaphors we live By 1980:5). Similarly, metaphorical associations of terms like "down" "out", periphery" etc. are "inferior" and "Feminine". An analysis into the functioning of metaphors reflects the way in which the concept of gender is applied-viz. to organize cognition on the basis of the physical experiences of the biological difference between men and women in the form of a dualism which is hierarchical and value loaded in nature. In this cognitive organization, "soft", weak", "emotional", "inferior" are associated with feminine, "hard", "tough", "rational", "superior" with masculine. It is the opposition between rational and emotional that is relevant in the moral context. Reason and its corollary, universalization, have been recognized traditionally as the key concepts in ethics (popularly referred to as the "justice perspective" in ethics). Recent feminist scholars, on the contrary are much more impressed by the "care" perspective, which chooses the situation one is in and the fact of

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connectedness among the concerned persons to be the determining consideration in deciding moral questions. Feminists consider the care perspective to be exhaustive enough to explain ethical experience at large. It might be interesting to explore in some detail the salient features of both these perspectives and attempt to decide whether any one of them is capable, single handedly, of dealing with the moral context echaustively.

The example in ethical thinking chosen by William Frankena in the beginning of his treatise "Ethics"- may well be considered as a fair representation of what has traditionally been taken as making a moral judgment. Frankena chooses his example from Plato's "Crito". In this dialogue Plato expresses his ethical thought-which has been recognized as the paradigm of ethical thinking through the ages, with the help of the character Socrates. Frankena understands Socrates' basic rules in making moral judgments to be the following: "We must not let our decision be determined by our emotions, but must examine the question and follow the best reasoning". The entire traditional philosophical community endorses that this procedure should be followed without fail. Such a scrupulous, vigilant guidance by reason leads one to arrive at universal principles in the form of blanket generalizations. These principles, when applied to concrete situations, lead to more or less foolproof moral judgments or decisions. The situation, for example that Socrates is in Plato's "Crito" is having to take a decision between whether to accept the death sentence pronounced to him unfairly by the state, or to make use of the oppritunity to escape, master-minded by his well-wishers Socrates, following the path of reason, deliberates with the help of three universal principles, namely, that we ought never to harm anyone, that we ought to keep our promises and that we ought to obey the state as we obey our parents and teachers. Applying these principles to the case in hand, Socrates decides he ought not to escape, as that would harm the state. It may be noted that the thinking process traced above is corrupted at no stage by emotional components. The incorporation of emotional elements is alleged to render the system defective. Hare also considers that what distinguishes prescriptions ethical in nature, from other sorts of prescriptions is the willingness to universalize in the case of ethical ones. This willingness to universalize is in fact constitutive of the meaning of an ethical judgment. This belief is seen to be the strongest g

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in Kant, whose preoccupation with reason and universalization in ethics is so obsessive as to treat emotions like love and sympathy as pathological. Kohlberg too restricts ethical efficiency to the conscious internalization of universal rules.

The above line of ethical thinking happens to be in sharp contrast to the demands of feminist scholars who are very serious about taking into account emotional needs and considerations of the agent's needs, contexts etc. so far as the question is moral in nature. They are pretty skeptical about the justifiability and practical fruitfulness of such rational universalizations or rules in ethics. Feminists feel that this procedure encourages sexism and perpetuates the patriarchal structures of society. It is phallocentric in the sense that it recommends the universalization of moral codes for the class "man" which pretends to be gender-neutral, while in effect, it is highly gender specific. It highlights, the interests of masculinity, silencing the voices of women and others.

It seems fair, at this juncture, however to pay attention to the justification proclaimed by the so-called phallocentric system in favour of itself. Their ethics is determined by the foundationalistic epistemology, so characteristic of Descartes, to which pure objectivity and value neutrality are of utmost significance as norms. The knower or agent is taken to be an individual- completely detached from particularity, situation, context or any kind of contingencey. Reason is visualized as potent to function absolutely independently of any subjectivity, locatedness etc.-thereby securing a "view from nowhere" (Ref.- Thomas Nagel's book bearing this title). The individual is seen to form the corner stone of epistemology. Ethics however, cannot afford to accord such unrestricted emphasis on the individual without giving rise to an intolerable egoism or selfishness in society. Reason guides the individual in a way that harmonizes his self - interests with those of "all", and hence the importance of universalization.

But feminist and others point out that such a blanket universalization is insensitive to the needs of particular others, i.e., person and relations situated between the individual and the world at large, like family-relationships, friendships, and most devalues and condemns morally vital phenomena like sympathy, concern for others, fellow feeling and the like.

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The absurd consequences, which a purely rational ethics lead to, may be understood from Karen Green's reference to the counter-example to Hare's presentation of prescriptions as universal. Here the fanatic, popularly considered as unethical or non-ethical, poses as a counter example. His fondness for a particular ideal, for example - anti-Judaism, and obsession with universalization may lead him to universalize 'All Jews should be terminated". Readiness to universalize being the only requirement of morality, his rule may be taken to be moral. The impossibility of this dictum being considered to be moral follows from the fact that the emotion of fellow feeling or sensitiveness to others pain is an equally important requirement of morality to which the fanatic's rule does not conform. Reason, therefore is not the entire story in morality. Frankena also points out that if universalization were the whole constituent of morality, as understood by Kant, then morally neutral maxims like "When alone in the dark, whistle", "Tie your left shoestring first", would have to be seen as possessing moral value, by virtue of being universal. The point of view from which the rules are willed to be universal needs to be taken into consideration to make the universalization morally meaningful. Rash universalization often turns into a vehicle of oppression. In the traditional moral context, devotion to mothers by sons is taken to be an epitome of moral perfection on the part of the sons. The moral code that "all sons should respect their mothers" has conventionally acquired the demand that the wives of these sons be given a position secondary to that of the mothers in the family structure. I choose to call this so-called virtue a moral one and not merely a social or conventional one, because it is accorded the requisite proportion of seriousness and normativeness, as accorded to amoral value. Brought up in the influence of such a moral stricture, a person as responsive to women's needs as Iswarchandra Vidyasagar, has been seen to comply with his mother Bhagavati Devi's dictate to let his wife Dinamoyee Debi play a second fiddle to his mother in domestic affairs. She has also been deprived of the opportunity to education, again because Bhagavati Debi willed so. The poet Satyendranath Datta agreed not to consummate his marriage as his mother condemned his wife as an unworthy sexual partner. Loneliness and depression damaged his wife Kanaklata Debi's health. On the strength of ethical rules emphasizing universalizability only, a section of women T

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aided by the men folk are empowered to silence another category of women. We have so far associated universalization with reason-but it is doubtful whether this kind of universalization is founded on reason alone. Such rules though apparently rational, seem more to be based on the emotional need of one section to dominate the other. This further highlights the role of emotion in morality.

The above discussion is intended to persuade one that purposeless universalization is useless, at least in morality. More relevant to the ethical context is the fact that far from being bad or undesirale, compassion or emotion in the sense of being sensitive to another person's feeling is a major requisite condition in ethics. Frankena quotes Josiah Royce and William James in his book 'Ethics' to the effect that unless ethics is reduced to the mechanical performance of routine chores', we must somehow attain and develop an ability to be aware of others as persons, as important to themselves as we are to ourselves, and to have a lively and sympathetic representation in imagination of their interests and the effects of our actions on their lives". Another important service discharged by an ethic of care, which recognized the importance of emotions in judging morally, is that emotions provide an effective motivation to do the good, as pointed out by Karen Green in her article "Reason and Feeling: Resisting the Dichotomy". The desire, particularly strong in childhood, to be cared by others motivates one to perform good acts so as to be continued to be loved by others. At this stage, rational self-interest is the guiding emotion. Before long, it gives place to care for others. A sensitive individual, on analogy of his pain on losing love and esteem of others, easily realized the kind of pain others would be subject to on losing love from him. This motivates him to act responsibly, so as not to hurt others.

The points mentioned above are expected to take care of the position that, an ethic of care is inferior and undesirable because emotion oriented; it would, however be quite suitable here to examine in brief the contrary claim associated with the works of Gilligan and Chodrow, that reason, justice and fairness are irrelevant in morality, that an ethic of care is exhaustive enough to deal with the ethical scene single-handedly. I feel skeptical about the tenability of the assumption that reason and independence are typical, exclusive of men and connectedness and interdependence are

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typical and exclusive of women, that it is neither possible nor desirable for typical and exclusive of workship the two to overlap. Such a stance has widened the distance between egalitarian feminists like Wollstonecraft, who champion women's right and independence and those who speak for connection among women. Sometimes, the commitment of the former group to the feminist cause has been called to question on this ground. My feeling is that the gap between reason and connectedness is not so unbridgeable that the two cannot be conceived to constitute an individual single self. Feminists should beware of constituting so rigid a polarization as not to permit any overlap between reason & emotion. Normally men are accused of effecting such strict dualisms, but unless women are careful, they are liable to commit the same error. It is common sense knowledge that in spite of emotion and connectedness being key concepts in morality, reason, too, has its role to play in the moral context. Unless some amount of reason and generalization is accepted in the ethical scenario, an intolerable amount of time and energy would have to be invested in making moral judgments separately in each context and situation. Secondly much of what is conventionally taken to be morally bad, like stealing from rich to nourish the poor, to break promises, to lie and so on would have to be accepted as ethically good under the pretext of their suitability to the context. It is bad reason, that is, reason, whose model is formal logic and its laws, as characterized by completeness, adequacy and independence that looks down upon emotions, because emotions are beyond the control of rational will. Julie A Nelson feels that such bad reason has been culturally and metaphorically associated with masculinity, and over connectedness a definitely bad trait, with femininity. In the traditional Western philosophical and scientific parlance, reason has been associated with objectivity, completeness, adequacy, separation. The paradigmatic Western rational being is totally separated, self individuated. Over-connectedness has been presented as the model for woman, especially in the Western middle-class culture. Women have been encouraged to let their individuality be engulfed by marriage and family. A maturer interpretation of reason and connectedness construes the two to be equally necessary conditions for defining human relations. Julie A Nelson points out that the opposite of rational is irrational, not emotional. Opposition has been defined as complementarity also in Webster's Dictionary (New

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collegiate, 1974), so there is not logical harm in viewing the two as complementary and equally constitutive of the human personality-masculine or feminine. Old metaphors, like the proverbs, thus, need to be made new, so as to accommodate the insight that the marginalized are not inferior. They deserve the same kind of attention in the moral and other questions as demanded by those constituting the core or center.

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MILL'S CLASSICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

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RAJNI SRIVASTAVA

Mill, the great classical philosopher, was an utilitarian. He believes in the principle of greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, but he differs from Bentham in his principle of utility because according to Bentham if the quantity of happiness is equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. Equal amount of pleasure should be treated equally, but Mill made a clarification in this principle, that which happiness is qualitatively greater than other that should be preferable. He says that everyone is in search of happiness and everyone wants to achieve maximum happines, but he also believes in harmony of interest, that one's happiness is good for one, therefore all men's happiness is good for all. Therefore man cares for all men's happiness. He says that after weighing the interest man would care for general interest. Man is supposed to feel himself one of the public and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit also.

This formula takes us to the root of Mill's theory of democracy. His theory has a moral basis and he holds that in a democratic government one can achieve the greatest beneficial consequences if there exists the necessary conditions for democracy. He gives three conditions for the success of any government:

- 1. That the people should be willing to receive it.
- 2. That they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation.
- 3. That they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them.

And if state is constituted with civilized citizen democracy is the best

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Mill

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government for them. Mill was attempting to lay down the principle that everyone has a right to pursue his own interest in his own way employing whatever means he has or may acquire to this end subject only to moral obligation plus any necessary legal compulsion of each to respect the similar and equal freedom of everyone.

Mill says that man is capable of being sometimes disinterested from his selfish desire. Man can develop his capabilities. Mill does not address man as 'consumer' as other utilitarians do. They say that man makes choice between the policies offered by representative and so he is only a consumer of public policies. But according to Mill man is developer and exertor of his human capabilities. Therefore the worth of an individual is decided by development of his human capabilities.

Mill does not believe that man has only selfish desire which Hobbes believes. But he holds that individual has a sense of morality and he is under a moral obligation to care for other also and he is in the position that he can develop himself. He pointed out that the criterion of the good government is that it should allow the free development of individual capabilities and the worth of an individual is judged by the extent to which it promotes the virtue and intelligence among the people and this development is continuous, and so for him no stationary state of capital and population. This development is not mechanical, but this is natural progress. It is the development of capacities through education. He believes in the greatest happiness for the greatest number. He holds the view that there are qualitative differences in pleasures and so quite right that some happiness is preferable to any other and the aim of society should be to maximise the happiness of the greatest possible number of its number and the wish of the people should not be taken as a consulting wish but it must be put in practice, but it also must be checked by some enlightened people from time to time.

Mill believes that self development or self realization has the intrinsic value and by self development, he means the highest and most harmonious development of human qualities which are distinctive endowment of a human being in the choice of his own plan of life.

"It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in

themselves but by cultivating it and calling it forth within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation."²

Mill rejects the view that the main function of government is to prevent individuals from force and fraud. Rather the good government is that which maximizes the good of the individual. He says

"we may consider, then as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed collectively and individually, since besides that their well being is the sole object of government their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery."

Representative government is a means of bringing intellect in the society and it is part of the function of state to restrain people from thoughtless errors in the major decision of their lives and more important to make moral judgement and to aid morality and to impede immorality and indirectly by non-coercive methods such as education."⁴

Every government is responsible for the well being of its citizen and if the society is composed of civilization, representative government can do it more successfully because in this type of government representatives are chosen by the citizens themselves.

Mill gives the argument for the participation of ordinary citizen in governmental action. He believes that individuals desire their self perfection and for achieving this participation in government's activity is necessary. He takes this participation as a means of giving political education to individuals and the errors which are probable in this process which are also part of that education because a man learns by his errors also and so for the maximization of happiness, it is necessary that all have right to participate in choosing among government's policies. He says that "it was evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation even in the smallest public function is useful. The participation should every where be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable

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He phrased man as progressive being and mankind were able to reach a level of mental cultivation. Democracy gives a direct interest to all citizen in government's activity and for participation it gives a right to vole to all citizens, that they can vote for or against any government. Thus it "make people more active, more energetic, in intellect in virtue and in practical activity and efficiency."

Mill was in favour of direct representation because it is a means of mental cultivation but in indirect representation people do not have this opportunity because in indirect representation people do not choose their representatives, but they choose only choosers and so in this process the main purpose of right to vote is lost. In this process people do not have any opportunity to participate in government's activity and it is not useful for increasing political intelligence in people. It prevents people to come in direct contact with their representatives. The indirect representation is based on the view that ordinary people don't have any political intelligence and it is difficult for them to choose suitable policies for themselves and for nation but they can easily know to whom they can trust, to choose their representative but Mill was not agreed on this view. He said that it is a negative idea and each person has capacity to develop themselves and if they have this atmosphere for development, they can develop themselves and can be politically intelligent also.

Power of deciding about matters shifts with the nature of matter. Sometimes it concerns to people themselves but sometimes representatives have right to decide but in a complex matter the legislative committee and experts have right to decide but Mill does not support this view that voters have only right to vote for or against any government after a schedule period and after that they totally depend on their representatives and their wish has no meaning at all. Rather he argued that participation of people in government should be well informed about government's policies and action and by discussing on these matters they can inform to government about their own wish and their wish should not be only consulting wish burther wishes should be put in practice but oftenly it should be checked by enlightened people.

"Government must be performed by the few for the benefit of many and security of the many, constitution being governed by those who possess the largest share of their confidence."

He rejects the view that few persons because of their preeminence are entitled to rule over others but the rulers can be only those persons to whom people will choose as their representatives but he says that executive body of the government should be appointed not by popular election not by those of their representatives but by competition.

Mill emphasized that in a representative government, final control should reside in the people, the voter but he believes that actual activity of government is a skilled activity and therefore interference by the unskilled is not appreciated.

Mill introduced the idea of universal franchise that every one should have a right to vote, and open ballot system but he was aware about the danger of democracy, the tyranny of majority. He says the will of the people more over practically means the will of the majority.

If the formula of one person one vote would be applied, there is always possibility of over ruling of majority on minority. There is danger of class legislation, because society is divided in groups and group of working class is always larger than other groups. So they are a numerical majority and if they all have one vote, they will dominate the minority and so that minority has no representative at all but in a real democracy each and every section of the society would be represented, not disproportionately but proportionately. The majority of the electors would always have a majority of representatives but if minority is left without any representative than it is not a real democracy. To secure a fair representation for minority Mill introduced the plan of representation, representation proportionate to numbers. Mill says that this plan of proportion numbers of even division of the electoral body, not two great parties alone. The danger of class legislation is severe problem for democracy but Mill thinks that Hare's plan gives security from this dangers. Because though minority in one constituency cannot be able to choose its representative but minority distributed in all over the country if counted for one will be able to make up a fix quota to choose a representative. Mill says "the majority would insist on having a

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candidate worthy of their choice or they would carry their votes some and the candidate who where else and minority would prevail" and the candidate who is chosen by the aggregate minority for the parliament secure a fair voice for minority and the majority of working class would not dominate the minorities. does not mean that Mill was against workers' power, he did not rejective power of numerical majority of working class while as an M. P. he regarded himself as a representative of working class. But he did not want that this majority would dominate the whole parliament. He was willing to grantle working class one half the representation but not more and second thingof the Hare's plan is "no elector would as at present he nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen" because in the local representation voters have only few options to choose any local candidate and if they like to choose any of them, they have right to choose, if they do not like any of the local candidate even then also, they have to choose one of them. They have no other option but in this scheme of representation they have liberty to any candidate all over the country when they want to be represented.

Hundreds of able men of independent thought who have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency have by their writings of exertions in some field of public usefulness made themselves known and approved by a few persons in almost every district of kingdom and if every vote that would be given for them in every place could be counted for their election, they might be able to complete the number of the quota. Representative government and leader would not be out voted only because he has done something against the narrow interest of some voters for the national benefit for his task of national reputation.

This scheme of representation depresses the party based politics because Mill thought that in partly system independent thought of intellectuals does not have any effect because they can act only on those principles which party has adopted.

Again this scheme provides a better way for leadership. In democracy though the leaders ate choosed by people yet they should be politically intelligent otherwise they can create a danger for democracy. Mill says that to have a wise legislator legislation should be a profession when the value of knowledge is adequately felt a man will choose his legislator as "Constituencies would become competitors for the best candidates and

would vie with one another in selecting from among the men of local knowledge and conscience those who were most of distinguished in every other respect. (10)

Mill was anxious to give democracy enlightenment of intellectual people and he thought that though education minority is small in proportion but much weight must be given to their view because to maintain standard of political intelligence, he proposed for the plural voting. Every one has one vote but some have more than one vote that everyone should have an equal voice is a totally different proposition.

He admits that the will of the people even of the numerical majority must be supreme in politics but in spite of that the criterion of what is right in politics is not the will of the people but the good of the people, and therefore our aim is to persuade the people to impose restraint on their own will for the sake of their own food and for this several votes should be given to intellectual people and when people are not equal in knowledge and intellectual vote for all is wrong in principle. For instance, if two persons have joint interest and one is superior to other but we regard both of them equal then we accept something which is not true and it is harmful to their interest, so far the benefit for all superiors should be given more weight than others and it is in the benefit of inferior person to give more value to the view of superior and so how many votes he can secure. Mill says that person's education and profession can give criteria to decide for plural voting." An employer of labourer is on the average more intelligent than a labour for he must labour with his head and not solely with his hands. A foreman is generally more intelligent than the unskilled. A banker merchant or manufacturer is likely to be more intelligent than a tradesman because he has larger and more complicated interest to manage."11

In thoughts of Parliamentary Reform Mill has written "that if the unskilled labours had one vote a skilled labour should have two, a foreman perhaps three, a former manufacturer or trader three or four, a professional or literary, an artist a public functionary, a university graduate and an elected number of learned society five or six." ¹²

Mill was convinced that Hare plan will now give security from "danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body and danger of

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class legislation on the part of numerical majority."13

Mill supported plan essentially because it preserved rule by elite, like Hare, Mill was convinced that if the educated classes could have representatives in proportion proper to their number, they would be able to exercise considerable influence beyond these number because of their greater capabilities.

Mill has taken a bold step when he allowed fight to vote for women. Though at that time it was supposed that women are mere followers of the male number of their family. Therefore it is useless to give women right to vote but for Mill the participation in itself has unique value and his second argument in its favour has pragmatic value that if women do not use freely it does not create any harm and if they are able it is good. So even if women are not have independent political thought, they must have right, have suffrage. It is itself a means of improvement.

But there are some negative aspects also in his conception of democracy. He restricted suffrage for uneducated and untax-payer. He makes it clear that he is not intentionally against for any sectoin of society and does not want to pull away their suffrage right. Therefore minimum standard of suffrage should be within the limit of every one or at an expense not exceeding what the poorest who earn their own living can afford and even after that any one remains uneducated and excluded from suffrage that it "would not be the society that would exclude him but his own laziness."

He also excluded untax payer from right to suffrage because has says that "those who pay no taxes disposing by their votes of other people's money have every motive to be lavish and none to economize...and it is also violating this rule a severance of power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise." 15

But according to this view, it cannot be said that Mill had some intention to exclude poor from suffrage, but he says that every one pays indirect taxes they do not have any responsibility on economic matter. Mill thought that some indirect tax should be converted into direct taxes and it also would be within the reach of every one, and it would be necessary for

every adult citizen to pay that direct tax.

Mill denied system of secret ballot because he thought that in this system people would be juided by their selfish interests and they would sacrify the public interests for their private interests, and Mill says that this secret ballot system cannot emphasise the effect of educated minority. He says that open ballot would encourage people to caste their vote disregarding selfish interests. He. takes suffrage as a trust not a right because exercise of any political function is power over other and "if it is a right if it belongs to vote for his own sake on what ground can we blame him for selling it or using it to recommend himself to any one whom it is his interest to please?... The suffrage is indeed due to him among other reasons as a means to his own protection, but only against treatment from which he is equally bound so far as depends on his vote, to protect every one of his fellow citizens. His vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly a matter of duty he is bound to give it according to his best and most conscienious opinion of the public good."16

He rejected salary for representatives because he thinks that it would become an occupation and person in hope of return spent more and more and try to win the election at any cost "it would become an object of desire to adventures of a low class and persons in possession with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy would be inussantly bidding to attract or retain the suffrage of the electors by promoting all things honest or dishonest possible or impossible and rivaling each other in pandering to the meanest feeling the most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest part of the crowd."¹⁷

So in order to save democracy from this demoralizing influence Mill rejected the idea of salary for the member of parliament, but "payment should be in indemnity for loss of time or money."

The duration of parliament cannot be fixed as it depends upon the condition of country that now much time is sufficient for the member of parliament, but it should not be so long that representatives would forget their duties for the groups who have elected them and it should not be so short that he would have no time to understand the real problems of the people and to put his policies into action. So the time would be well decided

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according to the situation of the country but Mill says "whether the term is short or long during the last year of it the members are in the position in which they would always be if parliaments were annual, so if the term is very brief there would virtually be annual parliaments during a great proportion to all time". 18 s

A government can stay in power as long as people have confidence in it but as soon as people lost their confidence in government, government has no right to exist in power but Mill does not give the people right to dissolve the parliament, but he gives this right to executive body. He says "it desirable that some power in the state which can only be the executive, should have the liberty of at any time and at discretion calling a new parliament, when there as a real doubt which of two contending parties has the strange following it is important that there should exit a constitutional means of immediately testing the point and setting at rest" and it is also necessary because "there ought to be any possibility of the deadlock in politics which would ensure on a quarrel breaking out between a President and an Assembly neither of whom during an interval which might amount to years would have any legal means of ridding itself of the other." 20

Success of any government depends on the intelligent administrations and citizens, but no government can unite all the wisdom of nation, but a representative government can make best use of it because in it administration depends not only on one man or one group but all people participate in it.

But Mill was aware of this fact also that representative government does not give any guarantee for the goods but it makes them only possible and again democracy is not suitable for all kinds of society, because where the people are uncivilized or in order to be civilized, democracy is not best government for them, because in it citizens should themselves be aware of the government's policies and action and be able to decide what is good for them and what is good for nation. In the consideration on Representative government Mill writes "When the people in order to advance in civilization, have order to advance in civilization, have some less on to learn some habit not yet acquired to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment."²¹

Executive body of the government remains in the direct touch with people, and it puts the government's policies before the people, but if this body is dishonest and conscious to only its interest, then it can misguide people and in this condition cannot work successfully and if people are passive and ready to give submission for tyrrany, they are not felt fit for democracy.

"Government by a trained officials cannot do for a country the things which can be done by a free government... but freedom cannot produce its best effects and often breaks down altogether unless means can be found of combining it with trained and skilled administration."²²

The greatest danger for democracy comes not from outside of democracy, but it is in itself democracy that is, the danger of class legislation, because in democracy, the government is always of numerical majority and it is possible that ruling power may be under the influence of class interest and they can out the majority. He defined that though democratic government is identified as "self government", the power of people themselves, but it is not true nature of democracy. The people who govern and who are governed are not the same persons. Generally in a democratic government the interests of people are identified with the interest of their rules, because people themselves choose their representative. Mill pointed out that this is a confusion. Both are different and their interests may be different therefore people must need liberty to express their different interests even in the democracy.

He was the defender of the individual liberty. His principle was "the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their member is self protection that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will to prevent harm to others." And in the area which concern only the individual himself his right of independence is absolute. He believes that intellectual advancement depends on the freedom of thought and discussion. Suppression of any opinion is indefensible in his view because he writes:

- Suppressed opinion may be true
- 2. Suppressed opinion may be false but it may contain a portion

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3. If the favoured opinion is not only partially true, but wholly false then also the expression of silenced opinion is useful because without its expression the received opinion will turn into a dogma.

He believes that there should be a complete freedom of expression if it does not result in immediate harmfull effects to others. Men are imperfect and they know only half truths and they have different experiences of life. Therefore for the development of mankind free scope of expression should be given. The development of society and self perfection can be achieved with greater success through freedom of expression than the intolerance and coercion.

Mill also believes in the liberty of action because without this liberty of thought and discussion is meaningless. He draws here the distinction of self regarding and other regarding action, but this is very unrealistic distinction because man is social animal and his every action affects others.

No man is entirely isolated from others. He is a social animal and his every serious effort for any thing affects other also. If we accept Mill's distinction mankind has no freedom of action. Mill gives liberty not only in thought and discussion but in economic relation also. He says that private property is a means of production. It leads to exploitation only when it is associated with monopoly but Mill says it is not unremediable. It can be cured through education. Product is the result of current labour and capital. So both the labour and capitalist have share in product. Without property right no exchange is possible. Mill argued that "the right of property includes then the freedom of acquiring by contract. The right of each to what he has produced implies a right to what has been produced by others if obtained by their free consent." Right of property, since the producers must either have given it from good will or exchanged it for what they esteemed an equivalent and to prevent them from doing so would be to infringe their right of property.

Mill accepts the exchange of property by consent because one has liberty to give his property to others also. Mill believes that private property gives the necessary incentive to efficiency and enterprise and it is a condition

of independence, self respect and personal responsibility.

Capitalism and private property is in his view not contrary to democracy. It guarantees to individuals 'the fruit of their own labour and obstinence of others. Therefore the owner and labour both have share in the product decided by market economy.

Mill says that *laissez faire* is more advantageous than restricted economy. Every one has the right to develop himself and the private property is necessary for the development, but Mill was aware that present distribution of wealth is so much unequal that it makes impossible for working class to develop themselves. The target share goes to those who do never at all and after that to those whose work is nominal and minimum share to the labour and this is against his equitable principle of proportion between work and wages but he says that cause of this unequal distribution is an historical accident not the capitalist principle of property. Reward in proportion to the market value of both the capital and current labour required for capitalistic production. The capitalistic principle of private property cannot be said to be responsible for the unequal distribution of wealth income and power. Capital is often gained by gift or by inheritance. Mill was at the last tried to put a limit on private wealth, that how much a people can inherit, but he had put the limit so high that it becomes useless.

There is several other difficulties also in his concept of democracy. He was an utilitarian and he has tried to justify democracy on utilitarian principle but democracy does not always bring the best beneficial consequences even when the necessary condition for democracy exists. Schumpeter challenges Mill's view that man is master of himself and he only knows what is in his interest. He says that political matter is so much sophisticated today that ordinary man does not understand what is the right approach. Again Schumpeter does not see any intrinsic value in participation.

At first Mill gives right of liberty to governed for their protection from governed, but he concludes that minorities of elites should be protected from the majority of ordinary people.

He also believes in equality, but he himself violates his principle of equality by providing plural votes to educated. He also restricted right to

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franchise to uneducated and untax payers. Though he made it clear that he does not want initially to exclude any section of society from franchise. Yet it is clear from his point of view that he was afraid from the strength of ordinary man and tried to put a limit on his strength.

He was a liberal thinker and instead of changing liberalism in democratic manner, he changed democracy in liberalism. Democracy is desired by him not because it ensures people's interest but it compels rulers to take account of the interest of their subject and to ensure that rulers will care for the interest of people, he advocated the universal suffrage and annual parliament, but he does not give any answer what the guarantee for this annual parliament and suffrage is.

His principle of democracy gives only empty liberty because he gives liberty to do anything only on that point, which does not concem to others but man lives in society and so what significantly he does for himself affects others also.

In the conclusion it is clear that though Mill believes in democracy and democratic ideals yet he was not bold enough to accept all the consequences of the democracy. He starts his notion of democracy by saying that governed should be protected from the tyranny of governor but he ends with the view that minority of elite should be protected from the tyranny of majority.

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KIERKEGAARD'S ONTOLOGY OF FAITH

S. A. SHAIDA

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In Kierkegaard's thoughts faith indeed is one of the most significant and crucial themes. It is on faith that the entire edifice of his religious thought is founded. Hence, with its tenability or untenability the most attractive and interesting aspect of his philosophy is at stake. His own rhetorical and ironical style of expressing his ideas often leads to misunderstanding of his thought and misconstruing of his intention. He has freely used words like 'madness', 'paradox' or 'passion' to characterise faith which may lead not so sympathetic readers to conclude that faith is not only unintelligible or meaningless but sheer absurdity - in ordinary meaning of the term and not in the respectable existentialist sense.

In order to properly understand the concept of faith and its place in Kierkegaard's dialectics of religious experience or his dialectical theology we need to probe into his overall understanding of the nature of philosophical reflection. His conception of philosophy in general and religiosity in particular must be comprehended through proper interpretive understanding of religion, faith and other related issuse.

I propose to limit my discussion of Kierkegaard's concept of faith mainly in the light of his views elucidated in Fear and Trembling (Fear and Trembling, The sickness unto Death, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954, hereafter FT), which has been genearally accepted as his best work on religion and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (tr. Swenson and Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1968, hereafter CUP). The former is aphenomenological account of religious experience, woven around his concept of faith which, according to the translator, involves 'the particularity of its relationship to God... the infinite resignation with respect to finite

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002 goods... the teleological suspension of the ethical as exemplified in Abraham (FT, p. 15). The latter's canvas which was intended to be a sequel to the Fragments is wide enough to include his version-of Hegel's philosophy and his critique, his concept of truth and subjectivity, the truth of Christianity, the conflict between faith and reason and the problem of becoming a Christian.

I

In an attempt to thematize the concept and our understanding of faith, it may be necessary to introduce his distinction between the objective and the subjective ways of thinking as well as the polarity of the universal and the individual which is manifest in his conceptions of the ethical and the religions. His best known identification of truth with subjectivity has not been discussed separately as it is the undercurrent in his entire gamut of philosophical reflection.

Kierkegaard formulates his understanding of philosophical thinking by categorising it as subjective and objective. The intellectual background against which his fundamental polemics concerning the nature of subjective and objective reflection are situated is Hegelian philosophy. In the latter objectivity and universality are the most important or rather, overarching theoretical constructs. It is interesting to note that almost in his entire bulk of writings he hardly speaks of 'reason', 'rational' or 'rationality' but of 'reflection', 'absolute thought' or 'pure thought'. His basic categories or frames of reference are those of objectivity and subjectivity and the universal and the individual (particular).

Kierkegaard's preoccupation with the subjective and the individual is rooted in his elucidation of the Being of the individual existence which is shares with other existentialist thinkers, Sartre's emphasis on subjectivity and Heidegger's on *Dasein* are clearly anticipated by Kierkegaard though the former two have undertaken these formulations in wider conceptual spaces. Before clarifying what is subject or subjectivity as against what is object or objectivity, it may be stated that for Kierkegaard the role of objective thought in logic (Non-Hegelian), mathematics or science is unquestionable but inconsequential for one whose main concern is our understant man's existence. What is important is his religiosity (for

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objec oppos Kierkegaard, Christianity) and truth as it relates to the concrete individual in his existence which is inalienable from his subjectivity. Therefore, we scarcely find any discussion of formal a priori disciplines or of natural sciences which concerns merely material or physical phenomena. Of course, if we understand 'logic' in Hegelian sense (which is based on the metaphysical view of identity of thought and being), Kierkegaard displays profound interest in it. As a matter of fact, Kierkegaard had first entitled his CUP as 'Logical Problems' ('logical' in the sense of conceptual or metaphysical, one is reminded here of the well known description of Hegel's logic as his metaphysics). But, lest anyone may feel tempted to think that Kierkegaard's CUP was anti-science, it may also be pointed out that the word 'unscientific' in the title of CUP was later mentioned replacing the word 'simple' which Kierkegaard himself had proposed as the correct (or nearest) translation of the original Danish word, Perhaps, he was thinking of it as non-scientific or non-technical since in this book his aim essentially was to problematize 'what it is to be a Christian?' In the light of the above. it should be clear as to what meaning or interpretation of truth he seeks to identify with subjectivity.

One may approach 'the heart of the matter' in Kierkegaardian discourse, which moves around a cluster of concepts, by starting with anyone of them since they all are interpenetrated and each one of them! draws its significance and meaningfulness from the other. We, however, intend to explain and interpret his notion of 'subjective' or 'subjectivity' as our starting point. To this end, we may state what it is not and how it is contradistinguished from its opposite, i.e., 'objective' or 'objectivity'.

It may be instructive to see how Kierkegaard seeks to explain what objective reflection (i.e. Hegel's pure thought or Kant's pure reason) is in opposition to subjective reflection. In his own words,

For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity (CUP, p. 171).

For Kierkegaard, inwardness of the existing individual is subjectivity

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and therefore the existing individual is the subject which objective reflection and therefore the existing married and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something turns into something merely 'accidental and thereby transforms existence turns into something turns into something merely 'accidental and the source turns into something turns into somethi into something indifferent, and this indefference is precisely its objective validity'. In other words, for Kierkegaard objective reflection which is adequate for formal logic, mathematics and historical knowledge, makes the existence or non-existence of the subject completly irrelevant Kierkegaard takes a lot of care to differentiate his idea of existence and subjectivity from Hegel's Concept of man which Kierkegaard considers to be a mere possibility of actual existence. Whenever a universal concept is applied to existing things it can not go beyond possibilities or operational functional rules of meaning. In his own conceptual scheme, The living concrete individual or the living subject is rooted in his inwardness or subjectivity whose sine qua non is the necessity of commitment to particular mode of being. The human being exists as a 'passionate' individual-master of his own life and having the creativity of making his own values. His personal freedom with its consequent commitment and responsibility enables him to transcend his mere existence within his own subjectivity. This realization he always calls 'passionate' as it is the mode of Being within which he moves and breathes with the sincerity and authenticity of a 'lover'. It is this sort of inwardness with which he exists. Hence, as he says in CUP. 'It is impossible to exist without passion'. In this mode of existence the search and demand for objective validity or justification of our ultimate choices are as uncalled for as the demand of proof for Moore's intrinsic value (in Principia Ethica) or for Mill's questions of ultimate ends (1) Utilitarianism). For Kierkegaard, absolute choices, specially in the sphere of morality and religion are paradoxical. They lack objective proof of justification because the categorical Either/or is decided by a choice about a future-oriented project or action which is as uncertain as furture itself. Despite the lack of objective certainty, there is subjective certainty based on the inwardness which alone can give rise to the only sort of justification which one can offer to oneself born out of self-understanding. Hence, 'inwardness' or 'subjectivity' in Kierkegaard's thought is the total mental framework or 's framework or 'horizon' (in Gadamar's sense) which essentially is the manifestation of the control of the contro manifestation of the 'form of life' one has adopted out of his free choice irrespective of the fact whether the choice is for the ethical or the religious

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In Fear and Trembling while discussing the possibility of a 'teleological suspension of the ethical' he observes:

The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone... conceived immediately as *physical* and *psychical*, the particular individual is the individual who has his *telos* in the universal, and his ethical task is to express himself constantly in it, to abolish his particularity in order to become the universal (*FT*, pp. 64-5, Italics mine).

Here Kierkegaard introduces a conception of the individual which may appear to go against what has been said above about the notion of the individual in his mode of subjective existence. But this apparent inconsistency can be explained in the light of what he has said in the passage just quoted. Here he speaks of the particular 'conceived as physical and psychical'. This is not his concept of the 'true' or whole individual. In Sickness unto Death he talks of man as a totality of body, mind and spirit which is the subject or individual in the religious state. Thus, man within the religious sphere transcends all the limitations and boundaries which operate at the aesthetic and ethical levels of existence. At the aesthetic stage it is the body which is predominantly the locus of his experiences. At the ethical stage his body and mind both are engaed in performance of duties prescribed by the ethical ideal he has chosen for himself. At this state he can transcend his self-love or his narrow conceptions of expediency but has to remain within some general and universal principles necessary for the ethical telos. It is not therefore surprising that in Guilty/Not Guilty or in Stages on Life's Way he almost concedes the objectively necessary duties or moral laws which by definition are universal. He seeks to combine the Socratic dictum 'know thyself' with Kantian prescription to do one's duty for the sake of duty. Once one has chosen the ethical and as long as One decides to remain within it, one cannot but continue to subscribe to its

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rules. To violate this requirement would be self-betrayal. But he can nevertheless transcend the ethical if at all it is needed from a higher, i.e. religious, point of view. It is here that the dynamics of faith comes into full play and gains the prominence it deserves in Kierkegaardian conception of religiosity and spirituality. We will return to this point later. Within the ethical the particular is subservient to the universal (laws/principles) and the individual, as far as she finds her telos in it, would not give in to the templation of violating it. In this respect, Kierkegaard's conception of the ethical as discussed in the second part of Either/Or comes closer to the Hegelian notion of the relation between the universal and the particular despite the persistent polemic that for Hegel the ethical marks the objective necessity in the dialectical movement of history. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand it comes about as an act of the individual's free decision, guided by subjective choice, - in the language of Kant- an act of autonomous will. Hegel. Kierkegaard would say, in fact does not properly understand the nature of the ethical by denying the individual the inwardness of her choice as a concrete individual - living on her own terms. Kierkegaard indirectly admits the relatively narrower or wider realms of the ethical universals and there is always a possibility of movement from one to the other though the desirable movement is from the narrower to the higher. The ethical individual can thus accept a choice of the higher domain of 'ethicality' by transcending the narrower domain, but all the time remaining within the ethical mode of existence without ever marginalising her individuality. This happens in cases of conflicts between what Ross calls the prima facie duties. His own allusion to the decision of Brutus to kill Ceaser is a case in point. It was chosen by Brutus in order to save his country though Ceaser was his mentor and a friend. This too may be understood in the context of the subjectivity and inwardness involved in such a choice. At the ethical stage the individual and the universal both are real in a certain relation of the self to itself. But even here Kierkegaard would not admit the possibility of mediation between the two as all choices for him are in the mode of either or-whether it concerns choices within the telos of the ethical or it is a choice between the ethical and the religious.

There is an interesting dimension of the problematic of relation between the subjective and the objective or between the individual and the

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universal. This comes out in 1.s understanding of the nature of communication which is scattere, in a few pages of CUP. In sec. 1 of Chapter II, he says:

While objective thought is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker is as an existing individual essentially interested in his own thinking, existing as he does in his thought. His thinking has therefore a different type of reflection, namely the reflection of inwardness, of possession, by virtue of which it belongs to the thinking subject and to no one else. While objective thought translates everything into results... subjective thought puts everything in process and emits the result... as an existing individual he is constantly in the precess of coming to be, which holds true of every human being who has not permitted himself to be deceived into becoming objective ... (CUP, pp.67-8).

The significant point here is concerning the reflection of inwardness in subjective thought. He further observes:

The reflection of inwardness gives to the subjective thinker a double reflection. In thinking, he thinks the universal; but as existing in this thought and as assimilating in his inwardness, he becomes more and more subjectively isolated... The difference between subjective and objective must express itself also in the form of communication suitable to each (*CUP*, p. 68).

In a footnote to the last lines of the preceding passage Kierkegaard seeks to clarify his notion of communication with the help of what he means by double reflection. For Kierkegaard, it is 'implicit in the very idea of communication' in which the existing subject is in isolation of his inwardness, expressing the life of eternity sans sociality and thus making communication unthinkable. But the subject may still seek to communicate with others. He further explains it:

Ordinary communication between man and man is wholly immediate, because men in general exist immediately. When one man sets forth something and another acknowledges the same, word for word, it is taken for granted that they are in agreement and that they have understood one another. Precisely because the speaker has not

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noticed the reduplication requisite to a thinking mode of existence, he also remains unaware of the double reflection involved in the process of communication. Hence he does not suspect that an agreement of this nature may be the grossest kind of misunderstanding (CUP, p. 69).

Thus for Kierkegaard understanding which is assumed in any proper act of communication can be arrived at only when the elements embedded therein are gone into over again in order to arrive at proper meaning and significance of what is communicated. It implies that the subjective initially is posited against the objective and the subjective is first expressed through objective meanings but after understanding it objectively one has to refer back to the subjective meaning which is couched in objectively meaningful words or expressions. Even the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' are so correlated that both have to be understood in relation to each other. The dominant tenor of Kierkegaard's espousal of the subjectivity rests on arguing how objectivity distorts the subject and his subjectivity. It is only after one understands the objective approach that the real significance and meaning of subjectivity comes to the fore. Hence, a circularity, which appears nonvicious, is involved in the understanding of subjectivity. This movement of reflection comes close to the view of understanding developed by Heidegger and Gadamar in and through their emphasis on the 'hermeneutic circle'. In one of its formulations it involves a method of interpretation which considers a whole in relation to its parts and parts in relation to a whole. We will adopt this minimal and simple version of 'hermeneutic circle' while interpreting the significance of faith in Kierkegaard.

II

Having said something about 'subject', 'subjectivity' and 'individual', it may be appropriate to locate 'faith' in Kierkegaard conceptual space.

A propos what we have said earlier about the particular and the universal and in the idiom of what has been called hermeneutic circle, Kierkegaard thus tries to formulate his view of faith:

Faith is thus paradox, that the particular is higher than the universal - yer in such a way... that the movement repeats itself, and that consequently the individual, after having been in the universal,

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now as the per cicular isolates himself as higher than the universal (FT, p. 65).

What Kie kegaard wants to assert is that first the individual is subsumed under the universal but when she recognises the consequence of this subsumption, e.g. the loss of her individuality and subjectivity she reverts to the reaffirmation of subjectivity with the authentic understanding of her spirituality and accepting her relation to God which is anchored on faith. The return of understanding to the subjective as a result of second reflection can be said to be the self-understanding of understanding itself. In Being and Time (Oxford, 1962, hereafter BT) Heidegger talks of understanding as a mode of Being of Dasein itself and interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding (BT, p. 188). We will soon have occasion to see how faith for Kierkegaard is a mode of Being like Heidegger's understanding which attains the reflexivity of self-understanding within 'hermeneutic circle'. Faith is something surrounded by objective uncertainty, unprovability, highest subjectivity, inwardness or individuality which Kierkegaard calls it paradoxicality:

...faith is normally expressed in him whose life is not merely the most paradoxical that can be thought but so paradoxical that it cannot be thought at all. He acts by the virtue of the absurd, for it is precisely absurd that he as the particular is higher than the universal (*FT*, p.67).

Illustrating his understanding of faith which prompted Abraham's will to sacrifice Isaac by teleologically suspending the ethical, he holds that Abraham's action is purely private and individual where objective proof or reason pales into absolute insignificance as it is irrelevant. However, Kierkegaard talks of suspending the *telos* of the ethical, not of its rejection. Nevertheless, the higher *telos* relegates the lower to a position of relative insignificance which is true of Kierkegaard's all the three stages on life's way the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. Each has its own *telos* and based on it we can talk of various frameworks or forms of life or, to use Kuhn's term, paraidgms. It may be more instructive to use Kuhn's terminology (in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Chicago 1962, second ed. 1970) and suggest that for Kierkegaard the movement from

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one sphere to another is like 'paradigm shift' with the added qualification that there is incommensurability among them. Similarly the paradigms of the subjective and the objective, the individual and the universal, the instrumental rationality and 'heart's reasons' (Balzac) represent different and incompatible universes of discourse with their own 'logics'. In Abraham's case, he accepts his relation to God as absolute, irrevocable and final. God asks for the proof of his faith and Abraham immediately accepts to give it without any mediation of the ethical which for him is important but not as important as to overcome his religiosity whose only ground is faith. As Kierkegaard holds, the ethical becomes the temptation and his supreme duty is to abide by the expression of God's will. At the same time it may be noted that at the level of inwardness, subjectivity and faith the intersubjective awareness of the dynamics of faith can be effected only in the light of one's decisions, choices and actions which are located within the bounds of one's subjectivity though in faith ultimately he stands in complete isolation. Kierkegaard feels that it is extremely difficult though not impossible to have some sort of communication with others. As he says:

The knight of faith is obliged to rely upon himself alone, he feels the pain of not being able to make himself intelligible to others... The pain is his assurance that he is in the right way (FT, p. 90).

Abraham's faith and his acceptance of the supremacy of his commitment and relation to God brings about a tensionfree unity of God's will and his own. Here again emerges the paradox that an individual puts himself in an absolute relation to the absolute despite being finite. As opposed to any objective justification, he has only a justification as a particular individual. This is indeed absurd but, as Kierkegaard says, 'by virtue of the absurd faith enters upon the scene' (*FT.* p. 79), or 'the absurd is the object of faith, and the only object that can be believed' (*CUP*, p. 189).

In order to understand the true nature and place of faith in Kierkegaard's philosophy we should also note that faith is not an attribute or a mere disposition or an attitude of the individual. The man in his religiosity is an individual whose primordial mode of Being is faith. In scholastic (or

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even Kantian) terminology faith is both the ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi of man's engagement with God. Faith, primarily, is not the regulative but the constitutive principle of man as Dasein-Being-in- theworld (-of-religiosity). Kierkegaard once said that we may begin possessing faith but we end up being possessed by faith. It appears that Kierkegaard ontologises faith as a religious man's mode of Being. For Kierkegaard the individual man's essence lies in his inwardness or subjectivity which is identical with his ontic reality. It thus has the ontological dimension. Since faith is identified with passion and inwardness, it also becomes a mode of Being of the spiritual subjective man. For him 'faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity (CUP, p. 118). One should not call such a being a man of faith. Rather, he is a man in faith (i.e., faith-ful). Faith is essentially ontical (not mere ontological) as the essential dimension of an individual's existence at the religious stage. Inwardness, subjectivity, despair, dread, passion, individuality, commitment to God, surrender or resignation are all collateral characteristics of faith. Kierkegaard points out that faith is to be seen as a paradox, not a temptation which detracts a man in faith from his ethical duty. The characteristics I have just referred to can be called criteria (of application) not the meaning of faith. This view possibly can be seen in what Kierkegaard intends to say in the following:

...those who posess faith should take care to set up certain criteria so that one might distinguish the paradox from a temptation (FT, p.67).

To conclude, our attempted interpretation of Kierkegaard's faith bends towards the ontological hermeneutic but it may also be admitted that within traditional hermeneutics Kierkegaard's position is on the side of the subjective which has been fiercely criticised by social philosophers like Betti or Dilthey. Nevertheless, if Heidegger's (and even Gadamar's) concept of understanding, as admitted by Gadamar in *Truth and Method*, 'carries an *ontological* weight', faith has possibly stronger shoulders to carry it on.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY

JAGAT PAL

While discussing the concept of rationaliry, in tribal thought or any other thought for that matter, a distinction should be made between what a man is and what he does. When we judge a man from the point view of what he is, we say that he is essentially a rational being. And when we say that he is essentially a rational being, we use the concept of rationality in the sense of 'capacity' to think rationally. And to think rationally means to have capacity to distinguish between what is reasonable and what is not reasonable concerning the matter of certain kinds of things. The rational thinking capacity is considered to be the distinguishing mark of human beings in virtue of which they are said to have language, philosophy, science. technology, music, art, value and culture, etc. But to say that human beings do have capacity to think rationally is not to say that whenever they think, they always think reasonably. It only means that they do have natural potential power to behave in rational way which other beings essentially lack. And the natural potential power to behave in rational way does differ in degree from individual to individual. The power of rational thinking no doubt is a natural quality of all human beings. But in spite of this its development always requires a conscious effort and proper training. The individual's educational, social, economic and cultural backgrounds do play a great role in its development. Not only this, to have a natural potential capacity to think rationally is one thing and to exercise that capacity is another thing. If a person does not exercise his or her natural rational thinking capacity when there is a need to exercise it, we do not generally characterize him or her as a rational being even if he or she is assumed to

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002 266 JAGAT PAL

have a natural potential capacity to think rationally. We characterize him or her as a non-intelligent person. In fact, whenever we judge any person as to whether he or she does have any capacity to do certain things rationally or not, we always do it on the ground of his or her mental and physical activities. Nevertheless, whatever the case there might be, the fact still remains that no human being, we believe, lacks the natural potential capacity to think rationally. And to say this is not tantamount to saying that whenever any human being thinks, he or she always thinks rationally because what he or she thinks may or may not be rational at all. This is perfectly quite possible not only logically but also factually. And when we say it, we do not definitely use the concept of rationality in the sense of natural 'capacity' to think rationally. We use the concept of rationality in the sense of 'reasonability' and the question of reasonability does primarily arise only in the context of what human beings think, believe and do in their life and not in the context of what they are essentially assumed to be in themselves.

When we judge human thoughts, beliefs and actions of certain kinds either as rational or as irrational, we always do it in the sense of reasonability and not in the sense of his or her natural capacity to think rationally. From this point of view, we can say very well that to be rational is to be reasonable and to be reasonable is to be logical and to be logical is to conform to the canons of logic because the canons of logic are the canons of rationality. There is no doubt about it that one may have difference of opinion as regard to what really constitutes the canons of logic and rationality. But even then the fact remains that whenever anyone judges certain kinds of things either as rational or as irrational, he or she always judges it by using certain canon of logic which he or she assumes as a canon of rationality. Thoughts, beliefs and actions to which the canons of logic cannot be applied are said to be beyond the scope of rationality. They are best described as non-rational. Thoughts, beliefs and actions to which the canons of logic can be applied are said fall within the scope of rationality. Since such thoughts, beliefs and actions fall within the scope of rationality, we can legitimately characterize them either as rational or as irrational. Those thoughts, beliefs and actions which conform to the canons of logic we call them as rational. But those thoughts, beliefs and actions which do not conform to the canons of logic we do not call them as rational. We Some

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characterize them as irrational. It is from this point of view that logical positivists claimed that metaphysical, religious and ethical systems of thought, belief and action are beyond the scope of rationality. Since they are considered to be beyond the scope of rationality, they can neither be characterized as rational nor as irrational according to their view. They can best be characterized as non-rational.

Deviation from rationality is irrational which can occur in different ways. For example, if we fail to recognize an inconsistency existing in our systems of thought, belief and action, no matter what they are, we cannot he said to be rational at all. We can be characterized as irrational. Not only this, even if we accept for the sake of argument that there exists an inconsistency in our systems of thought, belief and action but do not reject or exclude it from them, still we cannot be said to be rational at all. We can he characterized only as irrational. The reason is that because the concept of rationality does not admit in it the presence of inconsistency and contradiction. So the ideal man of rationality could be said is one who not only knows the distinction between what is reasonable and what is not reasonable concerning the matter of certain kinds of things but also believes and acts consistently without any deviation from rationality throughout in one's case as well as in other's cases. He exhibits his rationality through his coherent thinking and action. Such type of man we call as a man of rational character. In fact, whenever we judge any person either as rational or as irrational, we always do it on the basis of what he or she thinks, believes and does, and not on the basis of what he or she is assumed to be essentially is.

There is no one common canon of rationality by which we can legitimately assess all kinds of human thinking, formal and informal, concerning the matter of certain things. The reason is that the canons of logic differ from context to context and the canons of logic are the canons of rationality. For example, the canons of rationality which we use in the context of formal modes of reasoning we do not use them in the context of informal modes of reasoning. Since the canons of rationality of the formal modes of reasoning are conceptually different from the canons of rationality of the informal modes of reasoning, that is why we cannot say that the concept of rationality preserves the same criteriological meaning in both

the contexts of its applications. Not only in the context of formal logic but also in the context of informal logic the concept of rationality does not preserve the same criteriological meaning because the sense in which we use the concept of rationality in the context of natural sciences, we do not use it in the same sense in the context of social sciences like history, sociloly and political sciences etc. Take, for example, the formal canon of consistency, The formal canon of consistency no doubt is considered as one of the canons of rationality. But the sense in which we use it in the context of formal sciences like mathematics and logic, we do not use it in the same sense in the context of natural and social sciences. In the context of formal sciences when we use it, we use it in a rigorous sense, But in the context of informal sciences when we use it, we do not use it in the same degree of rigorousness. We use it relatively in loose sense. Those thinkers who have tried to use the axiomatic deductive model of rationality, which is considered to be the paradigm of rationality, to evaluate human thoughts and beliefs of the empirical sciences, to my mind, have gone wrong because empirical phenomena which these sciences study are of such kind that they cannot be presented rigorously in terms of axiomatic deductive model of rationality on par with formal sciences. They can best be presented in the inductive model of rationality. The reason for it is that human thinking concerning the matter of empirical reality is of such kind that it is always open to susceptibility and revision. We cannot clain that we have arrived a the final truth concerning the matter of empirical realities by assuming certain finite number of axioms or postulates as we do claim in the case of formal sciences. If we apply the axiomatic deductive model of rationality in the field of empirical sciences, we will have to first assume that the truth of explanatory premises, that is, laws and theories are the truths which we cannot assume. Karl Popper' was right when he said that the system of scientific knowledge concerning the matter of reality is always open ended. It is not a closed system.

Even within the contexts of formal and informal sciences, we find that the concept or rationality does not preserve the same meaning in criteriological sense of the term. Its meaning changes from one context of another. For every the context of the term of the context of the c another. For example, the sense in which we use the concept of rationally in the context of note. in the context of natural sciences like physics and chemistry, we do not use

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cases deffe it in the same sense in the context of social sciences. In the context of natural sciences we connect our conception of rationality with the notions of objectivity, universality, uniformity, relevance, observational and experimental testability, evidences, truth, laws and theories. While in the case of social sciences we do not necessarily connect our conception of rationality with all these notions. Take, for example, the method of experimental testability. The method of experimental testability no doubt is considered as a rational method in physical sciences. But this is not considered as a rational method in the context of social sciences. In the context of social sciences we do not link our conception of rationality with the method of experimental testability. The reason for it is that human actphenomena, we believe, are of such kind that they are beyond the scope of experimental testability. Take, for example, the discipline of history. To study human history of the past, we cannot re-enact past events in our 'historical laboratories' even if we wish as we do in the case of natural events. We cannot make the same kind of direct observation that the scientists make. Because of this reason many people have doubted whether we can really know anything definite about the past. Not only this, we cannot understand human historical events of the past in terms of the eventcause model alone the way we understand natural events because human events are of such kind that they always involve in them the role of a conscious agency, that is, human will and human will is not governed by any laws of causality. It is because of this reason in evaluating of human act-phenomena either as rational or as irrational we will have to use the agent-cause model of rationality which is conceptually different from that of the event-cause model of rationality. Likewise, in the context of formal sciences too the concept of rationality does not preserve the same chiteriological meaning. Its meaning changes from system to system. What we consider as rational in one formal system of thought, we do not consider the same thing rational in another formal system of thought. Take, for example, the context of formal logic. There are different systems of formal logic. What we consider to be rational in two valued logic, we do not consider same thing to be rational in three valued logic because in both cases the assumptions from which we derive our conception of rationality deffer. In the context of two valued logic the concept of rationality logically

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rests on this assumption that a proposition has two and only two truth values, that is, it is either true or false but not both While in the context of three valued logic this assumption is discarded. We rather assume that a proposition has three values. It is either true or false or possible. And this distinction is very important to assess the relative rationality and irrationality of both the systems. We cannot judge them by using a common canon of logic because they are on different grounds of rationality. If we do it, we are bound to deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational.

So when I say it that the concept of rationality dieffers from context to context, I say it in criteriological sense of the term. I do not say it in its generic sense of the term. In generic sense the concept of rationality no doubt does preserve a constant meaning throughout of all its applications. Because there are certain generic characteristics which are found invariably associated with all its uses. Take, for example, the characteristics of universality and consistency. The characteristics of universality and consistency are considered to be essential characteristics of rationality. This fact is quite evident from the very use of the concept of reason itself with which the concept of rationality is conceptually connected. Because what constitutes as a reason in one case, also at the same time constitutes a reason in other cases which are exactly alike in the relevant respects no matter whether these cases are the cases of facts or beliefs or actions. We cannot say in the same breath that something constitutes as reason in one case but not in other cases when the cases are exactly alike in the relevant respect without viloating the canon of consistency and the canon of consistency is a canon of rationality. What is true of the concept of consistency is also true of the concept of universality in this regard. Because the concept of reason is of such kind that the notion of universality is logically built into it. Since the notion of universality is logically built into the concept of reason and the concept of rationality is conceptually connected with the concept of reason, therefore the notion of universality is also logically built into the concept of rationality. That is why I say that rationality of the concept of of the concept of reason consists in its universal consistent applications. But to say this, however, does not tantamount to saying that the domain of the applicability of the the applicability of the concept of reason cannot differ. It does differ Some

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from diffe kinds when depending upon the nature of its context of application. For example, the domain of applicability of the concept of reason has a wider universality in the context of formal and natural sciences than that of the context of human act-phenomena. The reason is that in the domain of human actphenomena the applicability of the concept of reason is arrested by the conditions of human abilities and circumstances, etc. which is not true in the case of formal and natural sciences Because in the case of formal and natural sciences we do not consider these conditions as rationally relevant conditions when we talk about the relative rationality and irrationality of their systems. In the context of formal and natural sciences when we universalize reason, we universalize it by ignoring these irrelevant conditions which we do not do in the case of an act-reason when we universalize it. In other words, we do not universalize act-reasons the way we universalize mathematical reasons by ignoring human abilities and their circumstances. When we do it, we deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational.

Not only this, we also deviate from rationality when we assess different systems of thought, belief and action which do not belong to the same logical type either as rational or as irrational by using the canon of rationality of the one system against another. But when I say it, I do not mean to say that the concept of rationality is bereft of universality. It only means that the validity of universality of the concept of rationality is logically restricted to the domain of those things which belong to the same logical type. When we violate this restriction by universalizing our concept of reason beyond its legitimate scope of applications, it becomes irrational because we deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational. There is no doubt about it that the applicability of the concept of rationality always presupposes the acceptance of certain common conceptual framework of thinking regardless of its specific application. But to say this is not tantamount to saying that a common conceptual framework of thinking cannot vary from context to context. It can vary from contest to context and it does vary as a matter of fact. We do use different conceptual frameworks of thinking not only to study the different kinds of phenomena but also the same kind of phenomena of reality. And when we do it, we do not deviate any way from rationality. Because we

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can very well use the different conceptual frameworks of thinking to assess the merits and demerits of the same kind of phenomena of reality without violating any canon of rationality. The reason is that there is nothing in the concept of rationality as such which logically rules out this possibility. fact there can be nothing more rational than the method of critical analysis and assessment. And a critical analysis and assessment of the same phenomena can be made from different angles by using the different conceptual frameworks of thinking. And when we do it, we do not deviale any way from rationality. We deviate from rationality only when we do not apply our assumed canon of rationality consistently and universally to all cases of those things which belong to the same logical type. The reason is that because the canon of rationality involves in its meaning the notion of universal applicability throughout within its own domain of applications Take, for example, the case of value judgments. If we logically assume in our conceptual framework of thinking that value judgments fall outside the domain of scientific inquiries, we cannot surely use the value criteria of rationality to assess the relative merits and demerits of the different scientific methods, laws and theories which we use in the pursuit of our scientific inquiries. The reason is simple because value judgments fall outside the domain of the assumption of our scientific inquiries. Since value judgments fall outside the domain of the assumption of our scientific inquiries, we cannot go against it what we already assume as the basis of our rationality. If we do it, we are bound to deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational. So unless we reject our assumption of rationality which we assume, we cannot deviate from it. And when we do it rationally we always do it by assuming some other assumption or assumptions. So to accept or reject any system of thought, belief and action of any kind means to have certain other conceptual framework of thinking.

If there is any grain of truth in what I have just said, then from this it is quite clear that to assess the merit and demerit of the different scientific methods, laws and theories, we will have to use some canons of rationality other than the canons of value judgments such as the canons of empirical testability, truth, certainty, objectivity and explanatory and predicting power, etc. The whole issue of rationality, therefore, logically depends upon that what we logically assume as the ground of our rationality. And to say this,

howerver, does not mean that rationality is purely subjective and anything can be assumed as the ground of rationality. Take, for example, the case of the principle of our moral action. We cannot assume any impossible proposition as a rational principle of our moral action. The reason is simple because we cannot act on an impossible propsoition and what cannot be acted upon cannot be assumed as a rational principle of moral action. Only a set of consistent and coherent propositions can be assumed as the ground of rationality and none else. So if what we assume does not satisfy the logical requirements of rationality which it demands, we cannot derive any rationality from it. If we do it, we are bound to deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational. No discussion in fact is rationally possible unless we assume certain coherent and consistent common standard of rationality. To say this is not to say that we cannot judge rationally the same thing from different angles. To my mind, it is perfectly possible without deviating from rationality because there is nothing in the concept of rationality as such which logically rules out this possibility. Since the notion of universality is conceptually in built in our conception of rationality, the concept of rationality presumes that the presence or the absence of certain subjective elements makes no difference to the mode of the universality of rationality. From this point of view, we can say that the notion of universality preserves the objectivity of rationality in the sense of personal neutrality and impartiality.

It becomes impossible only when we logically assume that the rational subject cannot trasncend his or her conceptual framework of thinking which we cannot rationally assume. Because the rational subject does have the natural potential capacity to assess critically not only the relative merits and demerits of his or her own conceptual framework of thinking but also of the others. History is full of such instances. We also call us as rational beings because of this capacity. So in order to maintain meaningfulness of the use of the concept of rationality we will have to assume that the rational subject does have reflective capacity to critically view himself and his activities of thinking, believing and doing from the point view of others. And to assume this is not to assume something which is logically impossible. If we do not assume that the rational subject does have reflective capacity to examine different conceptual frameworks of thinking of different people including his or her own, he or she cannot be said to be a rational being at

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all which we say because the latter logically assumes thr former. If whatever I have said is true, then from this it is quite clear that the concept of rationality is conceptually linked with the concept of human free thinking. In other words, the rational thinking capacity of a person is not governed by any laws of causality. It is governed by the rational subject itself.

Furthermore, the concept of rationality is not a rigid concept. It is a dynamic concept because the paradigm of rationality shifts from time to time according to growth of our understanding and knowledge. This is quite evident from the facts of the history of knowledge itsefl. Many things which we did accept as rational beliefs in the past we now no longer accept them as rational beliefs. We have discarded them because of the growth in our knowledge. Take, for example, the belief of the sun's going round the Earth. This belief was considered as rational belief during the time of Galilee. But after the discovery of Copernicus we now no longer consider it a rational belief. We have discarded it. We now believe that it is the Earth which goes round the Sun. What is true of the belief of the Sun's going round the Earth is also true of many other beliefs which we have discarded from our stock of knowledge. If this be so, then the concept of rationality cannot be said to be a static concept because it does admit change or modification. In fact there is also no contradiction in accepting something to be rational and subsequently raising doubt about it. And once we raise a doubt about it, we withdraw its rationality claim. And when we withdraw its rationality claim, we always do it by invoking some other paradigm of rationality and this process never comes to ends. We cannot rationally calim that we have arrived at final truth where we can stop and say that no further shifting of the paradigm of rationality is logically possible. By the 'paradigm' of rationality here I mean what the members of a rational community share and practice. The paradigm of rationality is a mental construction of the rational human mind but it is not arbitrary. In this sense the concept of rationality is conventional because it is determined by the conscious will of the rational subjects. Since it is determined by the conscious will of the rational subjects, it also opens to further modification and changability depending upon the growth in our understanding and knowledge.

It is perfectly quite possible that a rational subject may think that

what he or she knows, believes ar I does is rational, and yet it may not be rational at all in 'reasonable' se se of the term. Because the concept of rationality in the sense of reasonability is not logically grounded in the mere act of human thinking, believing and doing. It is rather logically grounded in the rational act of thinking, believing and doing and the concept of rational thinking, believing and doing is quite different from that of the mere thinking, believing and doing. If it were not the case, there would be no possibility of making the distinction between rational and irrational which we make in our life, everything would have been rational by virtue of the mere definition of rationality itself in 'capacity' sense of the term. But this is not so. Because the capacity of rational thinking is the characteristic feature of the rational subject, that s, human being while reasonability is the characteristic feature of human thought, belief and action and not the characteristic feature of the rational subject even if there is a conceptual connection between the two.

Moreover talking about rationality within a particular system of thought is one thing and talking about rationality of the system itself is another thing and both the things should not be muddled because there is a conceptual distinction between the two. If we do it, we are bound to deviate from rationality and to deviate from rationality is irrational. Why I say we deviate from rationality when we muddle them is that because in both the cases we do not use the concept of rationality in the same sense of the term. We apply different criteria of rationality. When we talk about rationality within a particular system of thought, we do it by assuming the rationality of the fundamental postulates of that system which we do not do when we talk about that system itself. In the latter case when we talk about rationality, we do not talk by assuming the rationality of the fundamental postulates of that system. We rather examine them by assuming some other fundamental postulates of rationality and to do so is not irrational because we do not deviate any way from rationality. This is analytically true in the light of the very use of teh concept of rationality itself. Therefore when we talk about rationality in a particular tribal thought, regardless of what it is, we will have to keep this distinction in our mind to avoid deviation from rationality.

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THE REAL AND THE CONSTRUCTED: SANKARA AND HUSSERL

RAMAKANT SINARI

It is after Kant that we learnt to take seriously the proposition that our consciousness of the world is shaped by the structure of our consciousness itself. Kant's attempt was to show that the world we cognize as real conforms to the stuff our consciousness is ontologically made of, i.e., to the constitutive principles of our very faculty of knowing.

When, for the first time in the history of epistemology, Kant used Copernicus' norm to explain how our knowledge of the world is determined by our reason and by the categories a *priori* in our rational subjectivity he left for subsequent philosophers the task of defining the boundaries of man's existence vis-à-vis the world. Kant tried to prove that the organizing norms of our reason condition the way we know whatever we know, that the phenomenal or real world we experience is tied to the scheme inherent in our subjective, synthesizing consciousness. The problem (which in fact arose with Plato's theory of knowledge) regarding the connection between the "Form" or "Idea" and the object, the conceptual and the perceptual, the thing *known* and the thing "out there," was given by Kant a new status by placing the subjectivity of the knower at the centre of the process of knowing.

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The naive approach of the empiricists to the question of knowledge was evident, for Kant, from the fact that they look upon the world (the real, spatio-temporally existent world, i.e., the world of natural sciences) as the unquestionable referend of all true propositions. The empiricists, the commonsense realists, materialists and phenomenalists equate the world to the "sensed," the "perceived," the source of the sense-data or the sense-

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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contents, the objectively and independently given. The general position of these thinkers, since the days of G. E. Moore and Russell, for example, has been that everything is real that commonsense sees as real, that physical objects like hills, rivers, clouds, books exist independently of the mind which perceives them, that space and time and qualities and quantities are really there in the world outside us. It is only a few realists, influenced largely by thinkers such as Franz Brentano and Meinong, who were concerned about the origin of universal entities like number, the "thinghood" of things and the "roundness" of round objects. However, without diluting their realism they only echoed some sort of platonic standpoint that these entities could belong to a realm not identical with the realm of physical objects.

But the thrust of Kant's inquiry was more radical. He could not remain content with the empiricist postulation that the material world is independent of the human mind and that its objective knowledge, i.e., knowledge untainted by the transcendental constitution of the knower's consciousness, is possible. Since Kant, the distinction between the subjective and the objective in knowledge has remained the cornerstone of epistemologies. While science strives to discover the laws of the objective world and of the relations within it, it would be the endeavor of philosophy to go deep into the reality of the subject, i.e., the a *pariori* and transcendental principles governing the subject. By any measure, the philosophies that have been most rigorously committed to this endeavor are Husserl's phenomenology and *The Real and The Constructed*: Sankara's atmalogy. More than a thousand years' distance between them is not a factor which would make one dismiss the latter as less incisive or more mystical than the former.

Commonsense realism, empiricism, materialism, and now positivism-Whatever may be their shades are the philosophical undercurrent of science. Scientists strive to discover the laws of the objective-their goal is to state the truth about the objective structure of the universe. The most basic assumption of science is that objective knowledge is the only valid kind of knowledge, for it is definitive, exact, unambiguous, and mathematically statable. So for natural sciences, in order to know a phenomenon reliably, it must be reached objectively, i.e., it must be posited by mind outside itself. The ultimate design of all sciences, including quantum physics, has been to

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build up a single system in which the totality of phenomena, actual and possible, would cohere in accordance with the tacit laws of logic.

The main thesis of Kant's The Critique of Pure Reason leans toward subjectivism and demonstrates human mind's inherent incapacity to know the phenomenal world in itself. To know something, according to Kant, is to place it within the mind's ontological framework, to bring it under the "categories of the Understanding" and by that very process to construct it against the natural, a priori endowments of the knowing consciousness. Thus the knowing subject is unable to leave off the epistemic enclosure within which he resides and to leap out to the essence of the known. The knowing subject apprehends the world as it is given to him in his innate conceptual, rational setting and not as it is in itself. Things in their absolute objectivity, that is, things as they are, are called by Kant noumena or things-in-themselves. It can be said that, for Kant, our knowledge of the world is not, really speaking, the knowledge of the real world but rather the knowlege of the way or mode by which we perform the act of knowing. Kant's subjectivism is the first forceful attempt in epistemology to confirm that the scientist's faith that the knowledge of the world (as the world in itself is) is attainable is based on naiveté.

Kant's Copernican Revolution in epistemology is undoubtedly responsible for pushing into uncertainty our commonsense belief in what can be called the "solidity" of the world. The world and the relations within it, with which we are always acquainted as being "out there," was thrown into soup. The reality of this world has never been questioned by realists, empiricists, then by phenomenalists, positivists and natural scientists. They made this world the ultimate frame of reference for determining the meaningfulness or otherwise of our linguistic utterances. Their anchorage in this world was shaken by Kant's argument that this so-called *real* world is actually "constructed by the categories of the mind. Kant said:²

An object within consciousness... as distinguished from a thing in itself, must receive its character not from anything lying beyond the circle of consciousness, but from something within consciousness itself.

What Kant had triggered off as the shift of the epistemological

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concern to the transcendental make-up of our consciousness was envigorated beyond limit by Husserl in his doctrine of transcendental. phenomenological reduction. And, as I have already said, a time gap of over a thousand years notwithstanding, in his ātmalogical method Śańkara had dismissed the reality of the objective world and accounted for human consciousness's perceiving it to be "there" as a kind of its self-deceit (bhrama). To both Husserl and Sankara, if one withdraws one's consciousness from what it has been conditioned to receive as obvious, and makes consciousnes itself the subject of scanning, one would have a radically different view of the consciousness and the world nexus. That is to say, not only did both of them repudiate our commonsense or natural (for Śańkara, the vyāvahārika) attitude toward the world, but they sought, and were cure of, its transcendental-phenomenological (for Sankara, the pāramārthika) foundation. The world's being spatio-temporally there from our practical standpoint was not denied. What was stressed was the ultimate status it would attain when this practical standpoint is suspended and its meaning in the realm of the perceiving subject is grasped. Phenomenology and atmalogy are profound endeavours to meet the seemingly strange dichotomy between the world's being "this" to man's empirical awareness and its being "not this" to his transcendental awareness. Thus for both Husserl and Sankara the "real" is to be interpreted as the "constructed." The empirically "there" as the projected, the physical as the mental or intended (intentional), the existential as the essential (Eidetic) and the external as the internal.

The introduction of what is known as the method of "phenomenological reduction" by Husserl demonstrates his distrust in commonsense realism. The method throws open the door for a transcendental approach to our world-experience. The method, for instance, presupposes that the world that is taken by us as real in our everyday living is shaky and unreliable. What a philosopher sohuld aim at is the transcendental basis of this world, a basis which would be "seen" by consciousness as apodeictically given. Through the phenomenological method, therefore, the empirical world is to be put out of functioning, to be "bracketed," and its essential ground is to be grasped. This essential ground is the transcendentally reduced or transcendentally "purified" experience.

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And since the method of phenomenological reduction is to be used as a somewhat psychological tool for attaining this end, there is an implicit sense of uncertainly in Husserl regarding the world or facts.

Once the ordinarily perceived world is bracketed and all its epistemic and historically derived conditions are suspended, as if they are inherited by us as arbitrary, the direction of investigation would shift from the external to the internal. The externally "given" does not form the focus of Husserl's inquiry at all. This is obvious because what really bothered him was the original wonder that human consciousness (human subjectivity) should happen to "intend" or be "directed toward" the world. The reason is to be sought, according to Husserl, within the domain of subjectivity, its, primodial, transcendental and pure structure. Husserl writes:

The objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me this world, with all its objects-derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego.

The main design of Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction is that our consciousness should be allowed to find its own "roots." As consciousness conducts itself in the world, it is engaged only with the transient, contingent and fleeting domain of sence-experiences. For Husserl, there is nothing necessary, universal or indubitable about this domain although we regard it in our day-to-day existence as real and "solid." Phenomenological reduction is then to be guided toward the archetypal ground of this domain. This archetypal ground is called by Husserl the "Eidetic structures"-they form the very "stuff" our transcendental consciousness is made of.

One may passingly note that while Kant made categories the archaeological schema of conscionsness Husserl claims to have gone farther in his philosophical investigation. For Husserl, the Eidetic structures themselves constitute transcendental consciousness - they are the seminal configuration into which the very notion of worldliness is inserted. In this sense, the world is constructed by the human, mental reality: what is transcendentally given is found by consciousness to be "there," "outside,"

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"objectively real," separated and separable from consciousness. Our world-experience is embedded in transcendental consciousness, the latter being its very beginning. Although Husserl does not state it explicitlyly, his concept of transcendental, pure and trans-categorical consciousness conceals his reference to Being.

Although the primary interest of Śańkara's ātmalogy was visibly ethical and salvationistic, as an epistemology it has followed a path not much different from that adopted by Husserl's phenomenological reduction. In what may be termed as his genealogy of the human self, Śańkara indicates that our cognition of the phenomenal (vyāvahārika) world as real, our involvement in it as the space in which the history of our births and deaths and rebirths (all conveyed by Śańkara as saṃsāra) has taken place, and our being used to it as an indubitable mode (sattā) of our existence amounts to our natural nescience (avidyā). Indeed this is our everyday, existential nescience. As long as we live in this world as physiologically and psychologically controlled beings we cannot but respond to it as if it were ultimate, independently governed and perpetually present.

There is a certain leap in Sankara's ātmalogical method from the empirically and phenomenally guided consciousness to the transcendental (pāramārthika) consciousness. What Husserl has graphically described as the method of phenomenological-transcendental reducton figures in Sankara's writings⁴ as a sort of transition human self undergoes without any prior decision. In fact one of the riddles we come across in Indian transcendentalism from the Upaniṣadic ātmalogy onwards is that nowhere is the transformation of the individual awareness from its world-bound state to the transcendental state, from its acceptance of the samsāra as real to its rejection as merely a projection of the transcendental dimension of consciousness, is accounted for. Sankara, like Husserl, seems to assume that it is consciousness itself that puts itself onto the track toward the transcendental, toward Being toward ātman (pure consciousness), toward Brahman (the unqualifiable Spirit at the foundation of all that goes on as the world).

The phenomenal existence, Sankara says, gives us only the consciousness of the mutable, erroneous, deceptive and dubitable reality.

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In-built in this consciousness lie the seeds of an awakening, an enlightenment (jnina), the attainment of that certain, necessary and axiomatic "seeing" (called by Hindu metaphysicians darśana and by Husserl Anschauung) from which vantage-point the everyday reality we are accustomed to is discovered as a chimera.

The empirically experienced world is for Sankara "structured" by consciousness and brought into being from nowhere, so to say. Through the use of some of the most suggestive analogies in the history of epistemology Sankara tries to drive into our mind the dichotomy between "heing blinded" and "being insightful," "being naive" and "being wakeful nmth," "being stupid" and "being wise." He compares our commonsense and realist reception of the world to our deceptive perception of silver in a thining conch, of the mirage in a desert sending out heat waves, our perception of a snake in a rope lying in a dark corner. Thus, not to identify the source of our everyday perception of the world, i.e., not to go to the "roots" of what figures on the canvas of our consciousness as "the world." is to live a life of ignorance, avidy ā, error. To a person who has attained the profoundest insight into the meaning of worldliness, into its ontological status, into its incessantly fleeting character inseparable from the fleeting character of the very consciousness that perceives it, the world of senses isa "projected" world, constructed on or out of some non-world substratum. And this paradoxical process of regarding what is not there as being there, of perceiving the non-world as the world, must be attributed, according to Saikara, to the very ambiguous phenomenal-transcendental, or Ŋàvahārika-pāramārthika, structure of human consciousness (the jivaaman syndrome implicit in our existence).

The ātmalogical concern which the Upaniṣads introduced into ancient ladian thought was perceived and developed by Śaṅkara with unusual philosophic depth. The concern is to explain how the world of the physical phenomena emerges from a peculiar self-deceiving activity of our consciousness (this activity is termed as $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$) and how consciousness withdrawn from worldliness could be made to see its own transcendental constitution. The transcendental constitution is $\bar{a}tman$ or Brahman, i.e., is underlined (nirguṇa) and unconditioned reality, whose ontological status $\bar{a}tman$ with the conviction of one who looked upon the

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world drama as a kind of play of shadows (*lilā*). The transcendental consciousness is, for Śańkara, beyond the logical categories, beyond the modes of empirical existence, such as space, time, causality, change, substance, qualities and relations. When in complete unison with itself, the individual consciousness (*ātman*) would acquire the experience of absolute freedom and absolute fulfilment.

Atman or, in its universal formulation Brahman is beyond any conditioning forces, beyond names and forms, beyond empirical states, beyond concrete representations. But once under the sway of some strange power which is present within itself, atman generates the entire panorama of worldly events, and literally descends from its transcendental tier to the phenomenal tier. Human consciousness posits its own transcendental constitution onto the undecipherable and unidentifiable matter and creates the world of space and time, i.e., the world of our everyday existence, the world of the plurality of things and events. This world is constructed by consciousness out of what may be, or may not be, given to it as primordially there, out of what may be there as sheer presence (Ousia) or Being or Nothing. In fact there is no way for finding out why the world is there at all, or why it is there in its specific physico-chemical-biological characteristics. Sankara claims that all that we know is that the world, describable in all its physical or material qualities, is there for our vyāvahārika consciousness and that we would realize with absolute certianty that it is the figment of our imagination (bhrama) or the product of our consciousness's play $(lil\bar{a})$ when we withdraw to the transcendental (pāramārthika) state.

Husserl's genius finds its expression in his treatment of the perential problem that he, like Sankara in his time, engaged himself to solve: how and from where could one obtain absolute certainty in knowledge? The Eidos (Essences) or the Eidetic axioms denote, for Husserl, the true forms of things. One of the distinctions on which Husserl has built his philosophy is between a fact and its essence. No particular spatio-temporal position is necessary for a fact to be. In other words, though a fact is generally recognizable in terms of its empirical characteristics, such characteristics have nothing necessary about them. Every fact, and indeed the entire world of facts and their inter-relations, i.e., the world realists and naturalists take

for granted, becomes thus contingent. For Husserl, the very notion of for granted, (Tatsächlichkeit) emerges from the accidental nature of facts contingency (contingency) and thus, but it could be otherwise." Our consciousness of the contingency of the entire phenomenon of the world is conscious for the world is iself due to our innately Eidosoriented being. For Husserl, as for Sankara, the inner dynamics of human consciousness is to transcend the world of facts (that is, in Sankara's words, to transcend the vyāvahārikasattā). It is because of this inner dynamics of human existence, as existentialists often stress, that we have the feeling of uprootedness and restlessness while we live in the worldly situations. The main objective Husserl's phenomenology is wedded to is to schematize an epistemologically complete organization of the entire cognitive consciousness on the ground of the direct "Eidetic seeing," i.e., the seeing of the essential structures and their architecture within the domain of the ego. These structures are so closely intertwined with one another that the very stuff of consciousness that they seem to determine involves consciousness's total operation vis-à-vis the world.

For Husserl, what is true of the facts in the world is also true of the conventional norms of thought, of the principles of the world-organization, the activity of the world-interpretation, all of us engage in as the core culture of our life. When these very functions are suspended by means of Epokhé, that is, when we proceed to bracket whatever is offered to consciousness by its contact with the world, the procedure could stop, Husserl maintains, only when a certainty about the source of what is experienced or known is captured. Husserl describes the state of mind-gripped-by-certainty as mind's being in "apodeictic self-evidence."

The evidence and the certainty in knowledge Husserl speaks about have their origin in the domain of what he calls "transcendental-phenomenological self-experience." Evidence, Husserl and the phenomenologists following him held, is the mental grasping of something that excludes all doubt, all suspicion about its possible falsity, at least at the moment when evidence is present to the mind. Such an evidence figures in \$\frac{5}{2}nikara's\$ analysis and is called by him anubhava or anubhūti, which is an experience of the basic integration and oneness of things, an experience of the identity between the thinker and the thought, or between the subject and the object. Actually, the expression "apodeictic knowledge" is intended

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by Husserl, just as the expression "anubhave" is intended by \$ankara, to signify that there is such a thing as the transcendental evidence and that it is established by means of mind's immediate and direct act, a "seeing" or "vision" which, although possibly different in the case of different individuals, emits an absolute inward guarantee. The guarantee dawns from one's having touched the innermost point of the entire fabric of world-experience, the innermost point of the subject-object division iself.

Śańkara's ātmalogy and Husserl's phenomenology are both archaelogies of the self and have for their main thrust consciousness in its transcendental-empirical oscillation, so to say. Not only can the two paradigms be seen as repudiation of naive realism, phenomenalism and positivism, they are also attempts to establish that transcendental consciousness possesses a certain autonomy, a dynamics of its own, an independence and primordiality of operation. And it is not impossible to argue convincingly, Śańkara and Husserl seem to hold, that the real world "out there" and the world amenable to cognition, description conceptualization and language, are ultimately grounded in and discemible from the ontological structure of consciousness.

The main reason why our commonsense language with which we ordinarily describe the world, and the language of science (i.e., the language which refers to the empirical, i.e., the language anchored in the phenomenal, the language portraying facts) on the one hand, and the language of metaphysics, of transcendental experience (i.e., the language necessitated by the impulse to convey the experience one would have of uncovering the very raison d'être of all existence, or the language of Being itself) on the other, cannot be bridged is that either of them has its own lexicon of signification. To translate either of them into the other would require the rigor of a perennial hermeneutics-its task would be to contain within the everyday consciousness the essences seen as self-evident by the transcendental consciousness and also to discern the reality is perceived by the former from the constitution of the latter. The endeavors of Sankara and Husserl, the two most perceptive bridge-throwers between transcendental or pure consciousness and the world-bound consciousness, has been exactly to develop such a hermeneutic.

The Real and The Constructed : Sankara and Husserl

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The transcendental (pāramārthika) consciousness of Śańkara is the self (āman) which I, in my innermost being, am. Although it is possible to grasp it in its "pure," "uninvolved" and unqualifiable state, our acts of cognition, thinking and language-formation, according to Śańkara, represent the mundaneness of the self, i. e., the self hidden behind a veil (māyā). The veil is not externally acquired. The self by its very nature weaves it around iself. For Husserl, the transcendental or "pure" (Eidetic) ego is the ultimate ground from which structures constituting our world-experience arise. The transcendental consciousness, for Husserl, is the origin of meanings. The "intentional object" of Husserl is the constructed object, just as the everyday (vyāvahārika) world of Śańkara is posited as real by ātman (pure consciousness) itself, although the latter by its deepest vision knows that the former is not there as it offers itself to the senses.

One of the most penetrating theories in our time which has, though undesignedly, resurrcted the transcendental-empirical syndrome and posited the transcendental as the pre-thematic background of the empirical is Karl Popper' 3-world scheme.⁵

The world of naïve realists, that is, the world of physical entities such as plants, animals, stones, clouds and tables, is called by Popper "World I. This world is different from "World 2," which for Popper is the mental world, the world of psychological dispositions, the world of conscious and unconscious states. Now, there is, according to Popper, a world not exhausted by either World I or World 2. This is World 3. World 3 is the world of theories, scientific formulations, works of art, the world of seeing and understanding, the world of the entire spectrum of possibilities and insights and intuitions. Although this world can easily be seen to have a great resemblance with Plato's world of "Forms," "Ideas," or Universals, Popper asserts that we need not equate it with this world. Moreover Popper insists that World 3 is "man-made" in its origin.6

Our grasp of World 3, for Popper, is an "active process" whose Push, as it were, figures behind our re-creating, reconstructing and remaking whatever is given in World I and World 2. That is why, World 3, like Kant's categorial constitution of the mind and Husserl's Eidetic

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structures, is in the background of our rationality, our problem-solving and our system-generating drive. It supplies the inspiration and the thrust to the very cognitive process without which the world-experience would amount to nothing.

World 3, therefore, occupies in the 3-World found of Popper, a position basic to the contents of World I and World 2. One could even say that without the presence of World 3 the act of deciphering and comprehending and interpreting vis-à-vis World I and World 2 would not take place.

One could ask, in one's vein of imitating Heidegger: why is there something (the world's being there or, to use Popper's imagery, World and World 2) rather than nothing? And, further, if what commonsense perceives and scientific explanations agree on as real is held as merely the construction by the transcendental order (i.e., the Eidetic of Husserl, the pāramārthika of Śańkara, the World 3 of Popper), one is compelled to ask: "what are the structure and the contents of the transcendental consciousness itself?" What is the origin of this structure and the contents? To answer this question, one will have to resort to metaphors. Just as th Eidetic and the pāramārthika are metaphors, the World 3 is also a metaphor. Did not Wittgenstein suggest that "the things that cannot be put into word's make themselves manifest as "mystical"? And the mystical can be spoken about only in metaphors.

NOTES

This paper is based on the one the author presented recently at an international conference on "The Real, the Given and the Constructed" at Delhi University

1. Atmalogy (the word coined by me some years ago), like phenomenology, begins with the total suspension of the ordinary, vyavaharika about the nature and status of the world and aims at grasping the essential or transcendental foundation of the world. For a development of the idea of atmalogy, see my The Structure of Indian Thought (Delhi: Oxford Universe, 1984), pp. 60 ff.

The Real and The Constructed: Sankara and Husserl

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- 3. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas*, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New Youk: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 107 ff.
- See S. Radhakrishnan and Charles C. Moore (eds.), A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Un. Press, 1957), pp. 509 ff.
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ANALYSIS OF HOW AND WHAT WE KNOW BY A WORD (IN THE CONTEXT OF BHARTRHARI)

D. N. TIWARI

Karl Potter is right in observing that verbal-cogition is, logically, prior to the theory of knowledge by inference in so far as whether or not a iudgement or expression is true or false cannot be very well decided until we know what the expression expresses. Bhartrhari is, perhaps, the firstthinker, in the history of philosophy, who made a thorough interpretation of verbal-cognition as the main objective of his magnum opus namely Vākyapadīya. He bases his analysis of verbal cognition, whether it is by a word or by a sentence, on cognition as revealed in the mind by those units. According to his analysis and interpretation verbal-cognition is the cognitive ground or foundation to all epistemological justifications and other sorts of reasoning. Knowledge, for his philosophy, is the knowledge shot through and through by language². The language-cognition unlike perception and inference, is not a passive but active mode of knowing. It is an active mode of knowing because language, in every cognition, reveals itself first before it reveals meaning and the meaning is revealed by it non-differently3. Language and meaning are cognitive reals or philosophical beings. Our cognition, communication and philosophical reflexions are not only based on but are confined only to the beings revealed in the mind by the language.

Congnitive analysis of language

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Bhartrhari is not a linguist but a philosopher of language and grammar. He observes language by analysing it, separately, as -

1- language-tokens (*Dhvaniyān/lipiyān*) differing from community to community. They are marks and are taken, by proxy, as reference and designation of the things and thoughts. Bhartrhari has accepted two kinds

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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of dhvaniyān. *Dhvani* produced through the vibration of verbal-organs is prākņta and it when replicated and tripleted is vaikņta-dhvani. He, however, takes dhvani, as a whole, only as instrumental in the manifestation of sphoṇa. It is remarkable here to note that Bhartṛhari has, basically, mentioned the dhvani aspect of the tokens only but it can be said well that his view of dhvaniyān is not different from that of lipiyān. Both of them are included in tokens (noises/utterences, written-tokens, symbols, signs, gestures etc;)

2- language as expressor (*sphoṭa*) which is real-language. It is the illuminator and the illuminated (*grāhaka-grāhya*) for the manifestation of which the function of the former is confind to its being instrumental only.

Real-language (*sphota*)⁴, in the holistic philosophy of Bhartthari, is the maeaning-revealing language. It is not confined to language-token that is verbal utterances/noises, signs, symbols and gestures which are only instruments helping manifestation of the former. Language is a flash of awareness given ubiquitously in the mind as indivisible unit (*sphota*) which when manifested by language-token reveals itself first and, then, its meaning non-differently. It is by grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) that the indivisible sphota that is inner, indivisible sentence is, artificially, divided into different words which are also considered real from the point of view of practical purposes. Because of the association of *dhvaniyān/lipiyān* it is, syntactically, divided.

Grammatical analysis of language:

The indivisible sphota, by proxy is divided into syntactical units for helping the beginners understanding it in components. An account of them? is given as follows:

1- Nāma: nominal-words comprising nouns, pronouns and adjectives denoting meanings of an accomplished character. In the scheme of analysis they are explained as a unity of the crude form of the word and of the case terminations. They are expressive of the meanings of an accomplished character.

2- Akhyata: verbs are made by the roots by adding suffix "tin". They are expressive of meanings of non-accomplished character. The meaning of a verb is considered as the central and by that reason it is

taken as the central word in sentence. Its primacy in a sentence is such that nominal-words are called by the term nāma as they qualify or are subordinated to verbs.

- 3. *Upasaraga*:- prefixes are added with roots or verbs prior to the uses formed by adding verb-endings for a specified meaning. Their expressiveness is not seen independently of the verbs.
- 4. Nipatas: particles are not qualifiers of anything, they have no qualificandum. They are not used independently as a separate word and that case terminations conveying number and gender are not applied with them. They are suggestive of copulative-assemblage and aggregate of two or many
- 5. Karmapravacanīya: post-positions are related with actions. However, they are neither expressive of nor suggestive of an action. They only specify the sort of relation between past actions and the accessories if prefixed with the verbs.

These words are further divided into their stems/roots and their respective suffixes and accordingly their meanings are divided in the scheme of analysis sometimes as expressive and other times as suggestive. Grammatical analysis is a means by which the indivisible is made understandable to those who can understand it only through piecemeal and, thus, it is only instrumental in knowing the indivisible. In the holistic philosophy of Bhartrhari the sentence, as such, is not actually divided by grammatical analysis, though, it helps the beginners to understand it which they cannot understand otherwise. The units derived by grammatical analysis are outcome of an artificial division of the indivisible yet they are taken as real on the basis of functions they perform in grammar and practice. Bhartrhari analyses the meaning of these analysed units on the basis of analysis of congition (pratibhā) revealed in the mind by them.

Cognition by a word

Western and Indian philosphical systems except *Vaiyākaraṇas* involve themselves in the discussion on verbal-cognition, specially, on the occasion of interpreting sentential-meaning which, for them, is an association of the meaning of words. If the same line of interpretation is applied in the context of cognition by a word, quite opposite consequeces may come out.

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Of the association of what other meanings the meaning of a word would be cognised so? Letters, as their constituents, are not meaningful units. If it is taken that, though the letters are the eternal units, they are not meaningful and the word, constituted by them, is a meaningful unit then, in the absence of other meanings the cognition by a word will not be a cognition by relating meanings. If it is accepted that the words convey universals without the act of relating, as Kumārila Mīmānsakas say, then it must be accepted as a unitwhole and not as a synthetic unit the letters of which die the moment uttered. If otherwise, the cognition by the word will not be explained in the absence of it as a revealing unit. It is, perhaps, the problem for solving which Kumārila Mīmānsakas accept sanskāra, as a unity which, for them, is an outcome of the resurrection of the moments died, from which its meaning is conveyed. Naiyāyikas accept word as a conventional unit conveying meaning conventionally fixed but it is difficult for a conventionalists to deny the existence of letters uttered in a fixed sequence of the word in their atomistic spirit even so when there is no possibillity of simultaneous utterance of all the letters of a word. Moreover, they accept aggregate as the meaning of a word without accepting meaningfulness of the letters and, thus, their interpretation is concerned less with the meaning of words and more with the sentential meaning which they try to explain without accepting the existence of sentence even as a collection of words. To explain meaning of a word on the basis of śakti (power) is a good initiation but to interpret it as convention leads to an under-estimation of its natural character of being illuminator and the illuminated by the virtue of which vaiyākaraņas interpret both the word and the meaning as revealed units and the cognition by it as the identical-cognition revealed by the word itself.

Unlike Naiyāyikas and rhetorics of India, Bhartṛhari does not accept powers (abhidhā, Lakṣnā and vyaājanā) for explaining the cognition by a word. A word, for him, is expressive by nature, it expresses itself and its meaning is expressed non-differently by it⁷. In cases where the word is used for meanings other than the expressive meaning, he explains them las gauṇārtha (intended meaning) known by the imposition of the expressive or primary meaning of the word by factors like similarity, etc. and 2-nantarīyakārtha (non-intended - meaning) known by the nearness or

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closeness of the primary meaning of the word. In all the cases of cognition by a word he accepts primacy of the expressive meaning and on the basis of this logic he succeeds in explaining that all meanings are always the meanings of a word and not of inference, memory or other powers. Meanings are revealed units and are not relations known by inference or by other powers (śakti). Bhartrhari, unlike them, does not accept separate theories for explaining the verbal cognition by words and that of by sentences. The theory of revelation of meaning non-differently by the language is equally applied, by him, in the context of verbal-cognition by words and by the sentences, and thus, there is brevity (laghutā) and uniformity (ekarūpatā) in his theory of verbal-congnition.

What does Bhartrhari mean by knowing the word itself first? In a verbal cognition knowing a word does not mean only uttering and hearing but identical cognition of a word and its meaning as well. It comprises following cognitions.⁸

- 1-Śabda-jāti (word-uiniversal)-Manifested by hearing of verbalnoises the word-universal reveals itself by which we know that what is heard is not a series of sheer sounds like ringing, roaring, chirping, etc. but that which belongs to the class of words.
- 2- Śabda-vyakti (specific word-universal) After the cognition of word-universal the specific word-universal is revealed by which we know the specific unit in use. For example, hearing the utterances POT, first of all we know that it is verbal and not sheer sound of a non-verbal class, secondly, we know that the unit is 'POT', as it is revealed in the mind, and not others like horse, cot, etc:
- 3- Artha-jāti (Meaning-universal)- The word-universal reveals meaning universal on the basis of which we know that the unit revealed in the mind belongs to a class of meaning and is different from that of non-meaning.
- 4- <u>Atrha-vyakti</u> (specifice meaning-universal):- The specific meaning-universal revealed by specific word-universal that is 'potness' by the word POT is distinctly known.

In brief pot-token, pot-word, potness and so on so forth are all separate and distinct sphotas and they reveal their distinct meanings

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determinately known so as they are intertwined with their distinct sphous manifested by their separate tokens. As all of them are universals inhered by the pot-word-universal or are revelations of it and as 'universals in universal' is acceped, by Bhartrhari, there is no fear of infinite regress.

The cognition of the universal of the word in use and that of universal of meaning revealed by that word are given importance as the cognition of svājāti and arthajāti respectively. The cognition of svājāti is the clear revelation of sphota in the mind and that of arthajāti is the clear apprehesion of meaning (pratibhā) revealed non-differently by the former. B. K. Matilal and Radhika Harzberger have translated the term arthajāti for thing-universal and consider that word-universal is superimposed upon thinguniversal i.e., universal of external thing. Matilal, in order to justify his stand of non-difference of word-universal and thing-universal, accepts an intrusion of a metaphysical entity on the ground that latter is simply a transformation (vivarta) of the former. His interpretation is in accordance with Helārāja11 who takes this verse of Bhartrhari for the explanation of relation between word-universal and meaning-universal by supper-imposition of the former on the latter.

While dealing with cognition by a word Bhartrhari confines himself only to what is revealed or figured in the mind by the word. The word, according to him, reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. They are only being revealed in character in which the former is word universal and the latter is meaning-universal and the two are non-different as the former is revealed non-differently. It is not proper to translate the term arthajai as thing-universal as it is a revealed being. Meaning-universal (arthajāli) is imposed on individuals as the ontological apposition of the universal revealed by words in the mind. This interpretation is in accordance with what Bhart hari and Helārāja actually meant. If arthajāti is taken as thing-universal the word, then, will not be expressor and the arthajāli will not be the meaning proper of the word and in such a situation the relation of them cannot be explained without imposition of the word-universal on thing-universal.

Imposition of meaning universal is interpreted in three ways.

1- The word when manifested by word-tokens, reveals itself (svájál)

which, from the point of view of cognition of hearers and the speakers, is primary (antaranga-Tatrāntarangatvādhāraṇatvācca svarūpam mukhyam abhidheyam, HR. on 3/3/2) because it is understood even if others are not known and this svājāti is imposed on other universals and individuals which by imposition are also taken as the meaning of the word.

- 2- When the primary meaning of a word revealed in the mind is not intended in a use it, due to some similarity, is imposed on other meanings, for example, cowness (gauḥ) is imposed on other meanings like cowherd (gauravāhīka).
- 3- The words reveal meaning i.e; universal which, for practical purposes, is imposed on individual. For example, cowness is imposed on 'individual cow'

It is, generally, an accepted view of Bhartrhari and his commentators that the word reveals universal. The word, as it reveals first itself, is also universal and the meaning universal is revealed non-differently by it and it is on the basis of non-difference of word and meaning-universal that identical cognition is revealed by the words.

As I have already referred in the earlier paragraphs, that though both of them are units of awareness and, hence the long and short in shape, size, tone, etc., are not applicable in their context, there is difference between the universal expressed by a word and that of by a sentence and their respective meanings. In a very general-sense it can be said that-

- 1- The word-sphota is manifested by a set of letters conventionally fixed while a sentence-*sphota* is manifested by a set of word-tokens conventionally fixed in linguistic communities.
- 2- The word-universal, from the point of view of cognition, is an incopmlete while sentence-universal is a complete unit retiring further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning.
- 3- A specific cognition by a word is revealed if a verb to be is implied with it. In such a case the universal revealed by that is fully specified and complete in the sense that it extincts the desire of a unit meaning and, hence, not different from universal expressed by a sentence.

Bhartrhari is an indivisibilist/holist for he accepts the revelation of

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cognition indivisibly as a flash and not as one added with the others. He gives importance to theories, popularily known after Kumārila and Prabhākara's controversy as Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhidhāna, but only as different interpretations of the verbal-cognition which in his philosophy is indivisible pratibhā revealed non-differently by the sphota. Pratibhāis a complete unit, a sentential-meaning extincting further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning. It is pratibhā which, in a scheme of analysis, is taken as divided into word-meanings and interpreted as the association of them.

According to Bhartrhari's theory of universal all-roots/stems, suffixes, words/sentences are separate and distinct concepts and as all those concepts are manifested by their separate tokens in their several occurences and instances, they are universals. It is their separate universals on the basis of which they are distinctly known and so are their meanings which are revealed non-differently by them.

Bhartrhari, from the hearer's and the speaker's point of view, analyses verbal-cognition in the following manner-

From the hearer's point of view-

- 1- Verbal noises are heard first.
- 2- Manifested by verbal noises the form of the word (svājāti) or the word-sphota is revealed.
- 3- The meaning of the word is revealed non-differently by the sphota.
- 4- The meaning revealed thus is imposed on the intention, sometimes on speaker's and other times on the intention of the hearer's himself, due to which the meaning of the word varies in those cases.

From the speaker's point of view-

- 1- Perceptual entities are acquired by senses including Mana, the power of imagination.
- 2- The revelation of the form of the word (svājāti) or the sphon manifested by perceptual entities.
- 3- The revelation of its meaning, non-differently, in the mind of the speaker.

4- Articulation of the meaning revealed thus through dhvaniyān/

Out of all these activities involved in verbal-cognition, of both of the speaker and of the hearer, the revelation of sphota is given primacy by Bhartrhari. Revelation of sphota is so central to a verbal-cognition that it, for, him, serves as incentive to other activities involved in a verbal-cognition.

Analysis of meanings of a word expressive of an accomplished character-

All words, in the system of *Vyākaraṇa* are taken to convey all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) out of which universal/individual, gender, number and accessories are, primarily, taken as the meaning conveyed by nominal words and universal/individual action, time, number, person and moods, in general, are taken as the meanings known by verbs¹². An account of meanings conveyed by a nominal word is given as follows, ¹³-

1-UNIVERSAL (JATI) - In the philosophy of Bhartrhari all words and the meanings they express are universal. It is universal on the basis of which identical cognition by a word, in its several occurrences and instances, is accomplished. The meaning of a word is distinctly known by a word because of its distinct universal. The universal is expressed by both-the nominal words and the verbs. Bhātta Mīmānsakas also accept universal as the meaning of all words. The word 'dog', in its several instances and occurrences, is known as the same word only because of its universal and identical-cognition by it is revealed. For example, the norminal word 'Rāmaḥ' denotes universal similarly the verb 'pacati' also denotes universal manifested by different individual actions like cleaning the pot, burning the fire, putting the pot on the fire and so on. It is universal on the basis of which the word 'pacati' is used in its several instances and occurrences and identical cognition is revealed. All words, for Bhartrhari, express Universal, even the word 'individual' expresses universal on the basis of which identical-cognition by it in its several occurrences and instances is levealed. So far the meaning of proper names is concerned we will discuss it after a few steps.

2. INDIVIDUAL (VYAKTI)- Individual is the meaning known by implication as the ontological substratum of the universal which is revealed

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directly by the word. It is the substratum of gender, number, etc. It is known as having a specific universal, number, gender etc, constituting it, for example, the norminal word 'Rāmaḥ' denotes universal (Rāmatva) and the individual or particular Rāma is know by implication as the ontological substratum of 'Rāmatva' and, then, its gender, number and instrument (nominative, accusative, etc.) are known as associated with individuals. The words used for nominal are divided in two group 1- Ajanta-having a vowel in the end and 2- Halanta-having a consonant. As an action cannot be performed without an agent and as only by universal no action can take place. Individual is presumed as the agent of the action denoted by the verbs. In case of individual words serve not as expressive but as references to individuals referred.

- 3. GENDER (Linga) Gender is also conveyed by a word. As individual is distinguised from others by gender and number marked by the suffixes applied with the word. Three genders are accepted in Sanskrit:
 - 1. Masculine: The word which indicates the male animate.
 - 2. Feminine: The word which indicates the female animates.
 - 3. Neuter: Neither male nor female animates but inanimates.

Generally the gender is distincly known by the suffixes used with the word. It is difficult to decide gender in Sanskrit because even inanimates are presented as male or as female and synonyms are used in different genders. For example, the word $Bh\bar{a}ry\bar{a}$ is in feminine but Dara is in masculine and Kalatra is in neuter. $V\bar{a}ri$, payas, nira, are neuter while $\bar{a}pa$ is feminine. It is on the basis of convention that the genders are decided by the word and the suffixes used as fixed for feminine and masculine help us to know the gender by the word. For example, masculine gender is known by the suffix ah in $R\bar{a}mah$ as it is $ak\bar{a}r\bar{a}nta$ Top in $R\bar{a}ma$, $lekhik\bar{a}$, $aj\bar{a}$, is $ak\bar{a}r\bar{a}nta$ which helps us to know the feminine.

- 4. NUMBER Number is also conveyed by a word. Whether the word is used for one or dual or many individuals is decided by number (Vacana). It, in Sanskṛt is divided chiefly into three kinds.
- i. SINGULAR One individual, number, person, place, thing of action is known, for example, singular number of an individual is known by uses like Rāmaḥ, tvam, saḥ, pradeśaḥ, pustakam, paṭhati, etc.

ii. DUAL NUMBER - If the words are used for two individuals, for example, Rāmau yuvām, tau, deśau, pustake, paṭhataḥ, etc.

iii. PLURAL NUMBER - If the words indicate more than two individuals, for example, Rāmāḥ, yūyaṃ,te, vayam, pustakāni, desāḥ, etc.

The word indicative of many or several in Sanskṛt is always used in dual number and not in singular or plural (dampatī, aświn, dvi). The words Dārāḥ, Asavaḥ, prāṇāḥ, Varṣāḥ, sikatāḥ, āpaḥ, sumānasaḥ, apsarasaḥ, are always used in plural.

Trayaḥ, catvāraḥ, pañca, etc; expressing number are plural. The number 'one' is used in singular but when used in the sense of 'some' plural is taken.

5. SADHANA (means), - It is also a meaning conveyed by the words. An individual has several powers. What sort of power of an individual is in operation of an action is known by the word and is indicated by the use of case terminal suffixes, $R\bar{a}mah$, $R\bar{a}mam$, $R\bar{a}men$ etc.; conveys that relation for example the nominative case is known by the word $R\bar{a}mah$, accusative by $R\bar{a}mam$ and, instrumental by $R\bar{a}men$ and thus, we know that the individual denoted by the word $R\bar{a}mah$ is an agent ($kart\bar{a}$) and not other and similar is the case with other $k\bar{a}rakas$.

An account of meanings conveyed by verbs is given as follows:

1- Kriyā (action), - Action is expressed, primarily, by verbs. As vaiyākaraṇas accept sentence as a complete unit expressive of a complete sense with a primary emphasis on action, it is also taken as one among several meanings of a nominal word. A nominal, according to Bhartṛhari, if implied with verb to be is also a sentence 14. In this view action in general consists of any of the six actions (jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate, vardhate, apakṣiyate, vinaśyate) by implication of any of which the nominal word conveys the meaning action in general 15. The nominal word Rāmaḥ expresses action by implication of taken-birth, exists, etc, But it is the primary meaning of a verb and is indicated by the use of verb-ending suffixes, for example, ti=paṭhati, anti= paṭhanti, in third person of present lense, si, thah tha, in second person and mi, vaḥ, maḥ, in first person in sugnular, dual and plural number respectively. Similar is the case with suffixes used in other tenses. Similarly in all forms of roots they are divided

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into ten groups namely bhvādi, adādi, juhotyādi, divādi, svādi, tudādi, nudhādi, tanādi, krayādi, curādigaṇa. By suffixes (tiṅ) we know that the word is a verb indicative of an action.

- **2-** $K\bar{a}raka$ The means when employed with an action is known as $k\bar{a}rakas$. For example, see the sentence, 'The king Harṣa distributed the alms to thousands of Brāhmaṇas by his own hands in Prayāga. Prayāga where alm giving (action) was performed, Harṣa the person who gave alms, hands by which alms were given the gold which was distibuted, the Brāhmaṇas to whom alm was given are instrumental in the act of almgiving. Nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative and locative these six are recognised as $six k\bar{a}rakas$ which are known by the case-terminal suffix ah with the $R\bar{a}ma = R\bar{a}mah$ indicates the nominal case.
- 3- Kala (Time). The roots, when added with suffixes, fifteen in number, form verbs expressive of action. The forms of verb are formed in ten tenses and moods out of which five-present, future, past, imperfect tense, imperative and potential moods are chief. These tenses are known by the verb-ending suffixes applied with the root, for example, ti of the verb pathati, indicates present tense and with prefix a of the verb apathat, syati of the verb pathisyati indicate past and future respectively. Similarly, atu of pathatu, eta of the pathet indicate the imparative and potential moods respectively.
- 4- Sankhyā (Number)- Verb- endings applied with verbs indicate singular if the action is performed by one person, dual if it is performed by two persons and plural if it is performed by more than two person. Thus, singular by the verb pathati, dual by pathatah and plural by pathanti in third person are known by the suffixes applied with verbs and similar is the case with second and third persons.
- 5- Purusa (Person) Whether the doer of the action expressed by the verb belongs to third, second or first person is also known by the verb. For example, the use of suffixes ti, taḥ, anti, with the verb indicates the third person, si, thaḥ, tha, second and mi, vaḥ, maḥ, first person in present tense and similarly other suffixes used in different tenses convey the speaker himself, first person, if for listener or reader second person and third person

in rest of the cases applied with it, for example, the verb 'pathati' conveys third person.

6. Upagraha (Mood) - It is also a meaning converyed by verb. parasmai pada and ātmane pada of the verb are marked by the verbending suffixes, for example, in present tense ti, taḥ, anti (third person) si, thaḥ, tha, (second person) and mi, vaḥ, maḥ, (first person) are the suffixes by which we know that the verb belongs to parasmai pada that is we know that the fruit of the action goes to others not to the agent and similarly te, āte, ante, se, āthe, dhve, e, āvahe, āmahe, are suffixes which mark ātmane - pada by which we know that the fruit of the action goes to agent himself.

Measures by which the meanings are known in sequence -As we have seen, in the paragraphs mentioned above, universal, individual. gender, number and means are chiefly known by the nominal words (comprising nouns, pronouns) and action, means, time number person and mood are known by verbs. According to vaiyākaranas meanings known by a nominal word can be known by verbs and vice versa (sarve sarvārtha vācakāh). However, universal, individual, number, means, action in general are known by both sort of the words. The sequence in which the meanings of a word, in the scheme of analysis, have been placed should not be construed as an outcome of a fixed rule. It is just a proceedence followed in grammar and there is no instrument in the word for serving as assisting force in causing the cognition of all those meanings step by step in a sequence. In fact the meaning is a unit which is interpreted as a composite analysed as universal individual, etc; for the cause of making it understandable to learners. Bhartrhari has tried to clarify the issue by the analogy of a painter16. Just as a figure (the original model) is grasped by the painter as a single awareness and is painted upon the canvas as an other complete unitary figure, language or linguistic unit (śabda) has, like wise, all these three steps. The painter paints the unitary idea or figure in a sequence of parts similarly the unitary cognition, by analysis, is made understandable as a synthesis of several meanings like indvidual, number, gender, means, etc. For explaining the sequence of consequential cognition of different meanings conveyed by a word Bhartrhari in his vitti has given five measures.

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An account of the measures, for deciding cognition of meanings in sequence, is given as follows¹⁷:-

- 1- Contiguity (Pratyāsatti). In a scheme of analysis a word expresses a composite meaning i.e., Universal, individual, gender, number and means, etc; in case of word conveying meaning of accomplished character out of which a hearer first of all grasps that one which is very poximate to his expectancy. According to Bhartrhari universal is known as revealed by the word first. As communication is not possible only on the basis of universal and as it, without individual, is not manifested in ordinary communatiation, individual is known second by implication as the ontological apposition of the universal. Similar is the case with gender, number and means as they are associated with the individual which can not be known distinctly without them. As a gender does not require to be distinguished by anything other than the individual and opposite to it number and means required to be distinguished by others gender is known prior to the cognition of number and means. Number and means are dependent on others to be distinguished in a similar way but, as the number requires the individuals of same class, it is closer than means to individual and hence, known before means and as the means are dependent on individuals of different class, it is known in the last.
- 2- Great-concern (Mahāviṣayatva)- As universal is ubiquitous in all individuals, number, etc, of which they are wholes. It is more pervasive than individual and hence it is of a great concern (object) in a verbal-cognition. As individual is common to all genders and the gender is excluded by another gender that is where there is masculine there will not be faminine, individual is a great concern in comparison to gender which is of a small concern in relation to individual of which the former is a part. The gender, in comparison to number, is of a great concern as it pervades all numbers. A number as it requires other number in order to be distinguished, is more comprehensive than means. The number is associated with nominal words including means and verbs while means are associated only with nominal words, it is more comprehensive than means and, hence, known prior to means which is known in the last.
- 3- Degree of excellence (Abhivyaktemimittopavyañjanaprakarṣa) - According to derivation 'abjivyaktemimittam yadupavyañjanam

manifestation is called so. Out of meanings conveyed by a word that whose manifestors have excellence in number is determined first. As universal is manifested by several manifesting individuals, genders, numbers, etc; it is known first. As individual is manifested only through its constituents that is gender, number, etc; it is known second but prior to number, etc. A gender is determinately known as it is manifested by each individual and a number requires a number of individuals in order to be distinguished, gender is known first and number afterwards. As means are known on the basis of objects belonging to others it is the minimum in excellence of manifestors and, hence, known in the last.

- 4- Expectancy or desire to grasp ($Upalips\bar{a}$): Among many meanings of a word that which is much expected to be known frist is called $upalips\bar{a}$. It is on the basis of degrees-acute or remote, of expectancy for meanings that we know different meanings conveyed by a word in a sequence.
- 5-Bijavittilābhānugu nya- It is on the basis of favourable incentive by the cognition of the meaning cognised first that we know the next meaning by the fovour conferred by that. The idea or universal serves as the basis of implication of individual. The cognition of universal confers favours as the basis of cognition of individual as its substratum and it on the basis of individual by which gender, number and means which are constituents of, it, are known consequently in the sequence. Gender is incentive in the cognition of number and number confers favour in the cognition of means depending on external force in action.

According to *Vyāḍi*, as *Vṛṣabha* quotes, ¹⁸ we interprete the same being as comprising universal, individual, etc; on the basis of analysis and describe them separately as it is universal, it is individual and so on. Vyāḍi's interpretation seems right because in the system of grammar meaning is a flash of understanding, indivisible in nature, and is known thus in communication but for the understanding of learners it is interpreted through analysis as qualified by many meaning universal, etc; in which universal is taken as revealed directly by the word and individuals, are known by implication made on the basis of universal as its ontological substratum and

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gender, etc; as constituents of individual and similar is the case with the word expressive of non-accopmlised character.

Controversy over the meaning of Proper-names:

Now coming to the controversy over the interpretation of Kātyāyana's aphorism regarding the meaning of proper names according to which names are given to spatio-temporal-things on the basis of qualities which belongs to them. 19 In order to observe the contrast Radhika Harzberger²⁰ quotes Bhartrhari's and Dignāga's statements. According to Bhartrhari²¹ names are given to individuals indirectly on the basis of a universal which belongs in word (śabda-jāti). Dignāga, opposite to Bhartrhari, observes that a name conveys its object (spatio-temporal) on the basis of the quality which does not exceed over its objects²². According to her observation Bhartrhari has rejected the spirit of Kātyāyana's aphorism and Dignāga has rejected Bhartrhari in favour of Kātyāyana. B. K. Matilal²³ has tried to reconcile the two uncompromising stands of Bhartrhari and Kātyāyana by providing an interpretation based on an intimate connection (generic) established between word-universal and thing-universal which is, metaphysically, not different from the former being its trasnformation (vivarta), Matilal's interpretation is supported by Helārāja's24 commentary which considers all is one being the vivarta of Sabda but this may not be accepted as a cognitive solution to the problem of cognition of meaning non-differently revealed by the word. It simply says that the word-universal by super-imposition is taken as related with thing-universal. This is what Bhartrhari wants to say by the verse. Radhika Harzberger has frequently quoted the verse for interpreting Bhartrhari's theory of naming. If she is correct then Bhartrhari's stands will not be different from Buddhist's theory of naming but this may go against Bhartrhari's theory according to which the word reveals universal which is imposed on individual or person as an ontological substratum of the universal.

It is true that Bhartrhari, like Dignāga, accepts that names are given to individual on the basis of quality but unlike Dignāga the quality, for him, belongs to the word. In other words when the words are used to refer to a thing, the universal in that mode of use of words is the quality which belongs to that word and not to the thing and which when imposed on external

things serves as identical cognition of that thing. So far the cognition by personal proper names is concerned, it, firstly, reveals universal which by imposition, on external thing names, serves as the the cause of identical cognition of him by that name. In such a mode of use words, which are expressive by nature, serve by proxy as a mark of the thing. One is so habitual in stereo-typed use of the names as marks of things that the expressive meaning that is universal of them is almost overlooked. But only by that overlooking universal as the import of name-words cann't be denied because in that case indentical cognition by the word will not be possoible. The issue of identical cognition will be discussed later on after a few steps.

Jonardon Ganeri in his paper entitled 'Vyādi and the realist theory of meaning' remarks "the criterion of identity for every personal proper name is that of a person but in order to understand any one personal proper name I must also know to which it refers. And while it is, of course true that the knowledge of dittha-hood will be sufficient to distinguish dittha from all other objects, Bhartrhari's proposal fails to display what the proper name dittha and yaidttha have in common namely that they are both names of persons²⁵.

Ganeri is right in thinking that a referent must be associated with the identical cognition by a personal proper name as the criterion of the former. What he cofuses is the cause of identical-cognition. Bhartrhari makes a difference between the word as expression and the word as designation. In the former mode of word universal is revealed which serves as the basis of identical cognition and in case of latter individual is indicated but this indication of the individual, for Bhartrhari is not direct because the Word reveals only universal and the individual is known as as ontological apposition of the universal and it is presumed that the word is used in the case of personal proper names as indicative to the person named. Identical cognition, unlike what Ganeri observes,26 is not like child's disability of recognition but always a distinct knowledge revealed by the word in all its occurrences and instances. In the knowledge by proper name we must analyse what is revealed and what is presumed because without the knowledge of their distinction one cannot understand Bhartrhari's theory of cognition by personal proper names in particular. The person who serves

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as the criterion of identity of personal proper name in Ganeri's view, is not revealed by the name as what is revealed by the name is universal; the person is presumed by the imposition of the universal on the individual person. In such a case the name by proxy is taken as a mark of the person named. But confining to presumed part only we can not explain the proper names lacking referrent or non-existent and the identical-cognition of person by proper-names because even presumption/imposition requires a cognitive base in the absence of universal revealed by the word there is no possibility of imposition, inference, etc.

It is true that words express universal and individuals are not revealed but imposed-meanings. In such a situation it is justified to take that word reveals universal and the individual is known by imposition, presumption or inference made on the basis of universal as its ontological substratum. Similar is the case with personal proper names in which individual as qualified with number, gender, etc, is taken as the meaning of names.

Clarifying the position on proper-names we can say that Bhartrhari, like Mahābhāṣyakāra Patanjalī, is always conscious of showing that philosophy of language is not concerned with the things in themselves but with meanings as figured in the mind by words. Even the proper names as they are applied and are applicable to many individuals, denote universal. The universal denoted by proper names like Deodatta is explained by him on the basis of the indentical cognition of Deodatta through all changing stages of his childhood, youth and oldage. The universal, on the basis of which identical cogntion of Deodatta as Deodatta is accomplished, is the denotation of the proper name 'Deodatta'. Universal is the idea, the concept revealed by words and is not a quality of individual which is known only by presumption as ontological apposition of universal. Helaraja writes 'Itham oa sanjāā śabdānāmapi jātivādimate jātiśabdatvamityekaiva sabdānam pravittiķ²⁸. This passage is suffice of tell that he, very like Bhartrhari, accepts that a name is used for a named on the basis of universal which is non-different from the word. He does not accept intrusion of any metaphysical entity for the explanation of meaning of all sorts of words. The words are expressive of universals by natural-fitness realtion and not things real the expressive of things real thi of things whether imposed or real. Even the words Jāti and artha are known so distinctly by the universal they reveal²⁹. What is revealed by words is the real being of a philosophical concern. Helārāja writes30 śabda gramāņakānām hi yacchabdāḥ tat paramārtha rūpam. Conclusively, words do not express things or thier qualities. If it is accepted that they express things on the basis of qualities, an unsolvable problem of relation between a linguistic unit and an external thing may arise and this will go against Kātyāyana's aphorism31 'Na vā śabdapūrvako hyarthe sampratyayastasmādartha nivrtti h (vārtika on Pāṇini 1/1/67). Bhartrhari's and Helārāja's interpretations do not reject Kātyāyana's view that names are used for the individual named on the basis of quality of that individual hecause these explanations also accept that the words reveal universal but so far individual is concerned it is known by implication as the ontological substratum of the universal and, thus, the quality of a word i.e, meaning by imposition is attached to the quality of things which serves as the basis of naming. Dharmakīrti's and Kamalasīla's interpretation of names are also in the same line of thinking. Dignaga differs from them in so far as his interpreters accept the quality of things as the basis of use of names. But this explanation of names goes against their own theory of verbal-cognition which, for them, is confind to conceptual constructs hypostatized as external things. In case they accept the former view they contradict themselves and in case of latter they go in favour of Bhartrhari.

On the cause of Identical-cognition-

Nominalists and realists reject universal as the import of words on the ground that identical cognition, as they think, is accomplished by group (samūha), resemblance (sādṛśya) and the natural power (śakti) of individuals which are not different from individuals. Bhartṛhari has minutely analysed their difference from universal which, for him, is the cause of identical-cognition.

An account of Bhartrhari's observations is given as follows :-

1. Sam tha (Group)- Unlike Naiyāyikas, cognition of group, according to Bhartrhari's theory of verbal-cognition, is the cognition of aggregate without an accumulation or option (avikalpa samuccaya)³². For example, the word forest does not denote the cognition of different trees constituting forest nor as one added to another but expresses the whole without a reference of plurality. Objecting to the theory of group, Bhartrhari remarks'

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In the cognition of group difference is basic³³. The word forest in case of group, should reveal the aggregate of different kinds of trees similarly the word *Brāhmana* should denote the aggretgate of qualities like austerity, birth and learning and not the identity of forest and Brāhmin respectively. Even the identical-cognition by the word group as group can not be explained if group is taken as the denotation of words³⁴.

2- Sādṛśya (Resemblance) - Cognition by sādṛśya is different from that of group and of identity. According to it there are countless pots and all are different but because of similarity of them we call all of them by the word 'Pot35. Bhartrhari and his commentator Helaraja elucidates if that similarity is a common idea of which there are countless instances it is not different from universal. If it is not so it will be an addition to the heap of individuals and will not serve as the cause of identical cognition. Helārāja* rejecting Buddhists, observes that similarity is the cognition of identity cum difference. Two things are cognised similar only when they are cognised first as different and, then, found to share certain common features. To be similar is not just the same as to be identical and the causes of both of them are different. Bhartrhari further adds any thing can not be the cause of anything except a capable power. He gives the example 37 of dan of (dweller with stick) and says that it is not merely by having a desire to hold the stick but holding of stick which is the basis of designating dandi. The desire to hold the stick is the cause of being desirous of holding the stick but not of dandi. The general properties of an individual say, dew, heap, horn, tail, etc. of a cow and those of other cows are the cause of similarity of those properties but can not be the cause of identical cognition 'cow'.

If it is said, by Buddhists, who consider that universals are not perceived that identical cognition is ignorance and that there is nothing identical in momentary instants, Helaraja refutes them by saying that to accept identical cognition as illusory can not be known so without identical cognition caused by that statement (of illusory)³⁸. He further argues universal can not be said imperceptible without accepting it as the cause of identical cognition. He counter retorts what is wrong there in accepting universals as perceptible if Bauddhas accept n n la (blue) as perceptible. The universal deserves the same claim as that of $n n la^{39}$.

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Universals are perceptible beings and are denoted separately from individuals, for example⁴⁰, though perception the expression 'jale mukham paśyami (I perceive my face in water) is not perception of face but its reflection in water yet the denotation of the expression is face and not the water (medium), similarly universal is denoted independently of individuals through which it is manifested only.

3. Sāmarthya (capable power) - Refuting sāmarthya as the cause of identical cognition Bhartrhari argues⁴¹ that mere being of sāmarthya is not sufficient for identical cognition as it needs to be cognised as power and the cognition of power as power is not merely a fact of being of power but the identical cognition of it as power. Conclusively, samūha, sādṛśya and sāmarthya if they function for identical cognition are not different from universals⁴².

Word-Meaning Relation and the Identical cognition-

The word, in philosophy of Bhartrhari, is a revealed unit and, hence, a cognitive being. The meaning revealed non-differently by it is also a cognitive being. They are revealed beings and, hence, are of awareners in chacacter. In between these beings the former is eternally fit to express the latter and this fitness of the former, for him, is natural fitness relation (Yogyatā-sambandha). But of relation as yogyatā no verbal knowledge is possible. The word is naturally expressive and it is its expressiveness that itexpresses its meaning non-differently without the act of relating them by memory and inference. This relation is neither a relata nor changed into a relata and hence, it is not known independently of the expressor and the expressed. As it is natural fitness of the language, it is eternally dependent-relation. It is by this fitness of the language that cognition by language, independently of our physiological, psychological and ontological things or our allegiances to them is accomplished in communication.

As a word is both the illuminator and the illuminated the natural-fitness relation, only from the point of view of this context, is called $V\bar{a}caka$ - $v\bar{a}cya$ - $sambandha^{43}$. It is by the logic of the word as the illuminator and the illuminated that he propounds the active theory of cognition in which a word is conveyed/revealed first and, hence a $v\bar{a}cya$ which, from the point of view of meaning it reveals non-differently afterwards, is taken as $v\bar{a}caka$.

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Cognitive-beings are universal i.e, concepts; they are capable of being analysed by mind in several universals and as Bhartrhari, unike Naiyāyikas, accepts 'universals in universal' there is no case of infinite regress⁴⁴. It is the universal on the basis of which identical cognition is accomplished by words.

Difference between Knowledge and the Object of Knowledge.

Bhartrhari makes a remarkable difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. In a knowledge, the object of knowledge i.e; universal, is known but it is not the knowledge itself. There is difference between the cognition and the object of cognition because the cognition is the cognition of the objects i.e. self-awareness of the object (object awareness). It is not another in a cognition. Otherness is the character of objects but not of the knowledge itself⁴⁵. As in cognition so in memory and recognition the object of cognition is not cognition but of the object figuring in that cognition. The word 'Jāāna' (knowledge) expresses universal but the knowledge, of the universal, is not of object, that is, the knowledge is the knowledge of some object but it is not an object itself. It is the self-consciousness of the object of knowledge⁴⁶. Individuals are also the object of knowledge but by implication of the universal expressed by the word.

Between Knowledge and No-knowledge-

Bhartrhari's explanation of cognition as determinate and discriminate knowledge and his theory of verity of cognition are unique contribution in the history of philosophy. To take the former first we can say that he, on the basis of his theory of language infuses cognition and no cognition is possible if it is not revealed non-differently by language (\$\frac{\scale}{sabdanuviddhata}\$), succeeds in explaining that cognition as such is discriminative by nature. Discrimination is not possible without language. It is generally taken that in Indian Philosophy knowledge is divided, basically in 1-determinate (\$\savikalpaka\$) and 2- indeterminate (\$\nivvikalpaka\$) and as Naiyāyikas say, none of them is infused by language. The two, according to them, may not be differentiated if taken infused by language⁴⁷. In Bhartrhari, we do not find the division of knowledge in determinate and indeterminate. He considers knowledge in terms of cognition and no cognition. If it is a case of cognition it is a determinate cognition. Cognition ceases to be

so isolately from language. How can the sense-datum of 'pot' be distinguished from that of 'cot' if cognition of them is not taken as shot through and through language? Even the sense datum of 'pot' if separated from the language can not be the object of cognition if it is not revealed by language 'pot'. Abstracted from language no cognition either by perception or by inference, which are only instrumental in the manifestation of the language (sphota, is possible). Cognition by language is always a discriminate knowledge. No knowledge is possible isolately from language and to knowledge is knowledge if it is not discriminative and determinate. Even the indeterminate knowledge, say the knowledge of newly born babies, is also intertwined with language as bhāvanā. If not so no activity, crying, tittering smiling, etc; in them, is possible.

Now one may ask a question as to how the universal, a word reveals. can be said as determinate object. If meaning is a determinate-object, it must be individual and not universal. It is true that universals, as Bhartrhari⁴⁸ accepts, are expressed by the words/sentences and that language infuses cognition and, thus, cognition, for him, is always a determinate and destinguished cognition. Everything and, hence, every meaning according to him is distinguished by thier universals. Universals, in his philosophy, are not abstracted-abstractd by several instances and ocurrences of the individual but are self restrained-being of awareness in cahracter. They are given units and are manifested only by the tokens which are individuals. Manifested thus, the word universal reveals itself and, hence, a selfrestrained-being. These units are concepts and are called universal only because they are manifested by individuals and not because they are abstracted from several instances. They are distinctly and separately revealed because of their distinct individuals by which they are manifested. Even the individuals are also known distinctly by the words/sentences because of their distinct universal.

Between Verity and valldlty of knowledge-

Now coming to the issue of verity of cognition, it can be said that cognition by language, in the philosophy of Bhartrhari, is a clear, distinct and a complete indivisible unit, it is a flash of understanding (pratibhā). As the knowledge in communications is distinctly revealed directly by the language without instrumentality of perception, inference, etc, and

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verification, confirmation, etc. based on them, it taken as a veridical cognition. All cognition, for Bhartrhari, is revealed by language and hence veridical. This verity is the nature of verbal-cognition. Even the cause of the cognition of non-verity as thus, is the veridical cognition revealed by the term non-verity⁴⁹. What we count in communication is not the validity of verification by logical justifications and evidences, given importance by logicians for convincing others about the verity of cognition revealed directly by the language, but the verity which can not be denied without a veridical cognition revealed by the language "denial".

Conclusion

Generally, the words express universal and individual is known by implication as the ontological substratum of universal as having a gender a number and means which qulify it. Individual as it is a qualified being whether by imposition or by itself, can not be the meaning of the word isolately from the sentence. The use of a word for an individual needs to be qualified and, then, as qualified of a qualifier, it must be the meaning of a sentence and not of an isolated word. Universal does not require imposition of qualities to be qualified, it is directly revealed by words, and hence it is conveyed by all words independently of a sentence. if universal is also presented as a quality, then, it qualifies substance but such a presentation is possible only in case of the word in a sentence; isolately from sentence and even in sentence, all words express universal. Universal is not an abstracted being-abstracted from several occurrences and instances, but a self-restrained-being of awareness in character. It is by them that identicalcognition by the words is accomplished and by the imposition of which we know the individuals qualified by gender, etc. Verbal-cognition, whether by a word or by a sentence, is revealed directly and is shot through and through by those units, it is determinate and as it is a revealed being revealed by the word itself, independently of our allegiances to things, thoughts, theory impregnation and their justification by inference, etc. it is self-veridical. The self-veridical verbal-cognition is the cognitive base for logical and epistemological justifications.

NOTES

- It is a version of Potter's statement, see, Enyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2, p. 147, 1978.
- Na so sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. *Vp.* 1/123.
- 3. See, Vp. 1/56-57
- A detailed account of the Bhartrhari's theory of *sphota* is presented by the same outhor in a paper entitled 'Regarding *Sphota*' sent for publication in *JICPR*, New Delhi.
- Dvidhā kaiścit padam bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā. Apoddhṛtyaivo vākyebhyaḥ prakṛti pratyayādivat. Vp. 3/1/1.
- 6 Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmpalāpanāḥ. Asatye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate. *Vp.* 2/238.
- 7. Svājātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvairevābhidhīyate. Tato'rtha jātirūpeṣu tadadhyā ropakalpanā. *Vp.* 3/1/6.
- 8 This account of the analysis of language is based on Helārāja's observations on Vp. 3/1/7-12.
- 9. B. K. Matilal, The Word and the World, Oxford University press, 1990. p 36
- Marthari and the Buddhists, Radhika Harzberger, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, p. 78, 1938.
- II. Helārāja on 3/1/6.
- 12. *Ibid.* on 3/1/1.
- Bhartrhari has devoted part III of his Vākyapadīya for separate chapters on the different meanings, of accomplished and non-accomplished characters, conveyed by defferent kinds of words. A very general and brief account of the meaning of accomplished and non-accomplished characters, conveyed by words, on the basis of those chapters, is given, herewith, as they are the objects of verbal cognition.
- Vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam. Vp. 2/326.
- Janmādayo vikārāḥ saḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ. Vp. 1/3 A detailed description of these six is given by Bhartrhari in jāti-samuddesaḥ.

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- Yathaika buddhivişayā mūrtirakṛyate pate. Mūrtyantarasya tritayamevam 16. śabde pi drśyate. Vp. 1/52.
- Tasyapi pratyāsattyā mahsayatvenābhivyakti nimittopavyanjana prakarsen 17. opalipsayā bījjavrttilābhānugunyena vā grāhyāsu mātrāsvaniyamena buddhikramo vyavatisthate. Harivetti on Vp. 1/24-26
- Harivṛtti and Vāṛṣabha quotes two verses from Sangraha of Vyāḍi which 18. present a holistic view of language, see, Vrtti and Vārṣabha on Vp. 1/24-26.
- Siddham tu yasyagunasya bhavad dravye sabdanivesasyabhidhane 19. tvatalau. Kātyāyana's Vārtika on A stādhyāyī 5/1/119.
- Bhartmari and the Buddhists, pp. 1938. 20.
- VP. 3/1/6. 21.
- Pramāņa samuccaya, 1/3, 5/13. 22
- The Word and the World, p 36 23.
- Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/6. 24.
- Jonardan Ganeri Vyāi di and the realist theory of meaning Journal of Indian 25. Philosophy, p. 419, vol. 23, No. 4, Dec. 1995.
- Journal of Indian Philosophy, p. 419, Vol. 23, No. 4, Dec. 1995 26.
 - Sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādişu. Jātirityucyate tasyām sarve 27. śabdā vyavasthitāh. Vp. 3/1/33
 - 28. Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/12.
 - 29. Ibid. 3/1/12.
 - 30. Ibid. 3/1/11.
 - Vārtika on Astādhyi 1/1/67. 31.
 - Samudāyo 'bhidheyo vā' pya vikalpasamuccayaḥ. Vp. 2/126. 32
 - 33. Ibid. 3/1/11.
 - Samūhāvagrahe hi samūhināmanāvṛttā saiva buddhiḥ sāmānyam gṛḥṇāli. 34. Helārāja on Vp. 3/1/98.
 - Sakṛt pravṛttāvekatvamāvṛttau sādṛśātmatām. Bhinnātmikānām vyaktīnām 35. bhedāpohāt prapadyate. Vp.3/1/98.
 - 36.
 - Dandopāditsayādandam yadypi pratipadyate. No tasmādeva sāmarthyāl sā 37.

dandīti pratīyate. Ibid. 3/1/93.

- Mithyārūpādisamviccaikabuddhirityapi kvacit samyak samvedanamūlatvān mithyā buddheravaśyam kācidabhedabuddhiḥ satyāpyeṣtavyetyanapahnavanīyīni pratiniyatakārya sādhanāni sāmānyanīti sthitam. Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/95
- yena nīlam pratyakṣam sāmānyamīdṛśameva pratyakṣamiti. Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/95
- 40. Yathā jalādibhirvyaktam mukhamevābhidhīyate. Tathā dravyairabhivyaktā iātirevā bhidhāyate. *Vp.* 3/1/29.
- 4l. Necchānimittādicchāvāniti jñānam pravartate. Tasmāt satyapi sāmarthye buddhirarthāntarāśrayā. *Ibid.* 3/1/94.
- 42. Abhedarūpm sādṛśyamātmabhūtcāśa śaktyaḥ. Jātiparyāya vācitvameṣāma pyupavarṇyate. *Ibid*, 3/1/92.
- 43. See, Sambandha samuddeśaḥ. A clear account of this chapter can be seen in a paper entitled' Bhartrhari's philosophy of relation between word and meaning, *JICPR*, Vol. XI. No. 2, pp. 43-55. 1994.
- 44. Helārāja on Vp 3/1/11.
- 45. Jñeeyasthameva sāmānyam jñānānāmupakārakam. No jātu jñeyavajjñānam pararūpeņa rūpyate. *Vp.* 3/1/104.
- 46. Yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate. Jňānākārastathānyena na jňānenopagṛhyate. *Ibid*. 3/1/104.
- 47. Jayanta Bhatta Ny āyama ñjarī, Vol, II. p. 100.
- 48. Na so' sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. Vp. 1/123.
- 49. Yathā ghatādīnām dīpaḥ prakāśakaḥsvaprakāśe dīpāntaram nāpekṣate, tathārthasya prakāśakam jūānamātmaprakāśanāya prakāśantarānapekṣamiti svaprakāśakam siddham... samvedanabhāge pi sāmānyayoga iti sākārāḥ svaprakāśā niḥsāmānyā buddhyaḥ siddhāḥ. Helārāja on Vp 3/1/104
- For a detailed account of the concept of knowledge revealed by lanagage independently of things and our allegiances to them see the paper entitled' Possibility of Disinterested Knowledge: A Bhartrharian Approach, *JICPR*, Vol. XV. No. 3 pp. 47-69, 1998, by the same author.

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LANGUAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE SELF

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N. SREEKUMAR

This paper intends to analyse the nature of the human self and its perspectival horizon with a focus on the roles of language in determining them. It is a fact that the model of reality we subscribe to and the subsequent account of the understanding of this reality exert vital influence on our understanding this self. Thus we inherit the belief that consciousness, which is a special characteristic feature of the self, provides the foundation for all our understanding and knowledge. Since Descartes, the foundational status of consciousness had been forcefully asserted and it had been excluded from the subject matter of natural science. The domain of the self and its being were clearly defined in terms of the phenomenon of consciousness.

The most important feature of the phenomenon of consciousness in this framework is its ability to provide the human self a universal perspective. In other words, it envisages to understand the human self in the light of the "universal conditions of human existence", to which the perspectival horizons of the human self are intimately related. This paper emphasises on the ways the human self is related to language and argues that since the perspectival horizon of the self is the product of the linguistic horizon it inherits, the former cannot be an absolutely universal one.

Again, a discussion on the nature of man's being cannot ignore a pivotal feature of this phenomenon, viz., individuality. This phenomenon has to be properly accounted for and explained prior to any examination into the nature of the self. But by associating the self with a linguistic horizon a different picture naturally gains prominence. The intersubjective and community-bounded features of language prevent us from conceiving the self and the structure of its beinghood as limited to any closed subjective

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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horizon. This paper argues that the real nature of self cannot be understood without recognizing the ways it is determined by the different perspectives to which it is exposed as a result of its interactive encounters with others and reality as a whole through language.

This is to recognise the significance of language as a hermeneutic medium, which determines the ontological states of our being. Conceived from such an angle, language possesses the capacity to contain the various perspectives within its interactive and dialogical structure. It therefore functions as an intersubjective plane where continuous discourse between the various perspectives are carried out. Consequently, the position adopted here contends that the human self is in a continuous process of evolution within the intersubjective field of such continuous discourses. The evolution of the self presupposes the conversational structure of language, which in turn is necessarily dialogical. Before we come to recognize this we have to primarily assert the perspectival factor.

Self and its Prespective

The notion of, the human self, possessing a universal perspective, presupposes a metaphysical conception that asserts that the former has an intrinsic nature or essence. A peculiar notion of human rationality is derived from this metaphysical framework. It takes into account the demands of the scientific world-view, especially the notion of objective scientific knowledge. Kant's separation of the empirical and the emotional that are contingent from the rational, which is necessary, further contributed to the development of this framework as a paradigm. The idea of self surrounded more on reason, which is common to all human beings. It provides a picture of human self in the light of the universal conditions of human existence and thereby ascribes to the former a universal perspective for knowledge acquisition.

Richard Rorty examines the conceptual presupositions of this picture and says that, this temptation, to think of the world or the human self as possessing an intrinsic nature or essence, is the legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a language of its own¹. Such a non-human language that is necessarily non-contingent will have the power to determine all the conceptual categories of man and will

language and The Evolution of The Self

consequently provide the human self a universal perspective.

Conceptually, such a picture of the self and the notion of universal perspective were propagated in order to free the concept of self from the subjectivist and relativistic consequences it may lead to. This is because, a notion of self and of human consciousness almost inevitably brings with it the idea of individuality, which in turn calls for an explanation of the subjective features of the former. The identification of the self with the rational part of human nature is an attempt to dissolve the problem that may arise when subjectivity is associated with consciousness. This identification presupposes a separation of the mind, the res cogitans, from the body, the res extensa and also an exclusion of the former from the concern of natural science. All these were necessary to ascribe a universal perspective to the self. In short, what Rorty describes as the concept of a world created by a being who has a language of his own, takes for granted the legitimacy of the mind-body dualism.

This separation ultimately helped philosophers to surpass the individualistic features of consciousness. When a nonhuman language is envisaged to be representing the structure of the cognitive perspectives, consciousness as a special subjective feature of the self ceases to raise any conceptual riddle due to the former's invariable assurance of universality. This language makes the issue raised by subjectivity vanish and what remains is the world which is objective and which can be objectively represented.

The idea of a nonhuman language with a universal perspective ascribes to the former certain fixed roles and functions. Its nonhuman nature suggests that it is free from contingencies and its structure is fixed and universal. This ideal of universality further led to an explanation into the essential logical features of language, which will in advance define its functions and applications. The representational conception of language is the natural output of this outlook. Here representationality is conceived as the essential logical feature of language. This conception ultimately resulted in conceiving language as medium of expression or representation. With an emphasis on such logical features, the representational conception envisages to provide the self a fixed universal perspective. The model of

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language analysis carried out in this framework subsequently focused attention on simple forms of linguistic expressions that are immediate representations of the factual reality. This kind of language analysis ultimately asserts that language possesses a universal structure and therefore an intrinsic nature.

Again, this model eventually creates a unique space for the self, where it exists independently of the rest of the world. The conception of language as a dualistic medium is the central insight of this model. Being a medium through which reality is filtered, apprehended and communicated, language here stands between the self and the world yet not related to both in an intimate manner. It is, in other words, a nonhuman mediumthough used by human through which reality is represented. In other words, the world speaks through language. Representationality is the logical feature shared by all linguistic expressions. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus categorically asserts this by introducing the concept of logical form. The logical form, according to him, is the essential form that is shared by both the realms of language and the world². This logical form makes representationality a matter of logical necessity. He further introduces the concept of the general form of propositions. This general form is the essential logical form of all propositions that are pictures of factual reality. It would define the universal conditions to be satisfied by all linguistic expressions and would consequently provide a universal perspective to all those who use it.

This view with its attention shifted to language from mind implicitly proposes that the perspectival horizon of the self is located within the structural framework of language. Yet the dualistic framework it upholds immediately leads to certain conceptual difficulties. Rorty indentifies the mistakes of such a conception even if it substitutes language for mind or consciousness. He continues,

But in itself this substitution is ineffective. For if we stick to the picture of language as a medium, something standing between the self and the nonhuman reality with which the self seems to be in touch, we have made no progress. We are still using the subject-object picture, and we are still stuck with issues about skepticism,

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pholds ies the idealism and realism. For we are still able to ask questions about language of the same sort we asked aboout consciousness³.

The problem is with the separation between the medium and the mediated. Once we shift our attention from single sentences to vocabularies, asserts Rorty, the dualistic conception of language loses its foundation. It then becomes hard to locate the intrinsic nature of language because, here we lack a precise criterion to decide between the multitude of vocabularies, each possessing different nature and function. It will become difficult to think of the world as making one set of vocabularies better than another. As Rorty puts it, we cannot adjudicate on the basis of the world between the vocabulary of Athenian Politics vs. Jefferson's⁴. Here we have to consider alternative language-games. We hardly find any justification to think that the vocabulary is somehow alreaday out there in the world waiting for us to discover it⁵.

The image of a world that speaks through the language, which is its medium, vanishes. To identify language with alternative language-games and vocabularies is to recognize that the former is basically contingent. Consequently the relation between the language and world also becomes contingent and hence multidimensional. This is the result of what Rorty calls, a dedivinisation of the world. He adds;

The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose us a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that⁶.

When we do speak in this way we do it not from an independent space we occupy, detached from the world and the medium. No language game is an independently existing phenomenon, but is intimately associated with a form of life that is formed out of various practices. In other words, the self always finds itself as participating in the various language-games it is engaged in. The idea of language game therefore, envisages a unique coming together of the self and the world in language. It implicitly suggests that, the various forms of life determine not only our knowledge about reality, but also our very self-hood. Each language game, which the self is engaged in playing, reveals a unique dimension of reality to which it is

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intimately interwoven. As a consequence, a one-dimensional concept of reality is thoroughly undermined.

In this context, the idea of fixed human nature is no more at issue, Human beings rather derive thier essence out of the various ways they are involved in the language-games and forms of life. Since there is no fixed essence for a language-game and hence for language as a whole the idea of a fixed human nature also gets invalidated. The various language-games, says Wittgestein, have no one thing in common, as they are related to one another in different ways⁷. As language is something constituted of such relationships the human nature itself is something that evolves out of them, It is only through the projects and processes of various language-games that the human self derives its essence and this makes it flexible and historical. It is flexible because, a rule in the language-game does not stand for any a priori essence or structure that transcends the concrete existence of human being. And it is historical because, no language-game can exist in a vacuum. As Wittgenstein says, the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or a form of life8. Every human action and life form constituted of such actions and behavior patterns presuppose a background in history. We make the various language-games through our interactive encounters. Language evolves out of the historical process where in the words of Rorty, new forms of life kill old forms, not to accomplish a higher purpose, but blindly9.

In order to understand the nature of the evolution of the self from this historically situated interactive encounters we must know how the self derives its perspectival horizon from the various language-games that come to encounter each other in the process of historical evolution. This consists in understanding to what extent the historically evolving language-games determine the ontological status of the self. Here we cease to think language as a dualist medium and conceive it as a hermeneutic medium, which encompasses the being of man, the world in which he finds himself and all that contributes to the formation of a living reality for him. To recognize this hermeneutic significance of language is to conceive it as, as Hans George Gadamer says, as element in which we live and which we can never objectify to the extent that it ceases to surround us 10. Language is,

...nothing like an enclosure from which we could strive to escape. The element of language is not a mere empty medium in which one thing or another may be encountered. It is the quintessence of everything that can encounter us at all¹¹.

Hence in a very preliminary sense, language is ontologically significant in two ways, which together define the linguisticality of man's very being. Thery are:

1. Language functions as the essential hermeneutic medium that we cannot dispense with at all. All our access to the world and reality presuppose language and is necessarily perspectival.

2. language is both historical and contingent. This is because, on the one hand it is a historically evolving phenomenon as a result of human interaction and on the other hand it is the creation of humans who are contingent.

Conceiving language as a hermeneutic medium encompasses these two aspects. Martin Heidegger thus conducts a hermeneutic analysis of the being of man by combining these two aspects and accordingly derives his peculiar notion of human existence. The essence of man, according to him lies in his existence, which being historical is a temporal process that manifests in and through language. This temporal feature of being represents its historicity. The horizon of being. asserts Heidegger, is time¹². It brings together in a peculiar way the three dimensions of time into the unique framework of its being-hood. The present is formed out of the past and also projects the future to integrate the whole of its being. The past as well as the projection of the future constitute the present through a process of self-making.

This self-making process is, at the same time, a process of constituting history. This is because, the process of integration of the being that happens in the self-making activity is never a completely independent activity performed by the individual. This process on the other hand happens in a particular situation, natural as well as historical. The natural situation does not suggest any significant change in the structural movement of the self-making process that reveals itself in the domain of time. But the historical situations, being themselves formed out of the self-making process, penetrate this temporality in order to determine the momentum of such

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acts. In other words, there exists a dialectical relationship between the being of man and the histroical situations where he finds himself. In a sense, both are the products of the self-making and the integrating acts of man's being. Asserting the temporal features and historicity of man's being Heidegger contends that man's being is irretrievably being-in-the-world. Therefore, there exists a fundamental practical relationship between the being of man and the things in the world.

Heidegger says that this relationship is characterized by a 'concem' where the use of entities we encounter in our life situation acquires prominence¹³. This will resist the possibility of viewing something which we encounter in our life situations as an independently existing phenomenon. Rather it has to be approached like a tool or equipment, which will serve some of our practical purposes. Conceiving the world as consisting of equipment which have uses and which we can employ in various projects suggests the inevitability of value intervention in our relationship with the world and others. Every interactive encounter will necessarily precede with a projection of meanings by the self. Since all such projections and interactions are mediated through language, all our understanding of the world and all our experience presuppose that we have already oriented ourselves towards the world in particular ways by means of language. The 'as' structure is built into the very core of our relationship with the rest of the world and it exerts a normative power.

To recognize the 'as' structure of human perspectives is the first step towards recognizing the ontological significance of language, as far as the being of man is concerned. As a matter of fact, the self will be inheriting a linguistic horizon and will be deriving all its cognitive categories from the latter. This linguistic horizon is solely responsible for the self's possession of a perspective. Since the linguistic horizons are historically situated, the human perspective also will be historically situated. In short, the notion of a nonhuman logical perspective sounds highly improbable.

This association of the perspective sounds in the historically situated linguistic horizons reveals a unique feature of the nature of the human self, its community-bound and intersubjective nature. This enables the self surpass the fetters of a subjective perspective. The linguistic

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horizon is a common property of a community. Hence the self, as a result of inheriting it, will posses a broader perspective, the vital elements of which are community-bounded and therefore intersubjective. Conceiving language as a hermeneutic medium will ultimately amount to asserting this. Gadamer thus emphasizes this aspect by showing how in the linguistic character of our access to the world we are implanted in a tradition. Tradition in the wider sense will take care of the socio-cultural dimensions of language. We inherit a linguistic horizon as a result of our being rooted in a language orlinguistic tradition. This rootedness in turn, helps us surpass our finiteness and narrowness as a subjective entity. The prejudices we posses are not our subjective prejudices, but are the intersubjective conditions in which the tradition is handed down to us. In other words the linguistic horizon is the common possession of the community to which we necessarily belong. The language that makes up the categories of our thought and guides our thinking is something which we share with others-not as a universal condition, but as a concrete intersubjective field, where we interact with others and something that evolves out of such concrete interactions. Therefore the perspective of the self is not necessarily subjective, but is intersubjective.

Recognising language as a hermeneutic medium and its ontological significance does not conclude merely in an assertion of the intersubjective and community-bound nature of its perspectival horizon. It further leads to the realisation that, the self, as well as the consciousness it possesses is under a process of constant evolution, which never attains completion at any point. This is because, the unique linguistic horizon to which the self subscribes to is itself something that continuously gets expanded as a result of human interacions. Therefore, in order to evaluate the nature of the self further we need to understand the structure of the interactive encounter in which the self is engaged in. In every such encounter the self will be getting exposed to a multitude of perspectives, some of them raising strong challenges and some proposing alternatives to the one possessed by it.

Here the choice is between, as Rorty says, vocabularies, which are self-contained, and not between single sentences which are representations of factual world. Hence we are not presented with any fixed criterion in

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order to adjudicate between the alternatives. Consequently the self finds it difficult to decide the conclusive validity of any one of the perspectives that it encounters. This standstill situation is the result of the plurality of linguistic horizons, each proposing a unique and different world-view. To proceed with the interactive encounter the self has to recognise the relative significance of the different perspectives encountered. This is also to realize the limitation of each perspective, including its own, in providing a comprehensive perspective and thereby a perfect world-view. Language comes to fully deliver its functions as a hermeneutic medium only when such a realization occurs and also when it is employed as a medium to perform a dialogic encounter between the different perspectives. The evolution of the self takes place as a result of this dialogic encounter.

Dialogue and the Evolution of the self

To recognize language as a hermeneutic medium is primarily to realize that, ultimately a structure of dialogue is built into every fruitful human interaction. It is this structure that makes possible movements and therefore, is responsible for the essential dynamism of the linguistic medium. In its absence language willappear as a barrier, rather than a medium for interaction. This is because, as we have seen, linguistic interaction is all about an encounter between different linguistic horizons, each rooted in different traditions. In dialogue, the individual boundaries of the respective horizons get surpassed, as a dialogue envisages a collective exploration of meaning by different participants. It culminates in the creation of a common language with a wider and comprehensive perspectival horizon. Similarly, the self acquires a wider perspective from its various interactive encounters with the multitude of perspectives to which it is exposed.

The hermeneutic tradition discusses the problem of different perspectives that are historically situated when it analyses the problem of the understanding of textual meaning. On the one hand there is the text, which is the product of a linguistic horizon. The semantic horizon of the text thus belongs to its peculiar historical situation or tradition. On the other hand, the interpreter who tries to understand the textual meaning cannot approach the text directly owing to its historical situatedness. From the outset it seems that the meaning of the text can be explained in two ways:

Language and The Evolution of The Self

1. The interpreter should grasp the meaning of the text by transcending his historical situatedness, by imaginatively traveling to the historical situation of the text's original author.

2) This view asserts the historicity of the author more radically. It thus says that, the interpreter cannot escape the boundaries of his own historical situation, and hence he will understand the textual meaning from his own perspective.

The first position calls for an objective comprehension of the textual meaning while the second alternative adopts a relativistic position. Gadamer, after analyzing these two positions elaborately contends that, both are equally mistaken. Objective understanding of the text is impossible, because the interpreter cannot transcend his historicity. According to him, the meaning of the text is located, neither in the language of the text, nor is it to be found in the language of the interpreter. It has to be explored in a common language of the text and the interpreter, which evolves out of a dialogic encounter between them¹⁴.

Similarly, the self will be coming across a multitude of perspectives in course of its interactive encounters with others. Each of these perspectives will be the product of different linguistic horizons. Again, each of them will be holding a unique world-view and propose a model of reality. Therefore, an encounter with them will provide the self a possibility to realize its own limitations and also to acquire a more comprehensive persp ectival horizon. This enables the self to realize its possibilities in the famework of a continually expanding horizon. Every encounter with a different perspective will add something more to its existing view and herefore will enrich its perspective. Here the rootedness of its perspective na particular linguistic horizon does not appear as an obstacle. This is because the structure of language is essentially dialogic. As Gadamer says, the rootedness and situatedness in particualr linguistic horizons itself contains he possibility of seeing beyond. The horizon does not represent any fixed or solid state of affair. It is something which evolves and expands. To Recognize the situatedness of one's perspective is to recognize its limitations and this leads to a willingness to look beyond its boundaries. As Gadamer says, I-lessness is an essential feature of the being of language. He

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...speaking does not belong in the sphere of the "I" but in the sphere of the "we" ...the spiritual reality of language is that of the pneuma, the spirit, which unifies I and Thou¹⁵.

But to see beyond one must primarily realize and admit one's limitations and the inability of one's perspective to provide a comprehensive picture of reality. One should also admit the validity of other perspectives as possible interpretations of reality. This is to make oneself open to the claims of other perspectives. While discussing the problem of the understanding of textual meaning Gadamer stresses on the creative role of the interpreter which consists in exhibiting an openness to the text's claim to truth. This openness, as a matter of fact, amounts to the admission that one is not the authority about the subject matter and many things are left out for one to know. This is to admit one's ignorance and the very possibility of dialogic interaction presupposes such an admission. This in turn is to admit the contingency of one's own position. The self that encounters other perspectives ought to admit this ignorance and consequently make its position indeterminate. It thus has to consider other prspectives as possible alternatives. Since each such perspective is a product of historically situated linguistic horizon, each will be containing the insights of a community, which it has assimilated during its historical existence.

But in a dialogic interaction these insights can no more remain confined to their respective historical situations. They necessarily get exposed and articulated in language. Language in a peculiar manner contains all these various perspectives, since all of them are essentially linguistic in nature. In dialogic interaction there is the possibility of these various perspectives to get assimilated to a language of conversation that takes place between them. Gadamer observes that the evolution of a common language of conversation is a prerequisite for dialogic interaction. He writes:

Every conversation presupposes a common language, or, it creates a common language. Something is placed in the center, as the Greeks said, which the partners to the dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another. Hence agreement concerning the object, which it is the purpose of the conversation to bring about, necessarily means that a common language must first be worked out in the conversation¹⁶.

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During such conversations, the self, in a unique manner assimilates the insights of the different perspectives encountered. This suggests that is perspectival horizon is not a closed one, but is under a process of constant is perspectival horizon. A transformation necessarily takes place to the self. It is a transformation to a new communion with the other perspectives encountered during interaction. The linguistic horizon of the self gets transformed to a wider and more comprehensive one.

The process of transformation is a process of evolution. Here both language and the self evolve. The self is thus a dynamic entity, whose existence consists in acquiring new perspectives and world-views. It accomplishes all these by possessing new languages that it creates in its dialogic interaction with others. This new language will necessarily be a broader and richer one, as it will contain the insights gathered by all the participating linguistic horizons in their historical existence. Our discussion therefore suggest the following points:

- 1. The human self cannot have a perspectival horizon independent of language.
- 2. Language and therefore the perspectival horizon of the self are historically rooted, which in turn is a rootedness in a tradition. Hence the perspective of the self cannot be an absolutely universal one.
- 3. The rootedness in tradition, though suggests the essential rootedness of the self, also simultaneously suggests the endless possibilities of the self to assimilate the perspectives of the other historically rooted traditions and thereby expand its horizon and gets its very self-hood transformed. This consists in its ability to create and inherit new and comprehensive linguistic horizons as a result of dialogic encounters.

From the light of these discussions we can now form the picture of the self as an entity which evolves out of language. With language undergoing changes and transformation the self also gets transformed. Since language offers limitless possibilities for interaction and discourse, the possibilities of the perspectival horizon of the self also is limitless. At the same time every language is contingent and hence every perspective is incomplete and indeterminate. The self also is a necessarily contingent phenomenon. It is this contingency that enables it to assimilate novelty and

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thereby transform its nature and structure. Thus its limitations themselves provide it endless possibilities to realize its very being.

The evolution of language is the evolution of the self. Language evolves out of the self-making activities of the self which are materialized in the latter's dialogic interactions. We come to realise the fundamental identity of the two processes. Since the possibilities of language are endless, the possibilities of the self also are endless.

NOTES

This is the revised version of the paper I presented at the ICPR National Seminar on Mind, Language and the Evolution of Human Consciousness: Indian and Western Perspectives, held at the ICPR Office at Lucknow during 24th to 26th July, 2000. I thank all the participants of the seminar for giving me valuable suggestions.

- 1. Cf. Rorty, Richard: 1989, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p 5.
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- 12. Cf. Heidegger, Martin: 1962, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Marper and Row, p.38.

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- Cf. lbid. The Chapter VI of Being and Time introduces this concept to characterise the being in the world of the Dasein.
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STRUCTURE OF MIND AND STRUCTURED MIND

SANGEETHA MENON

The primacy of consciousness is a contention debated at various forums starting from neuro-biological to anthropological studies. It is interesting that debates on the primacy/non-primacy of consciousness focus on the immediacy or mediacy of a localised experience with its own contextualised characteristics and not on the ontology of an 'enduring' experiencer. The issue is whether many discrete experiencers contribute to the continuous 'experience' of the I-consciousness or each experiencer is a 'holonic' expression of the I-consciousness.

When I talk about 'consciousness' the first and nearest thing which comes to my mind is my mind. We cannot discuss in depth about 'consciousness' without a discussion on the 'I' who is the owner of it and who is also the choice-maker. We cannot initiate a discussion on my "Iness" without a discussion on my mind. And, mind can be discussed only on the basis of thoughts and patterns of thinking.

- Do we think based on mental structures?
- Are our thoughts formed from mental structures?
- How are mental structures and thoughts related?

These are pertinent questions to think about.

The 'I', 'You' and 'My-World'

The way we see the world and experience it is based on the interaction between three orders of realities: the 'I', 'You' and 'My-World'. All the three are potentially evolutionary in nature and hence prone to change. The 'I' is the one who experiences the world, makes assessments, acts and lives based on his/her understanding. Where and when does the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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"I-ness" originate and does it have an abiding self is an issue which requires yet another discussion.

The 'You' is that which is experienced by the 'I' as other than or away from him/her. The 'My-World' is a repository as well as resource of processed information which the 'I' gathers about the 'You'. The difference between the 'You' and the 'My-world' is that the relationship between the 'I' and the 'My-World' is private, and the relationship between the 'I' and 'You' is directed by objective, public laws and assumptions.

The 'My-World' is a private and individualised order of reality accessed and also contributed to be the 'I'. That which is experienced, that which is thought, and acts of the person all leave a mark in the 'My-World', when at the same time originates from the 'My-World'. The intentionality which causes the person to think, to experience or to act is a product of the (pure) 'I-ness' and the 'My-World'. The importance of the 'My-World' in the triangle of three realities is such that the health, sustainability and development of the person is dependent on the stability and nature of his/her 'My-World'.

Who does the talking: the 'I', 'You' or 'My-World'?

Intentionality threads the 'I', 'You' and 'My-World'. All the three sides of the triangular reality get connected to each other and generate a total and integral meaning due to intentionality. By intentionality, I mean the basic urge, for instance to open your eyes, to see, to feel or understand the seen and to keep a mark of it. Without intentionality there won't be a relationship between the seer and the seen. Intentionality is the basic conscious urge which gives and builds up a shape for the subjective 'Inness'. Now, if intentionality is that which causes the relationship between the 'I', 'You', and 'My-World', what is that which causes intentionality itself? Or, does it reside in 'I', 'You' or the 'My-World'? Who actually does the talking?

Different theories trace 'intentionality' to a material, psychological or metaphysical cause, with a parallel definition of what is 'intentionality'. Let us try to look into the three possibilites: Material is that which is 'outside', existing independently available to one and all but which is ruled by certain natural forces. The origin of 'intentionality' from that which is material

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nological ionality'. 'outside', by certain material should either give it the defining characteristics of the cause, such as independent objective existence, availability to one and all etc., or different independent objective existence from the defining characteristics such as dependent subjective existence from the defining characteristics such as dependent subjective existence from the defining characteristics such as dependent subjective existence from the defining characteristics such as dependent subjective existence from the defining characteristics and restricted availability. Does intentionality originate from the You'? I know that something derivation makes me to do something, influences me to think in a certain fashion, talks about what I feel. The dissided cogitations of mine become public through my expressions of them by means of my words and deeds. It is also possible to betray my true feelings and thoughts and deceive another person by behaviours which are not associated with my true feelings. Deception would even help me, to get a score in the evolutionary stance and, qualify as intelligent and a sure career of my culture.

Psychological is that which is 'inside', exist independently/dependently, and with restricted availability. My moods, my feelings, my conscious decisions, my unconscious drives, impulses, my thoughts: all of these and more can be said to carry my psychology and define my mind. Is intentionality psychological in origin? Though there could be reliable predictability and assessment about my personality, my states of mind can differ. Therefore intentionality can be a state of my mind or a cumulative result of my states of mind.

Inetentionality if it originates from 'You' then would give 'You' and things 'outside' other than me the power to purchase me. That is not the case. I not only desire for something but also desire not to have something. This double-sided complexity of intentionality can reside only in something which is open-ended and at the same time intimate. My 'soul' cannot be in 'You' and still talking! The 'other' always has to be away and different from me. If my intentionality springs from 'You' there won't be anything for me to intent. There won't even be the 'me'!

There are many reasons to believe that intentionality originates from the 'My-World' and 'I'. After all it is my mind which intents, or at least it feels' so. It is 'I' who feels, who thinks, who acts. But even when there is no feeling, thinking or acting, 'I' exist. 'I' seems to be a harder nut to break by the absence or presence of intentions. Who or what intents the 'I'? We can say that it is the 'I' which intents everything and therefore

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intentionality originates from the 'I' and therefore has a psychological cause.

The 'I' seems to be falling in a totally different category. It has a presentness which is expressed through intentions. It also has a beyondness embedded in it which is the reason for its non-extinction with the extinction of intentions, its non-absence with the absence of intentions. Here is a reversal of the Cartesian argument. Even if I don't cogitate, I exist Otherwise who is reporting or 'talking' about the cogitations being there or not being there?

To seek and define the origin and nature of intentionality is to seek and define the naturee of the 'I' who intents, the Intentor.

Where does the structure begin?

We all think. Sometimes it is not even wrong to say that we are 'thoughts'. Our own subjective identity as well as 'the big picture' which we see outside vis a vis our subjective identity are founded on the way we think and the way our thoughts are. A structure connects and networks the 'I' inside and the world outside, which we call as 'the mind'.

Any kind of thinking involves processes like correlations, associations and conclusions. Any kind of thinking is based on an accepted or assumed notion of causality, which will decide what is created by the thoughts, and what create the thoughts. Thinking takes place as a result of interactions between the 'I' to which everything is reported about the 'You' which is seen, experienced or understood. There is an invariable connection between that which is reported about and that which is reported to. Now, the question 'where does the structure begin' is a question about the reporter. Who does the reporting and to whom?

Patterns of thinking

Let us juxtapose the triangularity of the 'I', 'You' and 'My-World', and thinking, and look at the 'behaviour' of the thinker. When we think, as mentioned earlier, there is a process of thinking, that which is reported to, that which is reported about and that which reports. Thinking is a composite result of all the four processes.

That which is reported about are:

properties such as shape, size, location, design, color, smell etc. of

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physical objects qualities such as truth, be .uty and goodness nature of truth and method of verification

That which is reported to are:

- the analyst
- the experiencer

That which reports is:

the 'witness'

Processes of thinking are:

- induction and deduction
- . judgements and comparisons

The magical world of science and culture

We think about properties such as shape, size, location etc. of an object. The mind, in a pre-reflective state analyses the information which is reported about and generates meanings through correlations and associations. *Analytic thinking* is a part and parcel of our life. Though the information analysed and stored in the 'My-World' need not be always the starting point, analysed data gains some kind of granted validity to lead from.

However intuitive our thinking can be there is a stratum of accepted (culturally or scientifically) laws, theories, perspectives and norms. This stratum can be minimal but cannot be totally absent.

The information which is stored in the 'My-World' as a result of analytic thinking does not remain raw. Instead, it gets associated with other meanings generated as a result of *inter-subjective thinking*. The physical object assumes another form of existence, as a mental object, in the mind. The mental object is judged and compared. Questions about morality and beauty are related to mental objects. Though they are generated in an inter-subjective mental level, so as to prevent instability, they acquire a semi-real status through the formation of cultural practices and beliefs. The idea is akin to Platonic idealism. The 'best' exists somewhere in the

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mind. But the representative of it is present in the experienced world.

The mystical world of relationships

Apart from analytic meanings and associative meanings, thinking also generates meanings based on relationships based on love and hatred, like and dislike. The pattern of thinking which creates relationships takes place in the reflective state of mind. In this pattern of *intra-subjective thinking* the thoughts are founded on a common space shared by the thinker's subjective identity and the identity of another person. This pattern of thinking is the main contributing factor to the evolution and development of one's self (and another's self). Intra-subjective thinking is also responsible for our notions and conceptualisations of truth and methods of verifying truth. Interestingly, truth gets a definition which incorporates not only standards of knowledge, but also of feeling. Therefore truth is not only known, but also felt and experienced.

All the three patterns of thinking demand the presence of a thinker. There must be a thinker to make all the thoughts going on coherent and integrate them to contribute to the 'My-World'. The duality between the thinker and that which is thought about is another condition necessary for all the three patterns of thinking. The 'I', 'You' and 'My-World' act as a kind of strainer for the whole person. The information analysed, associative meanings formed and relationships attributed, also, contribute to the development of the 'I', 'You' and 'My-World'. Which is primary: the structure with which one is born, or the world which is known and experienced? is a question asked too often in the history of human civilisation. May be the structure with which we are born itself becomes unstable if it (mind) does not have at least an assumption of that which is prior and that which is later. The notion of causality underlies both the structure and these three patterns of thinking.

In these three patterns of thinking, the thinker takes the form of ananalyst and experiencer who are reported to about what is analysed and experienced. Is that which reports, (I call it) 'the witness' also another form of thinker or not is an issue which will bring back the problem of intentionality and the primacy of consciousness for discussion, along with the conjecture of a fourth pattern of thinking called the trans-subjective

thinking.

Another world of transcendences

Thoughts are complex, for two reasons: each pattern of thinking generates meanings and meanings are generated not by a simple association or correlation but directed by the already available 'My-World'. The complexity of thoughts is added to by the occurrence of another pattern of thinking which does not fall within the triangular boundary of the 'I', 'You' and 'My-World'. This non-structural pattern of trans-subjective thinking introduces new structures of thinking through images, metaphors, forms and sounds. Trans-subjective thinking transcends the general structure of 'I, 'You' and 'My-World'. It has the quality to go beyond structural thinking. Here, meanings are not created by association or comparisons but as a result of trans-exeriential state/s of happiness.

Pre-meditative thinking such as prayers, chants, visualisations, art appreciation etc. can cause a transcendence. Yet, even the transcendence experienced cannot escape without leaving a mark in the 'My-World'. That is why we 'express' about the sudden meanings experienced. Transsubjective thinking not only creates perceptual leaps but also translates them into visions that influence the development of and shifts in our identities.

Possible order of four patterns

At any given time, these four patterns of thinking override each other. Though it cannot be said that each one of these patterns follows a single path of development, each pattern has its own 'ups' 'downs' and 'equilibriums'. Each path's development if seen in segregation will have its starting and finishing points clear in terms of its end result.

At the same time, these four patterns of thinking do not have a hierarchical order of starting with one pattern and reaching another pattern of thinking. In each pattern of thought there are taints of structural rigidity and trascendental openness. It is the structural rigidity which gives a thought contextual meaning and reference. It is the transcendental openness which gives a thought a-contextual beyondness. We not only think within a context. We also think beyond a context.

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Where does contextuality give way to transcendence? When do we break the order of structural thinking? Unless there is a hierarchy of orders there won't be different means of knowing and understanding. Sense perception, inference, presumption, formation of theories and laws etc. are the structures through which or tools by which we see, create and defend meanings. We know when one structure or tool is to be replaced by another, and when one structure or tool is to be supplemented by another tool. However, meanings generated are integrated to a larger system called the 'experiencer', which gives coherence to various strands of thoughts, sustains them and in the process develops a self-identity for the thinker.

Forms, images and metaphors; companions to thinking

We think through words. We think through images. We also think through the space between words and images. An instance is our expression "I have no words to express my love for you". Intensity of an emotion overrides words and forms. It is the same principle which acts when we employ a metaphor in order to explain or understand an otherwise complicated and indirect phenomenon. Often meanings are created when quick jumps happen between the four patterns of thinking.

Forms, images and metaphors can alternatively explain the object of experience in a different way such that the explanation itself can influence and lead to the experience of the same object in a different way or intensifying of the original experience. What we are used to collectively call as 'emotions' rest a lot on the usage of metaphors, images and forms in thinking. The main feature of these three companions to thinking is that they can help create new and varied meanings for the same object, the object being redefined every time by the experiencer.

Looking at the structured mind

Mind is a structure or a group of structures, which get modified or newly formed. Can mind be conceived without structures? Can there be states of mind without thoughts? The fourth pattern of trans-subjective thinking is a clue to this question. But, this pattern is not a pattern frequently present. It has to happen. Another structure of thinking cannot create transcendence in order to see gestalt meanings. At the same time a mind without structures is inconceivable.

The transcendence of the mind from the structures with which it is equipped is not antagonistic to the structures themselves. At the same time the transcendence of the mind from the structures is some what dependent on the structures themselves.

There are two possibilities of non-structuring the structured mind. One way is to introduce another structure and take out the rest of the structures with the new one. The second possiblity is to remove all kinds of structures. The second seems to be an impossibility. We cannot cease to think. And as long as we think, we operate with the help of structures. The introduction of another structure to remove the previous structures is theoretically a sound option. The new structure, to remove the previous structures, should itself have a double-sided role. It should functionally be able to remove the previous structures. It should also be able to dissolve its structural nature into itself once its functional role is over.

Looking at the structure of Mind

I will cite an example from the epistemology of Advaita Vedanta.

The closest concept in Advaita to 'structure of thinking' is vnti. It is the vnti of an object which is seen, heard, etc. which forms a pratyaya and gives the knowledge or experience of that object. Two kinds of vnti are suggested: The khandākāravnti is the partite structure which gives any objective knowledge, and akhandākāravnti is the impartite structure which gives knowledge about one's self. Akhandākāravnti is a structure which turns its back to other structures by not giving any knowledge about the 'You' or a reference from the 'My-World'.

It is like the proverbial coiled snake which has its tail in its mouth. The beginning of it is also the end. The starting point of the akhandākāravṛtti is the Intentor who witnesses the structures. The end point is also the Intentor. Akhandākāravṛtti is, according to Advaita epistemology, that which creates the knowledge about the 'identity sentences' like aham brahmāsmi. When I think, I am the thinker. When I don't think I still exist as the one who differentiates the two acts (of thinking and not-thinking). There is an enduring 'I-ness' all througout.

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Looking for the presence or absence of thoughts are two ways of looking at the 'mind'. Whether thoughts are present or absent is not an important question. The important question is 'who is thinking'. The important question is to 'think about' the thinker who is also the experiencer, the reporter and the witness too. Understanding the structure of mind is a pointer towards the road to pure 'I-ness' and the primacy of consciousness as an irreducible phenomenon.

NOTES

1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the seminar on 'Dimensions of Mind' organised by Indian Council of Philosophical Research at Dept. of Philosophy, University of Jaipur, in March 2000.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Many discussions with my Spiritual Guide and Guru H. H. Swami Bodhananda encouraged me to write this paper.

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PUTNAM'S PROPOSAL FOR LOGICAL REFORM

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N. G. KULKARNI

In this brief paper I shall consider a specific proposal by Putnam to replace classical logic by quantum logic. There are many puzzles and controversies in this highly esoteric branch of mathematical physics. There is the debate concerning deterministic vs. statistical laws. There are the mysteries concerning the behaviour of the electron as revealed, for example, by the phenomenon of 'superposition' which suggests that an electron has passed through both of two apertures when the experimental set-up makes it possible for it to pass through only one of them. Finally there is the principle of indeterminacy. It is impossible to determine, by the most sophisticated methods, both the position and the momentum of an electron with precision. The more accurate the value of one of the variables the less accurate correspondingly, is the value of the other. The product of the two errors is constant and this suggests that the imprecision is not due to practical limitations but is somehow, inherent in the situation.

Suppose p_1 is the ascertained position of an electron and m_1 , v m_2 , are its possible momenta. The very fact of ascertaining the position makes itimpossible (theoretically) which one of the possible momenta, the electron has. It is therefore true in Quantum Mechanics (using ' p_1 ' and ' m_1 v m_2 ' symbolise the statements concerning the precise position and alternative momenta of the electron) that ' p_1 ' and also that ' m_1 , v m_2 ' but it is not ascertainable either that ' p_1 . m_1 ' or that ' p_1 . m_2 '. Thus the distributive law has to be jettisoned. The difficulty can be tackled by advancing scientific theories of a highly general and speculative character; the principle of complementarity is one of them.

Putnam, however, prefers to remove the difficulties by adopting an

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 2 & 3 April- July 2002

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alternative to classical logic. He explicitly compares this move to the adoption of elliptical geometry, in place of Euclidean, by Einstein to deal with light rays passing through powerful gravitational fields-such as the sun's. Putnam's proposal is not the first proposal of its kind nor is it the first attempt at reforming logic. Way back in the thirties Neumann and Birkhoff proposed a logic without the principle of excluded middle. Their logic was not 3-valued nor was it truth functional. When Lukasiewicz expounded, fairly systematically, his 3-valued logic, Reichenbach proposed the adoption of such a logic for the purpose of dealing with microcosmic phenomena. Putnam himself, in an earlier essay on three-valued logic, approved of this suggestion. Later on, however, he came to feel that this would not accomplish the desired result. In an essay entitled "Is Logic Empirical?", first published in 1968 and reprinted in the 1st volume of his 'Philosophical Papers' under the title "The Logic of quantum mechanics" he argued for his proposal to reject the distributive principle at some length.

He assumes that scientific theories including quantum mechanical theoris are to be understood "realistically". That is to say, they are not to be understood in purely operational or instrumental terms. Nor are we to have recourse to purely ad hoc hypotheses or metaphysical assumptions concerning the relation between the observer and the observed. In the above symbolical example the electron has some particular momentum, though we cannot specify whether it is m₁ or m₂. Neither the momentum nor the position of the electron is brought into being by our methods of measurement. So it is true that m₁ v m₂ just as much as it is true that p₁ But it is not true either that p₁. m₁ or that p₁. m₂. Why does Putnam deny the truth of these conjunctions instead of their knowability? The reason seems to be that having ascertained the truth of p₁, I cannot ascertain the truth of either m₁ or m₂ so that if I knew either p₁.m₁ or p₁. m₂ I would know a logical contradiction. Let us grant that the impossibility of knowing both the position and the momentum of an electron is a theoretical impossibility and not merely the result of our ignorance. This theoretical impossibility can, in a loose sense, be termed logical. But surely, even if we equate truth with knowability-which can be done with some necessary qualifications it does not follow that any one who knew either of the two conjunctions would be knowing a logical contradiction. Knowing what is false is impossible Digitized by Arya Sar Punam's Proposal for Logical Reform

insome sense. Putnam thus seems to be mixing up truth-values with noetic or epistemic values. Once this is realized it can be shown that there is no need to discard the distributive principle to avoid a contradiction in "Quantum Mechanics. Let us use 'K p' to symbolize "impossible to known that p". Then the impossible to know that p" is known that p" is not only since the realism adopted by Putnam implies that m₁ v m₂ is not only maningful but true, and p₁ is known to be true, the conjunctions 'p₁m₁' and p₂.m₂' can neither of them be regarded as logically contradictory though knowing either of them can be regarded as logically contradictory, in some sense. Putnam thus seems to be mixing up truth-values with noetic or epistemic values. Once this is realized it can be shown that there is no need to discard the distributive principle to avoid a contradiction in Quantum Mechanics. Let us use 'K p' to symbolize "it is known that p". Then the situation in "Quantum Mechanics is summarized by the following three formulae:

- 1. Kp,
- 2. K (m, v m₂)
- 3. $\sim K (p_1.m_1). \sim K (p_1.m_2)$

A possible derivation of a contradiction could run as follows.

- 4. Kp₁-K(m₁vm₂)......1, 2 Conj.
- 5. $K[p_1,(m_1 \vee m_2)]4$, by acceptable thesis of modal logic.*
- 6. $K[p_1.m_1] v (p_1.m_2)$ 4, distri.
- 7. $K(p_1.m_1) \vee K(p_1.m_2)......6$ dist. of K Sign. over disjuncts (?)
- 8. $\sim [\sim K(p_1.m_1) .\sim K(p_1.m_2)].....7$ De Morgan's
 - * We treat the K-sign as formally analogous to the sign for logical necessity.

Step 8 contradicts the premiss 3.

The sixth step in this attempted derivation is clearly fallacious. Since the 'K' sign is farmally analogous to the necessity sign in modal logic and the universal quantifier in elementary predicate calculus. We can bring the fallaciousness of the above step by noticing that

- 1.(x)(FxvGx) = [(x) Fx v (x) Gx]
- $^{2. N}(pvq) = (Np v Nq)$

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are obviously fallacious though the converse implications are valid

On the other hand, if we insist that 'p₁' and "m₁v m₂" are both true and 'p₁.m₁' and 'p₁.m₂' are both false in quantum logic, though not in and 'p₁.m₁ and p₁.m₂ are classical logic, It can be shown, I think, that a contradiction results. Putnam through out his discussion, gives the impression that it is sufficient to sacrifice the distributive principle to remove anomalies from Quantum Mechanics. At any rate he does not mention any other principle that has to be jettisoned. On the other hand he insists that we can retain a number of laws of classical logic including the principles of excluded middle, double negaion, simplification, conjunction and addition. He also adds P.~P never holds even in quantum logic. We may set up the following simple derivation.

| MEN MANUAL MANUAL MANUAL SAMUEL (1997) 10 MANUAL | |
|---|------------------|
| 1. p ₁ | Premiss |
| 2. m ₁ v m ₂ | Premiss |
| 3. $\sim (p_1.m_1)$. $\sim (p_1.m_2)$ | Premiss |
| 4. $\sim (p_1.m_1)$ | 3 simpli |
| 5. $\sim p_1 v \sim m_1$ | 4 De Morgan |
| 6. ~ ~ p | 1 D.N. |
| 7. ~ m ₁ | 5, 6, Disj Syll. |
| | |

By similar steps, from the second conjunct in 3 we obtain

8.
$$\sim m_2$$

9. $\sim m_1 \sim m_2$
7, 8, Conj.
10. $\sim (m_1 \vee m_2)$
9 De Morgan's

Step 10 contradicts premiss 2

The only principles used in the derivation, not explicitly accepted! Putnam in his writings are, De Morgan's law and the principle of the disjunctive syllogism. The former is a thesis in the 3 valued logic of Lukasiewicz as also in Heyting's system of intuitionist Logic. The principle of the disjunctive syllogism is not a law of Lukasiewicz's system. Ido not know what Putnam's attitude would be on admitting them into his version of quantum logic. The princple of D. N. is a law in Lukasiewicz's system and I have used that half of the equivalence which is acceptable to Brouwer. He will have to reject at least one of them. And it is likely that once this is done other revisions may be required. The cost of reforming logic may be

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heavier than Putnam imagines. In the essay referred to above, as also in "Two Dogmas revisited", Putnam insists that alternative logics are on par with alternative geometries. And yet there is a crucial difference. On a physical interpretation the three geometries result in incompatible theorems. Neither intuitionist logic nor the 3-valued Logic of Lukasiewicz contains a thesis incompatible with any of the principles of classical logic. So far as I know, no attempt has been made to develop such a logic. So far as the 3-valued logic is concerned the best description of the situation is to say that under the rules governing logical constants, extended to cover the intermediate value, some of the principles of classical logic cease to be tautologies. But then there is ample reason to belive that. The numerical values of the system represent, not muth values but certainly values or noetic values. Moreover, if logic can be changed and chopped to suit a particular inquiry, there is no reason why different logics should not be employed in different fields. Logical principles will then exhibit local or geographical variations. Leaping electrons may defy the distributive law but an ambitious father who wants for his daughter, alier who is either a well-placed civil servant or a green card holder, will be perfectly content with some young man who is both a lier and a well placed civil servant or else both a lier and a green card holder. And rightly 50; satisfaction of either of the two formulations will fullfil his heart's desire and neither will give him any thing more than the other.

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WHAT IS ARISTOTELIAN SYLLOGISM?

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S. V. Bokil

In the Note that is appended to the letter of Invitations for the Seminar on Inference: Indian and Western, the second paragraph opens with the following sentences:

"From the point of view of Aristotelian logic, one could raise the question of the structure of syllogiam. Why should there be five members of the Nyaya syllogism? Are the three members of the Aristotelian syllogism really sufficient? Another very significant question is that there is hardly any discussion of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in Aristotelian inferential process. In fact there seems to be no awareness of invariable concomitance in Aristotelian logic."

These lines reveal, as I shall argue in this paper, several misconceptions about Aristotle's own treatment of syllogistic reasoning and further, confusion of certain issues which we should carefully keep apart. Misconceptions and confusions about Aristotle's logic are not peculiar to the writers of these above sentences but they are widely shared by the present philosphical community in India so much so that it is necessary to plead that the earlier we get rid of them, the better will it be for furthering our investigations. The Western world of philosophers was also labouring under misconceptions and confusions about Aristotle's logic until very recently, say about 50s or 60s of the erstwhile centruy bygone. Therefore there is no wonder that most of us still continue to labour under the same misconceptions and confusions. I am not quite sure whether the entire West has got itself rid of them. I am not sure either if I will be able to cure

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the whole of philosophic community in India of those misconceptions and confusions about Aristotle's logic. I must also confess that I also laboured under those misconceptions and confusions until I myself began to study and teach modern Symbolic or mathematical logic and in the course of my own intellectual development gave a course at post-graduate level on Jan Lukasiewicz's Aristotle's Syllogistic From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic. (II Edn. 1967 Oxford University Press, London, W.I). In the Perface to the First Edition of the Book, Lukasiewicz has said the following:

"...There does not exist today a trustworthy exposition of the Aristotle's Syllogistic. Until now all expositions have been written not by logicians but by philosophers or philologists who either, like Prantl, could not know or, like Maier, did not know modern formal logic. All these expositions are in my opinion wrong."²

Lukasiewiz's work is thus groundbreaking and throws, as will be seen below, a new light on the nature of Aristotle's logic. I may further also point out that the results of Luksiewicz's investigations have been now confirmed and acknowledged by the contemporary scholarship in the field. I shall therefore follow Lukasiewicz as closely as possible in my presentation.

The following argument is usually quoted as an example of Aristotelian syllogism.

(1) All men are mortal,

Socrates is a man,

Therefore,

Socrates is mortal.

The example is to be found in Ernst Kapp's Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic, (New York, 1942), Fredrick Copelston's History of Philosophy, vol. I (1946), Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy (London, 1946) and many other standard textbooks on traditional logic. Sextus Empiricus mentions the same example (with replacement of 'mortal' by 'animal') as a case of Peripatetic syllogism in his Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes. Lukasiewicz points out that this example, as a matter of fact, differs from Aristotelian syllogism in two logically important respects.

Firstly, Aristotle does not introduce singular terms or premisses into his system. If we follow Aristotle on this point and frame the following example shristotelian syllogism viz.,

(2) All men are mortal,
All Greeks are men,
Therefore
All Greeks are mortal.

This is still not an Aristotelian syllogism. Because, and this is the second point of difference, it is an inference. The word 'therefore' used between the premisses and the conclusion is a clear indication of this. It should be noted specifically that no syllogism is formulated by Aristotle's primarily as an inference. Bertrand Russell gives the above second case of inference below the first case above, and adds in brackets the remark that Aristotle does not distinguish between these two forms. This is an obvious mistake for the reason that Aristotle in his *Prior Analytics* states all his syllogisms as implications having the conjunction of the two premisses as antecedent and the conclusion as the consequent. Thus a true example of Aristotelian syllogism would be the follwing example:

(3) If all men are mortal and all Greeks are men, then all Greeks are mortal.

This of course is a modern example of the Aristotelian syllogism and not to be found in the works of Aristotle. It should be further specifically noted that no syllogism with concrete terms like men, mortal or Greeks is to be found in *Prior Analytics*. Aristotle does mention a few examples of syllogisms with cocrete terms in his *Posterior Analytics* but it should be noted that they are stated as implications as mentioned above. e.g.

(4) If all broad-leaved plants are deciduous and all vines are broad-leaved plants, then all vines are deciduous.

Both these syllogisms, i.e. (3) and (4), are only examples of logical forms they do not belong to logic because they contain terms that do not belong to logic. Logic is not a science about men and plants. In order thus bet a syllogism within the sphere of pure logic, we must remove from the syllogism what is called its matter and preserve only its form. It should

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be noted that Aristotle did this by introducing letters in place of con_{Tele} subject-terms and predicate terms. Inducting letter A for 'deciduous', letter B for' broan-leaved plants' and letter C for 'vines', we get the pure syllogistic form:

(5) If all B is A and all C is B, then all C is A.

Aristotle's style of presentation is not however so simple as that. Instead, he states this as follows:

(6) If A is predicated of all B and B is predicated of all C, then A is predicated of all C.

or

(6) If A belongs to all B and B belongs to all C, then A belongs to all C.

Thus genuine Aristotelian syllogism is of the implicational form. It is interesting to note that since he does not state syllogisms as inferences, the component propositions of the antecedent and the consequent are all referred to by Aristotle as premisses. The distinction between premisses and conclusion is of later times-most probably of stoic origin. The Greek word used by Aristotle is 'protasiy' and it means a sentence affirming or denying something of something. Every premiss is thus a statement in which something is said about something else either affirmatively or negatively. The two elements thus involved in a premiss are its subject and predicate. Aristotle calls them terms, defining a term as that into which the premiss is resolved. In building up his Syllogistic Aristotle considen premisses using only universal (or general) terms. He does not take notice of singular or of empty terms. Further, premisses to be considered must have a sign of quantity. 'All, no' are the signs of universality and 'some's the sign of particularity. A premiss with no sign of quantity is indefinite and Aristotle does not ignore it but for the purposes of his Syllogistic treats its particular premiss. Taking into account the critria of quantity and quality Aristotle retained only four kinds of premiss: Universal Affirmative Universal Negative, Particular Affirmative and Particular Negative.

Lukasiewicz also investigates into the reasons as to why singular terms were omitted by Aristotle's. Philosophical explanations are suggested

What is Aristotelian Syllogism?

by various commentators of Aristo e but Lukasiewicz finds no textual basis for them in Aristotle's Prio Analytics which is his main logical work having bearing on his theory of syllogisms. About this work, Lukasiewicz says that it is purely logical work and that it "is entirely exempt from any philosophical contamination."5 Lukasiewicz however draws our attention to the fact that Aristotle emphasizes that a singular term is not suited to be a predicate of a true proposition, as a most universal term is not suited to be a subject of such a proposition. This belief of Aristotle's is certainly questionable but that is not the point at issue. What is important to note is that he concentrated only on such terms as could take the position of subject and predicate in propositions or premisses. Only universal or general terms could satisfy this condition. If that is so, the letters (A,B,C) which he sues for expressing valid syllogisms are to be regarded as termvariables. "The introduction of variables into logic is one of Aristotle's greatest inventions."6 If the earlier draft of Lukasiewicz's this all important work on Aristotle's Syllogistic were not to get destroyed along with his library in the II World War bombing by Germans in 1939, this finding of Lukasiewicz would be the first of its kind.7 Sir David Ross thought about this use of letters by Aristotle so greatly that he at once declared Aristotle as 'the founder of formal logic.'8

If the goal of knowledge is to construct a deductive system or science which is a systematically organized body of knowledge, then Aristotle's Syllogistic is such a science. Such a science must have all its theses true. Inference cannot be true or false. They can be valid of invalid. One can see why Aristotle stated all the syllogisms as implicative propositions that are necessarily true by the virtue of their form. Lukasiewicz, by providing textual basis, shows and proves conclusively how Aristotle tried to achieve this goal, viz. construction of deductive system of syllotisms in all the four figures. He shows that even those laws of propositional logic which are absolutely necessary for developing such a syllogistic system are stated by Aristotle in his *Prior Analytics*. I shall not go into details of all that to but return to the point which I wanted to make regarding misconceptions and confusions which prevail in the academic circles regarding Aristotle's syllogisms. If we bear in mind the true nature of Aristotle's syllogism, that it is implicational thesis which is necessarily

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true and that it is not an inference, we can avoid the temptation to have its comparison with Nyāy's *Pancāvayavi* Vākya. The latter is an inference and there is no attempt at building up anything like a science of formal logic. Formal proof of the said argument and justification of the steps involved by citing rules of inference seems to be of no concern to a Naiyāyika. If you consider the example of an argument or inference presented by Naiyāyika from the point of view of modern formal logic, its logical structure and formal proof of validity is as follows:

- 1. For all values of x, if x is smoky then it is firey.
 - 2. This mountain is smoky / ∴ This mountain is firey.
 - 3. If this mountain is smoky then it is firey...........1. U. I.
 - 4. This mountain is firey. 3.2. M.P.

Or to put it more symbolically

- 1. (x) $(Sx \supset Fx)$
 - 2. Sm /∴ Fm
 - 3. Sm ⊃ Fm..... 1. U. I.
 - 4. Fm 3.2. MP

In fact whether a syllogism or any quantificational argument is three membered or five membered is indeed irrelevant. Consider the following argument:

If all drugs are contamunated then all negligent technicians are scoundrels. If there are any drugs which are contaminated then all of them are contaminated and unsafe. All germicides are drugs. Only the negligent are absent-minded. Therefore if any technician is absent-minded then if some germicides are contaminated then he is a scoundrel.

This is a perfectly valid argument but I really do not know how a Naiyāyika will be able to handle the argument or how he will be able to construct a proof of validity for this argument. It is a quantificational or syllogistic argument. Is it three membered? or five memberd? or n-membered? All such questions whether we raise them in the context of Aristotelian logic or Naiyāyika's logic have lost their relevance due to extensive developments

in the field of modern formal logic.

I now come to the question of Vyāptijñāna. I think here we have a genuine philosophical issue. All of us share philosophical anxieties as to how we come to acquire truth of a universal real proposition. In the case of the example given by Naiyāyika, it is not the validity of the argument that is at stake. We also require that the arguments that we present are sound. A sound argument is one which is not only formally valid but it has also true premisses. There are types of discourses or inquiries in which proof is sought or demanded. Such a demand natrually gives rise to logical investigation. To prove a proposition is to infer it validly from true premisses. The conditions of proof are two: true premisses or starting points and valid arguments. It is necessary to realize that the two conditions are independent. linguity into the question regarding truth of premisses belongs to enistemology (Jñānaśāstra or Pramānaśāstra). It is an inquiry that falls within the scope of epistemology and not certainly within the scope of formal logic, which Aristotle was interested in founding. It is however a mistake to suppose that" there is hardly any discussion of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) in Aristotelian study of inferential process and that there seems to be no awareness of invariable comcomitance (vyapti) in Aristotelian logic." The distinction betwen the two conditions that I have mentioned above, especially their independence was perfectly clear to Aristotle when he drew the distinction between apodeictic reasoning on the one hand and dialectical reasoning on the other, in the Topica and again in the Prior Analytics. The premiss of an apodeictic or demonstrative reasoning (syllogism) is true and necessary, that of a dialectical reasoning (syllogism) need not be so. He points out that mathematical reasoning is demonstrative and its premiss or premisses are true and necessary. In dialectical reasoning which belongs to other fields, premisses are simply assumed to be true for the sake of the argument and then we look for proofs of contingent propositions. The following passage from Aristotle's Prior Analytics speaks for this distinction and Aristotle's view-point clearly:

"The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical because the demonstrative is the asumption of one of a pair of contradictory

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propositions (for the man who demonstrates assumes something and does not ask a question) but dialectical premiss is a question as to which of two contradictories is true. This, of course, makes no defference to the fact that there is a syllogism in each case. Both the man who demonstrates and the man who asks the question do reason assuming that some predicate does belong or does not belong to something......Syllogistic premiss is demonstrative if it is true and accepted because deduced from basis assmptions, while a dialectical premiss is for enquirer a question as to which of two contradictories is true and for the reasoner the assumption of some plausible or generally held proposition."12

In chapter 12 of Topica, he draws the distinction between Induction and reasoning, (i.e. deductive reasoning) and of Induction he says: Induction is the passage from particulars to the universal. He also suggests that by induction he does not mean the simple enumeration of actual individual cases but rather the bringing together and comparing of a number of specifically different cases. It is well-known that Aristotle in his Metaphysics explained and admired constructive positive elements in Socratic method mostly comprising induction.

NOTES

- Refer to p.1 of the Note mentioned. The national Seminar was held in Pune University in March 2001.
- 2. Lukasiewicz, Jan.: op. cit. p. viii
- Refer especially to Kneale W & M.: The Development of Logic, 1964, 3. Oxford Uni. Press, London, E.C.4. chap. II, pp. 25-112.
- Russell, B.: op. cit. p. 219
- 5. Lukasiewicz Jan.: op.cit., p.6
- ibid. p.7
- Refer to p. vi of Lukasiewicz, op. cit, for conditions in which his work saw the light of the day. I have said this because in 1946 Sir David Ross spoke independently of the use of variables by Aristotle.

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- Refer to Note 1 on p. 8 of Lukasiewicz's op.cit.
- Refer to Copi. I.M., Symbolic Logic, New York, 1954 (Iedn), The MacMillan Co. Chap. Sec. I.I am inclined to believe that since Aristotle lived prior to Euclid by at least 50/60 years, it is Aristotle who should be credited with laying down of Deductive System as a goal of science.
- Those who are inferested in this should refer to Lukasiewicz's work cited in the beginning of this paper.
- 11. See page 108 of Copi.: op. cit.
- 12 W. & M. Kneale, op. cit, pp. 1-2

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INDUCTION IN THE 'GRUE' - SOME WORLD

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Induction is a form of inference in which one argues that the nredicate asserted to be true for the narrow universe is confirmed for the whole universe of discourse. All emeralds examined so far are found to be green and none found to be non-green is a truth about 'emeralds' examined so far. The predicate 'green' states a truthfulness about narrow universe of the colour of 'emerald', for the truthfulness of the statement is restricted to the present time and the predicate 'greenness' asserts about the colour of 'emerald' up to now. The whole universe of 'emeralds' includes all cases of emeralds examined and non-examined, in the past and future. The projection of the predicate green about the wider universe is openended. The emeralds even found in the distance planet will be green. The narrow universe of discourse is given and is called the evidence statement and the wider universe is called the hypothesis. Since all the emeralds we have so far observed have been green, we project the predicate 'green' to the wider universe of emeralds and adopt the hypothesis that 'all future emeralds probably are also going to be green".

The issue of justifying induction involves the description of "an accurate and general way of saying which hypotheses are confirmed by or which projections are validly made from, any given evidence." The inductive rule takes care of not only the fact that "when, how and why the proceeding from a given set of beliefs to a wider set is legitimate", but also it explains "why one prediction rather than another", from a given evidence statement. The inductive rule provides a general and accurate mechanism to license or justify such projection of the predicates. On the one hand, the inductive rules guide us to project the appropriate predicate

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among the rival and available predicates, on the other, these rules provide the justification for such selection.

Therefore, the task of the inductive rule is twofold. First, the inductive rule should contain a mechanism to provide the legitimacy in projectible hypotheses that have been actually projected and second, the inductive rule helps us to rule out all those projected hypothesis that are not to be considered projectible, and thus "the two-fold problem of projected unprojectable and unprojected projectable." Some of the questions to be answered concerning induction are: when, how and why the inductive generalisation from a given evidence statements to the wider set is possible? In other words, how we acquire, modify and eliminate our hypothesis on the basis of the given set of beliefs? Further. How the hypothesis which is always more than the given, gets confirmation from the evidence statements? Thus, it is, "a problem of defining the difference between valid and invalid projection."

The issue of the projection of the genuine predicate or the adaptation of the hypothesis, therefore, is essentially a normative issue, because its basic task is to find out the correct prediction by prescribing the appropriate inductive rule. The regulative rules of induction permit the right kind of projection of hypothesis from a given set of evidence statement and prohibit the projection of unwarranted, conflicting and unfamiliar predictions. The question is different from the descriptive question: how do we project beliefs or how exactly are the new beliefs formed from the given set of beliefs?

Entering into the 'Grue'-some World

Philosophers have argued that such rules are readily discovered in the nature of the mind or in human behaviour or in the structure of the world. Kant, for example, argues that the inductive inference in particular and human reasoning in general, is structured in the mind. Our mind is so structured that we do not have any problem in arguing validly from a set of beliefs to a wider set. These rules are found in the form of rules of inference and are necessary and indubitable. There would be errors and mistakes, of course, if those rules are not followed rigidly. However, we are not sure whether such a *priori* mental rules are there or not, for had there been such uniform mental rules the need for the existence of the variety of

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inductive practice would not have been there. Even if such a priori rules are there, it is hardly enough to capture the inductive practice for those rules which do not say anything about the world and most of our inductive inferences are about the world.

The other way to seek such regulative rule of induction is to argue that the evidence statement contains natural kinds with fixed property. It is argued that the world is divided into different natural kinds and natural kinds possess such characteristics to set them apart as a kind of their own among other things. The common properties which the members possess are predictable and stable. The properties the possession of which by the examined members can warrantedly be inferred from the discovery that examined members have them, properties which examined members would have had even had they not been examined. Therefore, we can be very much sure that the emerald as a natural kind possesses inherently such character that emeralds are always green wherever and whenever they are found. The nature of the things gives guidance to the future use according to the laws of uniformity of nature.

The problem in such inductive projection of predicate, as Hume has already conclusively argued, is not based on any logical principle because there is no contradiction involved in denying the statement of the inductive inference. Hume argues that the statements regarding wider universe are neither logical statements themselves, nor are they logical outcome of the evidence statements or inductive practices. The past instances or the evidence statements do not impose any logical compulsion over the occurrence of something yet to happen or on future events. There is no causal and logical connection found to be holding among the objects of the world. Hume has argued that there is no such fact as there is no contradiction involved in denying the propositions about the world or what he calls as a matter of fact. Hume's view has been supported in recent time by Quine's critique of a necessary propositions. Even if things are causally related in the nature the description of such causal relation will Not provide any normative inductive principle for, the specification of such causal relations are the simple description of the fact and it is always Possible that the present causal relation may not hold true in the future and there is no contradictoin in such thinking.

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Even if we can overcome Hume's problem, the process of inductive justification suffers a big blow in the form of Hampel's paradox of Raven. The paradox points out that any two statements however remote they may be, can provide inductive support to each other. For example, the statement that a given object, say this piece of paper is neither black nor a raven confirms the hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens. But this hypothesis is logically equivalent to the hypothesis that all ravens are black, Thus the conclusion that a given object is neither black nor a raven confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black.8 However, the so-called raven paradox can be resolved by clarifying the fact that the prediction is always from evidence statement to the hypothesis and not from any statement to any statement. The projection of a predicate is possible when there are some instances of the projection of such predicate. In other words, the projection of predicate or the prediction of the hypothesis is possible when there is some evidential support between the evidence statement and the statement indicating the projected predicate. Only those projections of predicates are inductively confirmed from the statements when these statements are found to be related, and more precisely there are positive cases of such relation and to negative cases so far. For example, if all emeralds examined before a certain time t are green, then at t our observations support the hypothesis that all emeralds are green and not any contrary hypothesis such as all emeralds are blue.

As if that were not enough, Popper declares that Induction is a myth. Popper argues that inductive inference is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure. The actual procedure of science is to operate with conjectures: to jump to conclusions often after one single observation. The mistaken belief in induction is fortified by the need for a criterion of demarcation which, it is traditionally but wrongly believed, only the inductive method can provide. 9

After all these problems if someone still thinks about the possibility of a logic of induction Goodman poses a riddle or paradox by arguing that the same evidence statement gives equal inductive support to two contradictory or incompatible predicates or hypothesis, i.e., the projections of predicates or adaptation of hypotheses may disagree or conflict for the

mexamined instances of the wider universe. Goodman calls this paradox "the new riddle of induction."

The new riddle of induction poses the paradox by arguing that it is nossible to envision a system of predicates rival to our own, such that a possible by us that all examined emeralds possess greenness will be equivalent pa finding that all examined emeralds possess non-greenness up to the nesent time. On the basis of such findings, the inference that the remaining meralds possess greenness is inconsistent with the inference that the emaining emeralds also possess non-greenness. Both the hypotheses have smuch inductive support for both hypotheses as both of them have equal numbers of positive instances in favour of them and no negative instances mainst them up to now. However, the future projection or predicates about he wider universe of discourse will be inconsistent with the inference that maining emeralds possess non-greenness. 10 There is no logical compulsion nexclude the unwarranted projections like blue and include the lawful miection green for the adaptation of the hypotheses that "all emeralds will be green" from the evidence statements that "all emeralds examined whore a certain time are green." Goodman argues that this is possible if recan imagine a predicate such as 'grue' which is to be understood as phy = t if and only if either the thing is then $\frac{1}{100}$ and the time is prior to time t, or the thing is then blue and the time ∞ prior to t. He presents the grue counter-example as follows:

Now let me introduce another predicate less familiar than "green". It is the predicate "grue" and it applies to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue. Then at time t we have for each evidence statement asserting that a given emerald is green, a parallel evidence statement asserting that the grue. And the statements that emerald a is grue, b is grue, and so on, will each conform the general hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. Thus according to our definition, the prediction that all emeralds subsequently examined will be green and the prediction that all will be grue are alike confirmed by evidence describing the same observations. But if an emerald subsequently examined is grue, it is blue and hence not green.11

gree predicate is defined commonly as "a predicate which applies to a

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thing x, if x is examined before a time t and found to be green and x_{ij} examined after t and is blue." Schematically the predicate grue can be defined as:

x is grue =df (x is observed before the time t & x is green) and (x is not observed before the time t & x is blue)¹²

The definition of the predicate grue says "that till time t, both objects which are green and blue are green. If it is green, it is grue and if it is blue, then it is grue." That is to say in this formulation green and blue are not incompatible predicates. But after time t, they are said to be incompatible predicates.

The new riddle poses a paradox by revealing that incompatible and rival hypotheses can be inferred from the same evidence statemnt. Evidence statements, for example "all emeralds examined so far are green," leave us with no choice to select hypotheses of incompatibility, i.e., "all emeralds after t is grue (blue)" and "all emeralds examined after t is green." though we know which of the predicates is genuinely confirmed, both the genuine predicate, i.e. green and its rival predicate, i.e. grue are equally confirmed according to the definition of grue. Thus Goodman says, "it is clear that if we simply choose an appropriate predicate, then on the basis of these same observations we shall have equal confirmation for many predication whatever about other emeralds-indeed about anything else."13 There is no satisfactory inductive principle to exclude the unwanted and unacceptable predicate grue and include the legitimate predicate green in the projection of the hypotheses. All adaptation of the hypotheses, based on the evidence statements are only unjustified leap. Our future moves and predictions at all indeterminate-there is no right or wrong projection of predicates per st and incompatible hypotheses are equally acceptable.

Denying that there are such things as rules of induction, it puls in jeopardy some of our most central notions about ourselves. It puts question mark on the notion of world as an objective and independent entity requires us to describe it one way rather than other. If the riddle is allowed to have its sway, the building of knowledge system is impossible. If it is presed further, the conception of the meaning as an objective entity will be a danger and linguistic transactions are made impossible. The new riddle of the new riddle

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nduction can very much affect our day-to-day life and it is generalizable and the study as well. Indeed Goodman has painted a 'grue'-mone world through the riddle and has stage-managed the grue-some murder of our faith, hope and expectation about ourselves, friends, society and the world at large.

PREVENTING GOODMAN

The grue-some world would leave us in a state of wilderness of doubt and uncertainty. ¹⁴ Thus attempts are made to prevent Goodman to paise/introduce grue predicate to posit a world where things are not related inherently, where past experience is not sure guide to expect or hope things to happen. The critics have argued that since the definition of the predicate grue looks artificial and fabricated, the riddle also presents an artificial paradox. The apparent arbitrariness of the grue predicate is proved by the critics on the ground that the grue predicate is temporal, asymmetrical and complicated as compared to the green predicate.

First, the predicate 'grue' is illegitimate as compared to the predicate 'green', because the hypothesis that "all emeralds are grue" is a temporal hypothesis. The grue predicate has been defined in reference to timefactor. It seems that the hypothesis typically involves some spatial and umporal restriction or reference to some particular individual. The grue predicate, unlike the green predicate lacks complete generality and miversality to be consistenly projected even if there is an evidence for such prediction. 15 It seems clear that the predicates 'green' and 'blue' are malitative or universal and predicate like 'grue' is temporal. However, Goodman argues that temporality is very difficult to define. The mere equirement that temporal hypothesis contains terms which names and describes thing in respect to particular time and place is not enough to differentiate it from general and universal hypotheses. The hypotheses all emerald are grue does not contain any temporal terms. Even if the is reference to time and space, that can be suppressed and expressed the form of general hypothesis. On the other hand, it is possible that the so-called universal projection like all emeralds are green can be tipressed in temporal and spatial terms. Goodman writes:

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is then conceived either as one that is equivalent to some expression free of terms for specific individuals... I simply do not know how to tell whether a predicate is qualitative or positional, except perhaps by completely begging the question at issue.¹⁶

Second, it is argued that the grue predicate is contradictory to green predicate because it is asymmetrical to green. The foreignness of the predicate grue can be proved on the ground that it does not go with the established predicate which is a part of our language. The grue-speaker speaks incoherent language in comparison to our green-speaker. There are elaborate descriptions of grue-land and grue-speakers to show how green-language and grue-language do not go together. The paradox to be generated, the grue predicate must conform to two constraints—the relationship with our concept of green and blue and second, it should be understood in contrast with our concept of green and blue. Mulhill argues that both the conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Is Ian Hacking seems to agree with Mulhill at least partially in saying that Goodman's paradox cannot be raised for disunified science. Goodman refutes this charge by arguing that both the predicate grue and green are symmetrical and one can be understood as unfamiliar in contrast to other.

it is true that the predicate grue is foreign and its foreignness can be proved relative to our custom of projection and language. However, relative to the imagery language of the grue-speakees and their custom of projection, our predicate 'green' would be equally foreign. From their custom of projection, the projection of the hypothesis "all emeralds are green" appears to be outlandish. This can be argued by the grue speakers. One need only to note that Grue-speakers also have the predicate 'bleen' in their language, where,

x is bleen =df (x is observed before the time t & x is blue) and (x is not observed before the time t & x is green)²⁰

As Goodman says:

True enough, if we start with "blue" and "green," then "grue" and "bleen" will be explained in terms of "blue", and "green" and a temporal term. But equally true, if we start with "gure" and "bleen", then "blue" and "green" will be explained in terms of "grue" and

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Third, the grue hypothesis is rejected on the ground that it is more complicated and odd compared to the green predicate and the common sense says that simple predicates like green stand better chance for projection compared to the complex predicates. The argument does not hold much water as 'simplicity' is a relative term and very difficult to define. There is no criterion to differentiate simple from complex hypothesis. One hypothesis can be simpler to someone, but very complicated to other. With the introduction of each new theory and problem some new and peculiar predicates are introduced along with the problem. On account of newness the predicate does not become odd. If this is true many of the new terms in the science, for example "aluminium" would have been abandoned.

There are also attempts to rule out grue as useless on pragmatic and evolutionary ground. It is argued that it is a "fortunate coincidence or harmony between our past behaviour and future action, established by the evolutionary process and this harmony works for us."23 Thus, as Martin argues that people have predisposition against grue,24 for grue is a "peculiar predicate and abnormal concept" and the truth or falsity makes no "discoverable difference to our day-to-day life."25 The problem has been dismissed as immaterial because we do not project grue predicate generally. The unfamiliar predicates like grue do not make any difference in our understanding our day-to-day inductive practice and we can pragmatically avoid such useless predicates. But if we want a philosophically a sound theory of induction we cannot "excuse gross anomalies resulting from a proposed theory by pleading that we can avoid them in practice."26 We should be very clear that the validity question is not a pragmatic question. If pragmatism is the only consideration involved in the projection, probably We can avoid unfamiliar predicate easily. But the successful elimination of unwanted projection will be there at the cost of a proper theory of Justification of inductive inference. The predicate grue cannot be eliminated As inductive inference. The predictional, qualitative or observational. 370 GOPAL SAHU

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THE ENTRENCHED WORLD

The validity of inductive prediction cannot be determined just by looking at the object or being into the mind. This is not possible either by invoking the innate principle in the mind or the evolutionary principle. Even if we had the ability to read the mental processes, the problem could not have been answered squarely. The reason is, any amount of describing the fact about the world or about the mind or their interaction would not give us any clue as to what ought to be the next prediction. The new riddle of induction shows that normativity of the inductive rule or for that matter any normative rule cannot be captured in the description of the laws of nature or the working condition of the mind, for the future is not given. It should be noted that even if we could prevent the introduction of grue predicate, thereby the spirit of the riddle is not resolved. Another suitable counter-example can be introduced to posit the problem since it is a problem that can be visualised logically.

Goodman, thus, argues that no higher level principles of unquestionalbe certainty can justify the inductive rules. And yet, we do make induction and induction is a very reliable process in science and in our day-to-day life as well. Thus, Goodman argues that perhaps the way we actually do apply induction and are habituated with it will provide the necessary cue in justifying induction. Goodman says, "The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought out into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept, an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend."27 Goodman argues that we are thus able to eliminate a predicate which is not an application of the well accepted general rules. When there is a need to introduce a new predicate we amend the rule to accommodate the inductive rules. That is what has happened with the predicate 'mammal' when it is applied to the 'whale.' Thus he says, "predictions are justified if they conform to the valid cannon of induction, and the cannons are valid if they accurately codify accepted inductive practices."28

Goodman agrees that his solution to the riddle of induction is primarily Humean in nature. According to Hume, only those hypotheses are validly projected which we are habituated to project. We build our inductive

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primarily e validly nductive practices, not on the basis of som logical principle or on the basis of the practices, per on the basis of the necessary connection available among the events in the world, but on the basis of our record of two tlings occurring together. The repeated occurrences of two things make us believe psychologically that those two things are connected in the world and will remain so in the future. Our habit and naturalistic instinct are the basis of our inductive practices. Those hypotheses are considered to be deviant which are not habitually so related. Hume formulates the rules of induction on the basis of describing our inductive habits and practices. Though he has understood the real nature of inductive the new riddle of induction, he fails to go deep into the problem. His solution at best "pertains only to the source of prediction, and not their legitimacy" and "leave untouched the question of our licence for making them."29 Hume's account explains how a particular prediction is made out of our habit. This simple description will not be enough to explain why some of our habits give rise to regularity and others do not. The real inadequacy of Hume's account 'lay not in his descriptive approach but in the imprecision of his description"30

Hume's solution is inadequate in explaining the new riddle of induction because he fails to see the force of his argument. Hume himself has not taken seriously the importance of the "records of past predictions actually made"31 and undermined the legitimacy of information that are made in explaining scepticism. He was hesitant to use the valuable "knowledge of past predictions and their success and failures"32 for the fear of circularity. But there is no circularity involved in devising a satisfactory inductive rule taking feedback from the past projections for we are still defining valid projection or projectibility and ot demonstrating it. Thus Goodman says, "an inductive inference is justified by conforming to accepted inductive inferences. Predictions are justified if they conform valid conons of induction and conons are valid if they accurately codify the accepted inductive Practice."33 The process comprises the act of "defining projectibility-of projecting the predicate 'project' to the predicate 'projectable'."34 The basic task of justifying inductive inference, therefore, is like mapping out Our inductive habits and mark some regularity generating habits from those habits which do not.

Thus Goodman himself admits that, there is no hard and fast

distinction between justifying inductive rules and describing ordinary inductive practices. He says, "the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing or defining valid induction."35 The gap between the inductive rules and the projection of the predicates can be bridged on the basis of the record of actual projection, The actual projection involves the description of the "overt, explicit formulation and adaptation of the hypothesis."36 According to him, a hypothesis is said to be actually projected, "when it is adopted after some of its instances have been examined and determined to be true and before the rest have been examined."37 The mere history of actual projection, as Hume argues, is not enough to map the inductive practice and help us to eliminate unwanted projection like grue. Because, the set of past projections provides nothing more than the evidence ground and as we have seen in the grue problem, it can very much accommodate rival predicates. It is only the record of the actual and adopted hypotheses give a fair picture as to why the green predicate is projected from the evidence statements whereas the grue predicate is not projected. A hypothesis is adopted. according to Goodman, when it is more 'credible' than alternative hypotheses and at the time of projection, "it has some undermined cases, some positive cases and no negative cases."38

Those predicates are only projectable which are actually projected, adopted and unviolated. The more the predicate has been adopted, the more the degree of its projection. A projectible generalisation is one whose terms are well entrenched in the sense that they have been used frequently in the past generalisation of the sort. This way the projected prediction is entrenched by its repeated adaptation and use in our language. Therefore, "a projection is to be ruled out if it conflicts with the projection of a much better entrenched predicate." On this basis, the prediction of grue is ruled out because it is less entrenched than the predicate green though both are logically well supported by the evidence statement. Thus, based on the principle of entrenchment, Goodman puts forth the rule of induction as follows:

What distinguishes those recurrent features of experience that underlie valid projection from those that do not, is that the former

are those features for which w have adopted predicates that we have habitually projected.⁴⁰

Goodman is trying to provide the r .le for validity or at least a sound inductive rule in term of a social institution of language. According to this rule of induction, the prediction of the predicate grue is invalid because it is not in agreement with our past projection. And we know that it does not agree with the past projection because we use a common and a well-understood language. So, projectibility is a matter of the history of the term involved and the use of language in a living society. As language is a social phenomenon, terms get their meaning stipulated by social convention, therefore basically it is the social convention which fixes meaning and gives extension to meaning. The words which are deviant from the established conventions are held to be unwarranted and unprojectable.

AN ASSESSMENT

Gooman takes justifying induction to be a matter of describing, defining and codifying. On this view, we justify a particular inductive inference by showing that it agrees with a valid rule of inductive inference we make and accept. If Goodman's general rule accurately codifies the particular cases by taking into account the entrenchment of predicates, then it is justified on this view and solves the new riddle. Thus he argues that natural kind term like green are projectible because they are well entrenched in our social institution of language. But this provides an inadequate and insufficient solution. Goodman's response to riddle is external, for entrenchment is external to inductive inference. For it refers to our past usage of the same predicates.⁴¹ It is not internal to the properties of the minerals or the method of inference that can provide the necessity and certainty required to avoid unnatural predicate like grue. This is an external and outer-directed question.

The exteral response to answer the riddle is not adequate on two grounds. *First*, the entrenchment of the predicates however strong it may be, constitutes the history of the prediction up to a certain time. It provides nothing more than the accumulated data and is equivalent to the evidence statement. As we have already seen that even the most exhaustive and

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ough pased ction comprehensive evidence statement alone is not sufficient to resolve the conflict in the rule-following. Thus it is not the entrenchment that differentiates the valid from invalid projection of predicates. As Hacking argues that it is rather the other way round. We want more than accurate description. In particular, we need to know why the right predicate have become well entrenched while the spurious ones have not. Our habits of induction are the consequences of the fact that they are sound practice. We would have thought that predicates are entrenched because they are projectible, good for induction. "The condition for projectibility is entrenchment." The entrenched predicates, i.e. our actual cases of projection of the predicates. Like the evidence statements the entrenched predicates are not potentially infinite to have any control over the infinitely unlimited applications of the inductive inferences.

Secondly, Goodman's theory of projection will work very well in eliminating the rival predicates, like grue but it has no power in explaining how new hypotheses, like "whale is a mammal" are introduced into our language from the evidence that whale belongs to fish family. To start with, the new predicate has no history of adaptation and entrenchment to support the projection. Therefore, the theory of projection is at best a theory of elimination. The theory of projetion will put an end to the free play of words. The inductive rule, based on our inductive practice cannot really prescribe how a new and valuable theoretical term comes into our language and discipline of study. However, it is said that one can change the very inductive rule to accommodate the useful changes in the use of words. Therefore, the predicate grue is ruled out not only because it violates and less entrenched but aslo because it is less useful. This being so, it is not the simple entrenchment that decides which predction is valid and which one is invalid, rather Goodman is, in fact, speaking of the pragmatic consideration in induction. The theory of projection is only an elimination theory or a theory based on pragmatic principle. On both counts the theory of projection is not fully satisfactory.

By arguing that it is the social entrenchment that decides the meaning, it significantly undermines the importance of the world. Our knowledge is reduced to a set of practices set by the members of the society. It is true

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that there is nothing special in the predicate emeralds that decides what will be the colour of emeralds in the futre and helps us to get rid of the unfamiliar and rival predicates like grue. But it sounds very odd to account for our inductive practice in terms of the record of our past projection only. The very activity of justifying induction in the grue-some world is away from philosophical consideration and can become an issue of power politics. This will lead to an utterly a relativistic position, even to contradictory one. Imagine a situation where there are rival and contradictory inductive practices, and we have to map their inductive practices into inductive rules, this will lead to different and contradictory principles of projection. Their projection will be equally entrenched in their practice. The process of mutual adjustment between the inductive practice and inductive rule, as Goodman argues, will give no guidance to resolve the competing claims. The simple description of inductive practices, without some or other discriminatory principle will result in the conflicting projection. Beside, our inductive practices are not always correct. There are some empirical works showing that human being regularly and systematically make incorrect and invalid inductive practice. 43 If Goodman is right, some of our inductive rules, though properly map our inductive practices, are invalid and incorrect.44

Hypothesis about natural kinds like green, cannot be generalised on empirical basis. They are projectible because they are rule-governed. Therefore projectible predicates are normative since they are rule-governed and natural terms are entrenched becasue they are part of the form of life. That part is not recognised by Goodman. An external account fails to gap the bridge between the rules and their applications. This is primarily because the solution is based on the assumption that the rules and application are two different issues. On the assumption of the rules, no external relation will work to close the gap for the alleged external factor will require another factor and this will lead to infinite regress. Moreover, the force of the externl factor cannot go beyond the present projection of the predicates. It cannot provide the required necessity to have jurisdiction over the future case. The normativity of the inductive rules can only be accounted internally.⁴⁵

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NOTES

- 1. Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (henceforth FFF), 2nd edition, Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., Indianpolis, 1965, p. 84.
- 2. FFF, p. 58.
- 3. FFF, p. 60.
- 4. FFF, p. 92.
- 5. FFF, p. 62.
- 6. Elder, C. L., "Goodman's 'New Riddle' A Realist's Reprise", *Philosophical Studies*, 59, 1990, p. 115. Also Jackson, F., "Grue", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 72, 1975, pp. 125-129.
- 7. Quine, W. V. O., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in Ammerman, R. R. (ed.), Classics of Analytic Philosophy, Tata McGraw Hill, Bombay, 1965, pp.196-213.
- 8. Hempel, C. G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press, New York, 1965, pp.3-51.
- 9. Popper, K., Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, pp. 46 ff.
- 10. Elder, C. L. Goodman's 'New Riddle' A realist's Reprise, p.116.
- 11. FFF, p. 74.
- 12. Our interpretation is markedly different from the common definition of the predicate 'grue'. 'Grue' is defined in the form of "either....or" as follow:

 x is grue =df (x is observed before the time t & x is green) V

(x is not observed before the time t & x is blue)

Philosophers who have defined grue in this way are: Barker, S. F. and Peter Achinstein, "On the New Riddle of Induction", *Philosophical Reviews*, Vol. 69, 1960, p. 511, Hacking lan, "On Kripke's and Goodman's Users of 'Grue'", *Philosophy*, Vol. 68, 1993, p. 270, Jackson, 1975, *Grue*, p. 114-119 and Martin, M.R., "It is not that Easy Being Grue", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 300. Also See Elder, *Goodman's 'New Riddle'-A Realist's Reprise*, p. 116.

13. FFF, 76.

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- No wonder that the riddle has been interpreted as a form of rule-following scepticism. For a comparative study see, Bhat, P. R. and Sahu G., "The New Riddle of Induction and RuleFollowing", Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1999, pp. 25-37. Kripke himself has drawn precise analogy between his "Quus' counter -example with that of Goodman's 'Grue'. For details, see Kripke, S. A. Wittgenstein on Rule and Private Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982,pp.20,58-59
- 15. See Martin, It is not that Easy Being Grue, p 299-315 and Barker, S. F. and Peter Achinstein, On the New Riddle of Induction, p. 520
- 16. FFF, p. 79.
- 17. See, Mulhall, S. "No Smoke Without Fire: The Meaning of 'Grue'", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 39, 1989, pp. 167-180, Barker, S. F. and Peter Achinstein, *On the New Riddle of Induction*, p. 525 and Hacking, *On Kripke's and Goodman's Users of 'Grue'*, pp.282-84.
- 18. Mulhill, No Smoke Without Fire: The Meaning of 'Grue'", p. 168-172.
- 19. Hacking, On Kripke's and Goodman's Users of 'Grue'", p. 286.
- M. Elder, Goodman's 'New Riddle' A realist's Reprise, p. 118.
- 2l. FFF, pp. 79-80. Also, Goodman, N., "Positionality and Picture", Philosophical Reviews, Vol. 69, 1960, pp. 523-525, defends that positionality cannot be defined against the criticism posed by Barker, S. F. and Peter Achinstein, On the New Riddle of Induction, p. 511-522
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- 24. Martin, It is not that Easy Being Grue, p.304.
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- 26. FFF, p. 80.
- 77. FFF, p. 64.
- 28. *FFF*, p. 64.
- 9. FFF, p. 60-61.
- 30. FFF, p. 82.

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- 31. FFF, p. 85.
- 32. FFF, p. 86.
- 33. FFF, p. 64.
- 34. FFF, p. 92.
- 35. FFF, see p. 65, fn. 2.
- 36. FFF, p. 88.
- 37. FFF, p. 87.
- 38. FFF, p. 90.
- 39. FFF, p. 96.
- 40. FFF, p. 97.
- 41. Hacking, On Kripke's and Goodman's Users of 'Grue'", p. 276.
- 42. Hacking, On Kripke's and Goodman's Users of 'Grue'", p. 276.
- 43. Kanheman and Trevsky, "Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", *Science*, 1974, Vol. 185, pp. 1124-1131 in their empirical study on induction, have shown that there are numerous biased and unreasonable inductive practices we follow.
- 44. Stich, S. and R. E. Nisbet, "Justification and the Psychology of Human Understanding", *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 47, 1980, pp.188-202. They have explained what kind of invalid inductive rule will be formulated, based on false inductive practices, for example, Gambler's Paradox, regression paradox etc.
- 45. For discussion on the internal solution to the riddle see, Bhat, P. R. and Sahu. G., "The New Riddle of Induction and Rule-Following", *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1999, pp. 25-37

AHII

POLYLECTICS

[A READING OF DERRIDEAN STRATEGIES OF REASON]

RATNAMUTHU SUGATHAN

Jacques Derrida does a Nietzschean rendering of Hegel in introducing the device of difference and devising the method of deconstruction. In this paper I shall attempt, first, to depict this process that Derrida takes as a critique of metaphysics. Secondly, the dialectic involved is shown to coicide with a possible level of logic that I term polylectics or multilectics. While Hegel's method is adopted and transformed by Marx and Marxists, Nietzsche has anticepated the methods of Foucault and Derrida. When Hegel's differentiated, dynamic and monist thought espouses dialectics as the method, Nietzsche's perspectivism invloves in psychology, metaphorics and genealogy for tracing the drives to its archaic origin in the body. Deconstruction as a method in Derrida takes nourishment from Nietzsche, basically his concept of play. In a sense, Derrida can be said to have drawn resource from Hegel also, especially in drawing a conflated variation of difference (differance).

Dialectics is a teleological internal movement of concepts and reality representing, reflecting and containing the reality itself. Teleology in Hegel predetermines his system. Contradiction is the central category in Hegel's dialectic. Sublation (*aufhebung*) is the process of dialectic, dealing with the triadic, phased movement in Hegel. It is a positive and constructive movement of life-death-rebirth of idea/reality. Dialectics of Hegel is metaphysical to the extent that it is teleologically predetermined.

Nietzsche's genealogy is a journey into the origin of things interpreting and unveiling the truths and untruths. The genealogy of morals tries to explain the history of revengeful morality, resentment, bad conscience,

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ascetic ideal and negative will to power. Nietzsche tries to critique the decadent culture, reactive and nihilistic values. His critique of Christian morality in the light of the two (slave and master) types of morality is in fact a sort of deconstruction or deciphering of body, psyche and language. Eric Blondel calls this genealogy as "psychophysiophilology."

Nietzsche considers psychology the "queen of the sciences," "the road to fundamental problems." Daring travellers and adventurers ready to take their ships into the high seas of psyche can have the access to a "deeper world of insight." In Hegel, reality is reflected, represented and contained in dialectic. For Nietzsche, language and words do not represent or reflect reality. Thoughts, speech and words are only signs, unrepresentative of facts. Drives interpret reality, as reality is movement of instincts. Each interpretation is a perspective. Transition from one perspective to another involves metaphor. Multiplicity of perspectives means metaphorical richness. Metaphorics is the play of perspectives, and so, of language. Nietzsche ventures into a "metaphorical discourse." "

Here, I shall depict a critical account of Derrida's deconstruction and see how far he benefited from Nietzsche and also partly from Hegel. Derrida's deconstruction questions the domination of one mode of signification over another, and that it involves in dissemination and diffusion of meaning through *aporias*. Through a process of *differance* it can differ with and defer the signification of a text. Derrida adopts concrete strategies in various cases of deconstruction. Let us try to get some light on this curious process specialised in the elimination of metaphysics.

Reversal and Play

Derrida draws from Nietzsche in building up his arsenal against metaphysics. As Michel Haar says, Derrida borrows two elements of strategy from Nietzschean and use them in his deconstruction. Haar terms it a "hyper-Nietzschean" strategy of Derrida.⁴ The two elements are (i) a "reversal" of metaphysical oppositions, and (ii) a play or fire of words. Nietzsche finds metaphysics in antithetics. Nietzsche dislocates the system of oppositions through a subversive play of the opposing terms and language. As Michel Haar notes, Derrida develops and takes the Nietzschean strategy to it limits, to its extreme.

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Derrida considers that the history of metaphysics has always assigned the origin of truth, history of truth, the truth of truth to the logos. Metaphysics does not reside in single concept. It has its concept, opposing concepts and a chain of concepts. No concepts in themselves are metaphysical. Metaphysics is a certain determination or direction. Metaphysics is not something that can be naively opposed by non-metaphysics. Derrida writes:

There is no such thing as a 'metaphysical concept.' There is no such thing as a 'metaphysical name.' The metaphysical is a certain determination or direction taken by a chain. One cannot oppose it to a concept, but to a process of textual labor and another enchaining.⁷

The reversal of the system of opposition should not just be a process of inversion, because simple inversion would keep the oppositional structure intact. The reversal should not also be a term to term and face to face opposition. Derrida characterises the reversal involved in the demetaphysicisation process as oblique and equivocal. He calls it *loxic*. *Loxos* means oblique and equivocal. Deconstruction "inscribes" a loxic into the logic of reversal. This is to avoid the frontal opposition as well as to inflate the level of indecidability. He says:

To luxate the philosophical ear, to set the *loxos* in the *logos* to work, is to avoid frontal and symmetrical protest, opposition in all forms of *anti-*, or in any case to inscribe *antism* and reversal...⁸

Through oblique, equivocal antism, a reversal is brought about. The hierarchy of the classical opposition is reversed. With this, the system gets destabilised and displaced. The "originary" and the "derived" are reversed, that which commands (the principle, the *arche*) and that which obeys (the consequence) get reversed.

The second element from Nietzsche is the concept of play. Nietzsche lalks of the "play of the world." The motif of play in Derrida has got a wider significance. Play maintains itself below or beyond metaphysical oppositions. It thwarts all the obligatory opposition. Play is play without finality. Haar writes:

Play is the non-'originary' origin, the erased origin of conceptual

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differences in general. Therefore, 'negatively, play is equivalent to an absence, the absence of a founding origin, the absence of foundation, the absence of principle.9

Play is not ontic play. But it is a trace whose play transports and encloses the meaning. It has no meaning on its own. As an equivalent of difference, it is not a concept.¹⁰

Senses of Differance and Deconstruction

In fact, the equivocal, diffused, oblique reversal itself becomes play, a device in Derrida called *differance*. Deconstruction is a play, it uses differance. After introducing the latter device (not a concept), Derrida had to explain its status vis-à-vis metaphysics. "Difference" is not an entity. It makes no appearance and has no truth. It is neither a "Word" nor a concept. It is not a name. Differance is older than any name, older than the name of Being, and is itself not a name. This unnameable is not an ineffable Being like God. Derrida's platitude is not mystical, but grammatological. Derrida writes:

This unnameable is the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names, the chains of or substitutions of names in which, for example, the nominal effect differance is itself enmeshed.¹¹

Differance consists in pointing to the differential matrix which generates concepts and names and in which they are produced as effects. This matrix is presented as a "prior medium," "the bottom" of "diacritical reserve," "pre-originary" and "pre-eidetic" "receptacle." ** Differance* becomes one more effect of this differential matrix. Differance does not leave any trace of it, it "stretches out laterally over the surface as the chain of substitutability, as the coded tracing, within which are generated all names, ... including... differance." Derrida does not give a metaphysical status to differance.

"Ellipsis" is another sense employed by Derrida in his "oblique" reversal, the play, *differance*. Ellipsis makes surface, while circle makes hole. Ellipsis does not close; it takes one to "the horizontality of a pure surface" where meaning is infinitely getting altered gliding along the slippery surface. "Ellipsis is the ellipsis of the centre, its lack, its fault, and the

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exposing of its 'dangerous hole'..." Play of trace has no import of meaning. That is, play or differance does not have meaning or does not leave any trace. But, Being has traces and they become the event of tracing. Ellipsis of being as existence, ellipsis of the ontological and the transcendental, leads to the Being, its presence, exposed in trace or as a tracing, in its property of being non-presentable, tracing is the event, the advent and the material existence of such a property. 17

Differance works in an "economy of traces." derrida writes that "an element only functions and signifies, only takes or gives 'meaning' (sens) by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces." Time-design is important for differance. Derrida writes:

Differance is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity...) production of the intervals without which the 'full' term would not signify...¹⁹

From this statement of Derrida, the status of *differance* as a conjured subjective philosophical trick becomes obvious. However, the process can be possible. Each element gets meaning only through a play of differences. Each element gets signified in relation to another in the discourse. None gets on itself. They are traces in the chain or system. There are only "traces of traces," no independent meanings. *Differance* is supposed to be neutral, but neutral only to the unsettlement of meaning, its play is infinite.

Interestingly, the device of differance plays, finds and founds its time according to its needs of play, and also creates its space. It plays up the differences, does not allow the signification attempts to settle, defer the process of meaning and continuously differs with each attempt. This is a kind of double reading and double writing that can reverse and displace. "Deconstructionmust, by means of a double gesture, a double science, adouble writing, practise a reversal of the classical opposition and a general displacement of the system." 20

Derrida draws also from mimesis. Mimetic doubling involves a mechanism that foils any attempt of dominant inscription except perhaps

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the very logic that the mechanism releases, "mimesis both furthers and hinders the disclosure of thing itself, disclosing the thing by resembling it but obscuring it by substituting a double in place it." Double reading is necessary because there is no simple way out of metaphysics. A dominant reading has to borrow from and depend on metaphysical tradition that can again be put on scrutiny.

Deconstruction of a text means to think the structured genealogy of its concepts in a manner most faithful and most interior to the text and at the same time draw out what is implicit in those concepts, and to attack its edifice when the text diverges from itself. One may use "against the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house."²²

Deconstructive discourse is parasitical in the sense that it depends on the resources from the text to be deconstructed. It infects the text and becomes pathogenic. Derrida is cautious in keeping deconstruction's capacity for self-questioning. He admits in *Of Grammatology* that the enterprise of deconstruction can fall prey to its own work, unless the job is carefully done.

Through deconstructive or double reading, Derrida was able to point out the logic of supplementarity or substitution in texts like that of Rousseau and Descartes. The hyperbolic doubt in *Meditations* takes recourse to supplemental devices to get out the *cogito*. A similar situation is exposed in Rousseau also. The Cartesian pretension that he can go from self to outside self without affecting the centre of the structure is exposed. Derrida's critique of structuralism can be explained in terms of the supplementarity existing in the Cartesian case. A strategic affirmation of play is the feature of Derrida's critique of structuralism. He took this element from Nietzsche.

In the case of Kant, analysing his third *Critique*, Derrida exposes the logic of *parergonality* where the main argument is supported by arbitrary agruments and examples which Kant thinks as detachable from the main argument but trun out to be necessary and exemplar. The explicitly detachable and arbitrary becomes implicitly necessary, essential and constitutive, the "parergon" becomes "ergon."

In both these cases (of Descartes and Kant) Derrida reminds the

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thinkers to move within the field, frame and the limit they themselves created to begin with. Derrida tracks them down when they cross the pronounced limits. Derrida tackles them on their ground and not on his. But Derrida's chosen frame is wider, his play is indecidable, and from such a standpoint he deconstructs the texts (and authors). Derrida's own logic is not different from that of supplementarity, substitution and addition. His armoury is infinite and indecidable, besides being oblique and elliptical. His difference differs and defers, its armed neutrality is questionable.

Appropriation of Hegel and Demetaphysicisation

It seems that Derrida has appropriated the method of Hegel to certain extent, but for a different end. Hegelian reason does not exclude its opposites. Therefore, the logos in Hegel should be viewed differently. Derrida and also Sartre equally opposed the transformation of negation in Hegel. Hegel's negation transforms into affirmation. Difference in Hegel gets eventually dissolved in another unity. Derrida's difference is different. Derrida refers to the inescapability of the *anfhebung* (sublation) or speculative dialectic of Hegel. He calls it an "inexhaustible ruse." Derrida writes:

If there was a definition of *difference* it would be precisely the limiting, the interruption, the destruction of the Hegelian dialectic *everywhere* it operates.²⁴

In the same sense, one can rightly say that Derrida's differance is also an inexhaustible ruse. Deconstruction uses the rhetoric of rationality, reason, metaphysics, but of course for a different end. Derrida's strategy is however analogous to that of Hegel. Derrida interrupts and disrupts when Hegel overcomes!

Habermas criticises Derrida for his 'levelling' of genre-distinctions, treating philosophy and literature at equal status (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, and also *Postmetaphysical Thinking*: *Philosophical Essays*). But this criticism does not stand because, first, there is no necessity that distinctions should continue as such, and secondly, with deconstruction, new differences are sharpened, and "levelling" is only peripheral and temporal.

Derrida's attempt can be characterised as one more attempt of metaphysics, but one of less metaphysics. He himself is aware of the inescapability of working in an existing frame of metaphysics taking resources from it. But, when he was met with the question of universal application of deconstruction, the question whether there was a real need to have deconstructed Rousseau, Derrida tried to explain the issue in his oblique fashion while he was making a tribute to Paul de Man (after De Man's demise):

(T)here is always already deconstruction at work in works, especially in *literary* works. Deconstruction cannot be applied, after the fact and from the outside as a technical instrument of modernity. Texts deconstruct *themselves* by themselves; it is enough to recall it or to recall them to oneself.²⁵

Poststructuralist decentering, Hermeneutics and Perspectivist metaphorics

More than his devices of deconstruction and difference, his critique of structuralism, his finding that the centre of structure is absent or, in other words, in the classical thought, this centre or origin was shown to have been present inside as well as outside the structure (as in Hegel), deserves importance. The traditional understanding that the centre is within the structure and while governing and determining the structure it escapes the structurality is paradoxical. "The center is not the center." This paradox or contradiction helped Hegel in his movement of concepts. This helps Derrida in his criticism of Descartes, Foucault and structuralism in general. Derrida uses this paradox against precipitation of meaning. "Play" is the only explanation, may be an unexplainable, mystic, chaotic or poststructuralist or deconstructional explanation, for this infinite suspension of meaning. Derrida uses the Hegelian trick against Hegelian dialectics. It is difference and deconstruction against sublation and dialectics. The play from Nietzsche and Derrida brings in a sort of "Humean" turn in laws of thought and movement of concepts. Explosion of causal link is one of the features of this turn. This turn is what I am trying to figure out as the polylectical turn in dialectics or a third turn in logic (formal, dialectical and polylectical).

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The rendering of the absence of centre, origin, central signified, transcendental signified, or the signified, and the unsettlement of meaning. dissemination of meaning, "aporia 'scattering of the excess of meaning, displacement of centre of structure from inside the structure by mere absence, the dismantling of structure itself, was the complex job performed by Derrida. All this is done with the magical weapon of differance (and without any trace of it), a chaotic, mystical, to be precise and finite (to which Derrida can object), a metahysical arsenal of presence. Every movement of his writing is possible not without reference to the suspended or displaced meaning or the absence/presence of meaning or the origin/the centre of the structure/the outside of it of the logos/non-logos either through a temporary settlement or precipitation of meaning or through direct/ transcendental reference to the disseminated, unsettled, suspended signified. Because, this circle of metaphysics, even in its elongation into an ellipsis or in its end into a line (or double line), is the recurring motivation of philosophy. That is why dismantling of metaphors is possible through resorting to metaphors. Derrida accepts this difficulty and as he considers that metaphoricity guides signification, he feels it is essential to dismantle the key metaphors of western thought.27 Nietzsche considers metaphor as constituting a passage, a transition from one perspective to another. Metaphor both affirms and questions the world, interpreting it as a play of perspectives.28

Hermeneutics is not a particular method. But, it is a possibility of methods, plural interpretations. Each interpretation can be a specific method. Or, it is a method leading to multiple interpretations; a method of methods, a meta-method. According to Nietzsche there is no reality but only interpretations, and will to power interprets and each interpretation is a perspective and each perspective, for the reason of struggle of drives, tries to pose itself as *the* perspective. Nietzsche is involved in a metaphorical discourse. Since there is no way of articulating reality without rambling from sign to sign, text to text, metaphor is resorted to. But, this equivocation brings in another sour question: does metaphor represent? This will be only another beginning of another round, a round in the round of rounds. Then, metaphor is another metaphysic, another new myth, and another sign, without signification (?) Metaphor also turns out to be a blind end or an atomic/

quark end. Then, what is conveyed resides in between the metaphors. As Eric Blondel points out, metaphor is a transition from one perspective to another. Nietzsche involves in "metaphorics," metaphor of metaphors, transition-points from metaphor to metaphor, an inter-perspectival rambling.

Postmetaphysics, Dialectics and Polylectics

In the paradigm of hermeneutics, dialectics is just a method. For Nietzsche, it is a metaphysic. A leap out of metaphysics was not possible for Nietzsche even. What we can say is that dialectics is less metaphysical. For Hegel, dialectics comprehends everything including history. Hermeneutics and the specific multiple possibilities of hermeneutics are only historical spots in the motion of dialectics. But the pluralities are not given equal status in the dialectic: they are bound to come up and bound to fall in but within dialectics. Hegelian dialectics includes, its alienated forms are particulars and are within a frame of overall inclusion, exclusion works within the dialectic of an all-inclusive totality.

Nietzsche rejects dialectics as a form of metaphysics. Taking dialectics as a form of metaphysics, Nietzsche identifies antithetics as the basis of metaphysics. Contradictory relationship of opposites is the stratum of continuity between the parts in the whole of Hegel. While Hegel's play is inside the One, Nietzsche finds space outside it. Nietzsche objects to systems. He stays with the apparent, the moments, the fragments. In a sense, both Hegel and Nietzsche are involved in a metaphysics of arriving at reality and meaning. But, at the same time, both are involved in a process of dismantling metaphysics to find out its "ultimate" points and convert these into a communicable language.

Charges of metaphysics, claims of ending metaphysics and intentions to do philosophy in non-metaphysical terms are to be seen in the context, historical context, of efforts of demetaphysicisation of metaphysics itself. This is a process, unending, unending in a metaphysical (and non-historical) sense. Apparent ends of metaphysics will only be new beginnings of it. End of metaphysics is only an illusion, a myth. So, postmetaphysics, the post-Nietzsche stream of thought, is no less metaphysical. Metaphysics of historicity, of presence, of super-presence and of meaning will continue in their various forms and dimensions.

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Metaphysics in the older sonses of staticity or permanence, totalisation and determinism is over ome. Dialectics ends the metaphysics of permanence. The new break, manifested in the polylectics, outdoes the metaphysics of totality and determinism. We have seen that the post-Nietzsche thought or the post-metaphysical thought is not fully freed from metaphysics. This is because thought or philosophy itself is metaphysics. But it is possible to classify, sharpen, decloud the thought crystals, and this is the process of demetaphysicisation. What is the logic involved in this? Polylectics or multilectics is the new logic, or the new turn in logic, the third important phase in its demystification process.

Formal logic as consolidated by Aristotle identified identity as the key principle involved in the thought process. Hegel has clearly explicated that all three laws enunciated by Aristotle are basically forms of a single principle, the law of identity, the category of identity. Hegel discovered the identity of opposites, the major law of thought, the dialectical law of thought that comprehends even the earlier law of identity. Contradiction was adjudged the key category. Hegel considers contradiction the profounder principle, profounder than identity. Later, Marxists like Plekhanov have explained how formal logic was included in the overall frame of dialectical logic.

The arguments of Zeno of Elea against motion and multiplicity, i.e. the Zeno's paradoxes justifying the principle espoused by Parmenides, themselves contained both the principles of identity and contradiction. Aristotle located the principle of identity and consolidated it on the Socratic/Platonic tradition. After two millennia, Hegel could locate the other principle, that of contradiction. Contradiction as a principle also underwent some innovations. For instance, Mao Zedong has proposed the questions of identifying major contradictions of which there is a principal contradiction out of which there is a principal aspect. He has put forward that the principal aspect of the principal contradiction of an issue can represent the whole issue. The proposal is questionable, but it remained an advanced position in the Marxist discourse on the question of contradiction. Althussers' concept of "overdetermination" is also an advance on the classical Marxist treatment of contradiction. Overdetermination accepts multiple factors and one of these as overdetermining others. Elements of plurality and play are involved

in the conception.

Differance is the device that Derrida does not want to link with the tradition of dialectics. He differentiates his difference (with an a in it) from the difference in Hegel. Derrida's difference is simultaneously difference as well as deferral (French deference). difference is a construct, which is identified neither as concept nor as category. This construct is utilised by deconstruction, the method in Derrida. In Hegel, the negation in difference gets negated. difference in Derrida maintains its negation. Difference is "play" with multiple significations, play of deferring significations by differing with every signification. Derrida employs "free play" and fragmentation. With this, causal linkage is broken and also the totalisation of meaning. But this is not disintegration of logic, but a new logic which finds a space in the history of logic, a logic that bears with the ruptures and breaks, a logic that finds its links and steps wandering unprecedentedly. I prefer to call it polylectics because it is a new dialectics, a rupture in dialectics. Incidentally, it is the dialectics of postmodernism, the logic of poststructuralism. Ploylectics can provide the logic of the rupture in thought, the decentering of thought.

Polylectical Logic

Let us reiterate the features of polylectical logic. First, polylectics/ multilectics represent the third major turn in the growth of logic. Formal logic, the first phase, stood for permanence through its tool of "identity." Dealectical logic, the second phase, with its category of contradiction explained motion, development, growth, it deciphered permanence, it explained the linkage of extremes, the unity of opposites, the identity and difference in identity as well as in opposition. Dialectical logic overcame the metaphysics of permanence, rest, and staticity. "Free play" is the logical matrix in the third phase, the polylectics.

Secondly, the contradiction in polylectics is not binary, but plural. Multiple options reside in a single contradiction. Multiple possibilities within a single contradiction, not the multiplicity of contradictions, is the major point. With this, pluralism comes into play. This works against the totalisation of meaning. Metaphysics of totality is overcome. Pluralism does not take us to the many, but to "any" of "many." It does not lead us to fragmented is

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Thirdly, necessity/determinism/causality gets broken in polylectics. The predetermined causal links get exploded. Each step gets liberated. Linkage becomes autonomous. Freedom lies here. Free play is involved here. If "freedom" can be taken as a category, it replaces determinism, contingency can replace necessity, arbitrariness can replace causal linkage. Once free play is involved, we cannot track down the path of the series. Ruptures and breaks represent this "freedom" of links. "Play" explains the non-determination of steps, links, and path of series. In fact, the reason itself, the logic itself, gets broken. Fragmented rationality and dismantled logic can be conceived in polylectics. Logic of disintegrated logic, logic of logic-less-ness is the sort of "chaotic" logic that emerges under free play. When play is free in itself, undetermined of any path or step, the logic seems to be mystical and agnostic. To the extent it is unknown and undetermined, it seems to be mystical and chaotic. Sometimes, logic is allowed to lapse into mysticism and aestheticism (as Schelling did). Play entertains immense possibilities of moves. Since polylectics does not allow to predetermine the moves, our sensibility/intelligibility outplays and precipitates the logic as mystic, chaotic, contingent, aesthetic and the like in the predation of its knowing process. Otherwise, the moves, the steps, remain autonomous, suspended, and free to act, uninspired by any other link in the chain. Here, the metaphysics of necessity, causality, determinism is overcome. Once determinism is over, teleology is also over. In fact, the metaphysics of teleology and mechanism is overcome in polylectics.

As a method, polylectics presents itself as a free method, not bound, but abound in unbound possibilities of unitentional, purposeless, unprejudiced search where one may knock down non-revealed treasures of knowledge. Using the metaphors of horizon, sea and open sea, Nietzsche said, "...at last the horizon seems to us again free,... every daring venture of knowledge is again permitted, the sea, *our* sea again lies there open before us, perhaps, there has never yet been such an 'open sea."²⁹

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Statement Concerning Ownership and other Particulars about the Journal

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Form: IV (RULE 8)

Philosophy Department 1. Place of Publication

University of Pune. Pune- 411 007.

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Periodicity of its Publication

Quarterly

Printer's Name and 3. Address

Shri, Sudhir S. Jadhav Print Art Enterprises

847, Kasba Peth, Pune 411 011.

Publisher's Name and 4. Address

Dr. Shrinivas Vyankatesh Bokil Philosophy Department, University of Pune Pune - 411 007.

Whether Citizen of Indian

Yes

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THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE

SUDESHNA MITRA

The problem of Reference has occupied a central position in the idd of Analytic Philosophy from the beginnings of twentieth century. Remand Russell was concerned with the concepts of referring, denoting and naming, which he stated in his theory of descriptions that appeared this celebrated paper "On denoting" in 1905. But it would be incorrect passume that Russell was the first one to be concerned with the problem freference. Two of his great predecessors, Alexius Meinong and Gottlob frege were also thinking on the same line. Some of these problems were also noted by Plato in his work -Sophist and after the publication of P. F. Strawson's "On Referring" in 1950 in which he criticized Russell's theory if descriptions, there has been an active controversy between the followers of Russell and Strawson. The subject of reference thus has become a fively issue in the debate between opposing schools of philosophical analysis.

The main problem of reference revolves around the question - "are besentences containing subject terms which are non-denoting significant? What do these terms refer to?" Russell's interest in the problem has its wurce in his interest in ontology. In "On Denoting" Russell points to a group of 'puzzles' to which he claims to have provided solution through his description theory.

By a description, Russell means any linguistic expression having the bical forms, namely, 'the-so-and-so' and 'a-so-and-so'. Phrases of the bimer sort he calls "definite descriptions" since they connote uniqueness while phrases of the latter sort he calls "indefinite descriptions" since they are not subject to uniqueness limitation.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4 Oct. 2002

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Let us now state the first puzzle: The first of the puzzles is known as the Problem of Negative Existential statements and was of the most concern to him. When we consider the proposition "A differs from B" the truth of it means that there is a difference between A and B, which may be expressed in the form: "the difference between A and B subsists." But if the proposition is false then there is no difference between A and B which fact may be expressed in the form: "the difference between A and B does not subsist". But, how can a nonentity be the subject of a proposition? If a thing does not exist, it is not possible to say anything about it. On the other hand, if the proposition is about something then it must exist. It seems as if it is always contradictory to deny the being of anything.

According to Plato, problems arise when we ascribe non-being to something. For example, if I say "dragons do not exist" then the sentence seems to be about dragons, But, if the sentence is true then there are no dragons to talk about. So is a sentence about nothing meaningless? But we are all aware of what it means. Therefore the sentence must be about something. Hence, dragons must have some kind being in order to make statements of this kind.

This view, which Russell claims, and initially supports, was given by Meinong. According to Meinong metaphysics has a 'prejudice in favour of the actual', which leads us to believe that what is not real or do not have any kind of being can be neglected because they are not worth any consideration. Meinong advanced two main theses opposing this view. In the first place, he says, there are "ideal objects", i.e. there are objects that do not exist and secondly he devises the theory of *Aussersein* which means "the principle of the independence of so-being (Sosein) from being (Sein)."

It is argued by Meinong that we can speak about "the Golden mountain", "the round square" etc. and can make true statements of which these are subjects; hence they must have some kind of logical being since otherwise the statements in which they occur would be meaningless. Meinong held that even if there are no such things as "Golden mountain", they do have being. Meinong called them ideal objects. Such things will not be said to exist, they are rather subsistent entities.

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The Aussersein theory of Meinong was devised as a solution to the problem of Negative Existential. The attempted solution was that, things like round square,, Pegasus etc. were objects which were non-real and they were 'beyond being and non-being'. Meinong carefully pointed out here that the existence of these non-real objects is never asserted. His argument is as follows: that, 'A is not' (the Nichtsein of A) is an objective, as much an objective as the 'being of A' (the sein of A). An objective can be an objective of being (Seins objektiv) or an objective of non-being (Nichtseins objektiv). This being however must not be confused with existence.³

This theory of Meinong was greatly misunderstood by Russell who thought that Meinong wanted to say that non-real objects like Pegasus both exist and do not exist. Thus, this line of thinking (which Russell mistakenly thought as Meinong's view) led Russell into admitting varieties of being.

In order to solve problem of negative existentials, some philosophers like Russell tried to hold one horn of the dilemma. The dilemma was that, either the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' is false or it is not about Pegasus. Russell held that the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' is false-that Pegasus has some kind of being.

But soon after this view was expressed, Russell violently rejected it for being totally incompatible with his sense of reality. He vehemently criticized Meinong accusing him of overpopulating the universe with entity upon entity. This time he picked the other horn of the dilemma, i.e. 'Pegasus does not exist' is not about Pegasus and in order to establish this, devised his theory of description.

Another puzzle of reference, which may be called the puzzle of substitutivity runs thus: If 'a' is identical with 'b', whatever is true of one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now, George-IV wished to know whether Scott was the author Waverley and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we substitute Scott for the author of Waverley, and from which it follows that George-IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott which is trivial.⁴

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The third of the puzzles that Russell tries to solve deals with law of excluded middle, "By the law of excluded middle, either 'A is B' or 'A is not B' must be true. Hence, either 'the present King of France is bald, or 'the present King of France is not bald' must be true. Yet, if we enumerated the things that are bald and then things that are not bald, 'the present King of France' could not be found in either of the two lists for there is no monarchy in France at present. So both the propositions are false, yet according to the law of excluded middle either of the two propositions must be true. Russell tries to solve these puzzles by means of his theory of descriptions.

The special character of Russell's theory of descriptions is best understood and approached when seen against the background of Frege's distinction between proper names and predicate expressions. In Frege's view proper names stand for something complete; they have sense associated with them. Concept words and relation expressions are incomplete. Frege also tried to offer a solution to the problem of reference. Frege's interest in the problem comes from a desire to solve certain problems which arise in connection with the concept of identity. Identity is a relation which holds between objects, but only between an object and itself. The puzzle may be expressed thus: How then can an identity statement, a=b tells us anything other than just a=a, if a=b is true? Yet there are statements of identity which add to our knowledge.⁶

In order to solve this problem Frege introduced a distinction between the sense of an expression and what it refers to. Roughly speaking, two expressions may differ in sense or meaning, while their referent may be the same. Frege's famous example in this matter was 'Venus=the morning star'. Let us consider the expressions 'the evening star' and 'the morning star'. Both these expressions refer to the same object, namely Venus, nevertheless it was an important astronomical discovery that the morning star is identical with the evening star. To reconcile the fact that the two expressions refer to the same object with the fact that the assertion—"the evening star' is identical with 'the evening star'"—is not informative—we have to recognize that the two expressions differ in 'sense', although they refer to same 'object'. Frege concluded that this puzzle over identity arises through confusion between 'sense' and 'reference' of expressions. Though through confusion between 'sense' and 'reference' of expressions. Though

The Problem Of Reference

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Russell leans on this distinction, his acceptance and use of it is not precisely the same as that in which Frege understood it.

Russell does not accept Frege's solution either. He argues that a problem may arise when some word is used as a name which does not actually refer to any thing-when it has no denotation. Russell rejected Meinong's overpopulation of the metaphysical universe because it is averse to one's sense of reality, but rejects Frege's conventional denotation because it is purely arbitrary. Russell thought that the difficulty over identity rested not on the confusion between sense and reference of expressions but on the confusion between proper names and definite descriptions.

Russell makes a sharp distinction between what he calls a 'description' and what he calls a 'proper name'. Whereas a proper name, if it has a meaning, must denote an object, there are definite descriptions that have no denotation and in that sense have no "meaning". Definite descriptions have meaning only in the context of a sentence. In realizing all this we shall be spared the excesses of a 'Meinongian' ontology.

Russell gives the following as examples of sentences containing definite description:

- 1. Scott is the author of Waverley.
- 2. The present King of France is bald.
- 3. The golden mountain does not exist.

Russell's theory of Descriptions offers us an analysis which enables us to eliminate descriptive phrases from a context in which they occur. The descriptive phrases here are 'the author of Waverley', 'the present king of France', 'the golden mountain', Russell holds that sentences containing descriptions are to be analysed into an equivalent set of statements in which no descriptive phrases occur and which make explicit the logical structure of what is being asserted. In case 2 above, the analysis yields:

- 2(a) There is a king of France
- 2(b) There is not more than one king of France.
- 2)c) Anything which is king of France is bald.

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Or more accurately,

$$(\exists x) \{Fx.[(y) (Fy \rightarrow y = x)]. Bx\}$$

Sentence 2(a) is captured by the existential generalization; 2(b) is the uniqueness condition encapsulated by definite article 'the' and 2(c) asserts that the unique existent x has a certain property-in this case baldness. In 2, the description appears to have a denoting role, whereas in the formal paraphrase of the entire sentence there occur no singular terms, but only variables bound by quantifiers, predicates and signs of identity. It seems to Russell that any meaningful sentence has truth value. Thus if "the present king of France' were a logical as well as a grammatical subject expression, either it would have to denote something- a subsistent entity, or sentences in which they occur would be meaningless. The theory of descriptions provides a masterly way out, by saying that sentences with descriptions in subject are not logically subject predicate form of sentence and that descriptions, far from being representable as singular terms in a formal language, are in fact concealed existence and uniqueness assertions.

Criticisms have been raised by some philosophers against this theory, P. F. Strawson being the most prominent and sharp among them. Strawson's criticism of the theory of descriptions consists in a rejection of the theory of meaning underlying it. In Strawson's view no words or expressions have as thier meaning a designated object. If meaning is not denotation then there cannot be logically proper names, nor descriptions in Russell's sense, for in Strawson's view no one uttering such a sentence as 'the present king of France is bald' is asserting that there is a king of France. Strawson argues that whenever one refers to an entity, he presupposes that the entity exists; but this presupposition is not to be confused with entailment, because the presupposition of the speaker does not entail the existence of the entity. Russell, as Strawson saw it, had also failed to distinguish between, (a) the use of an expression to make a unique reference and (b) asserting that there is one and no more than one individual possessing certain characteristics.

To make out his case Strawson draws a three way distinction among a sentence, a use of a sentence, and an utterance of a sentence. One can imagine the sentence 'the king of France is bald (K) being uttered in

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successive reigns of French kings. Evidently however, there are differences between the occasions of use each time; users of K would be talking about different kings, and depending on the appearance of kings in question would be saying true or false statements. On Strawson's view, it follows from these distinctions that it is not the sentence which is true or false, but instead, that what is true or false is the assertion or proposition which the sentence is used to make. In using the sentence 'the king of France is bald', now, when France is not a monarchy, we would be making a statement that is neither true nor false, although the sentence is perfectly significant.

Russell's contention that the meaning of a name is identical with its bearer has not been accepted by many contemporary philosophers including Strawson and Wittgenstein. Russell held that if "the author of Waverley" was a name, then it would name something c, and hence "Scott is the author of Waverley" would mean "Scott is c". But this would follow only if it somehow followed that if "the author of Waverley" were a name for c, then it would mean the same thing as any other name for c, say "c". As Russell held that the meaning of a name was its bearer, his argument becomes valid for, in that case two names having the same bearer, have the same meaning. Strawson even goes further and objects to Wittgenstein's dictum - "Don't confuse the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name." It appears that though Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of a name was not its bearer, he assumes it to be something else. But according to Strawson names do not in general have meanings at all.

Another serious criticism is that Russell starts from a false premise. The theory is intended to show how it is possible for a descriptive expression to be meaningful, even though there is nothing which it denotes. And it does this in effect by maintaining that these expressions are not referential. The underlying assumption is then that the meaning of a referential expression is to be identified with its denotation. It is argued that, even in the case of proper names, this theory of meaning is mistaken. Then it follows that Russell's reasoning for theory of descriptions is not above criticism. However, its importance in the history of analytic philosophy can in no way be minimized.

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Reference, we thus observe, is a subject which has intrigued philosophers and raised questions in their minds which they have tried to answer over the years, and the quest is still continuing.

NOTES

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THE LANGUAGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RIGHTS - TALK IN SOCIETY

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We are all familiar with 'rights', whether we encounter them simply in asking if we have any right to assume so and so in different cases or in the rules and regulations of institutions, games etc. Questions about rights also get involved in consideration over weighty issues of morals, politics, law and widely social contexts because rights are something one can have or be given, earned, enjoyed, or exercised. The idea of human rights is a contentious affair of contemporary world and it is stated in length by international proprieties, both globally and regionally. But this idea is not exposed enough, however much its proponents try to dig into it and explain it as a self-evidenced one.

In the context of moral discourse, duty seems more obvious, and is certainly more ancient, than right. The utilitarian doctrine of the greatest happiness of the greatest number has so long been granted as a more fixed criterion of moral virtue than the idea of moral rights. Again, sociologically, it is evident that individuals gather together as members of communities who are less than global in extent, but they stand together as equal members of the society of all humankind. The starting question is what is *right* and how to understand the language of rights. Do the individuals enjoy their rights in society? What could be their language of rights that they intend to establish? Can talk about rights be established? The questions raised cannot be answered properly if the idea of human rights is not clearly explained and I shall begin with an attempt to make it clear. The question, which I shall try to answer first in this essay, is conceptual. With regards to the question of what rights people actually have or ought to have, I shall try to

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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explain what are distinctively held to be human rights, the grounding of human rights, and finally the language of talk about rights in society.

To begin with the conception of rights the preliminary question that arises is whether 'right' has any denotation or reference. It is a common assumption and indeed a traditional philosophical assumption that all words, for example, 'pen', 'book', 'chalk' etc. do refer to some item in the world. Historically this view is held to be true, at least in legal circles, of the word 'right'. Pollock¹ (1929, pp.89-95) and Maitland² (1923, pp.124-49) write that in medieval period a right used to be regarded as a corporeal sort of stuff like property or land. However, they rejected this view but continue to hold on the assumption that the word denotes some object which they regard as an incorporeal thing. Bentham³ (1970, pp./251-2) advocates the opinion that the word 'right' does not denote any corporeal substance but assumes that it denotes a fictitious object or entity (may be he believes it to be non-denotative). These views thus suggest that the word 'right' does not denote or refer any particular object, whether physical or mental.

The non-denoting function of 'right' has, however, led some philosophers to the conclusion that sentences employing such words do not express truths or state facts. Olivecrona⁴ (1971, pp.181-2) categorically states that the notion of 'right' does not correspond to facts. For him, the idea of 'right' as non-denoting and yet the sentences containing it referring to factual circumstances is purely inconsistent. What then is a fact? A fact is usually defined as that which corresponds to a statement or makes it true. It appears to have some existence in the world, independent of thought and language. Facts may be regarded as some sets of objects in the world related in certain ways, for example, 'The sky is blue' is a fact. White⁵ (1970, 80nn, 6&7) talks differently in that, facts are not, and do not have the characterstics of any part of the world. Unlike objects, situations, or states of affairs, facts have no date or location. Facts can be stated, whereas events and situations are described. For him, there may be facts about an event, situation, or states of affairs, but not the latter about a fact. True statements like 'The British Airways Flight from Bangladesh to England is at 9 p.m.', state a fact, but do not describe a situation or state of affairs.

The proposal here is that talking about someone having a right to

such and such can be a fact, but 'right' itself does not refer to any items in the world any more than a fact does. Since the conception of 'right' cannot be grasped by pursuing some item which it stands for, we can try to apprehend it to the circumstances in which it is used and to the relations it has to other notions which are commonly associated in thought with it. The related notions need to be included are duty, liberty, power, claim and obligation.

It is necessary first to defend rights against rationalist philosophy of history in that if the logic of history is the key to everything that happens, the values of judicial humanism are strictly relative to the historical moment of their appearance. The view that reality is subjected to the mastery of reason intends to follow Hegelian formula that "everything in history has unfolded rationally". If we return to the ancient conception of law and right we can get a historical picture of classical idea of rights, particularly Aristotelian thinking about right. The classical idea of law is defined against the authority of tradition, of the notion of nature understood as a 'standard'. Through the discovery of nature, the authority of par excellence, the ancestral was uprooted, philosophy recognizes that nature is the authority and thus originates the idea of natural right.

In order to provide the characteristics of this classical conception of right, we need to show what conception of nature makes possible a distinction between the *is* and the *ought* - a distinction that gives meaning to the very idea of right. We first note that, by adopting 'nature' as a criterion (standard) of the just, the ancients, unlike the moderns' consideration of the *subject's* reason, regard a substantial element, the cosmic order as a model which constitutes a dimension of *objectivity* independently of the subject. As opposed to the 'subjective right' of the moderns, ancient natural right thus proposes the pattern of an 'objective right' which is not derived from the requirements of human reason but can be observed and revealed in nature. Thus to understand the role of nature to decide what is 'just', the Greek idea is that natural right in its classic form is connected with a theological view of the universe. Aristotle's idea of a purposeful world can be recalled in this context.

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that can be the efficient cause of movement for the moderns. The cause of the movement is a *final* cause, objects move so as to regain their natural place, to occupy the place in the cosmos which corresponds to their nature and in which their essential features are finally established. Thus nature itself is the principle of movement, which occurs only insofar as an object has been driven from its natural place by some other object inclined toward its own place. And finally the movement of the object ends after regaining its position.

Aristotle's explanation of cosmology gives an account of nature as the criterion of the just. Right can be determined by considering the order in which everything that exists has, by virture of its nature, something like a right to occupy its proper place and where it attains the perfection of its essence. Thus the just, for a given thing, is what corresponds to its natural (its telos)- injustice, at the level of human actions, a movement by which some reality drives another one out of its natural place and prevents from being what it is.

What follows from this ancient idea of right is that the natural law of the just, the objective basis of right, is determined as the rightful place for something in the purposeful cosmos. The science of right, on the other hand, is defined not as the area of laying down rules of conduct, but as the science of distribution or division like the formula of Roman law: suum cuique tribuere (to give to each what is his due). Thus justice can primarily be formulated as distributive justice. Because justice is inscribed in the very nature of things, the method of the law will decide what is legitimate or rightful for each person according to the hierarchy of the cosmos.

Given this view, the term 'natural' in natural law is readily intelligible in Lockean⁶ thought (1960). Natural law describes a body of rules, authorizing human conduct, which are visualized as part of a natural ordr of things. These are laws laid down by God for human beings: they are natural because they are not 'artificial' laws as formulated by men. They are part of a given natural order of things as what can be considered presently as scientific 'laws of nature'. The laws of nature laid down by God should govern the laws advocated by human rulers.

For Locke, the basic moral rule that man require to conduct his life

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provided by the law of nature and that law is fully available to everybody in the state of nature. The state of nature is characterized by a structure of in the state of natures supplied by God's natural law. Conflicts and problems and rights and duties supplied by God's natural law. Conflicts and problems only when men fail to correspond to the natural law that God has provided. The failure of understanding natural law instigates men to establish political authority. But the establishment of political authority does not mean the disappearance of natural rights. Rather, Locke argues that men carry the infinite internatural rights forward with them into political society.

In the full language of 'human right', therefore, only a person or a human being can logically have a right because only human beings can be he holder of these types of affirmations. Non-humans cannot be the subjects of rights, however properly it may be treated to them in some particular ways. For example, children, the dead etc. may be empirically unable for various reasons to perform the complete role of a right-holder. But so long they are humans - and we crucially think and speak of them as young, feeble-minded, crippled, dead persons-they are logically possible subjects of rights to whom the full language of rights can importantly, however falsely, be used. These humans cannot unfortunately exert or claim their rights or fulfil their duty. In Roman law slaves were things, not human beings, and therefore, had no rights. The modern law has always linked logether the concept of a human and of the bearers of rights, duties, pivileges, etc., which shows that a change in application of one notion has accompanied a pearallel change in application of the other. Thus emerges the significance of using a set of concepts, for example, rights, duties, privileges, etc., together and not secluding one of them, for example, right, which is, as Wittgenstein⁷ (1968,#38.) might put it, the lone concept is only idling. What follows is that the job done in such contexts by the notion of 'a right' as opposed to that of 'right' can be questioned when it is segregated from other normal associative notions like duty, obligation, power, etc.

Before discussing the logical form of the idea of rights we must make a preliminary distinction between legal or positive rights on the one side and moral or human rights on the other. Legal or positive rights are those which persons have by virtue of some legal or customary practice within society. For example, a person has the right to vote in his/her country's general elections, but not in the elections of some other countries. The

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legal codes of each country may vary in terms of offering or denying the right as the case may be. Moral or human rights by contrast are less discernible, being endowed or denied in terms of a moral code. For instance, it is the moral right of persons not to be physically assaulted by others. The basic distinction between legal and moral rights depends on the courses or processes that are involved in order to establish the existence of rights. As Weale expresses,

Just as sentences in general take their meaning from the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for them to be true, so claims to the existence of rights take their character from the procedures that must be followed in order to establish their existence.8 (1983,p.123)

In case of legal or positive rights the central idea, therefore, lies in the fact that appropriate legal or constitutional procedures have been followed in establishing the right. As opposed to this, a moral or ethical argument is supposed to lead to a conclusion to establish the right with regard to moral or human rights.

Despite the differences between legal and moral or human rights, there remain still to be explained the logical structure of the idea of 'rights'. A classification of the form of rights was propounded by Hohfeld⁹ (1919) which has come to be regarded as the calssic analysis of types of legal rights. He divides rights into four types, which he names: claim, liberty, power, and immunities. We can explain them in turn.

Claim rights are those which constitute claim upon others and therefore, always exist in conjunction with others. For example, if a person A has lent money to another person B then A has a right to get that sum of money from B, and B has a reciprocal duty to pay back that amount of money to A. Hohfeld terms it as a right 'in its strict sense' although it is more commonly described as a 'claim-right' since it involves claims upon others and imposes a correlative duty to help secure the act protected by the right.

Liberty-rights, by contrast, are those whose exercise does not oblige other people under any duty to procure the ends for which the permitted action is undertaken. For example, if two persons are trying to buy a landed property, then each person is at liberty to buy it, but neither is under any

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Apower is usally defined as the legal ability to change a legal relation.

Apowers are more commonly stated as rights than as powers. For sumple, the right to make a will, the right to sue, the right to vote-each constitutes a power. In every case, the person involved has the legal power peffect some transaction. A person has the right to make a will in that the law provides a legal facility which enables him/her to decide the disposal of his/her property after his/her death.

Finally, to hold an immunity is not to be subjected to another's power, i.e., to possess an immunity is to be free of another's power. Immunities constitute the counterpart to powers, the correlative of an immunity is a disability. For example, in a society where there is no legal provision for divorce, a person is 'immune' from his/her spouse's power of divorcing. In other words, a person has the right not to be divorced by his/her spouse, in that spouses have no power to divorce. The point is that powers and 'immunities both concern the ability of person or institutions to determine the rights and duties of others.

But it would be wrong to believe that every right categorized by Hohfeld should belong to one and only one of the four types. For example, the assertion of a right to vote may be simultaneously the assertion of a power, a claim-right and a property-right. In a similar way, if one has a property-right in a car that would typically include his liberty-right as owner to use the car; the claim-right that other should refrain from damaging his car or using it without his permission; the power to sell the car or permitting others to use it, and also immunity from any other power of others to dispose the car without his consent. The idea is that a single right might but out to be a bunch of different types of right.

However, a society's conception of rights changes with social changes taking place. Hohfeldian four-fold classification helps us to follow the way of rights during the twentieth century. It is argued that the gains in civil rights of the eighteenth century (especially rights on arrest and trial) and in political rights in the nineteenth century (especially the political freedom of the working class) have been supplemented by gains in social lights in the twentieth century (especially the rights of social and economic security). Thus the number of rights, on this account, can be regarded to

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have expanded which enable the citizens to enjoy in the twentieth century and indicates the sign of recognizing more rights to enjoy in the present century too.

Apart from Hohfeldian classification of rights, a right is usually thought of as consisting of five main elements: (i) the subject of a right claiming some thing (ii) the object of a right, by enjoying or demanding it through (iii) exercising a right, against some individual or a group who is (iv) the bearer of the correlative duty, specifying in support of his/her claim some particular ground (v) the justification of right. We can elaborate these in turn.

- (i) The subject of a right, the right holder, might be specifically an individual. But it can also be a family, a group, a nation, a state, a culture, and even the entire world itself (in the journalists' word 'the world has a right to know)'.
- (ii) The object of a right is what it is a right to. This is something that the right holder can claim which should be marked importantly by attaching the label 'right'. Thus the demand for a secured society or a secured life must be regarded as a top priority to run a state as claimed by its citizens.
- (iii) Exercising a right, the activity which connects a subject to an object, can be formulated in various forms. It can be shown that right exists in the sense of a claim as a call for accepting something which is admitted. Or it can be done more confidently by asserting or demanding right. It can also be done in a relaxed way by enjoying a right. Energetic versions also get involved in it in the sense of seeking protection against violation of law or demanding compensation for the damage done.
- (iv) Rights, with some exceptions, are held against someone and it characteristically correlates with duty. The right of a lender to the repayment of a debt is held against the borrower which involves a specific duty of a particular person. Thus the link of duty with right helps to establish the idea that a *right* actually exists.
- (v) Finally emerges the question of the justification of rights. A right as a *justified* claim suggests the importance of the social acceptance of the right. Social permission or command can help to empower the bearer of a right to enjoy it. Entitlement of enjoying a right then rests on social

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of the justice of a claim. The type of justification nevertheless and it might appeal to custom, contract, or statute. But the form of the defense of rights remains the same: e.g. one is entitled to the right x property, freedom) because of y (contract, reason).

But how does the notion of 'human' fits or what does the addition of 'nights' in each of these five elements signify?

Firstly, with regard to the idea of right holder, it suggests that every but holder have rights in some way. The subjects of human rights are not members of any particular society, but of the community of humankind.

Secondly, the objects of human rights are no less important than plain rights. In fact, human rights may be said to outweigh plain rights. The human right to life may be judged to override, in certain situation, a right inder a particular civil law, say, to the use of land. For example a person to a 'secured life' which he can claim typically to his government in the form of protection of his life from any threats.

Thirdly, the exercise of human rights might have a more restricted range than that of civil rights. Rights indeed get involved with claiming, demanding, asserting, enjoying, protecting and enforcing. But in the case of human rights the assertive end of this entire compass is the most important. Because, prayer for human rights are often placed when the claims they pursue are not locally acknowledged in judicial law. Here the argument forwarded is that they should be so acknowledged, and enforcement would be the next step.

Fourthly, there is the question of the location of the duties that correlate with human rights. It can be said here that there are universal human rights in a strong and a weak sense. Rights in the weak sense are held against a partucular section of humanity. By contrast, the strong sense is considered to be globally held about rights of human beings where say, everyone has a right to life against everyone else and there is a general duty to respect it. Thus all (basic) human rights are said to be concerned with three correlative duties: duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation and duties to aid the deprived. The duty-bearers, in different situations, may be different (individuals, responsible nations) and

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the particular duty also varies (assistance in a natural disaster). But basic rights stimulate all these kinds of duty.

Finally, with regard to the justification of rights, rights can be conceived as possessed by all human beings simply as human beings. They can be described as 'general' since they are universal to all humanity. Merely being human is sufficient to make one a possessor of rights. It treats all human beings as its portrayal theme and attributes the ingredient of an equal basic moral significance to all human beings as such, but not in terms of different ideologies and cultures which give different moral statuses to people belonging to different races or religions.

If human being is defined as social and political animal then it does not need Aristotle's endorsement of regarding human as essentially rational to pass everywhere because it does not expect rationality to be present in every human when assembled. Aristotle, in fact, believes that although human beings actual tendencies are primarily non-logical, they are capable in principle- if trained technically to use the formal patterns of Aristotelian logic- of drawing valid conclusions from conceptually formulated premises. And one day they may prove their efficiency in working according to those validly deduced conclusions. But this Aristotelian thought hardly fits with the conception of human as social or political animal because even if anyone can be social or political, rational leadership can scarcely be developed in very few human beings.

However, social or political animal can be guided only indirectly, for the most part, by reason since their approach, even when they appear to follow the formal patterns of Aristotelian logic, will be largely non-logical. Most people live by impelling force rather than by strict reason. Whatever the degree of the power of logical thinking, all men are actively social and political. They associate themselves with various interests like economic, religious, cultural or simply social. But all their interests cannot be worked out properly without the concept of human right. Modern thought, therefore, has regarded rights as 'absolute' in the sense that

An absolute right is one that is never justifiably infringed, it is a right that must be respected in all possible circumstances. ¹⁰ (Jones, 1994, p. 191)

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The doctrine of human rights thus ascribes a number of rights to beings indifferently in an extended way in that it portrays all humanity sis members and attributes an equal basic moral significance to all human sign as such. In that way it stands at odds with cultures and ideologies tings as such declining to thich give fundamentally different moral statuses to people belonging to fferent races, religions, sexes or castes. Human rights are thus said to weattained a legal or semi-legal status, since they are now manifested in number of international conventions and declarations like the 'Universal belaration of Human Rights' adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. International lawyers also talk about human rights inhe strictly legal sense according to the declarations established by the nembers of the international community or international agreement. Nevertheless, the idea of human rights remains fundamentally a non-legal me in the sense that these rights are something which human beings are geculated to possess independently of their being recognised in positive wdes of law. The doctrine, therefore, advocates that declarations and conventions of human rights do not 'create' and 'give' rights to human kings, they simply recognise and announce the rights that human beings

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the claim that luman beings have rights and that human beings have rights. The first daim gives emphasis on the idea that merely being human is itself of moral ignificance and believes that being human makes one a member of the noral community. It maintains the view that there are certain ways in which it is right or wrong morally to treat any human being. The difficulty hat crops up here is to assess the range of 'human' since its area in human rights' is not very simple. Some rights can be extended to the bole of humanity without qualification. For example, the right not to be stured generally is and can be ascribed to all human beings independently their qualification. But not all human rights can be claimed for everybody the are biologically human, e.g. the right of self-determination. These ** confirmed as human rights with the implicit idea that they are not being able to the very young or to mentally handicapped adults. They are attributed to human beings only when they possess perfect human Pacities. But this is a disputed issue since it is well illustrated by arguments bout abortions and the right to life.

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By contrast there are rights which can be extended beyond the human race and may be ascribed to non-human beings. For example, the right not to be subjected to cruelty can be ascribed to all living beings. This suggests that not all human rights necessarily need to be only human rights. However, human beings are concerned with respecting human rights and the responsibility or duty lies upon them not to deny the moral relevance of humanity. They can and do share the general idea of human rights even though they differ over the specific rights they have, the possible rights that they can have and over the implications of these rights. This diverse thought about human rights makes the idea more logical and defensible. But when the question of implementation comes in, the diverse thought associated with human rights obviously creates problems.

Ouestions about rights, therefore, need to be further queried with regard to its absoluteness. Should all rights be regarded as absolute? If they are given the status of absoluteness with an added status of moral concern, can they maintain the conception of right as absolute? If the purpose of human rights is to provide guaranteed protection of individual persons, what sort of guarantee would it render to people when the right of not being tortured is not absolute? Can these rights be infringed in the 'national interest' and specially not claimed by those government dishonoring human rights for some justification for such violation? Despite the right not to be tortured listed in the UN Declaration, it is not very unusual to think of circumstances where it is put to test. For example, a bomb implanted by a terrorist will result in the killing of hundreds of innocent people. The terrorist's aim may be to implement some special purpose like asking for his country's independence from foreign captivity. If the man in this case is arrested but the result to find out the location of the bomb turns out to be negative, then the usual process to reveal the secret of the bomb in order to save hundred innocent lives is torturing. But should he be tortured or left free to give him the right of 'not being tortured' an absolute status in spite of the involvement of human costs?

This leads to the path of an unfortunate choice of alternatives where one option will be to treat rights as absolute which undoubtedly will give them a decisive status. Again, it might lead to unsatisfactory result morally and also purely incoherent outcomes (when one right will conflict with one

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The very idea of human rights looks special therefore, and cannot be answered simply in terms of conceptual setup since moral outcomes creep into it. Similar problem arises in case of ascribing fundamental moral importance to any principle like keeping promises, telling the truth, etc.—where there could be circumstances in which any one particular principle will be justifiably kept aside or overriden. One solution will be that the question of rights is given special status because it has been considered with the provision of security and protection. There may be a day when people will be well considerate towards each other and that insistence upon their rights will become unnecessary. At that stage securing and protecting individuals rights should be validated fully which, unfortunately, are not furnished now. The existing global situation of disastrous political experiments has indicated widely that the present non-establishment of rights cannot accelerate this trip to the pledged home.

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THE MĪMĀMSAKAS ON YOGAJA PRATYAKŅA: A CRITIQUE

BHUPENDRA CHANDRA DAS

The Naiyāyika is the propounder of yogaja pratyakṣa (yogic perception). This perception has been admitted by each and every system of Indian Philosophy excepting the Mīmāmsaka and the Cārvāka. The Mīmāmsakas do not admit the existence of yogaja pratyakṣa. To them yogic perception is non-existent like horns of a hare. They give some arguments for not accepting yogaja pratyakṣa. The Naiyāyikas logically refute these arguments to defend their position. An attempt has been made to provide some evaluative remarks from my own standpoint.

T

Yogaja pratyakṣa (transcendental perception) is one of the three types of supernormal perception. The word 'yogaja' comes from the word 'yoga'. Yoga' is defined as the cessation of the modifications of citta (Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ)¹. One who follows the prescribed method of yoga is generally called a yogin. The view of 'yogaja pratyakṣa' is mentioned in Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra (3.2.43) and this theory is elaborated by Vātsyāyana² and Uddyotakāra³. The Naiyāyikas hold that the supernormal perception of an individual i.e., a yogin is also as real as any other perception. They call such a perception as supernormal one, for such perceptions are beyond the range of normal perception. They can perceive the subtle objects, atoms, the minds of others, air, space, time etc. through this perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past and future objects and considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception⁴. And he rejoins that the yogins perceive all objects in all places through cognition simultaneously⁵.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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The supernormal state of the mind acts as the supernormal sense-object contact (alaukika sannikarṣa). This type of contact is known as yogaja sannikarṣa which causes yogaja pratyakṣa.

According to Viśvanātha, yogins are of two kinds: Yukta (conjoined) and Yun̄jāna (occasionally conjoined)⁶. So yogaja pratyakṣa is also of two kinds: yukta pratyakṣa and yun̄jāna pratyakṣa These are the perceptions of yukta and yun̄jāna yogins respectively. A yukta-yogin is one who has attained spiritual perfection and such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous to him. The yogins acquire the power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds free from all taints and one-pointed by constant concentration⁷.

A Yuājāna-yogin is one who is on the way to perfection and he requires the help of concentration for occasional intuitive cognition of all things. Here a yogin requires dhyāna, dhārṇā etc. as additional subsidiary factors for the supernormal perception⁸. A yogin is endowed with a mind having two types of properties: a particular method of thinking (cintāviśeṣaḥ) and a power generated through the practice of yoga (yogābhyāsajanitaḥ). Both the methods are accessory to the attainment of transcendental perception⁹.

The Power of the sense-organs of the ordinary man like us is limited. The Naiyāyikas hold that there can be natural or inborn variation in the capacity of sense-organs. For example, the cat can perceive in darkness also and the vultures can see an object from a very far distance from the sky. And Sampāti, the king of vultures, saw Sitā from a distance of a hundred yojanas¹0. But human eye cannot see after a certain distance. The superior quality of perception varies in degrees like the superior quality of the colour white, etc. A section of men attains the highest degree of perception if they develop in quality of the same. Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of perfection are called sages. So we cannot deny the possibility of higher degree of functioning of the sense-organs of a living being. The most excellent perfection of perception is constituted by the apprehension of subtle, remote, past and future objects¹¹.

The Mīmāmsaka has a strong objection against the possibility of yogic perception^{11a}. He holds that even if it were possible, it would be

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illusory. The perception of a *yogin* is said to be the consequence of the constant practice of meditation. Here, there is a flash of presentative intuition as the result of meditation. This doctrine of intuition, the Mīmāmsaka says, is peculiar to Indian thinkers. But though the cognition produced by the constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentative cognition, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as apprehended in the past, then the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory. But, according to the Mīmāmsaka, memory is invalid. And if it apprehends more than that which was perceived in the past then it is illusory since it apprehends something which has no real existence. Thus the Mīmāmsaka concludes that if supernormal perception called yogic perception is possible at all, it is invalid.

More grounds forwarded by the Mīmāmsaka for not accepting a yogic perception are as under:

- (a) Sense-organs have limitations. Although the power of functioning of senses is increased by practicee, still it has limitation. One can jump over a wall by the regular practice but how can one jump over an ocean or the Hiamalayas¹².
- (b) Though it is pointed out that by practice the power of a particular sense-organ can be increased, it cannot be said that a *yogin* can see anything and everything with his eyes, In fact, the eyes cannot reveal sound and ears cannot reveal colour¹³.
- (c) The Mīmāmsakas like Kumārila etc. state that a man, possessed of superior power of vision perceives only visible objects. But nobody comes across such superiority of sense-perception apprehending the transcendental objects like *dharma* etc. *Dharma* is known from the vedic texts only. It can never be the object of perception¹⁴.

This type of criticism is not fair. It is true that though *dharma* is transcendental to normal sight, yet it is perceived by hte sages or seers. We have seen above that though a very distant object and an object covered by darkness, are beyond the reach of our normal eyes, yet they are perceived by Sampātti and a cat respectively¹⁵.

In response to this sort of defence, Kumārila may say that if a sage

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perceives a transcendental object then he should also perceive smell, taste etc with his eyes. If someone imagines that an omniscient sage grasps every object of the universe by means of a single source of knowledge then he should admit that the sage perceivas taste, smell etc.with his visual organs. Kumārila's objection is not based on facts. The other sense-organs of the sage have super-excellent powers like eyes. So. the peculiar hypothesis that a sage perceives taste, etc.with eyes is not to be conjectured. The Mīmāmsaka may point out that the Naiyāyāyikas should not imagine that a sage perceives dharma is not invisible like taste etc. The argument of the Mīmāmsaka is based upon the misrepresentation of the above sentence. And it is know that taste and similar qualities other than colour are always imperceptible.

The Naiyāyika reacts on the Mīmāmsaka arguments and contends that the latter cannot say from his experience that a sage though possessed of super-eyes cannot perceive *dharma*. For *dharma* and the excellent power of the eyes of a sage are imperceptible to him. So, Kumārila should not point out that *dharma* is not an object which is capable of being perceived with eyes.

The knowledge of eternal *dharma* is only derived from the vedic injunction such as 'should sacrifice' *yajeta* etc. *Dharma* is the eternal fulfilment of duty. It has no limitation in past, present and future. It will be rash for us to think that *dharma* is perceived with our mortal eyes. But it is not at all difficult for the omniscient sages to perceive it¹⁶. A sage intuits *dharma* with his internal organ through the practice of constant meditation on it. Likewise, a love-sick man beholds his beloved lady with the help of meditation alone¹⁷.

The justification of such intuition is that the internal organ is competent to comprehend all objects without an exception and there is no such thing in the universe which disturbs its penetration. There is a lot of examples to show that persons, have clear and vivid vision of objects which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs. Such visual perception is possible only through the constant practice of meditation.

We find that persons, affected by lust, or excessive grief, disease, insanity, a dream of thieves etc. possess clear, distinct, vivid vision of

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When we repeatedly concentrate upon an object, each act of concentration leaves an impression behind it. These impressions accumulate on our self. They constitute the permanent (stable) basis of our knowledge. They generate the highest form of knowledge provided they are arranged in a perfect order. 18.

We can take an instance which shows the acquisition of proficiency in learning. A young student follows a prescribed course of discipline such as the strict observation of the vow of celibacy, the regular revision of the old subject matter learnt by him etc. He acquires permanent impressions thereby. They become stable as they are and they help him to recall the matters read by him in memory with perfect facility.

In case of another instance, we know that gold acquires matchless beauty if it is slowly purified in a closed vessel. In like manner, the inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.¹⁹

On the contrary, the inner organ of worldly men like ourselves is covered by the veil of passions and so we do not acquire the highest stage of knowledge, that is, omniscience. Any object is directly apprehended by the pure inner organ of the sages. The reason of this direct awareness lies in the fact that all the impurities of their mind are consumed by the daily practice of meditation. When the sages consume all the inner drosses and acquire high proficiency in the art of concentration by the constant practice of meditation, they attain the property of being omniscient.²⁰

Future events are foreseen sometimes by us. An illustration of the true judgement or foresight is that my brother will come tomorrow. This type of foresight is called as *Pratibhā Pramāṇa*. This kind of valid knowledge is not hallucinatory. It is not a doubt. It is not even negated by its contradictory judgement. Its source is not a defective sense-organ. Thus, it should be treated as a piece of valid knowledge.²¹

Pratibhā Pramāṇa. is one kind of Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP). ESP is another special type of perception through which senses can perceive distant objects, actions, minds of others etc. without being in contact with them. It is one kind of paranormal phenomena. Its validity is doubted

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by the critics as it, according to them, is purely accidental and a possible event. In this connection, it is said that the knowledge in the form, 'My brother will come tomorrow is certain, though the object is totoally accidental or unexpected²². But now the existence of ESP is almost a certainty, not a conjecture or mere a delusion of the mind²³.

This kind of valid knowledge (i.e. pratibhā-jñāna) is direct but not indirect. It may be objected that it cannot be direct since it is non-sensuous. This type of objection does not stand because the inner organ determines it. But, if the inner organ would independently grasp external objects, there wauld be no blind person in the world. The answer to this objection is that the external object which has been perceived with eyes is only intuited by the inner organ. Thus, the objection that there would be no blind person does not occur.

According to the critics, the direct awareness of a sage is not a perceptual one because it is not determined by a definite set of conditions like the normal perception. In response to this charge it is said that the transcendental knowledge of a sage is always perceptual. If it is not direct it is not the knowledge of a sage. Some opine that the knowledge of a sage is exactly the same derived from the scriptures. This implies that it cannot be direct.

Here another objection is that foresight is non-perceptual for perception refers only to a present object. Kumārila points out that an object which is present and comes in contact with our sense-organ is only perceived. Besides, perception differs from transcendental peception in the point that it apprehends a present object. Such an objection is not tenable. The objectors themselves have said in another place that an object with its future property is grasped. At the time of perceiving silver it is also perceived that it will last long. Thus, it is also established that the perception that my brother will come tomorrow presents a future object. Here the perception of an oridinary man refers to a future object, hence the supernormal perception of a sage refers to future dharma.

If the sages are pioneer to know the true nature of dharma from the Vedas then the wellestablished proposition that Vedas are the only source of dharma is never contradicted. It is the final argument of the

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erma from the only aent of the objector, e.g. the Mīmāmsaka. A reply to the above objection is given objection. There is a truth in the above objection that the sages are initiated hellow. In the Judges are initiated into dharma by the Vedas. Later on when they attain the fruit of meditation the transcendental perception of dharma flashes in their mind. As a result of it, we can say that the ascertainment of the truth of the thesis that the Vedas are the only source of the dharma becomes doubtful or shaky. Resides, the eternal perception of dharma belongs to God and this nerception is the source of dharma. God is the author of the Vedas for He nerceives it (Veda). God's eternal perception is already proved in Indian Tradition. If God's eternal perception is proved then the above thesis that the Vedas are the only source of dharma is not conclusively proved. Thus. the argument offered by the Mīmāmasaka, against the possibility of the transcendental perception of dharma by the sages, is not justifiable i.e. convincing. According to the Mīmāmasaka perception arises only from the contact of the senseorgans with an existent object and dharma cannot he perceived by the sages since an existent object is only perceived.

Dharma is the merit arising from the performance of the acts directed by the Sastras (scriptures). The view that the scriptures are the only source of dharma has been refuted by the following argument: Every word informs us only of known facts. The Vedas are nothing but the sum-total of words. So, they possess the character of words. Each of the words cannot give us piece of knowledge of an object not known before. In other words, words do not denote novel objects. The Vedas which are words do not signify novel dharma. Dharma is grasped by some other means of proof. Thus, the Vedas are not only the source of dharma. A jar is a knowable object, so it is to be perceived by somebody in the universe. All these counterarguments are easily available in order to silence of the objectors.

Hence, the *sūtra* on perception, put forward by the Mīmāmsaka (i.e., Jaimini) thus interpreted (i.e. meant for the refutation of transcendental perception) is really irrelevant.²⁴

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Now, a problem could be raised on the justifiability of the lanscendental perception, (yogaja pratyakṣa) rather one could describe las a metaphysical experience but not epistemological in the true sense of

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the term. Though it is a kind of direct knowledge, yet we may consider whether it is really a case of perception or not. One could know some object existing in remote future or in remote place transcendentally. It is very difficult to verify the truth, hence the question of transcendental knowledge is not beyond question. As such knowledge is purley personal, secret and non-communicable, one may challenge the truth of the same. If this be the case, the perceptuality of such knowledge is very difficult to establish as the principle of verifiability fails here. If somehow it is taken as perception by virtue of being a direct awareness, by which definition it can be taken as perceptual? The standard definition which is given in Nyāya is as follows:

The knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object is called perception (indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ Jṇāṇaṃ pratyakṣam). For being a perceptual knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and object existing in remote time and place is taken as artha. The question remains unsolved regarding the contact between them. As such contact is not easily conceivable the question of its validity may crop up. If this contact is beyond the range of our intelligence or direct awareness, it may not be acepted as perception. It is quite rational to describe it something belonging to metaphysical world.

In reply to such criticism one point could be forwarded in favour of the perceptuality of transcendental knowledge. In broader sense perception should be taken as a direct awareness (sākṣāt psatīti). This directness (sākṣāt tva) may be defined as something not arising from the instrumentality of other knowledge (Jñānākaraṇam Jñānam). If this broader definition of perception is taken into account, the transcendental knowledge should be put under this due to having the form of direct or immediate apprehension (aparokṣānubhūti). Though this feeling is non-communicable, secret and personal, yet it cannot be denied as an experience. It is not also correct to say that the impersonal and communicable knowledge is always perceptual. We can know many things intuitively in our daily life but these are not always communicable. From this it is not proved that our experience is not true or direct. Hence, the reality of transcendental perception occupies a true or direct. Hence, the reality of transcendental perception occupies a

ace in Indian epistemology.

It may be argued that yogic experience is beyond the reach of human being. Now the question is: How is it accepted by the vijayikas as a form of supernormal perception?

In reply, it can be said that there are many things in the world, which ne not capable of being known by ordinary sense-organ.

The inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of he world which is beyond the reach of sense-organs. There is some faculty naman that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as Pratibhā (intuition) 24a . This point will find justification in the fact that there are many things like God, self etc. which cannot be known through senseorgans but the existence of them is already accepted in Indian Tadition. Pratibhā is a flash of light which reveals the objects. The light is the wisdom characterised by immediacy and freshness25. Besides, it has hen described as 'supersensuous and suprarational apperception'26. As his suprasensuous knowledge has no spatio-temporal limit, it is considered stranscendental having capacity of revealing past, persent and future by asingle flash.27

The English rendering of the term 'Rsī is seer which means one who sees past, present and future through one's transcendental vision. He anknow the truth manifested in all objects. That is to say, 'Rṣī is described & Kavi in the Upanisad, which means Krāntadarśi or omniscient i.e., knower of all objects existing in the past, present and future.

There is a sharp distinction between poetic intuition or pratibhā operating in the case of attaining a property generated through yoga (vogaja dharma) and normal intuition or that operating in ordinary bhaviour. It is known from the fact that the former is mysterious while le latter is not. Had Pratibhā been same in both cases there would be no difference between them. Hence, the difference at least in the degree of Pratibh \tilde{a} is to be admitted. In the case of the former the degree of $\frac{1}{2}$ is stronger than the latter.

It has been said that Pratibhā is one in its essence, but differing in according as (i) it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or produced automatically by virtue of Adrsta (unseen factors). Gopinath

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In response to the objections forwarded by the Mīmāmsakas for not accepting a yogic perception the Naiyāyikas meet the objections one by one.

Their first objection is that sense-organs have limitations.

The second objection of the Mīmāmsakas is that it cannot be explained that a yogin can see anything and everything with his eyes though the power of the senses can be increased by practice.

The responses of these two objections have already been given.

The third objection is as follows: By practice one can jump over a wall but how can one jump over the Himalayas or an ocean? With regard to this objection the Naiyāyikas point out that if the opponents find our above answers regarding the operation of external senses as unsatisfactory to common sense, we would opine that a yogin would see anything and everything with his mind which is the internal sense. This is possible by practice of meditation. There is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

The forth objection is that dharma which is known from the vedic text only can never be the object of perception. In reply to this objection, it is said that dharma, though atindriya can be the object of mental perception, let it not be the object of eyes but there is no hindrance, with respect to its being the object of mind, since there is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

It is a fact that by practice, one can jump over a wall but not a mountain or ocean since it is a property of the body and body consists of nan yogin, Perception ne supreme perception ion. Hence,

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of Pratibha Vata etc. By practice a person brings a balance of these properties plesure to dimakes his body comparatively lighter and so he can achieve the power which can fumping over a certain height. But in each case, there is a limitation due the properties of the body. But there is no such impediment with regard nation caused by mind, because it is already stated that a yogin can raulire such a capacity of mind through the constant practice of dhyāna, hāranā etc.

The mind of an average man is affected by the dirt namely rāga, hesa etc. and hence it cannot overcome a certain range or limit, and so reare not yogins²⁹. Rāga dve sa etc. are the products of ignorance nihyā Jñāna). A cognition in which 'a' is cognised as 'b' and not as 'a' scalled ignorance. By constant and rigorous practice of yoga the yogins an attain a stage in which they cognise 'a' as 'a' and not as 'b'. When by are in this stage there is nothing which they cannot perceive.30

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmasakas take the Vedic mowledge or text as authoritative and there is clear expression of a yogic ralisation in the vedic literature. Then the question arises: Why do the Imamsakas not want to accept any yogic perception?

According to Jaimini, perhaps dharma is atindriya and is cognised yvedic injunction only. It can never be the object of perception and all the ther sources of valid knowledge except vedic injunctions are inactive or ton-functioning in case of dharma. Now if this stand of Jaimini is to be mepted then there is no other alternative to the Mīmāmsakas than to the reality of yogic perception. if they admit the reality of yogic Proception then dharma becomes directly the object of perception, which contradict Jaimini's statement. This goes against the thesis of the Mimāmsakas and hence they do not accept yogic perception.

Now if a deduction is a logical one, then it does not matter much whether same deduction contradicts someone's statement or not. The limāmsakas Naiyāyikas argue in this way. Therefore, even though the accept it a yogic perception goes against Jaimini, one has to accept it because it is established by expressions of such experiences of sages or ogins.

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anything and everything simultaneously, then they become the knower of all things (sarvjña). so how will they show the difference between yoging and Naiyāyikas Īśvara who is also omniscient?

In reply the Naiyāyikas say that the very definition of *Iśvara* or God would distinguish a *yogin* from God. According to Nyāya, the definition of God is as follows: God is the substratum of permanent or eternal cognition. On the other hand, a *yogin* is the substratum of an acquired or produced cognition.³²

But Jayanta Bhatta points out for the sake of argument that the Naiyāyika does not know whether the Mīmāmsakas cannot perceive dharma. 'Both of them do not know that others cannot perceive dharma. Even then, if the Mīmāmsaka avers that he knows that there is no perceiver of dharma, then he himself is a yogin because he perceives everyone's perception, that Naiyāyikas do not perceive dharma. 33

Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no argument which can refute the thesis of the Naiyāyikas regarding the acceptance of the reality of yogic perception.³⁴

It has already been discussed that the Mīmāmasakas have a strong objection against the reality of yogic perception. To them if yogic perception apprehends exactly the same thing in the past, the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory which is nothing but invalid. If it apprehends more than that which was perceived in the past, it is illusory because what is apprehended has no existence.

In response to the above mentioned objection, it can be said that we can perceive the past through yogic perception, but it is not only a recollective knowledge. It may be said that memory is nothing but generated by impression of a particular entity alone.³⁵ The impression of an object existing in the past can give rise to memory of the object if it (i.e., impression) is generated through experience. That which is not at all experienced cannot be the object of memory. In the case of yogic perception not only the previously exerienced objects come to our awareness but the objects not experienced earlier are also apprehended by us. The historical facts in which our normal sense-organs cannot reveal may be revealed to us by our super-normal means of knowing i.e., transcendental perception. Should

the Mimāmsakas on Yogaja Pratyakṣa

we call it mere memory? Obviously not. for, many incidents occurred in be remote past in our life or in the life of somebody else may come to our the remote personal through the flash attained during meditation. The value of such awareness that it comes under memory experience cannot be ignored merely by saying that it comes under memory and hence invalid. It is not also fair to say that if something more than and nemory is apprehended during meditatioin is nothing but invalid. There are many saints (even in this modern age) who have experienned many past and future events through yoga. It is not also correct to say that senseorgans have limitation. For, the sense-organs which we possess can reveal only those objects that are in proximity with them. This is true in the case of external perception which is normal one. But behind each and every sense organ there is a power which is described by sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath as Racit and surplus respectively. This power cannot be shown, but have to be experienced. The Upanisadic seers have referred to this power as 'Srotrasya śrotram manaso mano yad' (ear of the ear and mind of the mind). The first 'śrotrā' (ear)refers to our normal ear while another 'śrotrā' stands for that power which can take us to the supernormal world which is beyond the reach of our ordinary sense organs. If the 'surplus' existing in each and every sense organ is generated through meditation, one can have an infallible experience of something existing in the remote past and remote future.

An ordinary sense-organ like eye can reveal colour existing in past and future, but not sounds. In the same way ear can reveal those existing in past and future, but not colour. In this way, the 'surplus' existing in a sense-organ as pointed out by Rabindranath in his 'Religion of Man' can reveal the objects existing in past and future having the particular quality.

NOTES

- ¹ 'Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ Patañjal Yoga- sūtra, 1/2
- ² Vātsyāyana-Nyāya-Bhāsya (3, 2, 40)
- Uddyotakara-Nyāya-Vārtika (3.2, 40)
- Darśanasya paro' tiśayaḥ aukṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhavisyadādi viṣayatvam. Nyāyamañjari, (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), Vizianagram

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- Sanskrit series, Benares, 1895, p:103.
- Yugapad ekaiva buddhyā sarvatra sarvān arthān drakşyanti yoginaḥ. lbid, 5.
- Bhāsā-Paricchedah, Verse No. 65. 6.
- Nyāyamañjari, (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895, 7.
- Cintāsahakṛtaḥ-aparaḥ Cintā anya dhyānam dhāraṇā ca.Kraṇāvalī on 8. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Samsthān, Varanasi, 1972, p.216.
- Cintāviśeşayogābhyāsajanita-dharmaviśeşobhayasahakṛtamanasā 9. Yuñjānasya ākāśaparamāņvādisakalapadārthaviṣayakamānasapartyakṣaṃ bhavatītyarthaḥ Prabhā commentary on Verse No. 65, Kārikāvalī with Muktāvalī, Ed. Sri C. Sankarram Shastri, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p. 470.
- 10. Sampātināmā Cagṛdhrarājo Yojanaśata-vyavahitamapi daśarathanandanasundarīm dadarseti śruyate rāmāyane... Nyāyama ñjari, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series office, Benares, 1936, p.95.
- 11. Darśanasya ca parotiśayah sūksmavyavahitaviprakrstabhūtabhavisyadşayatvam, Ibid, p.96.
- Dr. V. N. Jha Studies in Language, Logic and Epistemology, Pratibha 11 a. Prakāshan, Delhi, 1986, p. 157.
- 12. Abhyāso pi kriyamāno nātyantamapūrvamatisayamavahati langhanāsavat, yo'pi hi pratidinamananyakarmā langhanamabhyasyati so'pi katipayapadaparimitamavanitalamabhilanghayati na tu parvatamamvudhim veti. Nyāymañjari, Ed. Pandit Śre Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City. 1936, p.97.
- Yatrāpi atišayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilanghanāt.Dūrasūksmādidṛṣṭau 13. syānna rūpe śrotravṛtitā. Slokavārtika (Śiva), Codanāsūtra, Verse No. 114.
- Dharmastu cakşuso na vişaya eva. Nyāymañjari Ed. Pandit Śir Sūrya 14. Nārāyana Śukla, the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City. 1936, p.96.
- Yato yadyapi nāsmadadinayana-viṣaya dharmaḥ tathāpi yogīndriya-gamyo 15. bhavişyati, tathāhi yojana-śatavyavahitamandhakārāntaritam

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vānāsmadādilocanagocaratāmupayāti sampāti-vṛṣadamsa dṛsostu Viṣayo bhavatyeva,...*Ibid*, p.96.

- Nanu kartavyatārūpaḥ trikālasparśa-varjitaḥ. Cakṣurviṣayatāmeti dharma ityatisāhasam. Satyam sāhasametatye mama vā carmacakṣuṣaḥ. Na tyesa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarvadarśinām. *Ibid.*p.96.1
- 17. Manaḥkaraṇakam jñanam bhāvanābhyāsasambhavam. Bhavati Dhyāyatām dharme Kāntādaviva Kāminām. *Ibid.* p. 97.
- Tatra Kevalamabhyāsātprakṣaye Kaphamedasoḥ. Śarīralāghavam labdhvā laṅghayanti yothocitam. Iha vijñānakamuasti saṁskāro vyavatiṣṭhate. Kramopacīyamāno sau parātiśayakāraṇam. The Nyāymañjari of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa Ed. Pt. Śri Sūrya Nārāyana śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares city, 1936, p.97.
- 19. Yathānuvākagrahaņe Samsthā bhyasanakalpitaņ. Sthiraņ karoti Samskāraņ pāṭhasmṛtyādipāṭavam. Yathā vā puṭapākena śodhyamānam śanaiņ. Hemaniṣpratikm tadyāti kalyām parām. Ibid.
- 20. Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapi mānasam.

Tadevam Ksīņadosānām. dh yānāvahitacetasām. Nirmalam sarvavişayam jāānam bhavati yoginām *Ibid*, P.98.

- 21. Api cānāgatam jñānamasmadāderapi ka cit. pramāņam prātibham śvo me bhrāta aganteti dṛśyyate. Nānārthajam na samdigdham na bādhavidhurīkṛtam. Na duṣṭakāraṇam ceti pramāṇamidamiṣyatām Ibid. P.98.
- Ka cidvādhakayogaścedastutasyāpramāņatā yatrāparedyurabhyeti bhrāta tatra kimucyatām. kākatālīyamiti cenna pramāņapradarśitam Vastu tat kākatālīyamiti bhavitumarhati. Ibid.
- T. R. Sharma Extra-Sensory Perception, Darshana International, Vol. XXXV, January, 1995, No.1, P.34

Not less than one hundred scientists of England, the USA and Canada have been working for years on data supplied by men and women from all over the world in the field of Extra-Sensory Perception or Paranormal Phenomena, for example, telepathy, psychokinesis, precognition, clairvoyance, intuition, deep meditation etc.

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- 24. The *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Ed. Pt. Śre Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla, The Cowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City, 1936, PP. 98-100.
- 24a. Gopināth Kaviraj: Aspects of Indian Thought, University of Burdwan, 1984, p.1.
- 25. Jadunath Sinha-History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta 26, p.281.
- 26. Nyāyabindutīkī (Vinitadeva) on Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), Kāsī Sanskrit Series, Benares, p. 15.
- Yogi-pratyakṣaṁ tvabāhyam alaukikaṁca. Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha) on Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra (kapila), 1/90, Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), 1888.
- Naṣṭamapi svakāraņe līnam bhūtatvenāsti, bhaviṣyadapi svakāraņe nagtatvenāsti-Sāmkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha) on Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra (kapila), Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), p.49.
- 29. Asmadādeśca rāgādimalāvaraņadhūsaram. Mano na labhate Jñānaprakarṣapadvīm parām. The Nyāyamañjari of Jayanta Bhatta. Ed. Pandit Śukla, The Cowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares City, 1936, pp. 98.
- 30. Pratyūhabhāvanā bhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmaṣam Yoginām tu manaḥ śuddhm kāmivārtham na paśyati *Ibid*, p. 98.
- 31. Nanvekena Jūānena sarvānarthān bhūtabhāvinaḥ parokṣānapi paśyanto yoginaḥ kathamakhilatrailokya vṛttāntadarśinaḥ sakalajagadgurorīśvvarādviśiṣyeran. Ibid, p,99.
- 32. Asti Viśeşaḥ īśvarasya tathāvidham nityameva jñānam yoginām tu yogabhāvanābhyāsa prabhavamiti. *Ibid*, p.99.
- 33. Matpratyakşam akşamam dharmagrahane iti bhavān na jānīte tvatpratyakşamapi na dharmagrāhīti nāham jāne, anyasya pratyakşamīdrśamevetyubhāvvapyāvam na jānīvahe. Tvayā tu uado sarvesām pratyakṣam jāātamīdṛsam. Tarhi tvameva yogīti yogino dvekṣi kim vṛthā. *Ibid*, p.95
- 34. Tadevam kşīņadoṣāṇam dhyānā-vahitacetasām. Nirmalam sarvaviṣayam jñānam bhavati yoginām. *Ibid*, p98.
- 35. Samskāramātrajanyam jūānam smṛtiḥ- Tarkasamgraha, Sūtra No. 35.

BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

SHAKUNTALA BORA

Belief in the concept of immortality is not an independent belief. It depends on the concept of person, his identity, and most importantly the possibility of continuing as the same person after death of the corporeal body. If our concept of person is corporealist as suggested by the Analytic philosophers, the very concept of immortality cannot be held at all. No one can deny the reality of death, the dissolution of the physical body at death. If immortality has to make any sense we must believe at least in some form, in the continuity of the dead person. Person as understood in common parlance is a complex whole of body and mind or the soul. Under such a concept of person any discussion of immortality should be abandoned. "It must however be acknowledged that both the words 'I' and 'survive' are not being given their normal meaning when we talk of survival after death".

Now what remains is whether the 'I' that remains survives in any sense at all.

Immortality as the belief in survival after death is accepted by all the advocates of the concept though they differ in their belief of how one should survive. There are three major forms of beliefs in survival after death. a) Resurrection b) Shadow-man and c) Disembodied existence. Resurrection suggests that the person survives in the same body that the person had prior to his death. This belief again may be held in two different ways-coming to life in an identical body after the previous body is either destroyed or decayed which involves a time gap between death and coming to life again and secondly, coming to life in the same body as was the case with Jesus Christ. Both the beliefs however demand sheer omnipotence. In case of cremation or a long time gap between death and being born

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again it is natural that the body gets destroyed. The constituent particles dissolve into nature. These particles are integrated again to create the same body so the person can come to life. These two persons are numerically different individuals living in two different times. And yet they are believed to be the same individual. Though they are claimed to be the same individual it is difficult to establish their identity as the same person. Person as a corporeal being is under constant change. Thus we must assume that the dissolved individual during the time was also changing. The person who will come into being will be definitely a different individual so far as his bodily constitution is concerned. Even if we assume that there is no change at all with regard to his bodily appearance there is no way we can establish the fact that they are in fact one and the same individual. While we talk of identity of person inspite of all the changes we generally make reference to his spatio-temporal and psychological continuity. The person who comes into existence after the time gap does not have spatiotemporal continuity nor proven psychological continuity to assert his identity. As Terence Penelhum said, "the very same person that died previosuly but merely a replica or simulacrum of him: for, since there is a time-gap between death and resurrection during which the original body may very well have been destroyed altogether, the connecting link that would make it unambiguously the same person and not a replica will have disappeared"2. There is no criteria that would make such two individuals the same person rather than two different persons. Bodily similarities though exact cannot prove identity. Bodily identity is guaranteed only by spatio-temporal continuity. There may however be psychological similarities. Again psychological similarities do not prove identity. It is easy to find cases where two persons exhibit psychological similarities and yet we do not say that they are one and the same individual. True, the person may claim to have all the memories that the pre-mortem person had. There are no criteria by which we can prove that memory claims made by the person are really genuine memories and not just memory claims. It often so happens that we forget what we did or felt at a particular time, and sometimes we seem to remember doing things we have never done. In the face of such difficulties memory cannot be regarded as the criteria of identity. Memory serves as a supporting factor of identity but not as the only determining

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factor of identity. The idea of such a person who looks like me and thinks like me but is not me living in some future time does not and should not make me think that I will be surviving through that individual. This person in the future is separated from me not only by time but also by a better body and a mind. Immortality to be something to be looked forward for must ensure a better life. If a person dies of sickness or old age or accident then it would not do to come to life in the same body. Such kind of revival will lead to another quick death. Resurrection not only demands coming to life but it also requires that one comes to life with some alteration. Question remains as to how much changes we can allow before destroying identity.

Resurrection does not always lack bodily identity. A person may come to life in the very body in which he breathed his last. However, such resurrection must happen within a short time period from one's death. It will not serve the purpose to come to life in a decaying body. Such a short time gap will always leave the question open whether the person really died or not. Moreover, the body which could not sustain the life resulting in death of the person cannot be expected to sustain life till eternity. These are some of the problems of resurrection. Besides these problems this concept does not make any sense without help from God. It also cannot answer why God in the first instance allowed death to the person if the person had to be brought to life again. Belief in resurrected immortality not only depends on the belief in God but also on the belief in the capricious whims of God.

There is another theory that lies between resurrection and disembodied existence. It is the belief of continuing in the form of astral body or subtle body. After the death of the physical body one survives in the form of astral body. Such bodies are not in space in the sense of occupying space. But they have location and thus they are in space. Astral Bodies do not emerge after the death of the corporeal body, they are always there even when a person is alive. When a person dies it detaches itself from the body. It is thought as a replica of the original body and is like the original person except for the absence of the physical body. Such a vision is not difficult to form. The difficulty arises when we have a closer look. Our concept of a person as a bodily being involves reference to space. These bodies being non-spatial has nothing to give them a shape, a form. What

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is it that determines the individuality of such a person? Mental qualities cannot give spatial position to individual. To continue in the same form such bodies must be material to a certain extent. And if they are so then their persence should have made itself known to the living persons somehow. As Geach has said: "How is it then, subtle bodies have never forced themselves upon the attention of the physicist, as x-ray did, by spontaneous interference with physical apparetus? There are supposed to be a lot of subtle-bodies around and physicists have a lot of delicate apparatus, yet physicists engaged in physical research are never bothered by the interference of 'subtle bodies'. In the circumstance I think it wholly irrational to believe in subtle-bodies. Moreover, I who am no physicist am invited to study the existence of subtle bodies. I find that very fact suspicious The discoverers of x-rays, electrons did not appeal to the lay public, but the physicist to study the evidence, and so long as physicist (at least in general) refuse to take subtle-bodies seriously, a study of evidence for them by a layman like me would be a waste of time"3.

However, Geach's argument does not prove conclusively the non-existence of subtle-bodies. It can be argued that subtle-bodies are not supposed to be just floating around interferring with the apparatus of physicist. That may be so, but still they require to be detected. Sometimes it is claimed that a chosen few can detect their presence. This however gives rise to the problem of proving the validity of their claim. Such perceptions may easily be said as illusion or hallucination as said by G.N.M. Tyrell. Again they may be claimed by supporters of disembodied existence as the materialization of disembodied soul rather than astral bodies. Accounts of subtle-bodies are always a bit obscure to eliminate such claims. But whatever they are they are claimed to be detectable in some way. If so, a definite way has to be found for its detection before such a view of survival is accepted.

The very concept of immortality as continuing in a new body or continuing in subtle bodies face certain logical difficulties. But belief in immortality may not consider the body itself as essential for survival of a person. It may be argued that the very essence of person is non-physical. So that the dissolution of the physical body does not bring any change to a person's survival and idetity. It might be belief of person as

Belief In Immortality

essentially a soul or a something unsplitable, undiversifiable, having an awareness of being itself. Such a being does not need the body to survive. It continues to be itself inspite of any changes thast may come upon it. It is indescribable. But each person is aware of being a person in the ultimate sense by himself. Such a being eludes all definition. Everyone knows what it is but nobody can describe what it is. It is the experiencer, its presence is realised in having experiences yet it is not the experience. It is that sense of self identity which cannot be lost no matter what changes may come upon the individual. "When I lost my memory, I am no longer aware of who I am in one sense, namely that I do not remember my name, where I live, what I have been doing in the past and so on. I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outside world observer would place me on the basis of what is known about me. But I do all the same recognize myself as the unique person I am. It. is particulars about my past history and situation that I cannot recover. In a more basic sense I have no doubt who I am -I am myself, the being expressly recognize myself to be in a way which is not possible for knowledge of any other"4.

Under such a concept of person it is possible for the individual to continue being so even after the dissolution of the body. According to this concept the same person continues by virtue of knowing itself to be so. Of course it is difficult to understand what is really meant by such a person it is not an object of which one can be aware. Its realization is completely intuitive. In intuition we are not aware of the existence of any continuous being by virture of whose presence I know myself to be a person. It must be something and yet there is nothing which could tell us what it is. If we are to think that this being will continue after our death then we must at least have some idea about its character. It is sometimes thought as a kind of dream body who though has a form does not exist is space. When we dream we see ourselves with a particular body having certain experiences. It can be imagined that while in dream our bodies are whisked off and what remains is only the dream body, continuing to have experiences. Just as the experiences of the dream do not have any impact on real life similarly the experiences of the life after death will not have any impact on this world. Again it can be conceived that a person is so lost in thought that he is hardly aware of his own physical presence. In such a moment of

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existing in the thought world the body may disappear and the person may continue without body. True that such a picture is hard to conceive but we cannot deny the logical possibility of such a life. Possibility of having this kind of life does not however make one desire to survive after death, Lewis saw the difficulty of such a life and said: "It would indeed seem to us now that such an existence would be anaemic and colourless. But intellectual exchange is not always unexciting, and there might be many compensations and new modes and media of existence, rich and rewarding and intimate beyond anything we can comprehend now. We only know mind and matter. What other dimensions might there not be?"5. It is true that there may really be such kind of life. But no matter how rich it might be it needs to be capable of being explained to us, here and now. If we can show that the life that will come to us posterior to our death is the kind of life we consider as interesting from our present state of affairs the concept of immortality will really carry some meaning for us. To be appealing to living persons it has to involve continuity of having experiences. As Williams has said: "I am afraid I associate my life rather concretely with my tastes. some of them are of rather bodily character, those I love and so on rather then this etiolated system of delusion, which you (Lewis) seem to be offering"6. Just to continue as 'myself' cannot be called as surviving. It will be a mere substience rather then surviving. We need to continue with our experience to go on surviving. Now the question is whether it is possible to go on having experiences after bodily death?

Having no body a post-mortem person cannot have some of the experiences that a normal human being can have. For example, he cannot walk, smile, frown etc. We can however imagine such a person having mental experiences. But this person might be claimed to be having some experiences which an embodied person cannot have. These experiences should not be such that they cannot be understood in this world of space and time. "Mystery though natural and expected cannot be complete". Any experience to be called so much be capable of being discussed and evaluated by us.

A disembodied being can be imagined to have perceptions but it is difficult to make out whether it is possible for such a being to have them the way we do. We have perceptions in a particular way because we are

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particular position in space. Let us say that this being is in the space so paparticular location. Its location can be made out from the action the same appear to him in a particular way rather than other way. So his being sees things as we do from a particular angle. In such a case here is every possibility that he took like us may commit mistake. When feel that we are not having a proper vision of the object we tend to hange our position to have a better look. The disembodied being too in ander to have a better view will have to change his position. How does he hoit? His movements do not involve any movements of his muscles as he bes not have them. He can be thought to move by willing, or trying or by imply deliberating. That is he can see things from wherever it is necessary ist by willing. There will be nothing for him not to see if he wills so. That isgranting special power to him which we do not have. He can see things which are not within 'sight'. He can desire to see and he will see. If we grant this power to this being we must grant him super control over his will. Otherwise he will see too many things at the same time to make any ense of it. These are difficulties which will come along with diasombodiod existence. But they do not prove the impossibillity of having such experiences. As Penelhum said: "There seems no decisive reasons to insist hat a disembodied person could not perceive our world, or, with the aid of inherited true beliefs about its nature, make some correct judgement about i, and be able to understand and sometimes correctly use, the fundamental distinction between how it seems and how it is"8.

It seems logically possible that one can continue after death and can also have experiences. But all these ultimately depend on our belief that an individual really remains being so in the state of disembodied being.

It may be true that our sense of identity is fundamental and we know that we are persons without being told so by anyone. But is it really possible to have the very concept of being a distinct being without being what we have been? I may have the knowledge of being the unique being but the sense of being a distinct individual can come when we can individuate ourselves as different from others. The feature of being myself in that fundamental sense could not have created the sense of being distinct from others. Without a particular mind or a distinct body this sense cannot distinguish one individual from another. Everyone knows that he is a unique

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being. There is nothing distinctive about this feeling. This is universally present in all human beings. Identity in this sense cannot give a person his distinct identity. To be a distinct being as different from others he needs to be characterised. This characterisation of a person comes from his distinct body and a distinct mind. Sometimes it is claimed that a mind alone can serve as identity conferring factor for a person. But to have a distinct mind one has to have a distinct body. A mind is nothing but the total construct made up of all mental states in a person's life. Now this mind is said to be one mind because it belongs to one body. Without a body one mind cannot be distinguished from the other. Reference to body is necessary for individuation of mind and without individuation it is not possible to confer identity. Because our body occupies a particular position we have a particular view of the world. Our world-view is given by our spatial position. And our mental states depend on how the things appear to us. As we are situated in a particular position which can not be anybody else's we develop our unique characteristics. The role of body over our mind is undeniable. The very fact of having a distinct mind is body dependent. "We find bodies without mind; we never find minds without bodies. When we do find minds we always find a close connection between their process and those of their bodies. This, it is argued strongly, suggests that minds depend for their existence on bodies, in which case, though survival may still be abstractly possible, it is to the last degree unlikely. At death there takes place completely and permanently a process of bodily destruction which, when it occurs partially and temporarily, carries with it the destruction of part of our mental life"9. This may be too radical a view. But we cannot deny that a distinct mind is distinct by virtue of belonging to a distinct body. There are stories of swapping minds like that of the cobbler and the prince. And on the first look they do seem probable. There are however many problems with such cases. In such case of interchange of minds a particular person acquires the other person's personality and the other acquires his. But it is difficult to comprehend how one person's, for example, the prince's personality can get expressed in the body of the cobbler or vice-versa. "When we are asked to distinguish a man's personality from his body, we do not really know what to distinguish from what"10. However, it is true that once the that once the mind is formed there is a tendency to identify ourselves with A BORA

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the mind. It happens so because with our mind goes the way we see the That is vital to the distinct characteristic we have which in turn akes us what we are. It is this tendency of ours to identify ourselves with mind that has led some of us to conceive the idea of continuing after edissolution of our bodies. But the logical possibility of conceiving such didea does not prove the existence of such beings. In fact the very 'I' bes not seem to be a reality on a closer look. The awareness of being a aique being seems to signify only the formal aspect of my being in which ental contents can be put. The 'I' seems to be a formal category of ognition which is created to distinguish oneself from other as realised by he mind and created by one's distinct spatial position. Without bodies there all be no distinguishing factor and there will not arise a distinct 'I'. Whatever is said to continue after the dissolution of the body cannot be called the person continuing. Mental features which can be thought to continue with the person alone cannot sustain it. Parfit tried to show we an survive with our psychological continuity without identity. We find it and to accept such survial as survival at all for not having identity. Identity sapsychological matter which we confer upon ourselves at the realisation theing a distinct being. We may conceive the idea of surviving in some hm but should we really call it the continuation of a person? There will be whing save our awareness of being oneself and our mental continuity to Islain our identity which will need to be cofined to certain boundaries to intinue being distinct. Having nothing to confine it to any where one erson carries the possibility of overlapping another person and ing overlapped. It seems improbable that individual consciousness hould continue after the dissolution of the body. It can be concived at consciousness of some sort continues after death but that cannot individual consciousness. Immortality as person is a myth.

NOTES

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MAKING SENSE OF MARXIAN CONCEPT OF JUSTICE

HAROON RASHID

Introduction

It is controversial as to whether there is any specific concept of instice in Marx's thought. The theoretical background of this controversy liss in his concept of capitalist exploitation and in his principle of communist distribution. This is the reflection of the controversy between classical Marxism and normative Marxism.1 According to normative Marxism. Marx's condemnation of capitalist exploitation as well as his concept of communist distribution allow a pinciple of justice. On the contrary, classical Marxism claims that neither Marx's condemnation of capitalism is based on any principle of justice nor his conception of communism suggests any heory of distributive justice. However, this paper is an attempt to make sense of Marx's own view about justice in the light of this controversy. I argue that although Marx uses normative terms in his condemnation of capitalism and in his conception of communism, he does not provide any specific theory of justice. Although he treats capitalist appropriation of surplus value as theft and robbery, he nowhere says that capitalist exploitation is unjust. In his view, exploitation is the very nature of capitalism, i.e., it arises from the economic inequalities of the system. Marx formulates acommunist principle of distribution as a principle of equality, but he does not consider it as a principle of justice.

Marx does not believe in any particular conception of justice. In The German Ideology² and in The Communist Manifesto³ he dismisses lalk about ideals like justice and rights. He asserts that justice and rights are ideological constructions, which only serve to justify and perpetuate the existing property relations. Actions are said to be just or unjust in relation

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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to a particular mode of production. There is no transhistorical concept of justice. Neither is there any communist principle of justice, because communism will be a society beyond justice. Marx is hostile to moral conceptions of communism. He believes that historical development is governed by an objective necessity independent of man's will. Accordingly, condemnation of capitalism as unjust is pointless. Communism cannot come about before conditions are objectively ready for it. As long as exploitation is historically necessary, capitalism will remain. As soon as its time is pass, it will disappear. There is no room for any principle of justice in either stage. However, according to the law of capitalist economy, surplus value is due to the capitalist, not due to the worker, hence, the appropriation of surplus value by the capitalist is not unjust.

Marx constructs a comprehensive theory of capitalism as a concrete historical mode of production. He condemns capitalism as a whole, and his condemnation is based on (what he believes) a unified and complete analysis of its inner workings and its position in human history. In his view, capitalism has performed a valuable historical task in developing social forces of production, but this development has taken place at the cost of humanity. Not only has it impoverished the physical existence of the workers, but the intellectual and moral lives of men have also been impoverished by it. The rapidity of social change under capitalism has created a permanent state of instability and disorder in social relationships. Hence, the Marxian charge that capitalism is essentially a system of exploitation, actually figures in Marx's critique of capitalism.

In Marx's view, social relations are disguised in capitalist production. Capitalist production rests essentially on the appropriation of surplus value. Capital, by its very nature, necessarily exploits the worker by appropriating and accumulating his unpaid labour. Hence this exploitation of the worker by capitalist is not a form of fraudulent exchange or economic injustice, but it is a form of concealed dominion over the worker. Capitalism is a system of slavery, expressed as the relations of dominion and servitude. Although this servitude is a source of misery, degradation, and discontent to the worker, it is not a form of injustice. The servitude of the wage labourer to capital is an essential and indispensable part of the capitalist mode of production.

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Capitalist exploitation rests on economic coercion. In Marx's sense, capitalist exploitation typically arises because workers are forced to sell their labour power. They have no land to cultivate, no capital to set themselves up in business, no entrepreneurial skills to pursue a bank to lend them money. Therefore, the choice of wage labour is forced, and capitalist exploitation does not involve any injustice. Capitalist exploitation also leads to a need for emancipation. This need appears as an actual movement within the existing production relations not merely as a social ideal. In Marx's theory, it arises only where there is antagonism between the productive forces and the existing production relations. Men develop and change the forces of production within a given mode of production, and in this way they bring about new historical possibilities, and with them new human desires and needs. Capitalism itself produces the need to abolish capitalist production. It produces an ever-growing burden of servitude and at the same time an ever greater capacity for emancipation. In this way, the productive forces become increasingly antagonistic to the production relations. But it does not mean that the downfall of capitalism is inevitable because it is bad or unjust. In Marx's sense, the creation of human desires and needs cannot be satisfied within a capitalist framework. These defects of capitalism are the causes of its downfall. So, capitalist breaks down not because it is bad or unjust but because it is defective.

In the Critique of the Gotha Program,⁴ Marx formulates a communist principle of distribution. The main function of this principle consists in abolishing economic inequalities of the capitalist system. In this sense this is a principle of equality, not a principle of justice. Marx makes adistinction between the principles of distribution in the first and the final stages of communism. In the first stage, there is the contribution principle - "To each according to his contribution." In the final stage, there is the need principle - "To each according to his needs." The contribution principle requires that skilled and unskilled labour have been reduced to a common measure that takes account of this difference. In marx's view, the contribution principle is defective in the sense that it embodies a bourgeois conception of formal rights. Distribution according to rights is necessarily inadequate. This defect is eliminated in the higher stage of communism which represents a transition from a society governed by rights to a society

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in which rights and justice no longer have any role to play.

For Marx, the contribution principle applies equal labour contribution to all producers. But different individuals make unequal productive contributions and are differently rewarded according to their unequal physical and mental endowments. Thus equal rights applied to unequal individuals give rise to material inequality. The contribution principle, therefore, favours those who are gifted by nature. Marx says that the individuals should not be discriminated on the basis of natural differences for which they themselves are not responsible. The contribution principle treats human beings one-sidedly as workers and ignores their individuality. This defect of the contribution principle would be overcome by the needs principle in the higher phase of communism. The contribution principle, therefore, only makes sense when it is seen in the light of the needs principle. However, Marx's needs principle implies that there would be an abundance of goods under communism. Accordingly, individual's needs will be satisfied and the "circumstances of justice" will no longer remain under communism.

For Marxian Concept of Justice

Jon Elster, one of the leading figures of normative Marxism (a recent trend in Marxist thought,) argues that Marx's theory of exploitation in Capital and his conception of communism in the Critique of the Gotha Program entertain the principles of justice. On the one hand, capitalism is unjust in the sense that Marx treats capitalist extraction of surplus value as theft, embezzlement and robbery. On the other hand, Marx's contribution principle in the first stage of communism entertain a conception of justice in the sense that exploitation is always and inherently unjust. The term "exploitation", according to Elster, carries connotations of injustice. It is highly value-laden, with overtones of moral wrongness and unfairness. To say that exploitation is unjust is to say that it ought to be abolished. But this view only makes sense if it can be abolished.

In Elster's view, Marx believes capitalism to be a profoundly unjust system. Although Marx treats justice as a bourgeois category, Elster believes, his theory of exploitation, and notably the frequent characterization of profit as theft, only makes sense if we impute to him a theory of distributive justice. That is, Marx condemns capitalism on the grounds of

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ly unjust y, Elster erization neory of ounds of distributive justice. When he refers to the transaction between capitalist and worker as "theft", "robbery" and "embezzlement", he believes that capitalist appropriation of surplus value is an unjust one. Capitalist profit violates the principle "To each according to his contribution". Thus, argues Elster, the contribution principle serves as a criterion of justice that condemns capitalist exploitation as unjust. Since exploitation violates the contribution principle, it is considered to be a main flaw of capitalism. Hence, exploitation as a main flaw of capitalism allows the conception of justice. As Elster says:

More specifically, he frequently refers to the capitalist extraction of surplus value as theft, embezzlement, robbery, and stealing. These are terms that immediately imply that an injustice is being committed. Moreover, the sense in which it is an injustice cannot be the relativistic one. The sense in which extraction of surplus value is unfair must refer to a non-relativistic, transhistorical conception. This argument is one important piece of evidence that Marx thought capitalism to be unjust.⁸

However, Marx denies any particular conception of justice. He does not believe in any non-relativistic, transhistorical conception of justice. Yet, Elster argues that his characterization of capitalism and communism suggests a particular conception of justice. He claims that there are at least two senses in which Marx entertains the conception of justice. On the one hand, Marx's critique of capitalism (capitalist extraction of surplus value as theft, embezzlement and robbery) shows that it is unjust. On the other hand, his numerous statements about communism offer a positive conception of justice (contribution principle in the first stage of communism).

Elster disagrees with Marx's logic that exploitation arises when workers are forced to sell their labour power. Contrary to Marx's causal notion of exploitation, he argues for a moral notion of exploitation:

Clearly, a worker can be exploited without being either coerced or forced to sell his labour power. Hence whatever is morally wrong with exploitation cannot stem from the forced nature of the wage contract- unless one is prepared to say that exploitation is morally unobjectionabel when the contract is unforced.⁹

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Although Marx's contribution principle tells us that exploitation is always and inherently unjust, it is not inherently wrong, it is not morally objectionable, It is objectionable because of specific features of the situation that are not always present. Hence, exploitation cannot be a fundamental moral concept. However, Elster points out two reasons why capitalist exploitation (appropriation of surplus value) may be termed unjust. First, pure capitalist (coupon-clipper) hires a manager at a poor wage to exploit the workers. This is unjust that the capitalist came to acquire his capital (whatever may be the means of acquiring). The capitalist receives an income without making any contribution in terms of work. Thus the capitalist violates the principle - "To each according to his contribution." For Elster, this is a principle of justice, though not the supreme principle of justice. Secondly, pure capitalist entrepreneur (who has no capital) exploits the workers by virtue of his organizational skills. He makes the workers much more productive collectively (than they could be in isolation) by bringing them together. But this does not entitle him to an income vastly greater than that of his workers. True, he "helps create what is to be deducted." But, argues Elster, one is not morally entitled to everything one is causally responsible for creating.

According to Elster, Marx' contribution principle only makes sense when it is assessed in the light of the needs principle. The defects in the contribution principle presuppose a superior principle of justice. To reject one principle Marx must appeal to another. That is, his argument to refute the contribution principle cannot serve the function of refuting the possibility of a theory of justice. Goods ought to be distributed so as to equalize welfare (a well-known theory of justice). Thus, Elster attempts to show that the two principles (contribution principle and needs principle) entertain the theory of justice. The contribution principle in the first stage of communism serves as a criterion of justice that condemns capitalist exploitation as unjust. In the second stage (of fully developed communism) it is itself condemned as inadequate by the higher standard expressed in the needs principle. Both these principles are violated by capitalist exploitation. In the words of Elster.

Hence Marx had a hierarchical theory of justice, by which the contribution principle provides a second-best criterion when the needs principle is not yet historically ripe for application. Capitalist

exploitation is doubly unjust, since it obeys neither principle. The "equal right" of the first stage of communism, is also unjust, but less so, since only the needs principle is violated.¹⁰

Thus, Elster imputes to Marx a two-tier or hierarchical theory of justice. The first conception is distribution according to needs and the second is the ideal of equal welfare. Exploitation is condemned by the first as well as by the second principle of distributive justice.

Elster's view is very close to that of Peffer.¹¹ Peffer argues for a labour theory of exploitation which suggests that economic exploitation turns out to be essentially forced, unpaid, surplus labour. Since economic exploitation violates Marx's principle of equal freedom, it is always wrong.¹² According to Peffer, Marx's views are compatible with theories of social justice and human rights. Marx is not only committed to general principle of equal freedom but also to human rights. Speaking of economic or social freedom makes sense only if we have a standard of justice. This view suggests that Marx's committment to notions of social and economic freedom requires us to account for his implicit committment to principles of distributive justice as well as human rights. Again. Peffer argues, Marxism is compatible with the concepts of justice and rights in the sense that an adequate moral theory must be able to show that socialism is morally preferable to capitalism. Socialism is morally preferable because it is a genuine historical possibility.

But Marx explicitly rejects any theory of justice and rights. In his early works¹³ he attacks these concepts (of justice and rights) by arguing that they are part and parcel of bourgeois ideology. In his later works¹⁴ he explicitly rejects the thesis that capitalist exploitation is unjust to the workers and that socialism is preferable to capitalism (because it is more just). Finally, he believes that these concepts will become otiose in communism. However, Peffer argues that Marx's criticisms of these concepts is in some way faulty and that there is no prima facie difficulty in either explicating Marx's moral views in terms of rights and justice or in basing Marxist moral theory on these concepts. Due to his various confusions about morality in general and the concepts of justice and rights in particular, Marx seems to have explicitly held capitalist exploitation to be just while

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implicitly condemning it as unjust. Elster also points out that Marx can at times be madly inconsistent. In this regard, Peffer agrees with Elster that "no interpretation of Marx' various remarks on justice and rights can make them all consistent with one another.¹⁵

Acording to Keyes, 16 Marx does not reject any standard of justice; rather he presents the reason for the defects inherently in the standard of justice in the first stage of communism. The defect of the first stage of communism is that it suffers from a "bourgeois limitation," namely, the individual needs are sometimes ignored. This defect is inescapable. Marx merely points out the unavoidable deficiencies. He does not reject the standard of justice, rather his argument concerning the defects of the first stage of communism is based upon a higher standard of justice. If there were no injustice involved in appropriating surplus value from the labourer. Keyes argues, why Marx so vehemently opposes exploitation. Why does Marx call it "shameless", and "systematic robbery"? Why does he insist that the worker is "cheated", "robbed", and "embezzled"? Why does he label the capitalist a "thief" and an "extorter"? Why does he refer to the capitalist's profit as "booty"? If Marx does not consider the capitalist extraction of surplus value from the worker as unjust, then why does he condemn it, and why does he spend the greater part of his life struggling against it?

Reiman¹⁷ argues for a Marxian theory of justice (which is materialist as well as historical), particularly presented in *The critique of the Gotha Program*. Like Elster he observes two principles of justice (contribution principle and needs principle) in the *Critique*. Reiman calls the first Principle Marx's socialist principle and the second his communist principle. Marx's socialist principle is a principle of equality in the sense that each person derives a share of the social product equal to his output. But this principle would, as Marx syas, still countenance inequality in the sense that people differ in their natural talents and abilities. However, Marx suggests a communist principle of equality to remedy this defect of inequality in the socialist principle.

Husami¹⁸ also finds the notion of justice in Marx's critique of capitalism. According to him, Marx condemns capitalism on the grounds

of its injustice. Like Elster, Husami observes two principles of distributive justice in Marx's *The Critique of the Gotha Program:* distribution according to labour contribution and distribution according to needs. Whether or not Marx regards capitalism as just, he argues, seems to be a matter of evaluating the capitalist distribution of wealth and income in terms of these distributive standards.

The first phase of communist society (socialist society" in Marxian literature) provides the idea of a socialist distributive justice according to Husami. This notion of justice marks an "advance" over the capitalist distribution of wealth and income in two senses. First, socialism establishes the principle of equal rights by abolishing the private ownership of the means of production. Secondly, socialism ends class exploitation. Under socialism, Husami argues, the producer is treated justly because his reward is proportional to his labour contribution, while under capitalism, the producer is treated unjustly because his reward is not proportional to his labour contribution. However, for Marx, socialist principle suffers from the defect of inequality in the sense that different individuals make unequal labour contributions and are differently rewarded due to their unequal natural talents and abilities. This defect of inequality would be overcome by the principle of distributive justice (the needs principle) in the final phase of communism. This sort of justice makes the satisfaction of needs and the full development of individuality its guiding principle. Thus, while socialist justice is closely linked to equality, communist justice to self-realization. Accordingly, the two principles of justice exclude exploitation by abolishing private property.

According to Husami, capitalism systematically violates the principle of compensation according to labour contribution. The worker would be treated unjustly even if he gets the full value of his labour power, because what this labour power produces exceeds in value than the value of the labour power itself. The value of his labour power invariably embodies an amount of labour less than the amount of labour he is forced to contribute. Capitalist injustice consists in this nonequivalence of contribution and reward. Capitalism also violates the principle of reward according to labour contribution. The labour contract is unjust even when the worker receives the full value of his commodity, because he receives no equivalent for his

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surplus labour.¹⁹ Capitalism, argues Husami, systematically violates the needs principle of distributive justice as well. Marx considers capitalism unjust because it does not satisfy human needs within its own productive possibilities and thus violates the principle of distribution according to needs.²⁰ Capitalism is not a planned system that reconciles supply and demand. The lack of conscious planning is a condition of injustice. Capitalism is directed to the generation of surplus value, not to the satisfaction of human needs. It is profit, not need satisfaction, that determines what goods are to be produced and in what qualities. Thus, capitalist exploitation violates not only the socialist principle of justice but also the communist principle of needs satisfaction.²¹

Against Marxian Concept of Justice

Allen Wood,²² one of the leading supporters of classical Marxism in recent time, argues against Marxian concept of justice. According to him, Marx does not provide any specific theory of justice, nor does he condemn capitalist exploitation from any standard of justice. Justice, for Marx, is not a standard by which human actions, institutions or other social phenomena can be evaluated. Rather it is an ideal which correspond to each mode of production. The appropriation of surplus value is not unjust and the new mode of production will be no more just them the old one. Disguised exploitation, unnecessary servitude, economic instability and declining productivity are characteristics of capitalism and they provide good reasons for condemning it. These reasons do not constitute any theory of justice and Marx never bases his condemnation of capitalism on any moral standard.

In Wood's view, Marx has powerful reasons for attacking capitalism and advocating its revolutionary overthrow. Capitalism is an irrational and inhuman system, a system which exploits and dehumanizes the productive majority people of the society. However, Marx does not provide any philosophical foundation for denouncing capitalist society. That is, he does not specify the norms, standards, or values he employs in deciding that capitalism is an intolerable system. Hence, Wood argues, it would be wrong to suppose that Marx's critique of capitalism is founded on any principle of justice. There is no good reason to claim that Marx provides any moral theory. In the words of Wood:

It is simply not the case that Marx's condemnation of capitalism, rests on some conception of justice (whether explicit or implicit), and those who attempt to reconstruct a "Marxian idea of justice" from Marx's manifold charges against capitalism are at best only translating Marx's critique of capitalism or some aspect of it, into what Marx himself would have consistently regarded as a false, ideological, or "mystified" form.²³

Wood argues that Elster is simply wrong when he says that Marx believes capitalism to be an unjust system. Although Marx believes that capitalist steals' from the workers, he explicitly asserts that (despite this act of theft or robbery) the capitalist appropriates surplus value not 'wrongfully or 'unjustly', but 'with full right. As regards the issue whether Marx thinks capitalism to be unjust, the interesting question is that whether Marx has good reasons for holding the paradoxical view that capitalist, though alienating and exploitative, is not unjust. Wood argues that Marx's materialistic conception of history, his theory of class struggle, and his conception of revolutionary practice suggest that he has very good reasons for refusing to condemn capitalism as unjust and for criticizing those who so condemn it.

According to Wood, Marx does not attempt to provide a clear and positive conception of justice in his writings. This negative conception of justice derives from his assessment of the role of juridical conceptions in social life. He attaches considerably less importance to juridical conceptions as measures of social rationality. But it does not mean that he tells us nothing about justice as a rational social norm. In Capital Marx clearly says that the justice of transactions arises as a natural consequence from the relations of production. According to him, "justice" is fundamentally a juridical or legal concept, a concept related to law and the rights of men. The concepts of right and justice are the highest rational standards by which laws, social institutions, and human action may be judged from a juridical point of view. However, Marx rejects this juridical conception of society. The concepts of right and justice which express the juridical point of view, are rationally comprehensive only when seen in their proper connection with other expressions of social life and grasped within the prevailing mode of production. As Wood argues:

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Marx gives no argument for his conception for justice, but the reasoning behind it is probably something like the following: Historical materialism holds that the concept of justice is socially important and socially potent because of the way in which standards of justice sanction the production relations corresponding to the current state of a society's productive forces.²⁵

In reply to Husami, Wood argues that Marx's condemnation of capitalism does not involve distributive injustice. The justice or injustice of an economic transaction for Marx depends on its relationship to the prevailing mode of production. Marx holds this view because he sees right and justice as juridical concepts, whose proper function is in the moral or legal institutions, and in social relations. Such institutions and relations, according to Marx's materialistic conception of history, are part of the social superstructure. They are the juridical expressions of societies' production relations. The exploitation of wage labour by capital is essential to the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, there is nothing unjust about the transactions in which capital exploits labour, and the workers rights are not violated by capital's appropriation of their surplus value. In Wood's view, the justice or injustice of capitalist institutions has little or no significance for Marx, explanatory or evaluative. Unjust institutions or practices are only abuses of the system, and not fundamental defects of it. At most they are symptoms of such defects.26

Nielsen²⁷ agrees with Wood's claim that Marx does not condemn capitalism for being unjust or for failing to promote any moral conception. For Marx, justice is a juridical concept dependent on a definite mode of production. On Wood's reading, justice for Marx is not an abstract general standard by which human reason assesses social practices and institutions, it is rather a standard by which a mode of production measures itself. We can say that certain things are just or unjust within capitalism or socialism, but we cannot coherently make such judgments of capitalism or socialism itself or use the norms of justice of one mode of production to criticize another mode of production. It is clear that Marx firmly condemns capitalism as exploitative and dehumanizing. But he never explicitly says that capitalism is unjust or that it violates the workers' rights.

According to Lukes, 28 the capitalist's extraction of surplus value is

means an injustice to the worker. He shares with Wood in that mactoins are just if they correspond to the prevailing mode of production. Independent of the existing mode of production, rather they are rational modes of the justice of specific acts and institutions based on their mode of production. Since the exploitation of wage labour by capital sessential to the capitalist mode of production, there is nothing unjust thout the transaction through which capital exploits labour.

Allen²⁹ argues that Marx never thinks that capitalism is distributively mjust. He agrees with Wood that Marx assesses capitalist distribution mly in terms of standards which correspond to capitalism itself. He thinks that Wood is right in interpreting Marx's transactional justice in terms of is notion of the function of juridical institutions within a mode of production. Indical institutions have the function of facilitating the operation of the mode of production to which they belong. Thus, economic transactions which arise as natural consequences from the relations of production are instituted in the prevailing mode of production.

Young³⁰ agrees with the view that Marx never provides any standard moniterion of justice. Marx never tells us by what standard or criterion he agards the extraction of surplus value as unjust and the wage-exchange is just.31 His condemnation of capitalist exploitation has nothing to do with putice or injustice. However, Young does not agree with Wood's claim hat Marx regards capitalist exploitation as just. He argues that there is no mod reason to ascribe to Marx the conclusion that he regards capitalist as just. Similarly, there is no good reason to suppose that the thraction of surplus value is unjust. From Marx's writings Allen Wood Mers that the extraction of surplus value is unjust. Young, however, argues hat this inference is unwarranted. Marx, in his writings, speaks of the lorker only in his role as owner and seller of labour power, not as a factor the production process. In his role as seller, the worker is treated fairly, cause the worker receives in the form of wages the value of the labour Wer he sells. But the worker is not treated fairly as a factor in the ocess of production. The transactions Marx speaks of are said to have idical form of contract. They are exchange transactions which occur in market. The extraction of surplus value is not an exchange, it is the

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basic capitalist production relation which occurs in direct production. H_{ence} it cannot be said to be just.

Like Young, Ryan³² does not agree with the view that capitalist exploitation is just for Marx. He claims that capitalist exploitation for Marx is not in an absolute sense just or unjust because there is no such sense. On Marx's account, capitalism is just-in-appearance according to prevailing notions of justice, but it is unjust-in-reality according to those same prevailing notions. As regards the question - 'is capitalist exploitation really unjust'? Marx's response is neither yes nor no. His denial of eternal moral truths and of any principle of justice makes the status of his own distributive principle problematic. He never thinks of this principle as a principle of socialist justice.³³ Thus, there are no socialist standards of justice. Marx does not argue that capitalism is just by its own lights and unjust by socialist lights. In so far as capitalism is unjust, it is unjust by capitalism's own lights, not by any socialist standard of justice.³⁴

Marx's Own View

In Marx's view, capitalist exploitaion is not unjust; it has become a historical necessity arising out of antagonistic social relations. Capitalist exploitation arises only when there is antagonism between the productive forces and the production relations. This is the very nature of capitalism that the productive forces become increasingly antagonistic to the production relations. In Marx's own words, "Thus only for the workers is the separation of capital, landed property, and labour-an inevitable, essential and detrimental separation" The inevitable result for the worker is over-work and premature death. The worker becomes a mere machine, a bond servant of capital. Marx seems to suggest that the sufferings of the workers are the inevitable result of the capitalist system. He would never argue for a good life for the workers in the sense that their sufferings are bad. He is never concerned with such normative ideas like 'goodness' or 'badness'. Rather he is concerned with the very nature of the capitalist system which creates antagonistic social relations, and leads to the sufferings of the workers.

Although capital exploits labour, it does the workers no injustice and does not violate any of their rights. That is, the exploitation of labour by capital is essential to the capitalist mode of production. Exploitative

transactions between capital and labour correspond to the capitalist mode of production. They are just as long as that mode of production prevails. It becomes clear in the following passage:

The justice of transactions which go on between agents of production rests on the fact that these transactions arise out of the production relations as the natural consequence. (The content of trasaction) is just whenever it corresponds to the mode of production, is adequate to it. It is unjust whenever it contradicts it ³⁷

However, Marx does not regard the justice of capitalist exploitation as any defense of it. What he wants to mean is that a transaction is just whenever it is functional within the existing mode of production. From this it follows that the exploitative transactions between capitalist and worker (and the system of capitalist distribution resulting from them) are not unjust.

In capitalist production the justice of transactions rests on the fact that they arise out of capitalist production relations, i.e. they correspond to the capitalist mode of production. In fact, capitalism is made possible by the existence of labour power as a commodity, by its use as a commodity to produce surplus value and expand capital. If there were no surplus value, labour power could not even appear as a commodity, capitalism would not even be possible. Accordingly, capitalist appropriation of surplus value (the exploitation of labour by capital) is not unjust. Marx is quite clear about this. He raises a seris of rhetorical questions on this issue in the Critique of the Gotha Program:

What is a "fair" distribution? Do not the bourgeois assert that the present distribution is "fair"? And is not it in fact the only "fair" distribution based on the present mode of production? Are economic relations ruled by juridical concepts, or do not, on the contrary, juridical relations arise out of economic ones?³⁸

Here Marx wants to say that present-day bourgeois distribution is fair, since it is justified by the present-day mode of production. He does not suggest any specific conception of justice either for bourgeois society, for fair distribution corresponds to the prevailing mode of production. The bourgeois assert that the present distribution is just and that it is based on

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the present mode of production. That is, capitalist exploitation is just by bourgeois standards. But to think this is to make the assumption that there might be standards of justice. This sort of assumption is rejected by Marx.

Marx's own view seems to be compatible with that of Wood. His notion concerning the wages of labour shows that nothing is wrong or unjust with the wages of the workers paid by the capitalist. In his own words: "Wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist." These statements clearly show that capitalist exploitation is not unjust. The exploitation of labour by capital is a historical necessity. Wage-labour creates capital which works as a means of exploitation. As Marx claims:

Wage-labour creates capital, i.e. that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation.⁴⁰

Labour-power, for Marx, is sold not with a veiw of satisfying needs of the worker. His aim is augmentation of his capital, production of commodities containing more labour than he pays for, containing therefore a portion of value that costs him nothing. Production of surplus value is the absolute law of the capitalist mode of production. Labour-power, therefore, reproduces its own value as capital, and yields in unpaid labour a source of additional capital.

It is true that the worker is exploited to great extent when his labour-power is bought below its value. But this does not tend to show that any injustice is done to him. Marx believes that the exchange between capital and labour involves exploitation, but it does not imply that there is any injustice in the exchanges. He rejects the claim that surplus value involves an unequal exchange of commodities between worker and capitalist. He points out that the value of labour-power, like the value of any other commodity, depends on the quantity of labour necessary for its production. That is, the value of labour-power depends on what is socially necessary. Like the value of any other commodity, it depends on the level of development of productive forces and on the concrete production relations to which they correspond. Accordingly, it can go up or down, but it cannot be just or unjust.

On Marx's account, the capitalist buys from the worker a special kind of commodity, namely 'labour-power'. Labour-power is special because it is such a commodity which creates more value (surplus value) than its production. Labour-power is the worker's capacity to work. When the capitalist buys it, he has the right to set the worker to work for whatever time the labour contract lasts and appropriate the additional value created by labour-power. This is the way the worker does unpaid labour. Marx insists that only a part of the worker's time is used to repay the cost of his subsistence, the rest goes to the capitalist, which he considers as forced labour or surplus labour. In his words:

...if the worker needs only half a working day, then, in order to keep alive as a worker, he needs to work only half a day. The second half of the labour day is forced labour, surplus labour.⁴¹

Marx, however, insists that the capitalist acts 'with full right'. That is, the worker sells his labour-power for its full value, but gives surplus value to the capitalist. The worker is forced to sell his labour-power for his subsistence and thus creates surplus value. As Marx claims: "Capital forces the workers beyond necessary labour to sruplus labour. Only in this way does it realize itself, and create surplus value."

In Marx's view, production determines distribution. He looks for the truth about the exploitation of the worker in production, not in distribution. He claims that the surplus is created in production, not in distribution, it is only realized in exchange. It is not because goods are bought at less than their value, but because a surplus appears in the process of production so that the capitalist can appropriate a profit. In the process of production, labour does not belong to the intrinsic nature of the worker, it is external to him. Marx likes to say:

His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced: it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need, it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.⁴³

In support of his claim that labour is coerced or forced, Marx argues that the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone elses. That is, it does not belong to him, but to another. For Marx, capital is the governing power over labour and its product.

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The capitalist possesses this power as the owner of capital. Capital cares nothing for the length of life of labour-power. All that concerns it is solely the maximum of labour-power. Capital attains this end by shortening the extent of labourer's life, by robbing his labour-time.

Marx anticipates two sorts of distributional criterion for two different phases of communist society. The first includes the contribution, principle and the secone includes the need principle. Marx speaks of these two phases of communism as criterion of distribution, not as principles of justice. He does not condemn capitalist exploitation as unjust by applying post-capitalist or communist standards of justice. Such standards would not be applicable to capitalism. Marx believes that a communist revolution will introduce a new mode of production, and with it new standards (of right and justice) as higher than those of capitalist society. But he does not mean that they are universal moral standards, what he means is that they only belong to a society which implies a higher mode of production. A higher mode of production is not 'more just' than a lower one, it is only just in its own way.

Communist society does not develop on its own foundations, but it emerges from capitalist society, and which is still stamped with the birth marks of the old society. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society what he contributes to it. In Marx's sense, this is the first phase of communism, which suggests the contribution principle: "The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form he receives back in another."44 In this first phase, for him, equal right is still in principle - bourgeois right, it is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation. The equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard (labour). However, since one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labour in the same time, this equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour. It is therefore, a right of inequality in its content. This limitation, as Marx says, is inevitable in the first phase of communism. In order to overcome this limitation he suggests a higher principle in a higher form of communism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."45

This is the way Marx depicts the picture of a communist society.

The two phases of communism are the two aspects of the principle of stribution. Marx refers to the earlier and later phases of communist society solver and higher phases of communism. What he believes is that one hase is a better state of affairs than the other. There seems to be moral idgement here. But Marx does not speak here as a moral philosopher. What he means to say is that one form of society is higher than another. because it is more liberating, more conducive to human self-realization and human needs satisfacton. There is a vision of a good society and of a himanly more adequate way of distributing things in this judgement. That is the earlier phase of communism is an improvement over capitalism and the later phase of communism is an improvement over the earlier phase. The need principle is not a principle of distributive justice. In the higher hase of communism Marx speaks of the circumstances (of scarcity and conflict) that make such principle necessary will no longer exist. The need minciple is not a general or formal rule, because it does not subsume people nder any equal standard. It is, therefore, evident that Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program does not suggest any principle of justice. The critique. however, suggest a principle of distribution, which can be understood as a practical or rational principle.

Concluding Remarks

Marx's theory of value postulates that all commodities are bought at their values. Hence the exchange between capitalist and worker is an exchange of equal values. Surplus value is appropriated by the capitalist without an equivalent value, but there is nothing in the exchange requiring to pay any equivalent for it. Therefore, the appropriation of surplus value by the capitalist involves no unequal or unjust exchange. Wood to the capitalist involves of unequal or unjust exchange.

The exchange of wages for labour power is the only exchange between capitalist and worker. It is an equal exchange,... The capitalist buys a commodity (labour power) and pays (Marx postulates) its full value, by using, exploiting, this commodity, capital acquires a greater value than it began with. The surplus belongs to the capitalist, it never belongs to anyone else. 46

This view is consistent with that of Marx. Marx says that the

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circumstance in capitalism is a good fortune for the capitalist (the buyer of labour power), but no wrong or injustice to the worker (the seller of labour power). By appropriating surplus value capitalists are not engaging in an unequal exchange with the workers, but they are 'exploiting' the fruits of their 'unpaid labour'. Marx condemns this kind of exploitation. But this condemnation of capitalism cannot be taken as condemnation of injustice. For Marx, once the purchase of labour power has been effected, this commodity belongs to the capitalist as a right. Labour power ceases to belong to the worker as soon as his labour actually begins.

Geras,47 however, attempts to establish an alternative view. He argues that whether or not the wage relation constitutes an exchange of equivalents is the dialectical play indulged in by Marx. Considered from the viewpoint of an exchange of commodities in the market, the wage relation is an exchange of equivalents. Considered from the viewpoint of a relation in production, the wage relation is not an exchange of equivalents, Those according to whom Marx sees no injustice in the wage relation belong to the view that there is an exchange of equivalents. Those according to whom he regards the wage relation as unjust belong to the view that there is no exchange of equivalents. But, argues Geras, Marx himself legitimates both of them. The two points of view are two different senses of equivalence.48 However, Marx rejects the claim that the transaction between the worker and the capitalist involves an unequal exchange. What he wants to mean is that there is no real exchange between capitalist and worker, there is only an apparent exchange. The exchange transactions do not involve any injustice, what it involves is the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist's extraction of the surplus value which arises naturally from capitalist production relations, and hence consistent with it.

Marx, in his first volume of *Capital*, assumes that all commodities, including labour power, are bought and sold at their full value. The creation of sruplus value does not require that labour power be sold below its value. But in actual price it often is, because it is subject to the vicissitudes of supply and demand. In his reply to Husami, Wood denies that the worker is done an injustice by capitalist when the price of his labour power falls below its value. he rightly says that the capitalist does not commit a wrong for which he is blameworthy. The capitalist buys labour power below its

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value, because (according to the law of exchange) he has no control over the price of labour power. However, the worker does have a claim basedd on the law of exchange to the valued of his labour power. But the law of exchange is in no sense for Marx a standard for evaluating capitalist exchanges.

Elster and Husami claim that Marx believes capitalist exploitation to he unjust. They cite passages where Marx calls the appropriation of surplus value not only "exploitation" of the worker, but even "theft" and "robbery". But Marx nowhere says that the capitalist appropriation of surplus value is an injustice to the worker. Although Marx says that the capitalist "robs" the worker, but nevertheless insists that the capitalist "earns surplus value with full right". This sort of "robbery' or "theft" involved in capitalist's exploitation of labour does not constitute an injustice to those who are robbed. For Marx, an essential feature of all economic exploitation is coercion. In capitalist exploitation, this coercion is masked by a voluntary contract between the capitalist and the worker. This is why Marx says that the capitalist not only robs but also cheats or defrauds the worker. Yet, Wood rightly argues, Marx never infers from this that the capitalist does the worker an injustice. Marx attacks the illusions built into capitalist production, particularly the illusion that wage labourers are freer than slaves, serfs or other oppressed classes.

In the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist coerces through his control over the means of production. That is, he coerces through the constant threat of depriving the worker of his means of livelihood. But this sort of coercion is not unjust for Marx. The worker is compelled to sell his labour power to the capitalist. Thus, there is an element of coercion in the wage exchange itself. In the wage exchange between the worker and the capitalist the worker becomes the capitalist property and is no longer free. The freedom the worker enjoys in exchange is therefore the freedom to choose his exploiter. Marx claims that the worker has no choice within capitalist production as to whether or not he will create surplus value. In this sense the worker is compelled to create surplus value by selling his labour power. Hence the freedom of the worker is only apparent, the compelled extraction of surplus value is hidden. It is, therefore, no more

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than a freedom to choose to be robbed.

In Young's view, when Marx says that the capitalist's appropriation of surplus value is an act of theft he considers it an injustice to the worker. This view, however, is not consistent with that of Marx. Marx nowhere suggests that the appropriation of surplus value is an act of "theft" or robbery in the sense that it is a wrongful taking and hence it is an injustice to the worker. He uses these words rhetorically only when he condemns capitalist exploitation. "Theft" or "robbery" is a special feature in capitalist exploitation in the sense that the capitalist robs the worker's labour time according to bourgeois property rights.

Elster claims that Marx's conception of communism in the Critique of the Gotha Program entertains a principle of justice. He tries to make sense of Marx's conception of communism by imputing to him a theory of justice. However, this view is inconsistent with that of Marx. In the Critique of the Gotha Program Marx speaks of the two phases of communism as the two aspects of the principle of distribution. The principle of distribution is not a principle of justice. The higher phase of communism is an improvement over the earlier phase not in the sense that the former is more just than the latter, but in the sense that the former can overcome the limitation of the latter and hence it is more acceptable. Marx does not suggest any principle of justice in his two phases of communism, he never says that the one is more just than the other. His condemnation of capitalism is based on the real interests of the workers, not on their moral norms. He does not condemn capitalism by applying any communist principle of justice. Marx's vision of the future communist society is beyond the circumstances of justice, because it will rest on the collective interests of the workers.

NOTES

1. Classical Marxism claims to provide a scientific basis of history. It starts with Engel's Anti-Duhring in 1878. In Anti-Duhring. Engels attempts to systematize Marx's dialectical and materialistic conception of history as a scientific view of history. Contrary to classical Marxism, normative Marxism claims to provide a moral basis of history. Normative Marxism is a recent trend in Marxist thought. Jon Elaster's Making Sense of Marx (1985) is the

- best example of it. According to this view, Marxism can only make sense from a moral perspective.
- Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1976.
- Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York: International Publishers), 1991.
- Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in Marx-Engels, Selected Works in Three Volumes, (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1968.
- 5. By abundance Marx means the flowering of the productive forces. That is, all goods under communism would be free goods and the demand for all goods are saturated.
- Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1985.
- 7. Karl Marx Capital I, Frederick Engels (ed.), Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (tr.), (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1984.
- 8. Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1986 p.95
- 9. Making Sense of Marx, p. 216.
- 10 Ibid., p. 230.

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- R. G. Peffer, Marxism, Morality and Social Justice, (Princeton: Princeton University Press.) 1990.
- 12. Ibid., pp.6-7.
- 13. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, The Holy Family, The German Ideology, Poverty of Philosophy.
- 14. Manifesto of the Communist Party, Grundrisse, A. Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Capital.
- 15. Peffer, Marxism, Morality and Social Justice, pp.339-340, Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p.230.
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- 18. Ziyad I. Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice", in Marx, Justice and History, Marshal Cohen, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1980. Husami attempts to deduce the notion of justice from Marx's writings, particularly from The Communist Manifesto, The Holy Family, Poverty of Philosophy, The German Ideology, and Capital which yield the picture of a society with extreme inequalities of wealth.
- 19. Ibid., p. 62.
- 20. Ibid., p. 72.
- 21 Ibid., p. 73.
- 22. Allen W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice", Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami", in Marx Justice and History, Cohen, Nagel and Scanlon (ed.), (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1980, "Marx and Morality", in Darwin, Marx and Freud, Caplan and Jennings (ed.), (New York: Plenum Press), 1984, "Marxism and Morality," in Karl Marx, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1981.
- 23. "The Marxian Critique of Justice", p.26.
- 24. Wood, "Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation", *Inquiry* 29, 1986, p. 24.
- 25. "Marxism and Morality", in Karl Marx, p. 132.
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- Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program", in Marx-Engels, Selected Works in Three Volumes, (Moscow: Progress Publishers), 1968, pp.321-322.
- Manuscripts, p. 71 Ibid., p. 72.
- Marx-Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York: International Publishers), 1991, p. 23.
- 41. Marx, Grundrisse, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books) 1973, p. 421.
- 42. Manuscripts, p. 71.
- 43. Capital, p 252...
- 4 "Critique of the Gotha Program", p. 323.
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- 48. Ibid., pp. 235-236. In so far as the laws of commodity production requires that equal values are exchanged in the market, they are. In so far as these laws allow that labour power may be sold as a commodity, they allow a relation in which the capitalist uses the worker to reap a profit over the wage, while the worker for his part simply works, just giving the portion of value that the other just takes.

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POPULAR ART : NEW ANGLE

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Arundhati Sardesai

Art in its most basic meaning signifies a skill or ability. The definition holds true for its Latin antecedent, ars, as well as its German equivalent. Kunst (to be able). One who has acquired a skill may be designated an artisan or artist. His abilities may have directed principally toward a utilitarian or an aesthetic purpose. While art continues to be associated with basic skills (e.g. the art of gardening, or the art of warfare), the term more generally carries the connotation of non-utilitarian activities (e.g. the art of painting, the art of poetry and the art of music). Such non-utilitarian aesthetic activities are called fine arts. The fine arts are those that are cultivated more for their own sake and for the intrinsic pleasure they offer to the mind and emotions of those who experience them (for example, the art of drawing, painting etc.) The artist may attempt to communicate a sense of beauty or he may react to his impulses and attempt to express them in various media. He accepts a sort of a style for his specific work and executes it to the best of his capability. These basic attitudes are broadly debated in art, which includes a review of the history of art and discussion of trends in arts, in terms of western and oriental approaches. Pop art is a new concept of present era in art, which is occasionally studied by the western aestheticians. Pop arts take position in popular arts but all popular arts may not get the status of pop arts.

In this article, attempt is made to define nature, characteristics and concepts of popular and pop arts in philosophical and psychological framework. It describes the difference between traditional folk arts and contemporary pop arts. The simplicity, universality, social and economic

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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considerations of popular arts is also discussed. Finally, a reference is made to effects of pop and popular arts on modern society.

The hypothesis is, that popular art is not always the degenerating taste of art but generally hurriedly produced art in the disguise of pop art. Modern society has its own style. Anything sells only when it is hot and fresh. Pop art lives in present. "Now" is its slogan and momentariness is the key word to it. Flux or change is its salient feature. It is as universal as art itself is!

Pop Arts and Other Arts

Pop is a thrust, an unexpected push. Pop is also an abbreviation of popular. Hence pop arts are arts based on modern popular culture and mass media.² Pop arts are like commercial product. They are need based and have a short shelf life. They are generally distinguished from classical arts and folk arts. Classical arts are specifically created arts. They are developed according to set standards or norms for some purpose, as classical music is written chiefly for concerts, operas and ballets. Folk arts are the traditions of a particular group, such as an occupational, ethnic, religious or regional group. For example, folk music is usually learned by listening to another person rather than by reading musical notes. There are no watertight compartments like classical, folk and popular arts. Sometimes they overlap. For instance, there is a tendency to sing lyrics in different styles. Pop art is an urge to create something different from the beaten path. Thus, it is largely a deviation from heritage and assertion of new media and expressive forms in the face of past. Pop arts are comparatively easy to learn, easy to understand, easy to get mastery over, easy to present and finally easy to get popular acceptance.

Art, in general, is a language of heart. it is a pure contemplation of an idea in a moment of emancipation from the will. There is extreme indefiniteness of the vocabulary, one is obliged to employ while describing it. This is because in each cultural epoch, time, ideas, and individual views, no one concept or image is considered ever final. All works of art exist in present and since new ideas are constantly appearing, all such works become links in the chain of evolution of new forms. In contrast, the popular pop arts are like a craze. A certain artist is able to break through the

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anventional ways of looking at things, is able to pick out one element hich is really in all of us but we are unable to perceive till it is made wious. We recognize it when it takes an art form. It is a recognizable scovery. In this sense this art merely reveals, it never creates. Any one of style remains in its apex of popularity for some time and then becends to give way to the other style. It is like a fashion, which is fickle dunpredictable. Both these things are based on almost same psychological inciple, the mob psychology of public mind. Popular arts are more hiective than objective, as more personal emotionality is involved in them. here is somewhat detached intellectuality appearing in pop arts, as quick notional appeal gains upper hand. For instance, popular music largely unresses sentiments of love, while other popular songs serve as a vehicle by social commentary. Genearally speaking, pop arts carry a shortime revance in which they are created. However, many popular pop art pieces ad songs have survived for many decades. If, again, we consider some Effiite illustrations of pop music of different decades, we find, Rock 'n' of 1950's, Beatles of 60's, Rock of 70's, Rap of 80's and Disco of 90's aying survived for longer duration. Most of these styles were imitated to in Indian context. It seems that it is only by accident, and in one sense my, that the artists produce a freak, which gets popular to such an extent. Ithis time, in music, most of the artists used the theme of social protest began to write their own songs. In fact, many rap groups use the form comment on such social problems as racism and poverty. Some rap thists have generated controversy because their lyrics deal graphically sex and violence. 3 Abraham Kaplan describes popular art as, 'a revolt sainst the artistic establishment, a reaction against the oppressiveness of eacademic and familiar'. He further says that, 'popular art may be bad t, but the converse is not necessarily true.4

ok Arts and Pop Arts

Man's primary concern is not knowledge but action, hence he creates att forms. Words 'folk art' and pop art', are used here in connection dance, song, lore, drawing, painting, customs etc., indicating the tracteristics that are distinctive from those associated with the word 'k', and 'popular'. The French word 'chansons populaires', does give raning of folk as well as popular, which in English conveys two distinct

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meanings. They have some similar traits but one is not synonym of other. Folk arts reflect communal characteristics. They are mostly integral pan of tribal customs. In many parts of Africa, Asia, and India these arts have religious content. They are also known as 'ethnic', 'rural', or 'village' arts. It is a collective art contributed by unknown hands of the people, by the people and for the people. They are very common people, the anonymous people, who unknowingly create a style of art, which becomes popular in later period. Following is the definition of folk music accepted in 1954 by the International Folk Music Council:-

"Folk music is the product of a musical tradition that has been evolved through the process of oral transmission. The factors that shape the tradition are (i) continuity which links the present with the past, (ii) variation which springs from the creative impulse of the individual or the group, and (iii) selection by the community, which determines the form or forms in which the music survives. The term can be applied to music that has been evolved from rudimentary beginnings by a community uninfluenced by popular and art music and it can likewise be applied to music which has originated with an individual composer and has subsequently been absorbed into the unwritten living tradition of a community. The term does not cover composed popular music that has been taken over readymade by a community and remains unchanged, for it is the refashioning and recreation of the music by the community that gives it its folk character.⁶

This definition can be broadened easily to other arts by substituting "arts" for "music".

They, most of the time, are unaware that they are the initiator of popular art. Recently popularized Warli paintings and Terracotta earthen pots are good examples of such folk and now popular arts. Folk arts become popular arts by accident. Artist gets pleasure, happiness and a feeling of satisfaction of creation, particularly when his art graces the social and festive occasions. Sometimes, he also gets adequate money for his artwork in such festivities. From such art, imitator picks up the style, which is not patented by the simple folks and makes it popular in the affluent group of people. Gradually,

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media popularity, the goods based on an anonymous idea, are flooded the market. Inferior commodities (as goods are changed into commodities when mass production takes place) by bad imitation are readily available of affordable price. In this way, folk arts come in the market under the figuise of pop arts. This work is not aesthetically explicit. It is not the art sessence. Innocence of artist is lost. The capital 'A' of action in 'Art' hanges into 'a' of popular art. Getting lot of money when the style is the in thing' is the only parameter applied by commercial men. At regular nervals, some changes are made in initial design for continuation of fashion' for some more time. Later buyers get a slightly different version. Thus, at the fag end of fading of popularity of the item, some more money is made.

In folk dances and folk songs, simple instruments are used. Dance mainly based on rhythm. Songs have unbelievably simple and staightforward but mind catching tunes. Folk songs describe everyday ocurrences of life like, change of seasons, harvesting, festive occasions tc. To folk people, art is mainly, a group activity, a relief from the routine bard work, an occasion to look forward. There is simplicity in selection of materials. The front wall of their hut is the ideal place for display of art. Natural colours are made and used. Designs drawn are absolutely simple. They are symbolic to nature, a raw imitation of nature. Mostly stick drawings are used to depict figures. There is no shadow work, perspective, three imensionality or use of cubism in these drawings. Simple faces devoid of expressions and with only essential features clearly convey the message which artist likes to present. Most of the folk arts of any particular tribe generally carry a common style, which is its stamp. This is because though he arts differ, themes and their sequences mostly remain the same. beliberate attempt of pop or popular art on folk art, does not carry the Enuine identification mark. In the market, commodities are supplied as Perthe popular demand. While folk art is full of life, there is no heart in the popular art.

Talents of the folk artists are appreciated by mere words or seldom ygiving them awards. Recently outlets are open to sell their 'art goods' dreal worth. Generally, genuine artifacts have to face stiff competition pop art items. Artist and art still continue to be the versatility of the

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village folks. Even if it reaches the urban market, it never disappears from its place of origin. Pop art flourishes on its own. It rarely needs media attention. A very little cosmetic is required to get mass popularity. If two almost similar goods are introduced in the market at the same time, one reaches at the top of the sale in no time whereas the other remains at the bottom with no genuine reason. Producer of pop art is little concerned about the social considerations.

Popular Art and Social Considerations

Utility items are produced, reproduced and repeatedly produced by number of members of the family, and members of the same caste. For instance, a leather worker and his family are always known as people from cobbler caste (chamar). How many generations are working in the profession and how much (quantity) and how fine (quality) 'goods' are produced is immaterial. The caste of a person hardly changes with the skill he gains, popularity he deserves, honors he gets or awards he bags. As per the increased demand, more people from castes often join in learning skills of manufacturing. Thus they get an identity without changing their original caste. Exchange of siblings in matrimonial alliances and sharing of food are still resorted to be people of the same caste.

In modern times changing of profession is not looked down upon. Middle class people change their professions and skills as per demand of the goods in society. Industrialization has brought only two social classes, the owner and the worker. Capitalism changes 'Art into Commodity'. It plays with the psyche of people and forces them to accept luxurious items as necessities. Rare artifacts gradually vanish and large commodities get flooded into the market. Owner of industries squeeze maximum profit. Rich gets richer. Cost of the commodities made on machines in a large quantity, are considerably cheaper to compete. The cost of handmade products is related to the number of man-hours it takes to manufacture. Therefore the genuine artists suffer.

Quality of Goods

In poplar art, quality and quantity work somewhat in inverse order. Consequently, quality suffers when the quantity or demand increases. In such a case, pop art changes into junk art. The conventional beauty becomes

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

imperceptible. There is an ugliness or meaninglessness in what is conventionality extolled as beautiful. The goods become rare as the difficulty level of manufacturing them increases. The individual artists, who are able to break through the conventional ways and create transient waves pisolate their art, become rare. Spinoza's dictum that "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare" is proved. To suit the new designs and dyles, different materials are tried out, alloys are made, research and development units are formed, machines are made, and workers are trained. Extensive experiments are done. Repetitive attempts bring refinement in art, Hand dexterity is still appreciated howsoever perfection machine brings in the "art good". Art is art when it passes through the craftsman's magic hands. The lover of art buys it irrespective of its cost. Unlike consumer goods it is the value that is more important to an art lover. Its value is judged by authorized and expert evaluators. Though the craftsman hardly oets his worth, he is not discouraged to pursue creative work. Very rarely artists from different parts of the world, come together, exchange their embellished craftwork and discuss their skills. Middleman conveys essence of changes in goods, necessary from art lovers to artists. In any case, notwithstanding changes suggested, the artist implicitly maintains purity of at for generations. The name or the place of the artisan's family gets attached to the style of art, like 'Kirana Gayaki', 'Benaras Thumari' in Indian classical music or 'Rajasthani' miniature painting in fine art. latricacy and exquisiteness in work of art is the taste of unblemished style.

The artist acts as both dreamer and creator. His work of art is on one hand a universal object, on the other hand, a unique experience. This unusual imaginative experience of an artist is superlatively harmonious and is of more than personal significance. His art becomes the symbol of ordr. Endeavour and goodness of his time.

Univerasality in Popular Art

"Art should endeavour to show the universal in particular." This is a phrase that is constantly used by art critics. It is also a revelation of infinite in finite. Popular art is a fine example of this revelation. Popularity of pop art spreads universally if it is a genuine work. Once the universal popularity is gained, the art becomes vulnerable to imitation. Such imitation

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items are available at comparatively lower prices and product gains wide acceptance. Famous philosopher and thinker John Dewey calls it an "An Product" which is perceptual and psychodynamic in nature. Variations are tried to suit the local ideas. Art needs no language. It is self-explanatory. Particularly fine arts, plastic arts and few performing arts are comprehensible, just by perception. Social customs, traditions play some role in the making of art. To understand this art, language of heart remains universally same. Unsophisticated simplicity helps art turn universal. There is little qualitative parameter to pop art, but there is definitely a quantitative measure, which makes it popular art. The new exposures to the world of art leave its imprint. Change is the vital factor in pop art, which provides a pivot for popularity Generally, art selects what is significant and suppresses the trivial. For popular art standardization is the need and with that comes simplicity.

Simplicity of Popular Art

Popular arts may very well appeal to a mass audience. They have characteristics that distinguish them from other varieties of mass art and have distinctive contexts and patterns of presentation. Popular art is popular in all strata of society because it is closer to human heart. Everyday life, daily chores, relationships, food items, feelings etc are the general themes. Spontaneity is the basis of this art. There is no question of 'why' this, and not 'that' in the selection of theme. Everything under the sun can qualify as a theme of popular art. Method of presentation is open to ingenuity. Sometimes, one tends to feel it to be a madness of new generation. The common man thinks this art is easier to imitate and hence it appeals him. Tunes are easy to hum, words are simple to understand. Figures are quick to draw, colour, contrasts are vivid. For instance, in a drawing, circle is a head, triangle is a body, two slant and two straight sticks are arms and legs, few streaks on head depict hair. All parts of the body are drawn in their places, but without any obvious proportion or special artistic sense. The unique feature of this art is its non-artisticity. The popular art is a straightforward thing with no surprises attached. In Henri Bergson's words, "what is vital in art is endlessly variable.ix

Popular art is devoid of no specific structure or body. It is like a

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structureless scarecrow. Only difference is that, nobody gets scared away by it. Popular art is neither any type of invention nor any discovery. It is a ont of simple repetitiveness and therefore, easier to understand. In computer terminology popular is like, cut, copy, and paste sequence. Generally it does not hurt the morality. It creates a wave but does not disturb the universe. It is so appealing to mind that sometimes well-known artist also likes to copy its simplicity. There is simplicity in texture, melody, acting, singing. hackdrops, rhythm and beats. Therefore, one feels like honored guest in his own house or a respectable host in other's house. Also, there is a joy of nostalgia, the nostalgia of soothing memories. Popular art is sometimes a step ahead or some other time a step behind the social norms. The only common reaction we find in appreciation is, "I like it".

Effects of Popular Art

Popular art is a leisure time activity. It prospers only when people have their basic necessities fulfilled. It brings festive mood. It is a symbol of happiness. Young and old all enjoy together. It has the charisma to spellbound thousands of people together as Michael Jackson does in his concerts. 'It is a craze', 'It is madness', some people opine. The wave of popularity catches everyone, the artist, as well as the audience. In this stressful world of today, to froget all our worries is essential. Popular art gives sheer joy, save for some exceptions when group psyche crops up and the crowd changes into a hostile rudderless lot. Controlling of this mob itself is a challenge. For a quick production of art, many times, deficient art is accepted without any reservations. Bake it when the oven is hot, is the general attitude. Hence aesthetic beauty is the very first casualty. At some stage, when a person comes to know that such type of art does not need any special quality, he tries his hand at it, resulting in dilution. Vulgarism becomes fashion.

For sometime parameters of beauty changed to ugliness, thus giving impetus to wrong doers. The art of ugliness was accepted as the "in thing". Struggle for existence, suffering, atrocities, heinous acts and crimes described in the modern literature, were also staged in theatres. The darker side of popular art was undesirable contamination of this art. In literature, certain under-privileged neo-literates tried to give vent to their sufferings. Unintentionally, this brought unparliamentary language in literature though

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the feelings were intense and too real to believe. The established authors tried to emulate the style of deprived neo-literates to attain quick popularity. All these developments brought in, a new type of literature in popular art, Although this was a passing phase it had a profound effect in terms of couldn't careless attitude of the young generation. A sort of compulsive acceptance to this style became then the need of the hour. Peer pressure was too hard to resist. Critics were not against the presentation of a reality in suffering, but they were worried about the presentation of only this one perspective. Some miscreants took undue advantage of the situation and spoiled the harmony of the society. The novelty whipped away flagging interest. At the same time the repetition minimized the sale-demand. Infantile need for protection felt. Once upon a time society was safe on the old and familiar ground. Fortunately, wheel of popular art rotated in full circle and gradually people again started realizing the importance of good art. There dawned a new bright morning in popular art. The age old thought of art is to give happiness to all was once again established.

Conclusion

The happiness through popular art is generally a temporary phase. It is a child's play, like playing with paper boats in bathtub. Yet, it is not a fantasy. It is not escapism. It is a need. Todya, popular art is becoming more and more sophisticated, a symbolic representation of reality. It makes audience aware of latest issues. In John Dewey's words, 'Art today is the beauty parlour of civilization'. It occupies some important place in busy and stressful life. Television works as a producer and advertiser of popular art. With the heavy work scheduled the old hobbies and arts are reducing almost to nil. Elite few have to make future generation aware of the importance of qualitative life through arts. According to old Sumerian culture, art is a mirror of mind. Popular art is a mirror of society.

Popular art is too often talked about, viewed on, on no other basis than its popularity. The popularity is mostly judged in terms of media attention. It is considered as a social status symbol to give opinions at the high place. The personal taste need not always match the judgment given in public. Right time, right mood, and right feeling created by right arts are always the healthy traits of a rightful society.

Popular Art : New Angle

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TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

MANJIRI CHAKRABARTY

The central aim of this paper is to overthrow the widely-held view that technology entails the mere application of knowledge derived from the sciences to the making of artifacts. The essential independence of technology from science has already been argued by distinguished scholars. Herbert Simon, Edward Layton, E.S. Ferguson, George Basalla and Subrata Dasgupta stand out among those who firmly insist that the intellectual nature of technology can never be comprehended on the basis of the natural sciences alone. However, this very theme has not yet integrated into our intellectual tradition. In this paper I intend to bring to light the crucial, though largely unnoticed, fact that technological knowledge is far more than just scientific knowledge. This paper is divided into two sections. The first section tries to explain, in a nutshell, the essence of what technology is. The second section presents an example from the history of technology to demonstrate that technology has a distinct component of knowledge not derived from science.

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Though ours is an age of high technology, the essence of what technology is and what the technologists do is not common knowledge. The anthropologists document that human beings have been conceiving, shaping and using tools from as far back as the early stone ages. This activity of conceptualizing, fashioning and using tools to meet human needs is basically what technology is². Clearly then, technology is much older than science. It reaches back to the hominids and the stone tools of the lower Paleolithic Age when science, even in its earliest forms, didn't exist.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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Dasgupta writes: "...Man had been making, treating, casting and forging metals and alloys, constructing roads, bridges, dwellings, and public buildings, crafting boats and ships; and shaping the instruments and engines of war many thousands of years before the rational comprehension of their respective underlying scientific principles could even be contemplated"

Evidently, for a large part of the histoy of human kind technological development has been independent of the growth of scientific knowledge. If it is the case that technology itself generates no new knowledge but is founded on scientific knowledge- and given that most of science itself is essentially the product of only the past four centuries, then we are led to conclude, as Edwin Layton noted, that all artifactual creations prior to this period-that is, almost all of technological history from the emergence of hominids-entailed no new knowledge at all⁴. The absurdity of this conclusion demands the rejection of the widespread tendency to regard technology as involving essentially the application of knowledge derived from science.

More importantly, technology is basically 'teleological' in nature. It is concerned with the creation of artifacts. Artifacts, in simple words, are artificial products consciously produced or conceived in response to some need or desire. Technology is, thus, an activity that entails human needs, aspirations, wants and their satisfaction. The natural sciences, on the contrary, have nothing to say about 'wants' or 'desires'. The world that the technologists are principally concerned with is not the 'given' world of the natural sciences.

There exists a deep divide between the 'given' natural world and what Simon refers to as the 'artificial' world⁵. This artificial, engineered world- the world that the technologists themselves make is characterized by an endless variety of things. This astonishing diversity of the 'made' world reveals another significant aspect - the needs that drive human beings to fashion such a variety of artifacts are not the 'basic' human needs. The plethora of 'made' things are not mere instruments to meet our 'minimum' needs. The animals too have minimum needs which are not radically dirrerent from ours. Yet from the point of bare living the animals maintain themselves perfectly and require no technology at all. Ortege Y Gasset writes that human beings, unlike the animals, have no desire just to be in this world, just to 'live', they want to 'live well'. They conceive of life not

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merely as 'being' but as 'well being'6. Their struggle for well being certainly entails the idea of needs but those needs are what Basalla refers to as 'perceived' needs'. Such 'perceived' needs undergo constant change as human tastes, values, aspirations and resources vary widely from time to time, culture to culture, from one social organization to another. The artifacts, thus are not narrow solutions to problems generated in satisfying our basic requirements- rather they are material manifestations of the innumerable ways human beings have chosen to define their well-being and pursue existence.

We should also take notice of the fact that need or necessity is very much a relative term. A necessity for one people, generation or social class may have no utilitarian value for another people, generation or social class. Basalla documents that even the 'wheel' - popularly conceived as one of the oldest and most important inventions of the human race - was not necessary to all people at all times8. The first wheeled vehicles invented in Mesopotamia were used for ritualistic and ceremonial purposes. In the second millennium B.C. spoked wheels were introduced on war chariots. Much after its initial appearance, the wheel was used for transporting farm goods. The case of Mexico and Central America is even more interesting. Wheeled transport was not known to these people before the arrival of the Spanish, but they used to make miniature objects such as clay figures of various animals fitted with axles and wheels. It is quite surprising that the mechanical principle of the wheel was understood and applied by people who never put it into use for transportation. The wheel, comments Basalla, was not a universal need.

Human beings create and use artifacts to meet their 'perceived needs' - the nature of which varies enormously. To put it in different words, artifacts are not elements of the given, natural world and they are intended to serve some purpose. Fulfillment of purpose, notices Simon, involves a relation among three terms: the purpose or goal, the character of the artifact and the environment in which the artifact performs? In terms of purpose, to use Simon's example, a clock is to tell time. If we focus our attention on the clock itself, it may be described in terms of arrangement of gears, and on the application of the forces of springs or gravity operating on a weight. It may also be considered in relation to the environment in

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which it operates. To sum up, whether a clock is to tell time depends on its internal construction on the one hand and where it is placed, on the other. An artifact, in Simon's words, is a 'meeting point, or an 'interface' between its 'inner environment', i.e., the substance and the organization of the artifact itself and its 'outer environment', i.e., the surroundings in which it functions¹⁰.

Natural science makes an effect on the artifact through two of the three terms of the relation that characterizes it: the inner structure of the artifact itself and the outer environment in which it performs. It is generally believed that the deeper the understanding of these environments, i.e., the more one understands the science underlying the artifacts- the more progress will one achieve in that technology. However, the fact is, even when the science behind the artifact is well understood-errors and failures occur. As Dasgupta explains that once created, the artifact "acquires a life of its own" it is governed by the principles and properties of its own inner and outer environments - which may well be far beyond the technologist's anticipation, understanding or cognitive capabilities.

The example of the Britannia Bridge, built by Robert Stephenson and his associates in the 1840's, is an interesting case in point. It was a huge tubular wrought-iron bridge through which trains could pass and it worked well for over hundred years. In structural terms, the bridge was undoubtedly a spectacular success. However, in Dasgupta's view, the bridge was literally an 'environmental failure¹². The engineers were exclusively concerned with the 'load' imposed by the weights of the bridge itself, by the train, as well as the forces exerted by wind. But the actual inner and outer environment of this bridge were constituted of more than mechanical loads and wind forces. They also included the excessive heating of the wrought iron by the sun, the smoke expelled by the steam locomotive but entrapped within the tubular form of the bridge, the human passengers and the acute discomfort they had to suffer by heat, smoke etc. The engineers failed to anticipate that these factors were as much part of the bridge's outer environment as were the loads imposed by the weights of the moving trains, the bridge itself and the wind forces.

From whatever has been said so far one may assume that artifacts are necessarily material in nature. Such an impression is to be avoided.

There are artificial products capable of satisfying certain human goals despite being physically intangible. Methods, designs, strategies, plans. algorithms etc. cannot be touched the way we touch a machine, but once created, they can be used, communicated, analyzed and modified as well. Dasgupta considers them all examples of 'abstract' artifacts¹³. The most important characteristic of abstract artifacts is that they are rendered visible through symbols. For instance, the architecture of a building is explicated through architectural drawings. The creation of most material artifacts - a bridge, an engine, or a computer, for instance, necessitates a conceptualization or to use the technical term, a 'design' phase that precedes the manufacture, or 'making' phase. A design expressed in the form of an engineering drawing, for example, is itself an abstract artifact. Thus most acts of technology entail the production of abstract and material artifacts. the former being the artifactual form, the latter the artifact itself¹⁴. The artifactual form is 'conceptualized', the artifact is 'manufactured'. The technologist is as much concerned with the design or conceiving of the artifactual form as with the making of the artifact itself.

Broadly stated, design, is concerned with the conceiving of artifactual forms intended to satisfy certain desired objectives. It seems obvious that such an activity would only be initiated if no existing artifact exactly satisfies the given requirements. The very idea of design - to conceptualize something that never was, is what most distinguishes technology from science 15. The major focus of the following section is on design.

II

In order to attack the long-held view that whatever knowledge may be incorporated in the artifacts of technology must be derived from the sciences, an examination of the very nature of technological knowledge is required. For this purpose I would like to consider the example of the design of the Britannia Bridge. The design of the Britannia Bridge, despite being criticised in economic and aesthetic terms holds significanse as it generated 'knowledge' whose benefits extended far beyond the realm of the bridges¹⁶.

The Britannia Bridge came into existence at a point in history when basic science and technological theory were beginning to make their presences felt. However, when Robert Stephenson (1803-1854) and his

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associates embarked on the design of the bridge in 1844, much of the requisite theoretical knowledge did not preexist. The body of knowledge these engineers relied upon as a basis of their design and reasoning did not entail basic science. Thus it is of crucial importance to see what kind of knowledge helped the engineers tide over the problems faced while conceiving the novel form of the bridge.

The basic task of Stephenson, the chief engineer of the project, was to design and construct a tubular railway bridge across the Menai strait in North Wales. At that time there were two main types of long-span bridges in use - a) cost iron arch bridge, and b) suspension bridge. Initially Stephenson rejected both - the former because it used to obstruct navigation and the latter because "... the failure of more than one attempt had proved the impossibility of running railway trains over bridges of that class with safety."17 In other words, Stephenson initially rejected the suspension bridge form because of the following proposition p₁: Suspension bridges are not sufficiently rigid for the support of rapidly moving railway trains 18. What is to be noted in this proposition is that it relates the structure or form of suspension bridge to a functional property, namely, the ability to withstand a particular kind of dynamic load. If we look closely into the nature of such knowledge we will see that it is not basic science, rather it is of how certain kinds of structural forms behave and appear under certain conditions. Such knowledge according to Dasgupta, is likely to have originated from experience of the behaviour and structural capabilities of suspension bridges19.

Later, Stephenson's attention was drawn towards J. M. Rendel's mode of 'trussing' to prevent oscillation in the platform of suspension bridges. Stephenson envisioned that Rendel's trussing system while adequate for ordinary roads, would not be strong enough for the purpose of a railway bridge. In other words, he felt that a stronger trussing system would be needed because of the proposition - P_2 : Road bridges are generally not as strong as railway bridges²⁰. Here again we see that P_2 is a comparative statement about two specific artifactual classes, namely, road bridges and railway bridges with respect to a performance property (strength). Dasgupta thinks it is quite conceivable that P_2 is a generalization based on empirical evidence²¹. Such knowledge of how certain kinds of structural forms

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Dasgupta maintains that for a given class of artifacts any such proposition, rule, procedure, or conceptual frame of reference about atifactual properties or characteristics that facilitates action for the creation, manipulation, and modification or artifactual forms and their implementations is an 'operational principle' 22. Thus, P₁ which relates the suspension bridge form to a functional property as well as P₂ which compares two specific atifactual classes with respect to a performance property, are operational principles. The knowledge, Stephenson used as a basis of his reasoning was not scientific knowledge, rather it was the knowledge of these opertional minciples.

Let's proceed further with the design of the bridge to see the influence of operational principles as the principal source of knowledge. Stephenson decided to combine the use of the suspension chains with trussed vertical sides and cross braces on the top as well as the bottom. He planned to use niveted wrought iron plates for the trussing and cross braces. The resulted form of the bridge was that of a rectangular tube supported by suspension thains and surrounded by a trussed framework. At that time there existed wither theoretical nor experiential knowledge that could be fruitfully applied to the design of such a structure.

Stephenson eventually came to realize that the hollow tube could be viewed as a 'beam'. By 1845, the basic theory of how beams resist the bending caused by vertical loads had been established. From this theory formulas were available for calculating the internal stresses in beams of different cross-sectional shape under certain special assumptions. However, this theory was inadequate for computing the ultimate strength or breaking bad, of a beam of some specified material. Working in such an atmosphere is far from an easy task.

Stephenson had felt the need for 'model' tests, and these preliminary lests were carried out by William Fairbairn (1789-1874), a versatile engineer, typerienced in both mechanical and structural testing and design. These lests were on tubes of circular, elliptical and of rectangular section.

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Fairbairn's friend Eaton Hodgkinson (1789-1861) helped the former by analyzing the data of these experiments. These engineers found that tubes of all three sectional shapes failed by 'buckling' of the upper sides of the tubes. In addition, the circular and elliptical tubes were distorted. Finally, the rectangular section became the preferred shape, and the 'buckling' problem the major focus of attention. The experiments with the various tubular forms produced the following hypothesis: H₁- the rectangular tube section is superior to elliptical and circular sections in its resistance to destortion²³. This hypothesis was undoubtedly an operational principle derived from experiment.

The buckling problem was eventually solved in a second lot of experiments conducted by Fairbairn between August and October 1845. These experiments established that a rectangular section with a multicellular top did not buckle under load. This cellular top was a novel feature at that time. Let's examine the knowledge that these engineers brought to bear in arriving at the multicellular top flange for the tubular beam.

It has already been mentioned that the early preliminary experiments had revealed failure of the top of the experimental tube by buckling. One of the elementary behavioural characteristics of beams is that if a beam is supported at two ends and subjected to a vertical load, it bends such that the top sufrace is in a state of compression and the bottom is in a state of tension. Under this circumstance, the engineer can conceive the top flange of the tube as an isolated bar in a state of compression. To isolate a structural component and treat it as a 'free body' with forces acting on it from its environment is in Dasgupta's view, another operational principle²⁴. Operational principles isolate the situation to which theoretical knowledge can then be applied. This is exactly what happened here.

Engineers had known for some time that the buckling load of a long strut of fixed length and fixed amount of material can be increased by making the strut in the form of a tube instead of a solid bar. This effect results from the fact that in a tube the material is placed further from the centerline, thereby increasing the rigidity of the strut against sidewise flexure. Rosenberg and Vincenti maintain that ideas such as these were undoubtedly behind Fairbairn's tests on tubes with cellular tops²⁵. Thus, the knowledge

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pat led these engineers to the idea of the multicellular top flange for the ubular beam was in part, structural theory and the theory of strength of materials (i.e. technological theory) and, in part, a model of the top flange sathin strut in compression, which is an operational principle.

The basic form for the tube thus settled, the task became one of beciding on the detailed shape and proportions of the various parts - in particular, the determination of the proportion of the cross-sectional areas of the top and bottom flanges so that they would be equally strong. The mowledge from the preliminary experiments was insufficient for such purposes. Therefore, additional experiments began.

These experiments were of two kinds: tests by Fairbairn of a relatively large-scale model of the entire cellular-flanged tube as then conceived and experiments by Hodgkinson of plates and simple tubes in compression and bending. These experiments gave a wealth of results. Besides indicating the most advantageous distribution of material Fairbairn's tests let the engineers know that the sides or webs of the beam had an assential structural function and would have to be considered carefully. On the other hand, Hodgkinson's compression experiments were the first experimental study of buckling of compressed plates and thin walled tubes. The theoretical study of these problems began much later in 1891 with the work of G. H. Bryan on the stability of compressed plates.

During this period (early 1846 to early 1847) ideas were examined, thanged and refined - until the final design was complete. Stephenson and Fairbairn eventually agreed on a modification to the design, wherein, in addition to the multicellular top flange, the bottom flange was also constructed multiple cells.

The train of reasoning underlying this design process was quite complex and entailed the development of several hypotheses which have not been mentioned here. What I have tried to point out is that a great deal knowledge that the design of the Britannia Bridge yielded was of the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the tried to point out it is that a great deal knowledge that the design of the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the tried to point out it is that a great deal knowledge that the design and directly from the tried to point out is that a great deal knowledge that the design of the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the tried to point out is that a great deal knowledge that the design of the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the principle of the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of this, in turn, was generated directly from the perational kind, and much of the perational kind, and the perational kind,

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knowledge of operational principles.

The design process is the most explicit means for the production of an operational principle. The output of any design process is an artifactual form which, when built, is intended to satisfy certain desirable artifactual properties. It has already been noted that such knowledge of how certain kinds of structural forms function, behave, perform, or appear under certain conditions, is the knowledge of operational principles. As designs embody operational principles, and since operational principles constitute technological knowledge, the processes of design necessarily generate technological knowledge.

Operational- principles - as - knowledge are also produced by experiments. Recall the hypothesis H_1 which was not deduced from any theoretical premise, but served as the basis for the engineers' decision to adopt a rectangular section for the tubular bridge. It was an operational principle derived from experiment. Likewise, the later experiments produced the knowledge of how the buckling of the top flange of the tube could be eliminated by adopting cellular form for the top.

Operational principles, as has been suggested, form the dominant type of knowledge that the technologist resorts to when designing artifacts. And we have also seen that operational principles can originate in the absence of scientific understanding of a technological phenomena. In fact this is how technology has developed primarily in the course of history till relatively recent times when basic science began to play more substantive roles. However, Dasgupta draws our attention to the fact that the technologists in the course of their practice do not always resort to basic science as the source of their immediate knowledge, even when such knowledge exists. Very often such scientific knowledge is abstracted into the form of operational principles. Thus even in domains that do have a scientific base, operational principles continue to serve as the dominant type of knowledge.²⁶

Once we recognize this epistemic character of technology, we can also begin to appreciate the thesis articulated most convincingly by E.S. Ferguson in his influential article "The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technology"²⁷. Thinking with pictures', writes Ferguson, is an essential strand in the intellectual history of technological development²⁸. For, as

already noted, the output of every act of design is an operational principle describing the form and behaviour of some desired artifact. An artifactual form, i.e. an arrangement of components and its behaviour lend themselves most naturally to the construction of pictorial mental models, in other words, amental representation of what the artifact will look like and how it will behave and operate in the world. Much of the thought of the technologists of this artificial world, is therefore, non-verbal, its language is a picture or avisual image in the mind. This intellectual component of technology, which is non-scientific and non-literary, has generally been unnoticed.

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HEIDEGGER'S INTERROGATION OF MODERNITY

ABEY KOSHY

Postmodern thinking is considered as a rejection of modernity. Heidegger's name has never been dragged directly into the group of thinkers who are considered as post modernists. Because his phenomenological recasting of the question of being does not fully fall into a rejection of being as in the case of the post modern tradition. The world historical project proposed by Heidegger includes many more issues, which are not the direct concern of the postmodern tradition. Still the postmodern thinkers can draw many useful reflections from Heidegger's thinking which can be very helpful inconfronting the project of modernity. This paper tries to view Heidegger's recasting of the question of being in his later writings as an encounter with the problem of modernity.

Heidegger's thinking locates modernity's origin in the failure of metaphysical tradition to think the question of Being in its concrete historicity. Although Heidegger does not take up the issue of modernity as aproblem in philosophy, he was deeply dissatisfied with the contemporary culture, which is characterized as modernity. Dissociating from the earlier humanistic attitude of 'Being and Time' his reflections on language in his later essays provide us tools to encounter modernity as a serious philosophical problem. Heidegger considered modernity as nihilistic as it is devoid of all true experiences of life. For him authenticity of man lies in his lersonal choice and commitment towards other beings. However the modern outlook of life promotes a kind of impersonal detachment. It looks aleverything in terms of human utility. Meaninglessness of life is considered as the greatest issue faced by man in the contemporary situation. This has

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXIX No 4
Oct. 2002

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been a major concern for most of the thinkers of the last two centuries. Nietzsche explained it as the experience of nihilism of modern man and Marx recognized it in terms of the estrangement of human being from his labor.

Analysis of the cause of estrangement and nihilism has become the immediate concern of the major traditions of the twentieth century thinking. Among them Heideggerian reflection on the cause of estrangement provides us some unique insights into the genesis of contemporary technology based society which is said to be in the postindustrial face. It is his practice of thinking Being in its concrete particularity that helps him to distinguish the uniqueness of man's practices in archaic past from the estranging endeavors of modern man. All thinkers before him considered the question of Being in an impersonal and detached manner. In their reflections other beings appear only in relation to man, because it is from the human point of view that things of the world, and animals and plants are defined. In this sense, the history of thought in our recent past can be characterized as humanistic. Humanism was the answer suggested from all quarters to solve every problem emerged in socio-economic and cultural spheres. Humanism is hailed as the most refined and mature expression of human consciousness in its historical development. However, most of the thinkers failed to understand that humanism is not simply a kind of sympathizing with the human lot or a project for social building. 'Humanism' of the West goes beyond that and becomes a way of understanding the world. It even turns into a sort of anthropocentrism when we posit our values as the criterion for dealing with other beings and measure everything in terms of human utility.

Heidegger finds a correlation between such an arrogant humanism and the estrangement of modern man. The origin of humanism can be traced back to Cartesian thinking. Descartes posited cogito, which is the thinking subject, at the center of the universe. Thinking is the fundamental property of the subject and knowledge is the outcome of its contemplative encounters with the world. Rest of the beings are dissociated from this transcendental subject and placed as substance with extension as the attribute. The autonomous thinking subject is freed from the objects and has given an autonomous existence. From then on the world, with all its

beings, is considered as an independent entity, open to the manipulation of the thinking subject. The meaning of the world is attained by the activity of representation of the objects by the subject. This deep cleft inflicted by modern philosophy between the self-conscious thinking subject and non-conscious beings was the corner stone of all humanistic thinking. Humanistic thinking does not recognize the unity of human consciousness with the rest of the world. The gradual ascendancey of man to the lordship of the universe was possible only at the cost of his alienation from other beings and finally from the world itself.

Heidegger insists that in order to overcome meaninglessness and nihilism we must stand above humanism. First of all Heidegger wants us to realize that:

"Man is not the Lord of the universe. Man is the shepherd of Being"!

This is possible only by achieving a radical break in the very nature of human thinking. As a first move towards this task he initiates a genealogical critique of the history of metaphysical thought. He tries to show that the fundamental nature of metaphysical thinking is abstraction. Metaphysics thinks the truth of Being of beings, but in an abstract way. Instead of bringing the concrete particularity of the truth of Being, metaphysics thinks only the essence of being which in turn sends the actual truth of Being into oblivion. Such a forgetting of Being was fatal to the history of man and gave rise to the technological devastation of earth, which now threatens the whole life world.

Heidegger, therefore, argues that the need of the hour is to change the essentialist mode of thinking. That is possible only by revealing the truth of Being in a different way. Such a revealing, which the history of thought has forgotten to undertake, is different from the metaphysical manner of thinking. To inaugurate such a revealing, firstly our language has to free itself from the humanistic bias. Instead of fulfilling the function of representation of beings, language can attempt to reveal the Being of beings as a *clearing*. Representation is merely the requirement of man as rational animal, who wants to rule over nature and manipulate its resources. However in the activity of *clearing* not only other beings are let to move freely but also brought into the daylight of human consciousness. Here

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utilitarian interest will give way for protective instinct. Then, perhaps, other beings, including animals and plants and stones, will come into radiant presence in our linguistic practices. This is the highest task Heidegger demands from contemporary man. Such a thought, because of its antihumanistic attitude, cannot be characterized as inhuman as some wishes to do. Beyond all humanistic prejudices it aims to grow as a thought of the entire life world in which man is only a part.

Heidegger offers to analyse the beginning of abstraction in the history of thinking. He argues that the turn towards abstraction in the realm of thinking is not an accidental event happened in the recent past. In his opinion its beginning can be traced back to early Greek metaphysics. He writes:

"..the technical interpretation of thinking..reach back to Plato and Aristotle"²

In his perception metaphysical thinking and abstraction are synonymous terms. It is the activity of abstraction that makes metaphysics possible. The fatal shift from the primordial understanding of Being to that of a technical understanding was inaugurated with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Even before the dawn of philosophical thinking human thought was able to reflect the truth of Being, but in an entirely different language. The ancient Greeks had a primordial understanding of the truth of Being. At that point their language was not one of technical mastery and abstraction. In their naming of things and creatures, Being was spoken directly to their hearts and they remained in a delightful fusion with the rest of nature. But a radical shift in man's approach towards 'things' takes place when thinking becomes essentialist. Thinking the essence of a thing makes metaphysical thinking different from other possible approaches we can have towards a thing. Metaphysical thought places the essence of a thing in the world of abstract universals as the manner of Platonic idealism. Those who consider the essence to be in particulars, as the case with Aristotle, also fall on the same track because of their acceptance of what is common to all particular things of that class as its essential truth. It reduces being to a concept. Its first form, manifested through Plato and Aristotle, is a theoretical activity whose aim is to achieve rational measurement of things in technical

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The Greeks' attempt to understand a thing in such a way heralded the advent of empirical sciences much in advance. Theoretical thinking is the seed from which modern science comes into being. Metaphysics can be termed science in its infancy and so it is not accidental that technical way of thinking brought about the technological age of modernity. For instance, Aristotle explains about four causes at work in bringing about a thing into being-material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, final causeand for centuries we have accepted that they are at work in coming into presence of any thing of the world. This fourfold causality is employed to produce results and it became a means for man to instrumentally manipulate the world to reveal what is yet hidden in the folds of Being. Thus, in our age, revealing of the truth of being takes place in the form of modern technology, which is nothing but the gradual culmination of philosophical thought pursued in terms of abstract categories. The end of philosophy writes Heidegger:

"proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization based upon Western European thinking."³

What is revealing in a different form? How can we approach a thing/Being in a different mode? Heidegger's entire carrier as a philosopher was devoted to seek the posibility of an alternative way of revealing the truth of things. Heidegger shows that in a form of thinking, that is neither calculative nor practically oriented alone man can come nearer to the proper meaning of Being. Ordinarily, man has the tendency to consider the validity of a thing and validity of thinking in terms of the result it is capable to produce. Whatever is not productive of satisfaction to our appetites are considered useless, and even a thing that caters to our needs is thrown away into the dustbin after our purpose is served. Our relation to a thing is like that of our approach to a Styrofoam cup that we use to drink coffee and abandon after use. Even animals and plants are no more than mere objects that will bring us some profit. In general, we deal with things as resources to be used. The same ethos is manifested in technological manipulation of the world "which puts to nature the unreasonable demand

that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such"4

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Heidegger argues that the calculative sort of thinking can be overcome only by retrieving the essential relationship of man to other beings. This is not at all something new which humanity has to acquire, but is already there as the primordial truth of Dasein. Here we can clearly notice Heidegger's phenomenological perspective in the understanding of the world. He underlines that Dasein's consciousness is not a pure consciousness, independent of its intentional objects but always the consciousness of something. Vice versa the meaning of things to us presupposes its existence to our immediate life world. Therefore, Dasein's existence and possibilities are closely knit with the other beings it encountered around. However, the conceptual mode of thinking man undertaken for centuries, separates the life world from our daily experience of existence. It does not allow us to see the truth of Being although Being is very closer to us. In Heideggerian terms:

"Being is farther than all beings and yet is nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God - Being is the nearest. Yet the nearer remains farthest from man."

Standing nearer to Being is not the way of the conceptual grasp of a specialist. For instance, geology studies the attributes, material composition and history of rocks. But to think the Being of the rock is to experience that which gives it existence and to immerse oneself in the full 'thereness' of that thing irrespective of its utility to us. In the same manner, a mountain range, the flight of a bird, or a building on the bank of a river communicate their presence through their radiant appearance, which is prior to any particular or general act of cognition. Heidegger shows that man's existence is entangled with the existence of other beings and that only in 'lighting their Being' does human existence gets its proper dignity. Because "plants and animals are lodged in their respective environments but are never placed freely in the lighting of Being which alone is "world", they lack language". It is man's responsibility to bring them into the open as only man has the capability to use language. It is only in language the Being of other beings can be revealed so that man becomes the guardian of them,

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whose dignity consists in the preservation of Being's truth.

Heidegger gives high priority to the practice of language in surpassing the nihilistic thought brought about by Western metaphysics, which ultimately culminates in modernity. Since modernity is rooted in *logocentric* employment of language, its overcoming necessitates freeing of meaning from essentialist prison house of language. For without language there would be no experience of Being, either in essentialist manner of primordial manner. *Dasein* is to be understood as a being in language. But in the perspective of Heidegger language is not a mere device invented by man for his communication. It is not that man speaks language, rather it is Being that speaks language through man. Therefore, language, firstly and foremostly is that event of bringing the Being into the open. In this sense language essentially is poetry because language is in its aboriginal form the utterance of man to whom for the first time Being is manifested into the open.

In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism, nor is it the expression of a living thing ...Language is the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself.⁷

In the modern age, says Heidegger, it is still possible for man to retrieve the truth of Being that has gone into oblivion under the over-arching shadow of the thinking practiced by the metaphysical tradition. But this fortune is given only to those who are ready to take up the guardianship of Being. To take the guardianship means to 'light the truth of Being'. In "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger repeatedly asserts that 'language is the house of Being's in order to remind us that the guardianship of the home of being is given only to those who think and create words. If homelessness of man is a condition brought about by the alienation from the rest of the beings, man's homecoming will be possible by coming into the shelter erected in language to preserve the truth of Being by man himself. The message Heidegger delivers to us is that we can still save our life, along with the lives of myriad of species at the abyss of this age of destruction and dwell on earth with all its dignity and greatness.

Heidegger attempts to make it clear that the project of modernity is merely a consummation of the search for the truth of things conducted in

abstraction. The aim of metaphysics from its beginning itself was to answer the question: what is a thing? To this date man couldn't fully answer this question. Logic articulated truth of things by means of their genera and species and paved the way for modern science. In the modern age it is the sciences that take up the search for the answer to this question. Now science and technology replace metaphysic. Technology with the aid of sophisticated tools can more effectively conduct the examination of things and offer more clear answer to this age-old question. When Heidegger argues that metaphysics ends, he does not mean that metaphysics dies away. Instead, metaphysics only transforms into specialized branches of science and technology.

Today technology is hailed as the final answer to all the problems faced by man. Technology, the boon of contemporary man, is also a form of revealing the truth of Being. But the truth unconcealed in technology is determined by humanistic interests and, therefore, highly alarming, Instrumentality is the essence of technology. In the mode of technology man's ordering attitude in its extremity holds its grip on nature's resources to produce results. As a way of manifesting the truth of Being technology is an inevitability of human history. Therefore, Heidegger does not make a call to do away with technology. In the opinion of Heidegger the threat in technology does not come from potentially lethal machines and apparatuses, but from its fundamental attitude that it is the single way of lighting the truth. The actual danger has already been inflicted on man in his essence, which is the forgetting of the truth of Being in a more primordial sense. This danger has been launched ever since the Greek metaphysicians began thinking in terms of abstraction. But Heidegger feels that the extreme danger lies in the enframing activity of tecnology. The overarching grasp of technology darkens other possible means for revealing and presents itself as the only way of revealing Being's truth. that could deny man the possibility of entering into a more original revealing of the truth of Being.

Modern technology being the inevitability produced by the essentialist metaphysical thinking, we cannot escape technology by reverting the course of history. Nevertheless, Heidegger insists that we should be able to harness the saving power within technology. The idea of technology originally comes

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from Greeks' techne by which they mean the activity of bringing forth something. It covered a wide range of activities and skills of craftsmen such as handicraft manufacture, artistic and poetical bringing forth. Techne was essentially bringing into presence something concealed within the folds of Being. Greeks called even the arts of the mind and the fine arts techne. Techne was the activity of poeis and is something poetic. They could even call physis the activity of poesis because the revealing of the truth of a 'thing' in physis was devoid of any interest of its utility for man. Understanding a 'thing' neither was a theoretical activity nor it was guided by the motive of manipulating. The activity of poesis aimed merely to reveal a thing as pure shining.

But the activity of *Techne* deviated from this course and assume the dimension of modern technology. This turn took place when man conceived of thinking in the model of scientific knowledge and measure our deeds by the successful achievements of praxix. Therefore, the saving grace can befall on man only if he gives up the manipulative humanistic mode of thinking and once again comes closer to the 'lighting of truth' as *poesis*.

Western metaphysical thought from Plato onwards failed to think Being in the proper sense. The theoretical kind of thinking practiced by them deviated from a more primely granted revealing of the ancients, which was a pure shining forth of the truth of beings. That is why Heidegger calls the history of philosophy, the history of the 'forgetting of Being'. This destiny does not rest upon a mere failure of human thinking, but a failure of Western representational rationality, which separated Being and existence that completely dominates the destiny of western history. At the threshold of the postindustrial age Heidegger asks whether a kind of thinking different from the theoretical kind, a reflection that is not metaphysical, is still possible? The answer perhaps depends on considering whether we employ language to let Being speak instead of we speak for ourselves. Then perhaps, as Heidegger wished, human thought will be able to overcome its arrogant humanism and once again let other beings come into radiant presence.

Such a thought will bring man closer to the poetic mode of existence. In Heideggerian perspective 'poetic' is neither strictly nor a specific sector

of cultural activity as in the case of art and aesthetics. Instead, language itself can be understood as poetry in the essential sense because language is that event in which for the first time being as *Being* is disclosed to man. In naming a being man first makes it appear. Hence the archaic man understood language as the primordial expression of truth as the magnificent revealing of Being. Poetry only completes this task, which is set up in language. *Poesis* is the end at which language aims. In the technologically dominated modern age, in order to save life and earth, Heidegger calls for a retrieval of that primordial approach towards the question of Being. Its retrieval may transfigure our present practice of thinking as theoretical activity into a mode of linguistic expression, which comes very close to art and poetry.

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- Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, trans. David Farell Krell, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p.221
- 2. Ibid, p. 194.

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- 3. Heidegger, End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, in Basic Writings, p. 337.
- 4. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in Basic Writings, p. 296.
- 5. Heidegger, Letter on Humainism, p. 210.
- 6. Ibid, p. 206.
- 7. Ibid
- 8. Heidegger, Letter on Humainism, p. 193.

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KRISHNAMURTI'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

G. VEDAPARAYANA

I. Krishnamurti is basically a philosopher who is also deeply concerned with right education. To him, there is no difference between philosophy and education. The aims of both are one and the same: to bring about a fundamental and instantaneous change in man and society by setting human mind absolutely and unconditionally free. What the philosopher teaches to the elderly, the educator teaches the same to the young. A true teacher is also a philosopher. He is not only knowledgeable but also wise. A philosopher loves truth and not ideas and theories. Philosophy is understanding life wholistically, directly and instantaneously. It is living life not as conceived by thought but as it truly is. A true teacher or a philosopher 'directs' the student towards the true living, at the very beginning of life. catches them young and teaches them the art of living life He unconditionally by keeping their minds free and fresh. Krishnamurti devoted his life to the task of keeping the young minds uncluttered by thought. He taught them to love truth or life without being caught in the network of thought. Writing to the students, he said, "Life is what is happening at this instant, not an imagined instant, not what thought has conceived. So it is the first step you take now that is important. If that step is in the right direction, then the whole life is open to you. Right direction is not towards an ideal, a predetermined end. It is inseparable from that which is taking place now. This is not a philosophy, a series of theories. It is exactly what the word philosophy means-the love of truth, the love of life. It is not something that you go to the University to learn. We are learning about the art of living in our daily life".1

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Krishnamurti holds that human mind as we know is deeply conditioned and contaminated by thought. Thought has divided and disintegrated it. It has made the mind narrow and old. Thought is by nature conditioned, either by an object or by an idea. It is a 'materialistic' process. Which is the movement of the past. It is the response of memory which is the past. Thought is never independent. Independent thought is a contradiction in terms. Thought is finite. It is self-contradictory and self-isolating. It is divisive and conflicting. Thought is measure and mechanical. So the mind conditioned by thought necessarily is a heir to selfishness, division, contradiction, conflict and so on. Thought may build up a civilization of scientific and technological advancement. But it inevitably brings about a society of division, conflict, poverty, violence and war. It renders life sorrowful, for sorrow is the urge for the repetition of the past, however pleasant it may by. And thought is precisely the repetition of the past. Thought cannot create a culture of true living of integration, peace and happiness. True living is possible only when the mind goes beyond thought and comprehends truth. Truth is 'nothingness'. It is the 'emptiness' of the mind.² Truth is when thought is not. Thought is 'something' whereas truth is 'nothing'. Thought is conditioned and truth is freedom. Therefore right education should not confine the student to the realm of thought. It should not exaggerate the significance of thought in life. It should not give thought undue importance. Instead, it should teach the student the nature and limitations of thought and help them to go beyond. Right education should enable them to 'perceive' truth, to keep their minds 'empty' and absolutely nothing. It should empty the student's mind of its ficticious content of ideas, beliefs, opinions, hopes, regrets, fears which are, in fact, the manifestations of thought entering the realm of truth or freedom. Cultivating thought beyond a certain limit creates imbalance in life. Right education should not allow thought to dominate the whole of the mind and life. It may condition the mind with information to the extent necessary but it cannot neglect the vast field of one's being and life. Krishnamurti says, "Right education cultivates your whole being, the totality of your mind, and gives your heart and mind, a depth of understanding and beauty".3

Krishnamurti contends that the existing systems of education all over the world are faulty for they have not been aiming at creating a free

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ad wholistic human being and a sane society. On the contrary, they are asy in deeply conditioning the student to the psychological structure of ed, envy, jealousy, ambition and success. It is concerned with conforming student to the prevailing sick and rotten social structure of utterly alerialistic values like, possession of wealth, power, position and prestige hich are the products of thought. The educators - the parents, the teachers with educationists - are moulding the student's mind according to their wish and will. They are imposing their pleasurable and brutal ideas adideals on the students. In fact, they are 'industrializing' the students adjudged them to second-hand human beings. Conditioning to a pattern. hether religious, economic or political, thwarts the inward flowering of be student. It mars the inborn aptitude to discover the right vocation and he 'way' of life which the student really loves. Conditioning is a barrier to fundamental change of flowering in goodness which is of great urgency. The elders and the teachers are totally oblivious of the unwholesome onsequences of conditioning the student. Talking to the parents and eachers Krishnamurti observed, "You have very carefully conditioned your hildren, though perhaps not deeply understanding the issue. Not only you, ut society, the environment, the culture, in which they have been brought , both economical and social, have nurtured them, shaped them to a articular pattern. They are going to go through the mill of so-called ducation".4 Conditioning, conformity and identification divide the student within' and the world 'without. They create inner conflict between 'what s, the fact and the 'what should be', the ficticious idea. They divide the manity and the world into various kinds of groups. They build walls of tistance between these groups. Living in groups with their labels as rich ad poor, Indians and Americans, Hindus and Muslims and so on, results in Inflict, violence and bloody wars. It has put man to untold and unwarranted isery. Nationalism, for instance, justifies homicide. It involves the greatest illof man killing man. Nationalism is in fact a glorified tribalism. Religion the absurdity of conditioning the mind to beliefs and symbols in the name Truth or God. Krishnamurti says, "Technologically we have gone very s, and psychologically we are very primitive. We are still at the state of bal conflict with our beliefs, our gods, our separate nationalities".5 Right ducation has to bring about individuals who are neither rich nor poor, neither Hindus nor Muslims, neither Indians nor Americans but just human beings who are not divided 'within' and 'without'.

The sole aim of the present system of education is the acquisition of knowledge, especially the technological knowledge. The system is mainly interested in turning out knowledgeable people. It is concentrating on sharpening the intellect. It is neglecting the observation and understanding of the mind and life in all their aspects. Right education, according to Krishnamurti, is a process of self-knowing and self-discovery. It teaches the student to learn about the workings of the mind, its conditioning, its prejudices, fears, likes and dislikes etc. It does not limit the student to mastering a technique. It does not confine the student to a particular comer of life. Right education enables the student to comprehend with sensitivity acation. the whole problem of living which includes relationship, love, sex, anger, edoes not fear, death etc.6

Krishnamurti says that the system of education as we know is a scontroll positive process of programming the student's mind like a computer. It is involves teaching the student to acquire and store knowledge and apply it derstand mechanically. It is emphasizing learning from books by rote. But true loutwar education implies the inculcation of the sceptic attitude of discovering by legration enquiry. It is a 'negative' process of questioning and finding out the truth perficial. of 'what is'. It is understanding truth as truth, false as false and truth in he order falsity. It is a critical study of books without rejecting or accepting them complete dogmatically. As Krishnamurti puts it, "Education is not only learning from dissideal books, memorising some facts, but also learning how to look, how to listen lorder are to what the books are saying, whether they are saying something true or why false".7

Krishnamurti distinguishes between learning and mere accumulation when it of knowledge. Accumulation of knowledge is a process of time and thought. It burdens the mind and makes it mediocre and dull. Apart from the sorder 'w knowledge or information which is absolutely necessary for physical whom the existence, knowledge is responsible for the 'me', the pride, the prejudice, whom low the confusion, the conflict, violence and war. Whereas learning is devoid externing is devoid. of accumulation. It is a process of observing 'what is' without knowledge external and authority. It is seeing 'what' is' directly and as it exactly is. It is without the land cor understanding 'what is' with a mind which is empty and fresh. Learning ove that

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man acquisition of knowledge are antithetical. Learning is possible only there is no acquisition. An acquisitive mind is incomplete, for on of without accumulation and for adequately. Krishnamurti regards ainly without accumulation as of great significance, for it reveals the thof 'what is' and life as a whole. Learning, like life, is open and infinite. ishnamurti says, "When knowledge becomes all important, learning g on ases. The more I add to knowledge the more secure, the more assured mind becomes, and therefore, the mind becomes dull and ceases to g, its The mind is merely acquiring. The acquisition dictates the conduct life and therefore limits experience. Whereas learning is limitless".8

Krishnamurti decries disciplining the student through the process of ivity acation. Discipline is regimentation. It compells the student to do what nger, sloes not love to do. It adapts the student by force to the so called ideals mideas conceived by the educators. Discipline is an external conditioning is a dentrolling of the student who is inwardly disintegrated and indisciplined. . It is involves suppression, resistance and opposition. It is a barrier to the ly it derstanding of the fact of inner indiscipline and disorder. Imposition of true loutward order over the student cannot bring about order and ng by degration' within'. The outward order of discipline is artificial and truth perficial. It is put together by thought which can never grasp true order. th in be order of thought is not creative and complete but destructive and them complete. Allowed beyond the biological realm, thought goes berserk. from dits ideals and ideas, including religion and God, invented as the sources isten lorder are disorderly. They are in fact the source of confusion and chaos. ue or latis why the student is disorderly and is disciplined inspite of the patterns discipline. Right education has to enable the student to observe disorder ation ithin'. It should not invent the patterns of order without understanding ught. Mending inner disorder. Outer disorder is the extension of inner disorder. the sorder 'within' ceases to be when it is observed without choice. Ending sical linner disorder is the beginning of true order which is love. The students dice, whom love is created, never do anything wrong. They love what they do woid do what they love. They do what is right irrespective of the authority edge external discipline. They do not become licentious in the absence of It is lemal control. They do not do whatever they like. Krishnamurti says, "It ming ove that leads to right action. What brings order in the world is love and

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let love do what it will". Krishnamurti admits of discipline in its true sense of constant learning about oneself without accumulation, prejudice, opinions and conclusions. Discipline in this sense is not subjugation but diligence of actively watching or observing oneself without sinking into second-hand and imitative existence. A truly disciplined mind is never negligent but ever vigilant. It feels responsibility to all its actions and the environment around. Krishnamurti observes, "The word discipline comes from the word disciple to learn, not conform, not rebel, but to learn about your own reactions, your own background, their limitation, and to go beyond them". 10

Krishnamurti is against comparison and competition in education for they destroy the student's vulnerability to truth and creativity. They generate hostility, envy and jealousy between the students. They are a hindrance to the harmonious relationship of love. Comparative and competitive approach involves struggle and conflict. Comparing and asking a dull student to compete with a cleverer one is cruelty. Examinations. rewards and punishments are the ultimate expression of comparison. Comparison causes fear in the student. It is a barrier to clear understanding of oneself and life. Fear experienced as student persists in the rest of life. Krishnamurti observes, "Giving marks, grading, comparison and any form of compulsion, either through kindness or through threats, breeds fear, and it is because we are caught in this fear while we are young that we struggle in fear the rest of our life"11 Fear stunts the natural and intelligent growth of the student. The so-called dull student has to be allowed to end his dullness by understanding instead of comparing himself or herself with others.

The present system of education is encouraging the student to be ambitious. But Krishnamurti says, "All ambition is stupid, petty-there is no great ambition". An ambitious mind is brutal in its effort to achieve the motivated ends. It is ridden with the constant conflict and resistance of becoming. It is a slave to self-aggrandisement. Its activities are self-enclosing. It is greedy, envious, insensitive, impatient etc. To be ambitious implies to be successful. Success is pleasure-oriented. And the pleasure of success carries within itself the pain of failure. The sense of success, like ambition, makes man selfcentred and wicked. The mind aiming at success may go to any extent of achieving its pet goals. It may adopt any

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kind of means. It does not understand the nature of the means but manipulates and moulds the 'what is' to its likes and dislikes. Krishnamurti says, "Success in any form, political and religious, art and business is brutal. To be successful implies ruthlessness". 13 Righy education should enable the student to overcome ambition and success by revealing their true nature. I should make the student to overcome the self-centred activity and selfish life. It should inculcate in the student the intelligence of acting without the centre, the 'me' which is the product of thought. Action with the centre is motivated and end-oriented. It is mechanical, contradictory and conflicting. Whereas action without the centre is creative. It is devoid of ambition and success. It is not dictated by the psychological pressure and the environmental demands. It is harmonious and without contradiction and conflict. 14

The present system of education is destroying the natural intelligence of the body, the physical organism. The intelligence of the body is the energy without division and dissipation. It is the functioning of the senses together in harmony. But the intelligence gets distorted when thought dominates over the body. Thought with its images, sensations, hopes, habits, remembrances, desires and pleasures, narrows down the energy by stimulating one sense as aganst the other senses. It fragments the harmonious functioning of the senses, the organism as a whole. It manipulates the energy towards a desired end. It directs the energy into the groove called the 'self'. Thus thought makes one of the senses dominate over the other senses. The student, in whom thought is dominent over the body, may find delight in hearing great music and yet be insensitive to other sensations. He may have sensitivity to taste and be wholly insensitive to delicate colour, subtle smell or touch. Right education has to awaken in the student the intelligence of the body. It should enable the students to release their total energy. It should make them to function, respond with all the senses and with the same intensity of energy. The teacher has to point out the student the mischief of thought's interference in the harmonious functioning of the senses, the organism. In fact, there is no division as senses, sensations and the body. They form a single organism or movement. The division is brought about by thought. The total awareness of the fragmentation of thought releases the total energy which is the intelligence

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of the body. Krishnamurti calls the release of total energy the flowering of goodness. The intelligence of the body is a part of an intelligent mind which is aware of the finitude of thought. Only an intelligent mind has as intelligent body. ¹⁵

Krishnamurti lays utmost emphasis on exposing the student to Nature, art and music. Looking at Nature and 'appreciation' of art in all its forms have a profound impact on the student. They create a sense of beauty in the student. The sense of beauty establishes right relationship between the student and people, things and ideas. Right relationship is relationship without labels and images. It is not based on attachment, detachment and expectation. It is devoid of the sense of possession, likes and dislikes. It is not self-centred and self-assertive. To be related is to respond accurately. To be accurate means to have great care. Beauty, like love, is without the 'centre' the 'me'. It forms the basis for the relationship of care and concern for the other. "To live is to be related. There is no right relationship to anything if there is not the right feeling for beauty, a response to nature, to music and art, a highly developed aesthetic sense". 16

Krishnamurti holds that right education should accomplish in the student an intelligent mind which has two movements - the scientific and the religious. The scientific movement is factual. It is based on thought and knowledge. It explores the world of matter through instrumental and experimental reason. Betterment of our biological survival is its concern. Whereas the religious movement is the movement of truth. It is beyond thought and knowledge. It is a mind which is empty and wholistic. The religious mind is not orthodox. It does not belong to any organised religion. It has nothing to do with belief and dogma. 17 To be truly religious is to live truth in actuality. Religious life is the operation of truth in the world of reality. It is the working of the emptiness- the freedom of the mind - in daily living. 18 Left to itself the scientific movement creates havoc in life. Thought and knowledge are incomplete. That which is incomplete is bound to create problems. Thought and knowledge cannot decisively solve the problems they bring about. It is therefore imperative that the scientific movement is rooted in the religious movement. The religious spirit of the intelligent mind reveals the limitations of thought and knowledge. It does not allow them to enter the realm which is beyond their purview. It confines

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them strictly to the physical realm. It prevents them from cluttering the mind with beliefs, prejudices, opinions, conclusions in the name of religion or spirituality. True spirituality, as it is already mentioned, implies the sacredness of keeping the mind totally empty of all content except the factual knowledge essential for biological living. To be spiritual is to have a mind which is absolutely and unconditionally free. In freedom, truth and love guide thought and knowledge and not vice versa. Truth and love as invented by thought and knowledge are pseudo and not real.

Life according to Krishnamurti has a wider significance than acquiring knowledge through thought. It has a higher purpose than securing adegree, a job and settle down in life. To be efficient at a certain profession is necessary but not sufficient. Fulfilment of life is living in freedom and peace 'within' and 'without'. Through education, Krishnamurti aims at creating an individual who is not only knowledgeable and efficient but also free from division, conflict, fear, anxiety, jealousy, envy, prejudice, violence and so on. He aims at bringing about a world without division, war, poverty, injustice, exploitation and misery. He hopes that right education can bring about a new world order in which all are just human beings and the resources of the earth are shared by humanity and not monopolised by a few. A new world order presupposes a new mind and a new man. As is the mind so is the man. As is the man so is the world. Krishnamurti says, 'You are the world and the world is you'. The crisis in the world is the spectacular manifestation of the crisis in consciousness. There is therefore an urgent need for the fundamental transformation of the individual. But the question that often arises, in the context of Krishnamurti, is: How to change the individual fundamentally? How to make man realize the truth? Krishnamurti does not prescribe any method as a means of transformation. He shuns all methods, for method implies the continuation of the same old mind. Methods can only modify the mind but cannot change it radically. Krishnamurti says, "There is no system, no practice but the clarity of perception of a mind that is free to observe, a mind which has no direction, ^{no choice".19} To him, direct and choiceless observatoin and understanding of the facts about oneself and the world is the only 'way' of changing oneself and the world. Realization of truth is timeless and pathless. The student should be taught to observe and understand the whole content of

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the mind without conforming to any method, system, religion or sect. An unconditional and absolute approach alone can understand the truth which is also unconditional and absolute. The means is not different from the end. Each determines the other. Radical change of the mind happens to be when it realizes the truth that the means and the end, the observer and the observed are one and the same. It is not thought or intellect but insight that transforms the mind. Insight takes place when the mind is completely 'still' without any movement of thought. Insight is holistic. It happens to be when the fragmentary thought is silent. Understanding of this truth without any choice is sufficient to realize freedom. "Insight is not the careful deduction of thought, the analytical process of thought or the time-binding nature of memory. It is perception without the perceiver; it is instantaneous. From this insight action takes place... Insight is supreme intelligence and this intelligence employs thought as a tool. Insight is intelligence with its beauty and love. They are really inseparable: they are actually one. This is the whole which is the most sacred".20

To conclude, the teachers as well as the parents have a great role and responsibility in educating the children and bringing about a new generation of human beings. The parents have to really love their children. They should not try to fulfil their desires and ambitions through them. The children are not the psychological extension of the parents. They are independent and unique beings. They should be allowed to grow and flower in real freedom, happiness and goodness. As Khalil Gibran puts it, "Your children are not your children; they are the sons and daughters of life's longing for itself; they came through you and not from you. You give them your love but not your thoughts".21 The teachers have to transform themselves before transforming the student. It is not enough if the teachers impart knowledge to the students. They should understand the truth and help the student to understand it. They should live as human beings without images and labels. They should be 'alone' without any identification. To be alone means to be undivided. To be undivided is to be one with all. Unless the teachers are philosophers, education cannot accomplish the task of changing man and society radically and fundamentally. Educating the educators is the primary and the urgent need of the hour.

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CLONING: SOCIAL OR SCIENTIFIC PRIORITY?

JYOTISH CH BASAK

The ethical issues involved in biotechnology in general, and cloning in particular, are exceedingly complex. The term 'biotechnology', which is in vogue now, is comparatively newly-coined. In a broad sense any technology involving biological materials should come under the ambit of biotechnology. However, the term is presently delimited to certain specific manipulations of biological material in the sterile culture in the laboratory and their application of various areas of life. Today's biotechnology has taken a new dimenson and a new identity with the development of molecular biology and genetic engineering techniques involving r-DNA (recombinant Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid) transfer technology. Molecular biologists and genetic engineers are now capable of transferring genes across the species which could not be done earlier. The prospects of emerging biotechnology are indeed great but what has brought this particular branch of applied science to the forefront is not merely the scientific appeal but the lucrative commercial potential of the technique and the ethical issues involved with it. In order to deal with this almost a new branch of ethics, known as bioethics, has come into being. It is a discipline that deals with moral principles and values in biological experiments and innovations and their societal acceptance. A major objective of this branch of ethics is to set up ideals and codes of conduct for scientists working in different branches of biology and orient them to do things that would be good for man as well as for the earth as a whole. More importantly, a new dimension has been added to bioethics with the unforeseen developments in biotechnology, especially in recombinant DNA technology and transgenesis, gene therapy

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for somatic and reproductive cells and more recently mammalian cloning, particularly possible in man. Unless bioethical issues are resolved properly consumer acceptance of biotechnology may fall short of the expectations of the biotechnologists and biotech business enterprises.

Among the bioethical issues most recent and most discussed one is cloning. Cloning means the technique of producing a clone. A clone is an individual obtained from somatic cell/organ of the parent organism. As such, production of clone is asexual and does not involve mating. Genetically the clone is a copy of its parent (single) organism. Large scale cloning is being done in plants employing organs, tissue and cell culture techniques. Embryo cloning and more recently somatic cell cloning has been successful in mammals also.

Most of the major ethical issues arise directly or indirectly from the genetic knowledge and correlated technologies that are concerned with human procreation. Procreation in the Living system is a unique natural phenomenon and infringement of the same especially in case of higher order mammals is considered by most people to be unethical. We know that agrarian civilization has for long continued denied sexual rights of farm animals particularly in the case of cattle, sheep etc. through castration for ploughing, load bearing and meat production, and even went up to interspecific and intergeneric crosses for production of sterile and more labour efficient animals (e.g., the mule, a cross between horse and donkey.)

In fact, cloning has been there since the beginning of agrarian civilization in the form of vegetative propagation of plants. Cutting of branches and twigs of trees to establish new trees are nothing but cloning. But the same technique would not work in higher animals like man, and a chopped off finger of a man has not as yet been used to create a clone. With organic evolution and growing complexity, totipotency and regeneration become increasingly difficult. As long as the process of cloning was used in case of plants and lower order animals it did not give rise to much ethical noise. But what triggered off the intense debate is the success of mammalian cloning. The first ever successful cloning of a mammal from differentiated somatic cell by Wilmut and coworkers was published in the February 27, 1997 issue of the prestigious journal *Nature*. The success of Wilmut *et al* electrified both the research community and the public in general, for

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although animals had been cloned before, creating a sheep (known as 'Dolly') from a single cell of a six year old ewe was a stunning technological feat that many had thought impossible. According to conventional wisdom, adult cells cannot give rise to new, mature organisms. So after Dolly's debut researchers scrambled to understand how she was created. But what is more important is that this success triggered off an explosion of concern about the cloning of humans. The ethical question that was hotly debated: can human cloning ever be justified?

Incidentally, it may be noted that even before Dolly's birth Gurdon, Laskey and Reeves in 1975 experimented successfully the cloning of cells from skin of adult frogs upto the stage of advanced tadpole. Although Gurdon *et al* (1975) could go upto the tadepole stage, their work should be regarded as a major foundation stone for adult animal somatic cell cloning work. But it is the birht of 'Dolly' that elicited rather strong reactions mainly because it gave a signal that cloning of the most evolved mammal, man, is not very distant.

Like many other technologies cloning has both positive and negative aspects. We shall consider these aspects later. When ethical aspects of cloning and other biotechnological issues are discussed the touchstone of our ethical choices is simply our judgment of whether it is right and good for man. We agree that it is right and good to reduce misery and improve the quality of life for all those who live, by using environmental and social means. We now debate whether it is right and good to use genetic means as well. Our conceptions of what is ethical, right, and good change in the light of new knowledge and new conditions. Apart from this, when we take ethical decisions on such a complex matter, we shall have to keep in mind the matter of human dignity also.

The Impact of Dolly

The ethical issues underscored by Dolly's birth prompted the then U.S. President Bill Clinton to ask for a review of experiments on cloning and in the interim period banned the use of federal funds for mammalian cloning. He directed the National Bioethics Advisory Committee (NBAC) to review the associated legal and ethical issues and report back within 90 days. J. L. Fox¹ in an analysis of the bioethical aspects of cloning writes

about two meetings of experts in Washington. The NBAC invited experts, clergy, ethicists, philosophers, lawyers and other interested individuals to deliberate on the issue. The views of the assembled experts ranged very widely - expressing everything from enthusiasm over the medical prospects of such work, to scepticism about whether mammalian cloning is practicable, to repugnance. Some individually expressing these views refer to their own instinctive responses, whereas others cite either religious or secular sources for their conclusion. While analytic approaches to the ethical issues were provided by the religious group, the views of the ethicists have been more philosophical. Some of them say that all efforts to reduce human suffering should go forward but cloning research that tampers with human reproductoin must be stopped. After the 90-day analytical sprint, in its 107-page report the NBAC says that it did not base its policy recommendations on any particular religious or moral view of cloning, because no single set of values enjoys universal acceptance. Instead it focuses on safety. Noting that it took Wilmut 277 attempts to clone a single healthy lamb, the report concludes that an attempt to clone a child would be a premature experiment with unacceptable risks. It might also do psychological harm. This in itself is suffcient to justify a prohibition on cloning human beings.

President Clinton accepted the recommendations. Human cloning, it has been cited, has the potential to threaten the sacred family bonds at the very core of our ideals and our society. There is nothing inherently immoral or wrong with these new techniques, if they are not used to clone humans, as they hold the promise of revolutionary new medical treatments and lifesaving cures.

But scientists got divided on the evident purpose of the President's ban. Some scientists and bioethicists reacted with alarm to moves by the politician to ban human cloning. They held the view that politicians were 'shooting from the hip'. For them the ban imposed could also stifle exploration of the promising avenues opened by the scientists in Scotland. On the other hand, some called the ban commendable. Others point out that such work is not currently feasible. Some argue that ethically defensible cloning of human might occur in the future, citing its potential use in infertility. Such cloning if ever to be used would be used incredibly sparingly. Again,

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ome others suggest for referendum. Those who are in favour of ferendum held the view that it is the duty of researchers to let people mow what is possible, and then to let society judge whether those possibilities should be turned into reality.

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Recently the controversial Italian scientists, Dr. Severino Antinori, is published his plan to clone a human being, to much approbrium from public and from other fertility specialists. But he is hailed as a hero by ouples desperate to have a baby that is genetically related to them². This nstance only unfolds the two opposite facets of the problem. Some experts nine that they are better informed and therefore better equipped to make thical decisions. Some other scientists, e.g. Kevin Shakesheff, a Professor tissue engineering at Nottingham University, disagree with this view. hey say that if they describe their research work well enough, the vast miority of people will be able to understand that information and act on it. In there are not adequate ways of getting feedback. It is here that the mestion of public referendum on such a contentious issue becomes relevant. lemay mention here such an poinion poll, which was conducted by ABC lews Nightline among 591 Americans. 87 percent of the respondents aid that human cloning should not be allowed, 82 precent said that it would y morally wrong, and 93 per cent said that they personally would not hoose to be cloned3

But Prof. Michael Reiss, a specialist in scientific ethics, does not believe that courting the public vote is the way of shaping scientific policy. He maintains that MPs and other elected representavives should be able make decisions on people's behalf, pointing out that democratic presentation has served society well for centuries. "Should we have had referendum over Louise Brown (the first test-tube baby) or the first transplant?" he asks. "I do not think so," he writes. The professor lotes that ethics has become a modern preoccupation of scientists. He he not want scientists to be oblivious to the consequences of their research. The opposes the researchers who hold the view that scientists should be honcerned with just the science, not with moral philosophy. Against both he extreme views he makes a way for middle ground. Many funding

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councils, he opines, require scientists to outline the benefits and value of their work to society and we don't need a Ph. D. in moral philosophy to do that. As a professional ethicist, Professor Reiss says it is not his job to arbitrate on whether we should clone, but to think of new ways to approach the debate. He compares himself to a travel agent, who does not decide which country customers visit but helps them to come to a decision.

Another important point is the role of such a bioethics committee as NBAC. Bioethics committees should not have a monopoly on ethical issues, but should promote public debate. Such committees should refrain from offering solutions to ethical problems; rather it should focus on clarifying the issues. Moreover, bioethics committees are excessively elitist and not sufficiently representative of public opinion. It is also a matter of concern, that pressure on such committees to reach conclusions could force an unnatural consesus that masked dissenting opinion.

In India also, mammalian cloning success in the west has sparked off wideranging debates especially in the print media, and as expected, views differ sharply on the subject. It, however, appears that so far as human cloning is concerned those calling for a ban far outnumber the other side favouring such work for various reasons. It is true that cloning can never be a substitute for natural procreation, but positive aspects of animal cloning also hold good in many respects of man as well.

Positive Aspects of Cloning

- Scientists will have a more clear understanding of the effect of environment on physical and mental development which would enable a separation of genetic and environment factors.
- ii) A better understanding of genetic deficiencies (congenital birth defects) would give clues to combat the same.
- iii) Elucidation of mechanism of ageing and age-related disorders will be easier.
- iv) The genetic and environmental basis of diseases like cancer can be better understood.
- v) Cloning will bypass sex, mating and fertilization and will therefore overcome male or female infertility because in case of cloning copy

(or copies) of the single parent may be obtained employing body cells and, if necessary, surrogate mothers. This is a strong point in support of cloning. It is argued that what is the objection if a wife prefers to have a clone of her husband suffering from azoopermia, oligospermia or similar problems instead of opting for artificial insemination with semen from an anonymous donor? If the genome of a somatic cell of the husband is transferred to an enucleated egg of the wife there should not be any major ethical objection to that. Anyway, the unbound joy of the couple of having a child would far outweigh other considerations.

- Another aspect which is being discussed in various quarters is cloning of great men. The birth of the cloned American calf 'Gene' reported on August 7,1997 is significant in this connection. Scientists can now have unlimited number of cells, freeze them indefinitely and then thaw them and make identical animals possessing a certain desired trait. What has been possible for 'gene', the cloned calf, is definitely possible in man.
 - Currently single parenthood is being legalized in some countries in the west and that may follow suit in the developing countries. If such prospective mothers prefer to bear clonal babies from frozen and subsequently thawed somatic cells of great men and women who excelled in various fields of human activities, the same, it is argued, cannot be termed totally unethical and immoral. Ethical and moral actions do not infringe upon basic human rights and values and in a broad sense they are intended for short and long term human welfare. Judged from that perspective bearing clones of great personalities cannot be termed as unethical so long as single motherhood and such events remain legally and socially acceptable.
- Cloning may help to save beleaguered species. The technology of cloning could be used to increase the genetic diversity of a dwindlig species. Oliver Ryder⁴ a geneticist, reasons that for species that are down to just a few surviving individuals, clones grown from frozen fibroblasts could provide an invaluable source of lost genes. It must allow us to go back and recover the genetic diversity.

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cloning could be especially useful tool for biologists trying to save species that either do not breed well in captivity (e.g. giant pandas) or even never bread in captivity (such as giant armadillo) by allowing biologists to asexually reproduce the creatures. It could possibly guarantee genetic immortality.

x) Cloning would permit the preservation and perpetuation of the finest genotypes that arise in our species - just as the invention of writing has enabled us to preserve the fruits of their life's work.

Negative Aspects

- Diversity is a crucial factor in the perpetuation of a species or type. Uniformity, as would be expected in clonal propagation, may prove disastrous if the particular genome becomes suseptible to external debilitating factors. A broad genetic base is an important survival stragagem for a species and narrowing down the base would be definitely counterproductive.
- ii) It is expected that cloning will be commercially useful in transgenic farm animals. Such animals are viewed upon as efficient bioreactors for the production of specific proteins or pharmaceuticals. However, such transgenic animals often suffer from physiological disturbances. For example, transgenic pigs with gene hGH (human growth hormone gene) would grow much faster by taking more feed but are prone to ulcer, arthritis and several other constraints.
- iii) If highly efficent clones are produced in abundance, and if they consume more food from the available food chain, the less efficient type may become extinct. Such an effect on the ecosystem will be most undesirable.
- iv) Cloning endangered species could distract people from saving habitats. There are many who think that cloning is not a solution to a major problem. They do not want cloning to minimize or supplant current conservative effort.
- Another important philosophical consideration is the question of determinism. When one brings back the clone of a man the physical and mental make up of the cloned offspring are to a great extent predetermined. The 'chance factor' inherent in the randomness of

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prepar life cro much dignity genetic recombinations in the offspring in sexual reproduction, is apparently non-existent in cloning. A cloned human offspring may in due course squarely put the blame on the parent (s) for a predetermined genome.

Can Human Cloning Ever be Justified?

We have delineated in brief the positive and negative sides of cloning. A little reflection will make it evident that it is not the prospect of the application of the new knowledge to the biological world in general that frightens thoughtful men. If we can clone prize cattle to improve our food supply; if through designed genetic change we can produce more nutritious crops which make more effective use of sun and water, if we could, for instance, greatly expand the range of plants with the capacity to serve as hosts for nitrogen-fixing bacteria; if we can engineer viruses or microbes 10 curb steps or to destroy cancer, these innovations might produce ecological concern, but not dire doubt. It is the possible application of genetic intervention to man that generates the shock wave. For this possibility illuminates from a new direction all that is encompassed in the word 'human', and thereby challenges traditional concepts in every area of human activity. And much of the alarm is that scientists-- with their clever tools--could crudely disrupt much of our social order with scant regard for its replacement. So it was thought that using the technique of 'Dolly' cloning of adult human could become feasible. It is for this reason we hear about ban on federal funds, legislative action, public outrage and so on.

If we apply the nonconsequentialist ethical approach to cloning we find that creatoin of human clones solely for spare cell lines would, from a philosophical point of view, be in obvious contradiction to an ethical principle. Would Kant approve of cloning of humans? Would he not raise the issue of infringing upon the point of human dignity? The principle of human dignity demands that an individual human life - should never be thought of only as a means, but always as an end. Creating human life for the sole purpose of preparing therapeutic material would clearly not be for the dignity of the life created. Again, the use of cloning as a means of combating sterility is much more difficult, as the explicit goal is to create a life with the right to dignity.

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In this regard we may mention the creation of headless frog in the post-Dolly period, in October 1997. The scientists who created these hapless creatures while studying developmental genes had speculated about their practical use. Sometimes in the future, they said, organs grown through nuclear transfer might provide compatible transplant material for people who otherwise could not get organs. This again set off a spirited discussion of the ethics of creating brainless humans for medical purposes. In the brief but intense media splash, ethicists are quoted saying that the whole idea is deplorable. It treated lives as a means and not ends, they said. On the other side, some developmental biologists say that there are not serious moral problems at all raised by cloning organs. If the donor is never sentient to begin with, they ask, what could be the harm?

Let us recall the point about the infertile couple. On this point debates have paid insufficient attention to the current strong social trend towards a fanatical desire for individuals not simply to have children but to ensure that these children also carry their genes. It is true that human descendence is not only biolocical, as it is in all other species, but also emotional and cultural. The latter is of such importance that methods of inheritance where both parent genes are not transmitted such as adoption and insemination with donor sperm - are widely accepted without any major ethical questions being raised. But today's society is characterized by increasing demand for biological inheritance, as if this were the only desirable form of inheritance. A person's personality is increasingly perceived as being largely determined by his or her genes. Moreover in a world where the culture is increasingly internationalised and homogenized people may ask themselves whether they have anything else to transmit to their children apart from their genes.

The implications of cloning technology go much further, opening up new avenues of research in cancer, development, and even ageing. Dolly forces a reexamination of what it means to grow old, for although she was a newborn, her DNA, taken from the donor cell, was almost 6 years old. Whether welcomed or feared, cloning in 1997 forced scientists and the public alike to rethink their basic ideas about life, and to confront the implications of our growing ability to manipulate life's blueprint. To a startled public, Dolly made the horrors of science fiction clones seem all too possible.

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freed arise: that r be co over itself econe If she could be cloned from an udder cell, people wondered, then why not a dictator from her nose, as was attempted in the movie *Sleeper*, or a spare self as a reservoir of replacement body parts. Such things are safely in the realm of fiction, but many people became concerned that cloning people would dehumanize our species and spoke out against it.

Professor Reiss characteristically prefers to provoke rather than pronounce. Let us imagine a situation where a highly educated couple in their forties, driving along with a 12-month old daughter in the back seat. The mother is a top reproductive scientist and the father is a highly respected ethicist. The car crashes and the baby dies. They take a sample of the child's tissue in the hope of cloning her. Given their ages, a clone is the neatest hope they have of having a child of their own. They realise that genes are not the whole story, and emphasize that the clone will never be identical to the child they have lost. "In many other culture, if a child dies early, the next child of the same sex takes on the name of the dead sibling. This is very common - there must be millions of children named in this way, and not all suffer psychological damage. Is not this a partial precedent" writes Professor Reiss. Thus he puts us in tricky situation.

Indeed as with all breakthrough, it is not possible yet to foretell exactly where cloning will lead. Althogh initial reactions were universally against all human cloning, there have been whispers that such cloning may one day have a place in giving infertile couples genetic offspring. Whatever direction the research takes, however, the public is likely to demand a say in how cloning is applied. Biologists, and others will be wrestling with the implications of the birth 'Dolly' in a barn for years to come.

Social and Scientific Priority

By now it has become obvious that there is a tension between the freedom of science and the social responsibility of scientists. The question arises: can scientific liberty be absolute? There is no gainsaying the fact that no research is neutral and its potential social and moral impact should be considered from the outset. Scientific freedom should not be given priority over risks to safety or human rights. It is true that fundamental research itself has an ethical value. Still a balance has to be struck between the economic prospects of new technology and the human and social dimension.

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To the point regarding priorities the relevant questions are: (i) Should society at this stage try to develop priorities in this area; (ii) (assuming an affirmative answer to the first) can society develop priorities? With respect to the first, I note only that many of the developments are so new that it is not clear that we are yet to ready to set priorities. Genetic knowledge regarding cloning is at nascent stage whose implications have yet to sink in most of us. With respect to the second, at this very moment the willingness of our society to assign priorities is being severely tested. It is indeed inconsistent with our goal of individual self-fulfillment to suggest that society should deny to any individual the right to seek basic knowledge in any area. Still the setting of scientific priorities must have its foundation in social priorities. We acknowledge that research not consciously or explicitly related to any immediate practical application has on many occasions led to acquisition of knowledge which has subsequently proved to be of great importance in solution of social problems. Hence time is not ripe to give any conclusive answer. We may conclude our discussion by quoting a line of Paul Ramsey. He says: "men ought not to play God before they have learned to be men, and after they have learned to be men, they will not play God."5 We should not loose our nerve; we are just realizing how complex the situation really is.

NOTES

- 1. Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 15, 1997.
- 2. The Times, London, Source: The Statesman, Nov. 19, 2001.
- 3. Nature, Vol. 386, 13 March, 1997, p. 97.
- 4. Science, Vol 276, 30 May 1997, p. 1324.
- 5. Ethical Issues in Human Genetics, ed, by B. Hilton and others, p. 366.

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THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPERMORALISM IN THE BHAGVADGĪTĀ

SHIVNARAYAN JOSHI

The supermoralism of the Gītā rests on three assumptions viz., (i) Naiskarmya Siddhi (going beyond the sense of doership or Kartrtva bhāva), (ii) Nistraigunyatā (transcending from the effects of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) and finally (iii) surrender to God1. A person who has attained Naişkarmya-Siddhi and Nistraigunyaţā and takes refuge in god, goes beyond good and evil2. Before analyzing these assumptions we ponder some thought on moralism. Morality or Dharma, as it may rightly be called in the context of Indian philosophy, is concerned with Samsāra. We the worldly men have deep attachment for the objects of senses. We desire to achieve certain things we like and have aversion for such things which we dislike. Ista is desired object and Dvista is that which is shunned or avoided3. If our action performed to achieve Ista causes harm to others then it is wrong action or Asubha Karma but if it is beneficial to others, it is right action or Subha Karma. Dharma or morality is concerned with the obligation to others. Since we have deep attachment for objects of senses the observance of Dharma is not an easy sailing for us in our life. We are constantly facing contrary pulls between Preyas or desired object and Śreyas or obligation for duty. Our natural tendency is to run after the objects of our choice. We find constraint, may it be internal, in doing acts which are in accordance with Dharma. We have to sacrifice choices of our interest or liking in favour of duty or obligation. When our Ista is not in consonance with Dharma or there is a demand of choosing some higher value we are obliged to drop the Ista or desired object. So Dharma or morality needs readiness to sacrifice the Preyas in favour of Sreyas. Samsāra is a constant war between two opposite forces of Preyas and Śreyas in which sometimes

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Śankara describes Samsāra as characterized by doership and enjoyership4. We perform actions and enjoy their fruits. Since we are combination of unconscious body and conscious spirit the qualities of both apparently get superimposed. That is why we are both rational and irrational, selfish and not-selfish. Man led by reason cares for others but when he is under the influence of senses he seeks self-interest. But there is an inherent urge to go beyond Samsāra in every person, may it be dormant in some and awakened, in others, which motivates them to pursue Śreyas or higher values in life. We have thus three stages from lower to higher in our pursuit of values viz., (i) to live competitively (ii) to live co-operatively and (iii) to live sacrificially⁵. Persons living at the first stage act mostly for their own interest without paying attention to benefit of others. They act for the benefit of others only when it is in their self-interest. At the second stage while seeking interest of ourselves we do help others also for their betterment. Interests of both ours as well of others are protected at this stage. Finally, the aim of our life becomes to live for others. We sacrifice our own interests in favour of others. To live for others seems to be an impossible task to a man engrossed in Samsara. But it is the firm belief of the Gītā that one can control one's lower passions by doing constant effort or Abhyāsa and detachment or Vairāgya6 and can live sacrificially for others. At this stage a man acts under the guidance of reason but still it is not an effortless moral life. He is not out of Samsāra. We make distinction between the world of objects and Samsāra. Samsāra is an interaction between man and objective world. Man living in Samsāra, though he leads a moral and rational life, is not Dvandvātīta or beyond the duals of life. The battle between Preyas (desires) and Śreyas has not yet ceased to be though by exerting rigorous effort he always wins it and lives sacrificially. There remains always a possibility of losing the battle in this moral realm. Since a moral man is not completely detached form Samsāra, he is under the influence of pleasure and pain. Kant has beautifully presented the dilemma of struggling moral man in these words - "There is always deciet, violence and envy around and about him, even though he is honest, peaceable and kindly. He sees righteous man who deserves happiness fall victim to the evils of want, sickness and untimely death as animals do..... This right

minded person may, therefore, feel impelled to give up the impossible purpose which caused him to obey the moral law".

In contrast with moralism, the realm of supermoralism is an effortless iourney to achieve Śreyas or the highest good. While a moral man lives under the constant stress of obligation, a man of super-moralism is free from the constraint of 'ought'. Because a man of super-moralism has attained Naiskarmya- Siddhi he is mentally detached from the objects of desires. Naiskarmya Siddhi is not the state of actionlessness. It is not possible for man to remain without doing actions8. Naiskarmya is a nonattachment to the ego-centric perspective or absence of doership which is followed by the non-attachment to fruits of actions. A person who has realized that the spirit is different from body also realizes that spirit is, by its very nature, non-doer or Akartā. The Akartrtva-bhāva, is a necessary condition for the attitude of non-attachment to the fruits of the actions. The attitude of non-attachment though very difficult, can be cultivated by a person who has controlled body by controlling senses, has controlled senses by controlling mind, has controlled mind by controlling intellect and finally has controlled intellect by controlling spirit⁹. The spirit being conscious is the highest of all these elements. The objects of senses are not significant in themselves but our ideas or values assigned to them make so. A thing which was most significant for a person before the dawn of knowledge may become totally insignificant after self-realization. Akartṛtva bhāva developed in a self controlled person transforms the action done into inaction. This is to see Karma or action as Akarma or inaction. 10 The transformation of action into inaction is the real meaning of Naiskarmyasiddhi. Naiskarmya-siddhi is not renunciation of actions but renunciation in action. The awakened person while performing his Dharma or duty skillfully remains totally detached from the result thereof. The Kartrtva-bhāva or attitude of doership attaches the person to fruits of actions and contrarily the Akartṛtva-bhāva or the attitude of non-doership detaches him from the fruits of actions. The awakened man knows that it is the body animanted by the contact of spirit is real doer and enjoyer and not the spirit.11 It is not the 'action' that binds the person but his attitude towards the action is responsible for the feeling of pleasure and pain. It is said very rightly in the Gīta that the awakened person abandons both 'good' or Sukṛta and 'evil'

or Duskṛta12. The true self knower (Atmajñānī) acts and reacts without any emotional disturbance on his part. The person attaining Naişkarmya-Siddhi also attains Samatva or equanimity which is of two kinds viz., (i) Psychological and (ii) Social. There are two most powerful opposite mental forces known as Rāga or like and Dveşa or dislike which motivate persons to perform actions¹³. Impelled by these forces men are attracted to the objects of their liking and are averted from the objects of disliking. Both Rāga and Dveşa produce pleasure and pain in the agent. The person who has attained Akartrtva-bhāva is not mentally attached to the objects, hence he rises above pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat. His stable mind rests in tranquility and peace. He becomes Nirdvandva or devoid of opposites. This is the psychological equanimity which paves the way for social equanimity. A man who has risen above the opposites of Raga or attachment and Dvesa or hatred, performs his duty without making any discrimination of gender, wealthy or poor, lower, or higher. He gives due respect to the every member of society impartially.

Nistraigunyatā is another foundational feature of supermoralism. It means to go beyond to the effect of triplet viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is to be noted that Nistraigunyatā is not new achievement. It is already there. The spirit in essence is devoid of Triguna or triplet. One has to realize the true nature of self as distinct from the Trigunatmaka body. According to the Bhagavadgītā the Prakṛti, the unconscious element is Triguṇātmaka. All the products of Prakṛti including body are also endowed with Triguna. The real doer of action is not spirit but the Prakṛti or body possessed with triplet which after coming in contact with spirit becomes conscious.14 The spirit- wrongly identified with body, misunderstands itself as an agent of action. Consequently the spirit enjoys Sukha (pleasure), Duhkha (pain), Moha (delusion). Attaining the state of Nistraigunyatā is to get rid of the effects of Triguna. After self realization the person understands properly the true nature of both body and spirit. Now he knows that Kartrtva or doeship belongs to body endowed with Triguna or three qualities.15

Though Naişkarmya and Nistraiguņyatā go side by side and are interdependent, the former may be said to be logically prior to the later. Naişkarmya is absence of doership and Nistraiguņyatā is the absence of

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enjoyership. Kartṛtva or doership is followed by Bhoktṛtva or enjoyership. So long as there is Katṛtva - bhāva there reminas Bhoktṛtva-bhāva also. As soon as the spirit realizes that it is not an agent of any action whatsoever it also ceases to be Bhoktā or enjoyer of pleasure (the product of Sattva), Pain (the product of Rajas) and delusion (the product of Tamas). On realizing Nistraiguṇyatā one is happy within himself, enjoyes within himself the delight of self. ¹⁶ This is because the spirit, by its very nature is bliss or Ānanda. ¹⁷ The pleasure arising from Sattva in the objective world is momentary whereas inner happiness is everlasting. The surest way of transcending of Triguṇa is the constant devotion (Avyabhicārinī Bhakti) of God. ¹⁸ It is the one pointed and unswerving devotion to god which takes a devotee beyond Triguṇa.

The person who has attained the state of Naiskarmva and Nistraigunyatā enters into the realms of supermoralism where he is freed from both good as well as bad deeds. 19 The distinction of good and bad remains significant within the limit of Samsāra. Dharma or morality is also significant only within Samsāra. On transcending Samsāra one goes beyond good and bad and also morality. Prof. R. D. Ranade has asked a very significant question. "The question, however, arises, whether there is any 'ought' after god realization.20 'Ought' is related to obligation which is the heart of morality. The man of self knowledge has outgrown the mere do's (good) and don'ts (evil). He acts from no moral compulsion or obligation to do good or to abstain from evil, but acts or abstains naturally and spontaneously so that he does not feel the goodness of his acts (Nistraigunyatā). The goodness comes to him unsaught and unannounced wherefore he feels no effort at all in doing it and, therefore no pride nor a longing for reward (Akartrtva bhāva).21 So long as we are conscious of the ethical distinctions so that we feel something to be 'good' and something to be 'bad', we have not abandoned our desires and so have to do rigorous efforts for acquiring and then mainataining virtue and avoiding vice.22 At the realm of morality we are supposed to be constant vigilant against our desires which may detract us from our duty easily. On the contrary the awakened man, attaining the state of super moralism rejoices the practice of moral life effortlessly. Just as for Socrates 'knowledge is virtue' in the similar way 'the self knowledge is the sole virtue' for the awakened person.

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One who has achieved self-realization never indulges in immoral acts. Super-moralism is not immoralism as some thinkers have misinterpreted its spirit, ²³ but it is perfect morality in the sense that it (moral behaviour) becomes routine of spiritual or awakened person. Prof. R. D. Ranade has very rightly called this state of super moralism as a state of moral Jivanmukti. ²⁴ Just as a person having reached metaphysical Jivanmukti goes beyond all sorts of sufferings in this very life similarly a moral Jivanmukta person is above to 'resist the rush of desires and anger even here before he gives up his body. ²⁵ In short for a man of super-moralism the morality is a spontaneous flow of virtues where as a moral man is engaged in a constant war against desires. The awakened person, though living in world, goes beyond Samsāra.

In connection with the possibility of super moralism one may raise the question: is it possible for a man to give up all desires? Is it possible to act without any purpose or motive? Even if it is possible, is the purposeless life a worth living? The Gītā gives the most practical solution to the problem which makes spiritual life more significant and worth living. Though an awakened man does not have any selfish purpose to fulfill his actions are not purposeless. His actions are aimed at for the benefit of all living beings.26 Though the Gita accepts both personal and impersonal forms of God it gives more importance to personal form or immanence of God because it is readily accessible.27 Serving other beings is to serve God directly. God loves a person who sees God as immanent in all things and all things as present in God. The yogin who worships God as residing in all beings, resides himself in God no matter what he does.²⁸ In fact he will not do any immoral act but seek only well being of others. A spiritual man diverts his attachment from the objects of senses to God as present in all beings. "Āsakti (attachment) to God means Anāsakti (non-attachment) to all other things whatsoever"29 In this way the life of a man of super-moralism realm is not dry and aimless but purposive and full of happiness. He devotes his whole life for social welfare or Lokasangraha and thus remains inwardly calm while being outwardly active. He is full of joy. The super-moralism of the Gītā culminates in surrendering all his Dharmas or duties to God.30 This again is not abandoning of duties but to take all his duties as the service of God. All his worldly duties like Varnadharma, Āsharmadharma,

Sādhāraṇadharma etc., find their terminal in one Dharma and that is service to God which is nothing but the service of all living beings. The spiritual man remains most dutiful till he breaths his last.

Scholars are of opinion that the spirituality cannot be a justification for morality. According to them the pursuit of Moksa or God cannot be a satisfactory answer to the question- 'Why should I be moral? Prof. Rajendra Prasad savs'. "In whatever way the Moksa is described, it remains a factual or ontological state and therefore to that extent Moksa is a descriptive term"31 For him it is wrong to derive ethics from metaphysics. It may be agreed that both morality and spirituality are distinct phenomena at the level of Samsara and therefore spirituality cannot justify morality. But what we are trying to explain here is that for an enlightened person who, by way of Naiskarmya-Siddhi and Nistraigunyata, has transcended the Samsāra there remains no distinction of morality and spirituality. The every action of a spiritual man is aimed at in the pursuit of God. The distinction of ethics and metaphysics is reconciled in God who is immanent in all things. For him no ought or obligation whatsoever is left behind. This does not mean at all that he is a immoral person. On the contrary he eats morality, drinks morality, breaths morality and lives with morality.

Thus the supermoralism is neither immoralism nor anti moralism but the culmination of moralism.

NOTES

- 1. Prof. R. D. Ranade, "The Bhagavadgītā, As a Philosophy of God Realization. Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1982, P. 190-191.
- 2. "Buddhiyukto Jahātiha Ubhe Sukṛtaduṣkṛte" Gita II 50
- 3. M. Hiriyanna, "Indian Conception of Values" Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore P. 2
- 4. "Kartṛtva-bhotṛtvādi lakṣṇam Samsārtivam," Vivekacudomani 10
- 5. Jayantilal S. Jariwalla, 'Gāā: The Science of Living' Motilal Banarasidas 1984, p. 47.
- 6. GāāVI-35, XV-3
- 7. 'An Emmanuel Kant Reader' Ed & Trans by Raymond B. Blankey, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1960 P. 276.

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- 8. "Na hi kaşcitkşanamapi Jātu tişthatyakarmakrt" Gātā III-5
- 9. GītāIII 42-43
- 10. GāāIX 18
- 11. GāāⅢ-27 V 8-9
- 12. GñāII-50
- 13. Gītā II 64, III 34, V 3, 20
- 14. Gītā III 27.
- 15. GñāXIV 19, 23
- 16. GītāV-24
- 17. "Anyontara ātmānadamayāh' Ānanda ātmā" Taittirīya Up. II- 5
- 18. Gñā XIV 26.
- 19. Gītā II-50
- 20. 'The Bhagvadg āā: As a philosophy of God Realization: Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan 1982, P. 183
- 21. Jayantilal S. Jariwalla, "Gāā: The science of living" Motilal Banarasidas, 1984, P. 50
- 22. Ibid, 50
- 23. Dayakrishna, "Three Myths about Indian Philosophy-A counter perspective" P. 7
- 24. "He who is able to bear the ferocious onslaught of Kama and Krodha before he bids good bye to his body may be called a moral Jivan Mukta"

 The Bhagavadgāā As a Philosophy of God Realization P. 221
- S. Radhakrishnan "The Bhagavadg nā (V-23) George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1960. P. 183.
- 26. "Sarvabhūtahite ratah" GātāV 25, XII 4
- 27. Gāā XI 3-6
- 28. Gītā VI 31
- 29. Prof. R. D. Ranade, "The Bhagavadg # ā, As a Philosophy of God Realization. P. 189
- 30. 'Sarvadharmānparityajya Māmekam saraņam vraja" Gātā XVIII 66
- 31. Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality, ICPR & Munshiram Manoharlal, 1989 P. 318.

BOOK REVIEWS

I

Acharya, Kala: Buddhanusmrti (A Glossary of Buddhist Terms); Somaiyya Publications Pvt. Ltd.; Mumbai; 2002; Rs. 425/- (HB)

The book under review, as the sub-title indicates, is a glossary of Buddhist terms, basically meant to be an introduction to a novice and to common readers. Taking into consideration diversity of concepts, notions, ideas, expressions and terms used for explanation of Buddhistic beliefs on various themes, compiler has chosen to be selective, although quite arbitrarily, The work, it is claimed in the preface, hopes to shape lives of people using the Buddhistic faith, though one feels that no glossary of such a kind would be ever able to accomplish such an expected result anywhere to any extent. The exercise is accomplished with the assistance of many scholars and institutions. Though the work does not, on the whole, involve any major *Apasiddhānta* (basic misunderstanding) there is hardly anything striking and novel methodologically, philosophically, indologically or even lexicologically. In what follows, the present reviewer, in all humility, wishes to draw attention to some points which seem worthy of consideration.

In the glossary section, head entries are said to be either in Sanskrit or Pali. But, then, one is unable to make sense of such entries as 'Buddha, the': Epithets of the Buddha (pp.133-35) or Buddha-ten powers of the Buddha (pp.135-36). If there is entry on Buddha-Gayā (p.136), there is no reason why there should be none on Rājagraha, Sāranātha, or Śravasti. Or again, if there is entry on Vaibhāṣika (p.209), there is no reason why there should be no mention of Mādhyamika, Yogacāra or Sautrantika. The book is replete with such arbitrariness and it is needless to multiply instances.

As per the sub-title, the work claims to be a glossary of Buddhist terms. However, on careful consideration one finds, unfortunately, that it is fraught with recurrent confusion as to whether the entries are appropriate and befitting for a glossary or a dictionary or a lexicon or an encyclopedia. This seems to be the case mainly because the compiler appears to be unaware of the methodological and systematic grounds on which to demarcate such entries. For example, consider such entries as *Sunya* and

Śunyatā (pp. 200-201), Vipaśyanā (pp. 212-213), Ālaya-Vijñāna (pp.93-94), Anātman (pp. 95-96), etc. They are more appropriate as entries in a lexicon, dealing with historical changes in meanings of words, though even in that context they would require refinement and editing. Entries like Buddha (p. 132), Bodhimanda (.119), Mala (p. 158), Avabhāsa (p.111), Irya-Patha (p.149) etc. on the contrary, are fit to be incorporated into a dictionary, dealing with etymological meanings, definitions, uses and contextual applications, where again such entries would require improvements and precision to purge them of their present crudity. Such entries as Akuśala-dharmah (pp. 91-93), Āryasatyāni (pp. 101-109). Bhiksu (pp. 115-17), Bodhisattvabhūmī (pp. 121-25), Bodhyangāni (pp125-30), Karma (pp. 151-54), Pāramitā (pp. 163-69), Pratītya-Samutpāda (172-80) etc. are more apt to be included in an encyclopedia of Buddhism, but only after a good deal of revision and emendation. There are hardly any entries strictly glossorial in character dealing with explanations or words or expressions that are obscure, unusual, technical but frequently used. Those entries like Acintya (pp. 89-90), Anusmṛti (pp. 97-98), Brahmacarya (p. 130), Dhātu (pp. 144-145), Kuśalamūla (p. 157), Posadha (p. 171), Triratna (pp. 207-08) etc. which seem to be glossorial in character, do not turn out to be so on critical perusal. Some entries like Indriya (pp. 147-48), Navānga-Śāsana (pp. 159-60), Kaśāya (p. 154), etc. are purely enumerative in nature, offering no analysis or explanation of any kind. In some others like Brahma-Vihāra (pp. 130-131), Ārya (pp. 100-01) etc. the main concerns of Buddhist understanding of the terms like Brahma, Arya, etc. seem to be completely ignored. Some entries such as Pāramitā (pp. 163-69), Saṅgha (pp. 186-90), Vimukti (pp. 210-13), Yāna (pp. 213-18), etc. are disproportionately lengthy, while others like Anitya (p. 97), Kalyāṇa-mitra (p. 151), Dharmacakra (p. 144), Bodhi (p. 118), Yoga (p. 218), etc. are too sketchy and short. The entire exercise, in short, seems to lack any coherent and balanced systematic conceptual framework. Arbitrariness and confusion, instead, are often found throughout the book.

Preceding the glossary section proper, running over for three pages, there is a small collection of excerpts and quotations from various Buddhist, Pali and Sanskrit texts bringing out the sense in which certain term/

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expression is used in the given text. One is unable to understand the purpose, if any, of citing such quotations in a glossary. More importantly, however, without proper and accurate reference, such entries as Samyuttanikāya, Ariyasaccāni, Dighanikāya, Tanhā, Majjhimanikāya, Akuśaladhammā (p. 86) are extremely difficult to be located and verified in the respective voluminous works and hence are as good as unprofitable.

As per the announced intention, the compiler wishes to restrict mainly to entries originating from Pali and Sanskrit works on Buddhism. But if so, one is unable to make sense of the utter lack of any reference to such decisively important works such as Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi, Dharmakirti's Pramāṇavārtika, Ratnakīrti's or Jñānaśri Mitra's Nibandhāvalih etc. Similarly, it is very difficult to understand significance of the sort of appendice which are added at the end of the glossary. For, all of them are basically enumerative or indicative in character, explaining or clarifying no term or expression - obscure or technical - in the process and, thus, do not seem to fit into a glossary properly understood.

Lastly, turning to the introduction, which claims to provide a bird's eye-view of Buddhism, a survey of Buddhist literature and a background for the entries in the glossary (p. 1), one normally expects a statement from the compiler regarding the general diretives that guided selection of entries in the glossary and the reasons behind them. Unfortunately, no attempt of this sort is made because no such methodologically tenable perspective has found favour with the compiler. One would also have expected, howsoever brief, a statement concerning distinctive contribution of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. One is disappointed on this count as well. In fact there is hardly any systematic but brief account of the Buddhist contributions to the field or logic and epistemology. Accordingly, one also notices that important terms and expressions from these areas of investigation are conspicuously absent. And along the same line, in the survey of Buddhist literature that is claimed to have been provided, there is not even a mention, leave apart account, of such decisively important works as Pramāṇa-Samuccaya and Ālambana-Parīkṣā of Dinnaga, Pramāṇa-Vārtika, Hetubindu, Sambandha-Parīksā etc. of Dharmakirti, Jñānaśrinibandhāvalih, Ratnakirtinibandhāvalih etc. each of which has

a profound catalytic value. Each of them has exerted vivid impact on posterity. In the introduction, there also occasionally occurs mis-statement of facts. We cite two examples by way of samples. It is claimed that Abhidharmakosābhāṣya is an auto-commentary on Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu himself. There is a celebrated commentary called as Sphuṭārtha on the former, which is by Yasomitra and not by Vasumitra. Further, is is claimed that Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa is not avaliable in Sanskrit (p. 80). As a matter of fact it has been published and gone through couple of editions and reprints. It is needless to multiply such instances.

In sum, the work reflects an overall balance of points of weakness and liability over those of strength and assets and, therefore, it is doubtful whether and to what extent if at all, it would realise its intended goal.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

II

Nayak, G. C.; *Mādhyamika Śūnyatā: A Reappraisal*; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2001, pp. xi + 93; Rs. 250/- (HB)

Madhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. It is an outcome of a Senior Fellowship awarded by the I.C.P.R. to the author for a period of two years. The project rightly seeks to contest the traditional characterization of the Mādhyamika philosophical enterprise in general and of Nāgārjuna's philosophy in particular, to be nihilistic, absolutistic or transcendentalistic in character. It is pointed out that such improper characterization has emerged basically out of miscomprehension of the concept of 'Śūnyatā', despite their protests to the contrary, and of Śūnyavāda, whose advocacy they are illicitly accused of. The work also seeks to highlight some important tenets of the basic framework of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, as one of the pioneering Mādhyamikas. In this part, the author is neither original nor uniquely singular. Unfortunately, he has ignored quite a few but important books and journal-articles previously published by Indian and foreign scholars.

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As is clear from the title itself, the author seeks to re-examine the Mādhyamika concept of 'Sūnyatā', by undertaking a critical and careful study of Nagarjuna's Mādhyamakaśāstra, also known as Mulamādhyamikākarikā and Candrakirti's celebrated commentary on it called Prasannapadā. This is well-taken as far as it goes. But, then, why should author ignore other commentators such as Buddhapalita and Bhāvaviveka (or Bhavya) etc.? Is it because they were not Mādhvamikas or they did not comment upon the said work of Nagariuna or their works are un-extant as once upon a time was the case? Nothing of the kind seems to be justifiable, and their neglect seems indefensible on any valid ground. In his attempt to study Nagarjuna's concept of Sunyata, the author hardly seems to draw upon Nagarjuna's other relevant treatises like Sunyatā-saptati, Vigrahavyāvartani etc. in any systematic and major way, except referring to them perfunctorily, marginally and sporadiclly. In fact, both the works are available and importantly relevant in this context. Further, the author attempts to undertake re-appraisal of the Mādhyamika Philosophical enterprise with special reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti through their concept of Sunyatā, as mentioned above. But as Nāgārjuna repeatedly points out and is at pains to frequently emphasise, in his framework the concepts of Śunyatā, Pratāya-Samutpāda, and Nirvāṇa together with those of Mādhyamā-Pratipad along with Dve-satya (two truths) form an integral whole in a way that none of them can be studied in isolation from the others. Without attaining penetrating insight into the basic teachings of Buddha, preference of categories involved in them and the rationale of such a preference, one can hardly develop a legitimate comprehension of Nāgārjuna's thoughts on Śunyatā. In the present sketchy work no major attempt seems to have been made in this direction. What one finds, unfortunately, is a patch-work of many points, without any major thread systematically and consistently running through them.

It would be pertinent to draw attention to one more point that deserves serious consideration. The author basically wishes to limit himself to a specific work of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti's commentary on it. Both the works do not mention in any major way, leave aside elaborate discussion, the concept of or ideal of *Bodhisattva*. Nor do they make any reference to Advaita Vedānta. The author is, however, unable to resist the traditional

temptation of somehow comparing Mādhyamika philosophy of Sunyatā with that of Advaita Vedānta, and the Buddhist ideal of Bodhisattva with that of Jīvanamukta of Advaita Vedānta. For this, he draws upon Sāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra from the Buddhist side along with Prajñākaramati's commentary (viz. Pañjikā) on it, and upon fifteen century work called Pancadasi of Vidyāraṇya from Advaita side. The author is oblivious as to whether this fits into his proclaimed principal objective of writing his treatise. One finds it extremely hard to understand the significance and role of such excursions and connect them inarticulately with the main aim of the author. This is all the more so especially when neither Sāntideva's work under consideration is a commentary on Nāgārjuna's treatise, nor does it draw upon or make any reference to Advaita system. Similarly, Vidyāraṇya's Pancadasi does not in any way concentrate on or even make reference to Buddhism.

All the same, the work needs to be studied by beginners and sophomores of Buddhist philosophy in general and of Nāgārjuna's philosophy in particular to know that they have been misunderstood and that a determined attempt needs to be made to understand them properly. It would have been better if bibliography were added for the benefit of students and researchers. Further, it would have been also profitable if instead of merely citing excerpts and quotations from various texts appropriate and exact references were provided in the notes and references. Likewise, care should have been taken to provide precise and exact references in place of ambiguous and inexact ones. Lastly, it would have been helpful if author were to provide an appendix of his own previously published papers to enable readers to pursue author's ideas in a meaningful way.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

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